Report of the Fundamental Classification Policy Review Group

Appendix H to the
Report of the
Fundamental Classification
Policy Review Group

 

Report of the
Military Reactors Working Group

 

January 15, 1997

 

Captain James Alley, USN, Chair
Joint Chiefs of Staff

 


CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
INTRODUCTION
BACKGROUND
Classification Authority
Restricted Data (RD)
Formerly Restricted Data (FRD)
National Security Information (NSI)
Threat Analysis
CONDUCT OF THE REVIEW
Working Group Membership
Independence of Review
Access to Information
Scope of the Review
Review Methodology
Classification Considerations
Factors Favoring Classification
Factors Favoring Declassification
Conclusions Regarding Classification of Information
RECOMMENDATIONS
Army Nuclear Power Program
Current Policy
Findings
Discussion
Recommendation
Directed Nuclear Energy Systems
Current Policy
Findings
Discussion
Recommendations
Space Reactor Power Systems
Current Policy
Findings
Discussion
Recommendations
Thermoelectric Converter
Isotopic Heat Source
Multihundred Watt Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator
Current Policy
Findings
Discussion
Recommendations
ANNEX A–Membership of the Military Reactors Working Group
ANNEX B–Classification Guidance

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report summarizes the results of the Military Reactors Working Group review of information classification policies associated with military reactors. This review was conducted as part of the Department of Energy (DOE) Fundamental Classification Policy Review (FCPR). The Working Group focused on classification issues associated with nuclear power sources and related technologies, and did not address the classification of specific military applications of reactor technology. The Military Reactors Working Group did not address classification policies associated with nuclear weapons science and technologies; these were reviewed by other FCPR working groups.

Military reactors are associated with the following programs:

The Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program (NNPP) is a joint DOE-Department of the Navy organization tasked with the responsibility to design, build, operate, maintain, and manage the nuclear-powered warships and facilities supporting the U.S. nuclear-powered fleet. Classification with the program is governed by a single guide, CG-RN-1.

At the time the Fundamental Classification Policy Review began, the NNPP was already engaged in a detailed review of their classification policy. Therefore, the Military Reactors Working Group did not review CG-RN-1. The Working Group maintained a dialogue with Naval Reactors personnel and exchanged draft reports with them.

The Knolls and Bettis Atomic Power Laboratories conducted the first portion of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion review. This work consisted of an examination of each topic contained in the classification guide. Working groups at the two laboratories compared their separately formulated assessments against current guidance and the results were exchanged and reevaluated in a series of conferences until consensus was reached. A similar review was independently conducted at NNPP Headquarters. Proposed changes were then compared with those from the laboratories and the merits debated by the Division Directors until a consensus was reached on each item. The final determination was made by the Director.

Twenty-one NNPP items have been recommended for declassification or downgrading, including information on ship design, materials and metallurgy, chemistry, power plant design, and reactor servicing. To facilitate release of information concerning public health, safety, and the environment, guidance has been reemphasized to separate this information from protected information.

The Military Reactors Working Group has reviewed the NNPP Classification Review Report and considers the results consistent with the general and area-specific principles of the Fundamental Classification Policy Review.

The remainder of this report addresses classification policy related to those military reactors which are not associated with the NNPP.

The United States has constructed 51 military reactors, in addition to those built for the NNPP. Used primarily for testing and research, all but four non-naval military reactors have been retired. Many military reactor technologies were declassified prior to this review. However, certain aspects of a limited number of military reactor programs have remained classified to date because of their relationship to military operations and missions. The Military Reactors Working Group examined each of these programs to determine which information required continued classification protection for reasons of national security, and which information could be reasonably declassified and released to the public. The Review concentrated on the limited group of classified military reactors programs which have potential for technical advances and future military applications.

Classification in directed nuclear energy systems (DNES), isotopic heat sources, thermoelectric conversion, space reactor power systems, and related programs was based on protecting technologies that were difficult or expensive to develop and which could be used by other countries to advance their military applications and missions. The classification guides associated with these areas are jointly owned, and DOE must coordinate final declassification decisions with the Department of Defense (DoD) and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), as appropriate.

With full understanding of the importance of reactor technology, the review was objectively performed by a group of experienced, technically knowledgeable, senior personnel. In addition to representatives from the Department of Energy, personnel from the following organizations participated in working group deliberations:

The Working Group sought information on potential harm to U.S. national security that might result from declassification and release of additional military reactor information. Threat summaries were provided by the Defense Intelligence Agency and the U.S. Air Force National Air Intelligence Center.

The Working Group actively participated in formulating and refining the general and area-specific principles of the Fundamental Classification Policy Review.

The Working Group concluded that classification should not restrict the ability of industry to use space nuclear reactor technology for civilian applications, unless there is a clear national security concern. The Working Group believes that classification of reactor technology is appropriate only to the extent that dissemination of the information would enable or assist in the military application of space nuclear reactor technology, not in the development of the reactor technology itself. The Working Group identified the following categories of information which should be considered for classification as Restricted Data or National Security Information:

a. Information which would assist a potential adversary to identify or exploit potential vulnerabilities of planned or existing U.S. military space systems.
b. Information which would assist foreign powers to develop or improve advanced military systems that derive significant military utility from nuclear reactor technology.
c. Information which may reveal classified aspects of nuclear weapons designs or technology, or other military programs.
d. Information which must remain classified solely because of its relationship to military operations or missions.

The Working Group reviewed existing classification guidance and the 337 individual classification topics associated with this guidance. Of the total, 189 topic areas had previously been identified as unclassified. The remaining guidance and topics were reviewed for conformity with the general and applied classification principles of the Fundamental Classification Policy Review. The Working Group then deduced policy recommendations from the results of the topic area determinations.

The Working Group determined that relatively few reactor technologies require continued classification protection. Most of these are related to military programs or missions. It was determined that environmental, health, and safety information generated by the various military reactors programs is, and should continue to be, unclassified and available for unrestricted release to the public. Working Group recommendations are summarized below. Of the remaining classified information:

The Working Group made the following additional recommendations:

INTRODUCTION

On March 17, 1994, as part of the Department of Energy Openness Initiative, the Secretary of Energy inaugurated the Comprehensive Fundamental Classification Policy Review. For the first time in 50 years, the Department of Energy conducted a review of information related to nuclear weapons and nuclear power to determine which information requires continued classification protection, and which information may be reasonably declassified and released to the public. The Review is a policy-level effort, from which detailed classification guidance at the topic level will be derived. This, in turn, will lead to document review and declassification of information which no longer requires protection for reasons of national security.

Over the five-decade history of the Department of Energy and its predecessors, classification policy evolved, albeit slowly, toward greater openness. The Department gradually recognized the extent to which it required public trust and support to carry out its statutory responsibilities. Evolution of the global, competitive economy produced greater pressures to release classified technologies for commercial exploitation. The end of the Cold War provided a final impetus to a more open public discourse and access to information. Protection of some nuclear reactor technology information now appears unnecessary and counterproductive.

BACKGROUND

Classification Authority

The authority to classify military reactor information derives from two sources:

Restricted Data (RD)

During the early development of atomic energy, Congress recognized its special significance to national defense and security. Congress created a unique category of classified information, Restricted Data, to provide special measures for protecting atomic energy technologies.

Restricted Data is all data concerning:

Unlike information classified by executive order, Restricted Data is classified by law at its inception, that is, "born classified." The Atomic Energy Act further requires that the Department of Energy determine and declassify data, within the definition of Restricted Data, which can be published without undue risk to the common defense and security. The Secretary of Energy has this authority. Restricted Data is not automatically declassified; specific action must be taken to declassify it. Once declassified, the information is no longer Restricted Data.

Formerly Restricted Data (FRD)

Section 142 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (as amended) designates information as "Formerly Restricted Data" (FRD), which is:

"...such data as the Commission (Department of Energy) and Department of Defense jointly determine relates primarily to the military utilization of atomic weapons and which the Commission and Department of Defense jointly determine can be adequately safeguarded as defense information..."

National Security Information (NSI)

Executive Order 12958 of 17 April 1995 prescribes a uniform system for classifying, declassifying, and safeguarding National Security Information (NSI). It balances the desire to inform the public concerning the Government activities with the overall requirement to protect information against unauthorized disclosure which is vital to national security and foreign relations.

Executive Order 12958 prohibits classification unless the disclosure of the specific information reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security. Unlike atomic energy information, NSI is unclassified unless positive action is taken to classify it.

The authority for classifying information as NSI is granted by the President to the Executive Branch on an agency or organizational basis. Unlike Restricted Data, NSI may be declassified by the same department or agency having primary responsibility in the particular area of interest. The Department of Energy, the Department of Defense, and NASA exercise this authority for NSI related to space-based systems.

Information may be classified as NSI under Executive Order 12958 if it falls into one of nine categories. The following are particularly germane to military reactors:

a. Military plans, weapons, systems or operations;
b. Foreign government information;
c. Scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to the national security;
d. United States programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities; and
e. Vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, projects, or plans relating to the national security.

Threat Analysis

Information concerning potential threats to military reactors programs was provided by both the Defense Intelligence Agency and the U.S. Air Force National Air Intelligence Center. The Working Group considered the following threat evaluations as part of its deliberations:

CONDUCT OF THE REVIEW

The purpose of this review was to perform a detailed, independent, informed classification review of information associated with military reactors technologies.

Working Group Membership

The classification policy review was objectively performed by a group of experienced, technically knowledgeable, senior personnel from several organizations, including:

The members of the Military Reactors Working Group are listed in Annex A.

Independence of Review

The classification policy review was independently performed by the Military Reactors Working Group members named in this report. The members took into account the institutional priorities of their respective agencies, but conducted their review independent of outside influence. The Fundamental Classification Policy Review Steering Committee was apprised of Working Group progress and provided with preliminary findings. Although the Steering Committee provided guidance for the purpose of consistency in areas of overlap between the working groups, they did not attempt to influence the outcome. Consequently, the opinions expressed in this report are solely those of the Military Reactors Working Group.

Access to Information

Working Group members enjoyed full access to all materials and information necessary for their review. Subject to classification restraints, the members were free to consult other technical experts for topic information or recommendations. Due principally to the selection of Working Group members with extensive knowledge and experience, the Working Group was able to address most issues with little to no outside assistance.

Scope of the Review

Information concerning use of SNM in the production of energy for space-based systems is Restricted Data, unless previously declassified. All information necessary for the design, construction, and operation of civilian power reactors, with the exception of that information primarily applicable to military propulsion, production reactors, or Army Package Power Reactors, was declassified in 1956.

Many military reactor technologies had been declassified prior to this review. However, certain aspects of a limited number of military reactor programs have remained classified to date because of their relationship to military operations and missions. The Military Reactors Working Group examined each of these programs to determine which information required continued classification protection for reasons of national security, and which information could be reasonably declassified and released to the public. The Military Reactors Working Group concentrated on the limited group of classified military reactors programs which have potential for technical advances and future military applications.

The Military Reactors Working Group conducted a classification policy review of the following categories of reactors:

The Review did not address information associated with the following categories of reactors:

Review Methodology

The Working Group sought information on potential harm to U.S. national security that might result from declassification and release of additional military reactor information. Threat summaries were provided by the Defense Intelligence Agency and the U.S. Air Force National Air Intelligence Center.

The Working Group actively participated in formulating and refining the general and area-specific principles of the Fundamental Classification Policy Review.

The Working Group reviewed existing classification guidance and the 337 individual classification topics associated with this guidance. Of the total, 189 topic areas had previously been identified as unclassified; these topic areas were not further evaluated. The remaining guidance and topics were reviewed for conformity with the general and applied classification principles of the Fundamental Classification Policy Review. A listing of classification guidance sources used during this review is provided in Annex B.

Classification topics areas were divided among Working Group members. All members, in turn, were encouraged to consult other individuals who might be knowledgeable about military or civilian applications of specific technologies. For information requiring continued protection for national security reasons, Working Group members made a further determination whether information should be classified as Restricted Data, Formerly Restricted Data, or National Security Information. The Working Group compared its findings with existing classification guidance. Where there were differences, the members evaluated why a change in classification guidance might be appropriate. Finally, the Working Group then deduced policy recommendations from the results of the topic area determinations.

No topic area was recommended for reclassification. In some cases, the Working Group determined that classification guidance should be more specific, or combined with other guidance to present a more complete picture.

The Working Group determined that relatively few military reactor technologies require continued classification protection. Most of these are related to military programs or missions. It was determined that environmental, health, and safety information generated by the various military reactors programs was already, and should continue to be, unclassified and available for unrestricted release to the public.

Working Group recommendations are provided later in this report.

Classification Considerations

The Working Group considered several classification factors during its deliberations.

Factors Favoring Classification

Factors Favoring Declassification

Conclusions Regarding Classification of Information

The Working Group based its deliberations upon the general and area-specific classification principles of the Fundamental Classification Policy Review. The Working Group concluded that classification should not restrict the ability of industry to use space nuclear reactor technology for civilian applications, unless there is a clear national security concern. The Working Group believes that classification of reactor technology is appropriate only to the extent that dissemination of the information would enable or assist in the military application of space nuclear reactor technology, not in the development of the reactor technology itself.

The Working Group identified the following categories of information which should be considered for classification as Restricted Data or National Security Information:

RECOMMENDATIONS

Army Nuclear Power Program

Current Policy

Most Army Nuclear Power Program information has already been declassified. The remaining classified information primarily concerns military missions and operations and is protected as National Security Information (NSI).

Reservation is made for protecting "breakthroughs," defined as new developments which are not predictable qualitatively, even by a person trained in the appropriate disciplines, or which permit an order of magnitude increase in performance or capability.

Findings

The Army Nuclear Power Program was developed to field mobile and stationary small-to-medium nuclear electrical generating plants for use in remote areas. For example, one mobile Army nuclear power plant was deployed as the emergency electrical power supply for the Panama Canal.

There are no Army nuclear electrical generating plants in use or under development.

Some Army Nuclear Power Program information has been protected because declassification might reveal details of related classified programs, such as the Navy Nuclear Propulsion Program.

The Navy has concluded that declassification of Army Nuclear Power Program information is not likely to reveal significant information about the Navy Nuclear Propulsion Program.

The Army concurs with the complete declassification of the Army Nuclear Power Program.

Discussion

There is no apparent reason why the Army Nuclear Power Program cannot be completely declassified.

Recommendation

The Army Nuclear Power Program should be declassified in its entirety, including:

Directed Nuclear Energy Systems

Current Policy

The following information associated with directed nuclear energy systems (DNES) is unclassified:

The following detailed DNES information regarding military applications is protected as Restricted Data (RD):

The following DNES information regarding military applications is protected as National Security Information (NSI):

Findings

The current guidance was approved in August 1987. It differentiates between military and nonmilitary use of reactor and laser technologies, and stipulates that safety and environmental data should be unclassified, except where classified information could be revealed.

Discussion

The current policy appears adequate, but could be misinterpreted as requiring classification of basic information which is unrelated to development of military applications.

Recommendations

The current classification policy concerning DNES, as described above, should remain in effect.

DNES classification guidance should be revised to provide clarification and stronger differentiation between DNES research conducted for military applications and research which is not suitable for military applications development.

Space Reactor Power Systems

Current Policy

All technology developed prior to August 27, 1973, concerning space reactor power systems is unclassified. Additionally, space reactor power systems information publicly released prior to February 1, 1987, is also unclassified.

Release of information pertaining to the enabling characteristics of space reactor power systems could allow adversaries to duplicate system design characteristics or exploit weaknesses.

Information concerning the reactor power supply, specifically multimegawatt (MMW) or particle bed reactor designs, is protected as Restricted Data.

Theoretical and basic reactor system information has essentially been declassified.

Information concerning military application of space reactor power system technology is protected as NSI on a case-by-case basis; but, for the most part, administrative, budgetary, programmatic, and safety-related information is unclassified unless specific guidance has been promulgated.

Some applied technology information, while unclassified, is subject to export control.

"Key information" is defined as information that reveals aspects, features, or attributes of space reactor power system concepts or technologies that:

(1) Are innovative—not obvious, unexpected, or difficult or time-consuming to duplicate;
 AND
(2) Permit either a significant technical advancement or resolution to a significant technical problem.

NOTE: A significant technical advance is defined as an advance of sufficient magnitude to have a potential use in an operational or advanced system, and results in a significant developmental or military advantage.

Findings

Space reactor power systems technology is not undergoing a major development effort. While major advances are not foreseen in the immediate future, systems which employ the existing technology might be useful for military missions and operations.

One space reactor power system, the SP-100 Program, advanced to the engineering development phase of the ground engineering system (GES). The MMW and the particle bed reactor programs did not complete the technical feasibility phase of development.

Space reactor power system areas protected as Restricted Data concern specific MMW and particle bed reactor designs which resulted from Phase I development, and fuel fabrication methods and test data which reveal phenomena associated with fuel performance or lifetime.

Information concerning the integration of thermoelectric conversion materials with nuclear reactor fuels is also protected as Restricted Data, but is classified under guidance prescribed for both thermoelectric converter and space reactor power systems information.

Discussion

The definition of "key information" lends itself to underclassification of information since, under strict interpretation, the requirement for a technical advance, as defined above, can seldom be met. Had these systems completed more advanced testing, classification criteria likely would have matured with system development.

Given the lack of ongoing development programs, a technical advance in space reactor power systems technology, as defined above, is not likely to happen in the near future. Nevertheless, there are good reasons to classify specific space reactor power system technologies; namely, their potential usefulness for military missions, and the level of effort required for their development.

The basic classification policy, while sound, lends itself to inconsistency of definition. Existing guidance at the topic level simply refers the reader back to the definition of "key information."

Recommendations

As programs advance, the definition of "key information" should be refined to more accurately describe those aspects, features, or attributes significant to achieving military advantage which require continued classification protection. Likewise, as programs advance, those aspects, features, or attributes which do not contribute to gaining or retaining military advantage should be declassified.

Basic physical, mechanical, chemical, and thermochemical properties of fuel, such as thermal conductivity, thermal expansion, creep characteristics, high-temperature strength and ductility, phase diagrams, and electrical conductivity, are and should remain unclassified.

The potential usefulness for military missions justifies continuing classification protection for some aspects of space reactor power systems.

Detailed information on fabrication, process parameters, and testing of uranium nitride fuels and particle bed reactors, and test information which reveals key information related to performance limits or lifetime-limiting phenomena, should be protected as Restricted Data.

Information concerning integration of thermoelectric materials with nuclear reactor fuels should be considered in conjunction with space reactor power systems and reviewed for continued classification as Restricted Data, dependent upon program advances.

Information concerning multimegawatt and other baseline space reactor power systems designs should be reviewed for declassification. Priorities for review should be given to those technologies which might prove useful to NASA.

Space reactor impact points may be classified, if needed to protect recovery of nuclear materials or sensitive components, until recovery is completed. Decisions to classify orbital parameters should be made by the office having primary responsibility for the mission.

Information concerning integration of thermoelectric materials with nuclear reactor fuels should be considered in conjunction with space reactor power systems and reviewed for continued classification, dependent upon program advances.

When unclassified space reactor power systems are used for classified military missions or operations, the mission itself, not the power source, should carry the classification.

Thermoelectric Converter

Isotopic Heat Source

Multihundred Watt Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator

Current Policy

Current guidance provides Restricted Data (RD) protection to:

The following information is currently protected as National Security Information (NSI):

Reservation is made for protecting "breakthroughs," defined as significant technical advances not predictable qualitatively, even by persons trained in appropriate disciplines; or technical advances that permit an order of magnitude increase in performance and capability.

Findings

ZT exceeding 1.8 at 700ºK has not been achieved. Existing thermal conversion technologies are unclassified.

Thermoelectric conversion and isotopic heat source technologies are not undergoing a major development effort and major advances are not likely in the near future. The technologies remain useful for both military and civilian applications.

Discussion

The primary reason for classification of thermoelectric conversion and isotopic heat source technologies appears to be their potential usefulness for military missions.

Breakthroughs in thermoelectric conversion and isotopic heat source technologies are not likely. The advantages of working on an unclassified basis appear better than classifying technology that may not be further developed.

Information from other programs should be protected in accordance with guidance specific to those programs; however, classification of similar technologies should be consistent.

Future advancements and application of these advancements to military missions and operations may require consideration for classification should they be developed.

Recommendations

Classification of information concerning the integration of thermoelectric conversion materials with nuclear reactor fuels should be considered as part of the overall classification policy for Space Reactor Power Systems.

Information concerning nonselective venting, as applied to isotopic heat sources, should be declassified.

Information concerning selective venting should be declassified as related nuclear weapons program technology is declassified.

When unclassified radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTGs) are used for classified missions or operations, the mission itself, not the RTG, should carry the classification.

Military applications of unclassified technologies should be classified as NSI only as required to protect military operations and missions.

Breakthroughs, as defined above, or technologies with demonstrated potential for breakthroughs, should be considered for classification, dependent upon program advances.

Subject to the above, the remaining classified information related to thermoelectric conversion, isotopic heat source, and multihundred watt radioisotope thermoelectric generator technologies should be declassified and released to the public.

Classification guidance for thermoelectric conversion, isotopic heat source, and multihundred watt radioisotope thermoelectric generator technologies should be consolidated.

ANNEX A

Membership of the Military Reactors Working Group

OrganizationMember
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Nuclear Policy Division
Capt. John Shaw, U.S. Navy
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Nuclear Policy Division
Capt James Alley
Alternate Chairman
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Technical Readiness Directorate
Defense Nuclear Agency
(now called the Defense
Special Weapons Agency)
Capt. Fred Nichols, U.S. Air Force
U.S. Army
Nuclear and Chemical Agency
Lt. Colonel John Bliss, U.S. Army
U.S. Air Force
Nuclear Surety, Weapons, and
Space Safety Directorate,
Headquarters, Air Force Safety Agency
Lt. Colonel Marcia Thornton, U.S.
Air Force
Department of Energy
Technical Guidance Division,
Office of Declassification
Dr. Mortimer I. Kay
National Aeronautics and Space
Administration
Ms. Mary Kicza

ANNEX B

Classification Guidance

Classification GuideTopic
CG-DNES-1 Joint DOE/DoD Classification Guide for Directed Nuclear Energy Systems
CG-IHS-4 Classification Guide for Isotopic Heat Source Information
CG-MHW-2 Classification Guide for the Multihundred Watt Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator Program
CG-RAR-5 DOE–DoD Classification Guide For The Army Nuclear Power Program
CG-SRPS-1 Space Reactor Power Systems
CG-TE-2 DOE–DoD-NASA Classification Guide for Thermoelectric Converter Information
Classification Bulletin Topic
SP-20 Declassification of Space Nuclear Power and Propulsion Technology
SP-21 Classification of Heat Source Reentry Impact Points
SP-23 Space Nuclear Systems Safety Information
SP-24 PIPE Experiment: Particle Bed Fuel Concept


Report of the Fundamental Classification Policy Review Group