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Congressional Record: June 21, 2000 (Senate)
Page S5563-S5580

                     


 
                          AMENDMENTS SUBMITTED

                                 ______
                                 

      FOREIGN OPERATIONS, EXPORT FINANCING, AND RELATED PROGRAMS 
                        APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2001
               KYL (AND DOMENICI) AMENDMENT NO. 3558

  Mr. McCONNELL (for Mr. Kyl (for himself and Mr. Domenici)) proposed 
two amendments to the bill S. 2522, supra; as follows:

       At an appropriate place in the bill, insert the following:

     SEC.   . IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY REFORMS AT THE DEPARTMENT 
                   OF ENERGY.

       (a) Findings.--Congress finds that--
       (1) On March 18, 1999, President Clinton asked the 
     President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) to 
     undertake an inquiry and issue a report on "the security 
     threat at the Department of Energy's weapons labs and the 
     adequacy of the measures that have been taken to address 
     it.''
       (2) In June 1999, the PFIAB issued a report titled 
     "Science at its Best, Security at its Worst,'' which 
     concluded the Department of Energy "represents the best of 
     America's scientific talent and achievement, but it has been 
     responsible for the worst security record on secrecy that the 
     members of this panel have ever encountered.''
       (3) The PFIAB report stated, "Organizational disarray, 
     managerial neglect, and a culture of arrogance--both at DOE 
     headquarters and the labs themselves--conspired to create an 
     espionage scandal waiting to happen.''
       (4) The PFIAB report further stated, "The Department of 
     Energy is a dysfunctional bureaucracy that has proven it is 
     incapable of reforming itself. * * * Reorganization is 
     clearly warranted to resolve the many specific problems with 
     security and counterintelligence in the weapons laboratories, 
     but also to address the lack of accountability that has 
     become endemic throughout the entire Department. * * * real 
     and lasting security and counterintelligence reform at the 
     weapons labs is simply unworkable within DOE's current 
     structure and culture;''
       (5) The PFIAB report stated, "Specifically, we recommend 
     that the Congress pass and the President sign legislation 
     that: Creates a new, semi-autonomous Agency * * * [to] 
     oversee all nuclear weapons-related matters previously housed 
     in DOE.''
       (6) The bipartisan Select Committee on U.S. National 
     Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's  
     Republic of China of the House of Representatives released 
     an unclassified report on May 25, 1999 which concluded 
     that "The People's Republic of China (PRC) has stolen 
     design information on the United States' most advanced 
     thermonuclear weapons. These thefts of nuclear secrets 
     from our national weapons laboratories enabled the PRC to 
     design, develop, and successfully test modern strategic 
     nuclear weapons sooner than would otherwise have been 
     possible. The stolen U.S. nuclear secrets give the PRC 
     design information on thermonuclear weapons on a par with 
     our own.''
       (7) The report of the Select Committee further concluded 
     that, "Despite repeated PRC thefts of the most sophisticated 
     U.S. nuclear weapons technology, security at our national 
     nuclear weapons laboratories does not meet even minimal 
     standards.''
       (8) In response to the findings of the Select Committee on 
     U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with 
     the People's Republic of China of the House of 
     Representatives and the President's Foreign Intelligence 
     Advisory Board, Senators Kyl, Domenici, and Murkowski offered 
     Amendment 446 to the Fiscal Year 2000 Intelligence 
     Authorization Act calling for the creation of a semi-
     autonomous agency to manage all United States nuclear weapons 
     programs, which was passed by the Senate on July 21, 1999, by 
     a vote of 96 to 1. This amendment called for the semi-
     autonomous agency to be organized with clear lines of 
     authority and accountability to replace the previous 
     structure with confused, overlapping reporting channels and 
     diffused responsibility that led to earlier security 
     failures.
       (9) The provisions of Amendment 446 were incorporated in 
     the Fiscal Year 2000 Defense Authorization Conference Report, 
     which was approved by the House of Representatives on 
     September 15, 1999, by a vote of 375 to 45, and the Senate on 
     September 22, 1999, by a vote of 93 to 5.
       (10) President Clinton signed the National Defense 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (Public Law 106-65) on 
     October 5, 1999.
       (11) Notwithstanding his signing into law the legislation 
     creating the National Nuclear Security Administration headed 
     by a new

[[Page S5574]]

     Under Secretary, on October 5, 1999, President Clinton issued 
     a statement which said, "Until further notice, the Secretary 
     of Energy shall perform all duties and functions of the Under 
     Secretary for Nuclear Security. The Secretary is instructed 
     to guide and direct all personnel of the National Nuclear 
     Security Administration. . . .''
       (12) On May 3, 2000 the nomination of General John Gordon 
     to head the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) 
     was received by the Senate from the President. On June 14, 
     2000, General John Gordon was confirmed by the Senate by a 
     vote of 97 to 0.
       (13) The Secretary of Energy has failed to fully implement 
     the law signed by the President on October 5, 1999. For 
     example, Section 3213 of the National Defense Authorization 
     Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (Public Law 106-65) sates that, with 
     the exception of the Secretary of Energy, NNSA employees, 
     "shall not be responsible to, or subject to the authority, 
     direction, or control of, any officer, employee, or agent of 
     the Department of Energy.'' Yet page 16 of the Department of 
     Energy's Implementation Plan for the National Nuclear 
     Security Administration released on January 1, 2000, states 
     that in order to manage the performance of non-weapons 
     related work at NNSA facilities such as the three national 
     labs, "non-NNSA officers or employees of the Department 
     retain the authority to direct NNSA employees and contractor 
     employees with regard to the accomplishment of such work.''
       (14) On May 26, 1999, Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson 
     stated, "American's can be reassured: Our nation's nuclear 
     secrets are, today, safe and secure.''
       (15) In response to a question from Senator Fitzgerald at a 
     joint hearing of the Committees on Energy and Natural 
     Resources, and Governmental Affairs of the Senate on October 
     19, 1999, that "So if there's a problem, God forbid, with 
     security at our Nation's labs while we have not fulfilled or 
     appointed somebody as Under Secretary in this new agency 
     within an agency, you would be willing to assume full 
     responsibility. . . .'' Secretary Richardson testified that, 
     "I would assume full responsibility.''
       (16) The recent security lapses at Los Alamos National 
     Laboratory demonstrates that security and counterintelligence 
     measures continue to be significantly deficient at United 
     States nuclear facilities.
       (b) Sense of the Senate.--It is the Sense of the Senate 
     that--
       (1) The national security of the United States has been 
     significantly harmed due to weak and ineffective security and 
     counterintelligence measures at America's nuclear facilities.
       (2) The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
     2000, if implemented, will improve security and 
     counterintelligence measures at United States nuclear 
     facilities by establishing clear lines of authority and 
     accountability to enable lasting reforms to be put in place.
       (3) The President and the Secretary of Energy should 
     faithfully implement the provisions of Public Law 106-65, 
     which established the National Nuclear Security 
     Administration.
       (4) The Secretary of Energy should permit the Administrator 
     of the National Nuclear Security Administration to manage all 
     aspects of United States nuclear weapons programs without 
     interference.
       (5) The Secretary of Energy should drop efforts to "dual-
     hat'' officers or employees of the Department of Energy to 
     serve concurrently in positions within the National Nuclear 
     Security Administration and the Department of Energy. Such 
     efforts to extensively "dual-hat'' officials are contrary to 
     the intent of Congress when it passed Public Law 106-65.
       (6) The Administrator of the National Nuclear Security 
     Administration shall take all appropriate steps to ensure 
     that the protection of sensitive and classified information 
     becomes the highest priority of the National Nuclear Security 
     Administration.
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