Chapter 1.
INTRODUCTION TO CLASSIFICATION
THE NEED FOR CLASSIFICATION
A
government is responsible for the survival of the nation and its people. To
ensure that survival, a government must sometimes stringently control certain
information that (1) gives the nation a significant advantage over adversaries
or (2) prevents adversaries from having an advantage that could significantly
damage the nation. Governments protect that special information by classifying
it; that is, by giving it a special designation, such as "Secret," and then
restricting access to it (e.g., by need-to-know requirements and physical
security measures).
This
right of a government to keep certain information concerning national security
(secrets) from most of the nation's citizens is nearly universally accepted.
Since antiquity, governments have protected information that gave them an
advantage over adversaries. In wartime, when a nation's survival is at stake,
the reasons for secrecy are most apparent, the secrecy restrictions imposed by
the government are most widespread,
and acceptance of those restrictions by the citizens is broadest.[†] In peacetime, there are fewer reasons
for secrecy in government, generally the government classifies less
information, and citizens are less willing to accept security restrictions on
information.
MAJOR AREAS OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
The
information that is classified by most democracies, whether in peacetime or
wartime, is usually limited to information that concerns the nation's defense or
its foreign relations--military and diplomatic information. Most of that
information falls within five major areas: (1) military operations, (2) weapons
technology, (3) diplomatic activities, (4) intelligence activities, and (5)
cryptology. The latter two areas might be considered to be special parts of the
first three areas. That is, intelligence and cryptology are "service" functions
for the primary areas--military operations, weapons technology, and diplomatic
activities. From a historical perspective, the classification of weapons
technology became widespread only in the 20th century. Classification of
information about military operations and diplomatic activities has been
practiced for millennia.
Military-Operations Information
Examples
of military-operations information that is frequently classified include
information concerning the strength and deployment of forces, troop movements,
ship sailings, the location and timing of planned attacks, tactics and
strategy, and supply logistics. Obviously, if an enemy learned the major
details of an impending attack, that attack would be less successful than if it
came as a surprise to the enemy.
Information possessed by a government about an adversary's military activities
or capabilities must be protected to preserve the ability to predict those
activities or to neutralize those capabilities. If the adversary knew that the
government had this information, the adversary would change those plans or
capabilities. Military-operations information is usually classified for only a
limited time. After an operation is over, most of the important information is
known to the enemy.
Weapons Technology
Weapons
technology is classified to preserve the advantage of surprise in the first use
of a new weapon,† to prevent an adversary
from developing effective countermeasures against a new weapon,‡ or to prevent an adversary from using
that technology against its originator (by developing a similar weapon). A
major factor in that latter reason for classifying weapons technology is "lead
time." Classifying advanced weapons-technology information prevents an
adversary from using that information to shorten the time required to produce
similar weapons systems for its own use. Consequently, assuming continued
advancements in a weapons technology by the initial developer of that
technology, the adversary's weapons systems will not be as effective as those
of the nation that initially developed that technology, and the adversary will
be at a disadvantage.
With
respect to lead time, when weapons systems can be significantly improved, then
information on "obsolete" weapons is much less sensitive than information on
newer weapons. Thus, information on muzzle-loading rifle technology was not as
sensitive as that on breech-loading rifle technology, which was not as
sensitive as information on lever-action rifle technology, . . . semiautomatic
rifle . . . automatic rifle . . . machine gun. However, with respect to nuclear
weapons, a "rogue" nation or terrorist group can probably achieve its objectives
just as easily with "crude" kiloton nuclear weapons that might require a ship
or truck to transport as with sophisticated megaton nuclear weapons that might
fit into a (large) suitcase. Thus, "obsolete" nuclear-weapons technology should
be continue to be protected, especially with respect to technologies concerning
production of highly enriched uranium or other nuclear-weapon materials.
Weapons
technology includes scientific and technical information related to that
technology. World War I marked the start of the "modern" period when science
and technology affected the development of weapons systems to a greater degree
than any time previously.[1]
That interrelationship became even more pronounced in World War II, with
notable scientific and technological successes: the atomic bomb, radar, and the
proximity fuse. World War II, particularly with respect to the atomic bomb,
marked the first time that the progress of military technology was
significantly influenced by scientists, as contrasted to advances by engineers
or by scientists working as engineers.[2]
With
respect to classification, the more that applied scientific or technical
information is uniquely applicable to weapons, the more likely that this
information will be classified. Generally, basic research is not classified
unless it represents a major breakthrough leading to a completely new weapons
system. An example of that circumstance was the rigid classification during
World War II, and for several years thereafter, of much basic scientific research
related to atomic energy (nuclear weapons).
Diplomatic Activities
The
need for secrecy in diplomatic negotiations and relations has long been
recognized. A nation's ability to obtain favorable terms in negotiations with
other countries would be diminished if its negotiating strategy and goals were
known in advance to the other countries.
The effectiveness of military-assistance agreements between nations would be
impaired if an adversary knew of them and could plan to neutralize them. In New York Times v. United States, the
"Pentagon Papers" case, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Stewart recognized the
importance of secrecy in foreign policy and national defense matters:
It is elementary that the
successful conduct of international diplomacy and the maintenance of an
effective national defense requires both confidentiality and secrecy. Other
nations can hardly deal with this Nation in an atmosphere of mutual trust
unless they know that their confidences will be kept . . .. In the area of basic national defense the
frequent need for absolute secrecy is, of course, self evident.[3]
During
the term of the first U.S.
president, it was established that some need for secrecy in diplomatic matters
would remain even after negotiations were completed. President Washington, in
1796, refused a request by the House of Representatives for documents prepared
for treaty negotiations with England
and gave the following as one reason for refusal:
The nature of foreign
negotiations requires caution, and their success must often depend on secrecy;
and even when brought to a conclusion a full disclosure of all the measures,
demands, or eventual concessions which may have been proposed or contemplated
would be extremely impolitic; for this might have a pernicious influence on
future negotiations, or produce immediate inconvenience, perhaps danger and
mischief, in relation to other powers.[4]
It has been said that President Nixon initially was not
going to attempt to stop the New York Times and other newspapers from
publishing the "Pentagon Papers." However, the executive branch was then in
secret diplomatic negotiations with
China,
and Henry Kissinger "is said to have persuaded the president that the Chinese
wouldn't continue their secret parleys if they saw that
Washington
couldn't keep
its secrets."
[5]
Intelligence Activities
Intelligence
information includes information gathering and covert operations. Collecting
military and diplomatic information about other nations involves the use of
photoreconnaissance airplanes and satellites, communication intercepts, the
review of documents obtained openly, and other overt methods. However,
information gathering also includes the use of undercover agents, confidential
sources, and other covert methods. For those covert activities, secrecy is
usually imposed on the identity of agents or sources, on information about
intelligence methods and capabilities, and on much of the information received
from the covert sources. Few clandestine agents could be recruited (or, in some
instances, would live long) if their identity were not a closely guarded
secret. Information provided by a clandestine agent must frequently be
classified because, if a government knew that some of its information was
compromised, it might be able to determine the identity of the person (agent)
who provided the information to its adversary. Successful
intelligence-gathering methods must be protected so that the adversary does not
know the degree of their success and is not stimulated to develop
countermeasures to stop the flow of information. Intelligence information from
friendly nations is generally classified by the recipient country. Allies would
be less willing to share intelligence information if they knew that it would
not be protected against disclosure.
Cryptology
Cryptology
encompasses methods to code and transmit secret messages and methods to
intercept and decode messages. Writing messages in code, or cryptography, has been practiced for thousands of
years. One of the earliest preserved texts of a coded message is an inscription
carved on an Egyptian tomb in about 1900 B.C.[6]
The earliest known pottery glaze formula was written in code on a Mesopotamian
cuneiform tablet in about 1500 B.C.[7]
The Spartans established a system of military cryptography by the 5th century
B.C.[8]
Persia later used cryptography for political purposes.[9]
Cryptography began its steady development in western civilization starting
about the 13th century, primarily in Italy.[10]
By the early 16th century, Venice's
ruling Council of Ten had an elaborate organization for enciphering and
deciphering messages.[11]
Restrictions
on cryptologic information are necessary to protect U.S.
communications. Diplomatic negotiations could not successfully be conducted at
locations other than the seat of government if safe communications could not be
established. Cryptologic information must also be protected to prevent an
adversary from learning of a nation's capabilities to intercept and decode
messages. If an adversary learns that its communications are not secure, it
will use another method, which will require additional time and effort to
defeat.[‡]
The Allies' World War II success in breaking the German codes contributed to
shortening that war.[12]
That success was kept secret until 1974, about 34 years after the German code
had been broken and about 29 years after World War II had ended. The U.S.
Army's success in breaking a World War II U.S.S.R. code (the Venona project,
which began in 1943 and continued until 1980) was not made public until about
1995. That was about 50 years after the first such message had been deciphered
(and about 45 years after the U.S.S.R. had learned through espionage of the
Army's success).
BASIS FOR CLASSIFICATION IN THE UNITED STATES
The
need for governmental secrecy was directly recognized in the U.S. Constitution.
Article I, Sect. 5, of the Constitution explicitly authorizes secrecy in
government by stating that "Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings,
and from time to time publish the same, excepting such Parts as in their
Judgment require Secrecy." Also included in the Constitution, in Article I,
Sect. 9, is a statement that "a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts
and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time." A
U.S. Court of Appeals has determined that the phrase "from time to time" was
intended to authorize expenditures for certain military or foreign relations
matters that were intended to be kept secret for a time.[13]
The
Constitution does not explicitly provide for secrecy by the Executive Branch of
the U.S. Government. However, the authority of that Executive Branch to keep
certain information secret from most U.S.
citizens is implicit in its executive responsibilities, which include the
national defense and foreign relations.[14]
This presidential authority has been upheld by the Supreme Court in a number of
cases.[15]
Judicial decisions have also relied on a common-law privilege for a government
to withhold information concerning national defense and foreign relations.[16]
Congress, by two statutes, the Freedom of Information Act and the Internal
Security Act of 1950, has implicitly recognized the president's authority to
classify information (see Chapter 3).
At this
time in the United States,
information is classified either by presidential authority, currently Executive
Order 12958, or by statute, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (Atomic
Energy Act). Classification under Executive Orders and under the Atomic Energy
Act is extensively discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, respectively.
CLASSIFICATION AND SECURITY
Classification
has been variously described as the "cornerstone" of national security, the
"mother" of security, and the "kingpin" of an information security system.[17],[18],[19],[20]
Classification identifies the
information that must be protected against unauthorized disclosure. Security
determines how to protect information
after it is classified.[21]
Security includes both personnel security and physical security.
The
initial classification determination, establishing what should not be disclosed
to adversaries and the level of protection required, is probably the most
important single factor in the security of all classified projects and
programs.[22],[23]
None of the expensive personnel-clearance and information-control provisions
(physical security aspects) of an information security system comes into effect
until information has been classified; classification is the pivot on which the
whole subsequent security system turns (excluding security for other reasons,
such as to prevent theft of materials). 19 Therefore, it is
important to classify only information that truly warrants protection in the
interest of national security.[24]
Since
the mid 1970s, several classification experts have remarked on the increasing
emphasis by some government agencies on physical-security matters, which has
been accompanied by a decreased emphasis on the classification function. One of
the founders (and the first chairman) of the National Classification Management
Society (NCMS), who was also an Atomic Energy Commission Contractor
Classification Officer, has expressed concern about the tendency to emphasize
the word "security" at the expense of the word "classification" with respect to
security classification of information.17 In the mid 1980s another
charter member of the NCMS pointed out that, although the status of
classification still remained high in the Department of Energy (DOE), the
situation had changed within the Department of Defense, where Classification
Management had been organizationally placed under Security.[25]
Even the NCMS, founded as a classification organization, appears to be changing
to become increasingly oriented towards security matters rather than
classification matters.[26]
It is noteworthy that the marked emphasis by the U.S. Government in recent
years on physical-security measures has not been accompanied by any significant
increased emphasis on classification matters.
The previous paragraph was written in 1989, and the trend
described in that paragraph has continued. The classification function at DOE
headquarters is now a part of the security organization as is the
classification function at many DOE operations offices and DOE-contractor
organizations. That function generally used to be part of a technical or other
non-security organization. The NCMS has also continued to become more
security-oriented.
With
respect to classification as a profession (or lack of recognition thereof), it
is interesting to note some comments and a recommendation in the Report of the Commission on Protecting and
Reducing Government Secrecy.[27]
In this 1997 report, that Commission noted the "all-important initial decision
of whether to classify at all,"[28]
and that "this first step of the classification management process . . . tends
to be the weakest link in the process of identifying, marking, and then
protecting the information."[29]
The Commission further stated that "the
importance of the initial decision to classify cannot be overstated."[30]
However, the Commission then stated that "classification and declassification
policy and oversight . . . should be viewed primarily as information management
issues which require personnel with subject matter and records management
expertise."[31]
Although recommending that "The Federal Government . . . [should] create,
support, and promote an information systems security career field within the
Government,"[32]
the Commission made no similar recommendation for security classification of
information as a profession or career. Res
ipsa loquitur.
REFERENCES
[1]
B. and F. M. Brodie, From Crossbow to
H-Bomb, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, Ind., 1973, p. 172.
Hereafter this book is cited as "Brodie."
[3]
New York Times v. United States, 403
U.S. 713, 728 (1971).
[4]
J. D. Richardson, A Compilation of
Messages and Papers of the Presidents. 1789-1897, U.S. Government Printing
Office, Washington, D.C., Vol. I, at 194-195 (1896).
[5]
Richard Gid Powers, "Introduction," in Secrecy--The
American Experience, by Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Yale University Press, New
Haven, Conn., 1998, p. 32.
[6]
D. Kahn, The Codebreakers, MacMillan,
Inc., New York, 1967, p. 71. Hereafter cited as "Kahn."
[12]
See, for example, F. W. Winterbotham, The
Ultra Secret, Harper & Row, New York, 1974.
[13]
Halperin v. CIA, 629 F.2d 144,
154-162 (D.C. Cir., 1980).
[14]
U.S. Constitution, Article II, sect. 2.
[15]
See, for example, Totten v. United States,
92 U.S. 105 (1875); United States v.
Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1952); Weinberger
v. Catholic Action of Hawaii, 454 U.S. 139 (1981).
[16]
F. E. Rourke, Secrecy and Publicity:
Dilemmas of Democracy, Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1961, pp. 63-64.
[17]
D. B. Woodbridge, "Footnotes," J. Natl.
Class. Mgmt. Soc. 12 (2), 120-124 (1977), p.122.
[18]
R. J. Boberg, "Panel--Classification Management Today," J. Natl. Class. Mgmt. Soc. 5
(2), 56-60 (1969), p. 57.
[19]
E. J. Suto, "History of Classification," J.
Natl. Class. Mgmt. Soc. 12 (1),
9-17 (1976), p.13.
[20]
James J. Bagley, "NCMS - Now and the Future," J. Natl. Class. Mgmt. Soc. 25,
20-29 (1989), p. 28.
[21]
T. S. Church, "Panel--Science and Technology, and Classification Management," J. Natl. Class. Mgmt. Soc. 2, 39-45 (1966), p. 40.
[22]
W. N. Thompson, "Security Classification Management Coordination Between
Industry and DOD," J. Natl. Class. Mgmt.
Soc. 4 (2), 121-128 (1969), p. 121.
[23]
W. N. Thompson, "User Agency Security Classification Management and Program
Security," J. Natl. Class. Mgmt. Soc.
8, 52-53 (1972), p. 52.
[24]
Department of Defense Handbook for
Writing Security Classification Guidance, DoD 5200.1-H, U.S. Department of
Defense, Mar. 1986, p. 1-1.
[25]
F. J. Daigle, "Woodbridge Award Acceptance Remarks," J. Natl. Class. Mgmt. Soc. 21,
110-112 (1985), p. 111.
[26]
D. C. Richardson, "Management or Enforcement," J. Natl. Class. Mgmt. Soc. 23,
13-20 (1987).
[27] Report of the Commission on Protecting and
Reducing Government Secrecy, S. Doc. 105-2, Daniel Patrick Moynihan,
Chairman; Larry Combest, Vice Chairman, Commission on Protecting and Reducing
Government Secrecy, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1997.
Hereafter cited as the "Moynihan Report."
[28]
Moynihan Report, p. 19.
[29]
Moynihan Report, p. 35.
[31]
Moynihan Report, p. 44.
[32]
Moynihan Report, p. 111.
Security Classification of Information: Table of Contents