

CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF INSTRUCTION

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION POLICY FOR MULTIPLE INDEPENDENTLY TARGETABLE REENTRY VEHICLES AND MANEUVERABLE REENTRY VEHICLES

References(s):

- a. CJCSI 3231.01 Series, "Safeguarding the Single Integrated Operational Plan," (U)
- b. DOD Directive 5230.11, 16 June 1992, Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations (U)
 - c. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended
- 1. <u>Purpose.</u> Provides DOD security classification safeguards concerning multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) and maneuverable reentry vehicles (MaRVs) for use by the combatant commanders. This guidance is not specified in existing classification guides.
- 2. <u>Cancellation</u>. CJCSI 5220.01, 1 April 2001, "Security Classification for Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles and Maneuverable Reentry Vehicles," is canceled.
- 3. <u>Applicability.</u> This instruction applies to all holders, users and processors of MIRV and MaRV information.

4. Policy

a. An important factor to consider concerning MIRV and MaRV security classification is that the basic use and operation of these kinds of reentry vehicles (RVs) in US strategic missile systems will continue to be a matter of public record and international discussion. It is essential to provide information that clearly shows US intentions, but specific

performance, vulnerability and operational deployment information must remain classified so as not to provide a basis for developing successful countermeasures to those systems. References a through c provide additional instructions for the DOD Information Security Program when MIRV and MaRV information is OPLAN 8044 REVISION (formerly known as the SIOP) related.

b. The term "multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle" involves the concept of an RV carried by a delivery system that can place one or more RVs over several separate targets. The MIRV concept, its strategic value and knowledge that the United States has equipped MINUTEMAN III, PEACEKEEPER, TRIDENT I and TRIDENT II missiles with MIRV are UNCLASSIFIED and are a matter of public record. Also, awareness of the compatibility of TRIDENT I and II missiles with MaRV is UNCLASSIFIED and is a matter of public record.

(1) Association of MIRV with MINUTEMAN III, PEACEKEEPER and TRIDENT I and II.

UNCLASSIFIED

(2) Association of MK-4 with TRIDENT I, MK-4 and MK-5 with TRIDENT II, MK-12/12a with MINUTEMAN III and MK-21 with PEACEKEEPER and MINUTEMAN.

UNCLASSIFIED

(3) DOD interest in MIRV and pursuit of MaRV technology programs.

UNCLASSIFIED

(4) The lack of a MaRV capability in Navy's MK-4 and MK-5 and Air Force's MK-12/12a and MK-21.

UNCLASSIFIED

(5) Association of TRIDENT I and II missiles systems with MIRV technology and MaRV concept.

UNCLASSIFIED

(6) Classification of performance parameters as RESTRICTED DATA or FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA (see paragraph 4d).

(a) Mission-related capability (e.g., range, maneuver capability).

SECRET

(b) Effectiveness.

SECRET

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(c) Accuracy. SECRET

(d) Reliability. SECRET

(e) Survivability/Vulnerability. SECRET

(May be TOP SECRET if sufficient information is or may be revealed to defeat the system. See individual system security guides for specifics.)

(f) Penetration aid mission requirements (e.g., spacing, decoy, chaff deployments). **SECRET**

(7) Detailed deployment plans (including target doctrine and operational procedures).

SECRET (May be TOP SECRET if associated with the OPLAN 8044 REVISION in accordance with reference a.)

- c. The "maneuverable reentry vehicle" concept involves an RV capable of performing preplanned flight maneuvers during the reentry phase. Classified MaRV information is not releasable to foreign nationals. Any proposals for foreign releases will be referred through established channels to the USD(AT&L) and the Services for review and concurrence before release.
- d. Information classified in accordance with the above guidance referring to any RV that is a nuclear weapon is either RESTRICTED DATA or FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA if it involves the design, manufacture or use of nuclear weapons. Specific guidance for individual weapon systems will be published in the classification guide for each system.
- e. For Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), this policy is modified to permit the release of information to

Canadian operational personnel assigned to NORAD. By authority of this instruction, information may be released to Canadian personnel functioning in need-to-know positions. This authority should not be interpreted as removing other restrictions pertaining to the disclosure of classified information, including those delineated in references a, b and c. The number of personnel authorized access to this sensitive information should be limited to those absolutely necessary to carry out the NORAD mission, including exercises and increased defense readiness conditions (DEFCONs). Briefing and debriefing procedures should be followed for Canadian personnel being assigned to or leaving need-to-know positions.

f. For Commander, USSTRATCOM, this policy is modified to permit the release of information to United Kingdom (UK) operational personnel assigned to USSTRATCOM. By authority of this instruction, the information may be released to UK personnel functioning in need-to-know positions. This authority should not be interpreted as removing other restrictions pertaining to the disclosure of classified information, including those delineated in reference a, b and c. The number of personnel authorized access to this sensitive information should be limited to those absolutely necessary to carry out the USSTRATCOM mission, including exercises and increased DEFCONs. Briefing and debriefing procedures should be followed for UK personnel being assigned to or leaving need-to-know positions.

5. Responsibilities

- a. Each applicable command, agency, activity or office is responsible for the provisions of this instruction.
- b. Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate, Joint Staff, is responsible for coordinating on future revisions.
- 6. <u>Summary of Changes</u>. Changed "Commander In Chief" (or "CINC") references to "combatant commander" and corrected SIOP references to OPLAN 8044 REVISION.
- 7. <u>Releasability</u>. This instruction is approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. DOD components (to include the combatant commands), other Federal agencies and the public may obtain copies of this instruction through the Internet from the CJCS Directives Home Page--http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives. Copies are also available through the Government Printing Office on the Joint Electronic Library CD-ROM.

8. Effective Date. This instruction is effective upon receipt.

T. J. KEATING VADM, USN

DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF

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