

- (U) Serial numbers were not always registered in the DoD Registry of the Small Arms Serialization Program for the weapons purchased by DoD and provided to ISF. Only 2 of the 19 IRRF-funded contracts contained requirements specifying that the contractor provide weapons serial numbers for the DoD Small Arms Serialization Program. The report noted that this information suggested that only 10,000 of the 370,251 IRRF-funded weapons, or about 2.7 percent, may have been recorded in the DoD Registry. The MNSTC-I property books contained serial numbers for only 12,128 of the total 505,093 weapons issued and warehoused or about 2 percent of the weapons provided.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> (U) The report noted that this is the total issued and on-hand quantity (pending issue) as reflected in the two MNSTC-I maintained property books as of September 4, 2006. The property books reflect all weapons, regardless of funding source, and the counts were not exclusive to IRRF-procured weapons.

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## Appendix C. Glossary (U)

(U) This appendix provides definitions of terms used in this report.

**(U) Arms and Ammunition** – Joint Publication 1-02 states that arms and ammunition, in common usage, can be military weapons, ammunition, and equipment. For purposes of this report, the term arms and ammunition is used to mean weapons (small arms) and ammunition.

**(U) Accountability** – DoD Instruction (DoDI) 5000.64, “Accountability and Management of DoD-Owned Equipment and Other Accountable Property,” November 2, 2006, states accountability is the obligation imposed by law, lawful order, or regulation, accepted by an organization or person for keeping accurate records, to ensure control of property, documents or funds, with or without physical possession. The obligation, in this context, refers to the fiduciary duties, responsibilities, and obligations necessary for protecting the public interest; however, it does not necessarily impose personal liability upon an organization or person.

**(U) Defense Articles** - Defense articles are defined in 22 U.S.C. 2403(d), (laws in effect as of January 3, 2005) as:

- any weapon, weapons system, munition, aircraft, vessel, boat or other implement of war;
- any property, installation, commodity, material, equipment, supply, or goods used for the purposes of furnishing military assistance;
- any machinery, facility, tool, material supply, or other item necessary for the manufacture, production, processing repair, servicing, storage, construction, transportation, operation, or use of any article listed in this subsection; or
- any component or part of any article listed in this subsection;
- but shall not include merchant vessels or, as defined by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2011), source material (except uranium depleted in the isotope 235 which is incorporated in defense articles solely to take advantage of high density or pyrophoric characteristics unrelated to radioactivity), by-product material, special nuclear material, production facilities, utilization facilities, or atomic weapons or articles involving Restricted Data.

**(U) Force Multiplier** – Joint Publication 1-02, “DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,” as amended through October 17, 2007, states that a force multiplier is a capability that, when added to and employed by a combat force, significantly increases the combat potential of that force and thus enhances the probability of successful mission accomplishment.

**(U) Logistics** - Joint Publication 1-02 states logistics is the science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensive sense, those aspects of military operations that deal with:

- a. design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution,

maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel;

b. movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel;

c. acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities; and

d. acquisition or furnishing of services.

**(U) Security Assistance** – DoD 5105.38-M, “Security Assistance Management Manual,” October 3, 2003, states that Security Assistance is a group of programs, authorized by law, which allows the transfer of military articles and services to friendly foreign Governments. Security Assistance transfers may be carried out via sales, grants, leases, or loans and are authorized under the premise that if these transfers are essential to the security and economic well-being of allied Governments and international organizations, they are equally vital to the security and economic well-being of the U.S. Security Assistance programs support U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives. They increase the ability of our friends and allies to deter and defend against possible aggression, promote the sharing of common defense burdens, and help foster regional stability.

**(U) Sensitive Items** – DoD 4100.39-M, “Federal Logistics Information System,” Volume 10, Table 61, November 2007, states that sensitive items are materiel which requires a high degree of protection and control due to statutory requirements or regulations. It includes, for example, items that are of high value; highly technical or of a hazardous nature; and small arms, ammunition, explosives, and demolition material.

**(U) Small Arms** - Joint Publication 1-02, defines small arms as man portable, individual, and crew-served weapon systems used mainly against personnel and lightly armored or unarmored equipment.

**(U) Small Arms Serialization Program** – DoD 4000.25-2-M, “Military Standard Transaction Reporting and Accounting Procedures,” September 2001, Chapter 12, “Small Arms Serial Number Registration and Reporting,” Change 5, January 2006, states that one of several objectives of the serial number registration and reporting program is to establish continuous visibility over all small arms by serial number from the contractor to depot; in storage; in-transit to requisitioners; in post, camp, and station custody; in the hands of users; during turn-ins; in renovation; and during disposal/demilitarization. Another objective is to provide law enforcement or investigative agencies with the identification of the last accountable activity having specific serial numbered weapons when those weapons are found to be missing or stolen.

## **Appendix D. Organizations Contacted and Visited (U)**

(U) We visited, contacted, or conducted interviews with officials (or former officials) from the following U.S. and Iraqi organizations:

### **United States (U)**

#### **(U) Department of State**

- The Secretary of State
- The U.S. Ambassador to Iraq and officials assigned to the U.S. Embassy Iraq
- The Deputy Chief of Mission to Afghanistan and officials assigned to the U.S. Embassy Afghanistan
- The Inspector General, Department of State and officials assigned to the Department of State, Office of the Inspector General

#### **(U) Department of Defense**

- The Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense
- The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
- The Director, Joint Staff
- The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
- The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)
- The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and members of his staff

#### **(U) Department of the Army**

- The Secretary of the Army
- The Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army
- The Commander, U.S. Army Materiel Command
- Officials assigned to the U.S. Army Materiel Command
- Officials assigned to the U.S. Army Joint Arms and Ammunition Command

- Officials assigned to the U.S. Army Materiel Command Logistics Support Activity
- Officials assigned to the U.S. Army Security Assistance Command
- Officials assigned to the U.S. Army TACOM and Life Cycle Management Command

**(U) U.S. Central Command**

- The Commander, U.S. Central Command, the Deputy Commander, U.S. Central Command, and key senior staff members
- The Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq and key staff members
- The Commander, Multi-National Corps-Iraq and key staff members
- The Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (to include the Civilian Police Assistance Training Team and the Coalition Military Assistance Training Team [now the Coalition Air Force Transition Team and the Coalition Army Advisory Transition Team]) and key staff members
- The Commander, Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan and key staff members
- The Commander, Gulf Region Division, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (to include the Logistics Movement Coordination Center) and key staff members
- Training Team to 2<sup>nd</sup> Brigade, 5<sup>th</sup> Battalion, National Police

**(U) Defense Agencies**

- (U) The Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency and officials assigned to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency

**Government of Iraq (U)**

**(U) Ministry of Defense**

- Chief of Iraqi Joint Staff
- Vice Chairman Iraqi Joint Staff
- Iraqi Ground Forces Commander
- Inspector General
- Former Deputy Commander for Support
- Iraqi Army Units

- 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion, 2<sup>nd</sup> Brigade, 1<sup>st</sup> Division
- Headquarters Support Company, 3<sup>rd</sup> Division
- Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 4<sup>th</sup> Brigade, 9<sup>th</sup> Division
- 1<sup>st</sup> Company, Base Defense Battalion, Taji
- Regional Support Units (now known as Base Support Units)
  - Al Kasik
  - Habbaniyah
  - Numaniyah
  - Taji

**(U) Ministry of Interior**

- Minister of Interior
- Director General for Logistics
- Provincial Director of Police – Ninawa Province
- Provincial Police Chief of Logistics – Ninawa Province
- Deputy Inspector General
- Iraqi Police Units
  - National Police, Director of Logistics
  - Mosul Special Police Unit

**(U) Ministry of Health**

- Inspector General

**(U) Iraqi Inspector General Association**

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## Appendix E. Management Comments (U)



ACQUISITION,  
TECHNOLOGY  
AND LOGISTICS

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY  
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3000

APR 30 2008

The Honorable Claude M. Kicklighter  
Department of Defense Inspector General  
400 Army Navy Drive  
Arlington, VA 22202-4702

Dear Mr. Kicklighter:

As requested, this letter is in response to recommendations contained in Part I (A), Part IV (M), and Part V (N) of the Department of Defense Inspector General (DoD IG) draft report *Assessment of the Accountability of Munitions Provided to the Security Forces of Iraq*.

As the report itself notes, since the data collection period of this report concluded in October 2007, many steps have been taken to improve the processes and procedures utilized to train, equip, and mentor the Iraqi Security Forces.

**Recommendation A:** DoD IG recommends the issuance of a letter to clarify that DoD Instruction 5000.64 governs the accountability and control and DoD Instruction 5100.76 governs the physical security of munitions under U.S. control from the point of entry into the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility until formal handover to the Iraqi Security Forces or as appropriate to other national partners within the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility.

**USD(P)/USD(AT&L/L&MR)/USDI Response:** Concur. The Office of the Secretary of Defense will issue a statement clarifying the applicability of DoD Instruction 5000.64 and DoD Instruction 5100.76.

**Recommendation M (1):** DoD IG recommends the Secretary of Defense appoint a DoD Executive Agent for the Iraqi FMS program to:

- Improve program performance and to ensure the responsive delivery of equipment, including munitions, in support of the train and equip mission in Iraq.
- Establish a U.S.-based Joint Program Management Office to implement integration and coordination of the Iraqi FMS program, increase the responsiveness of the support effort, and meet the wartime requirements of U.S. commanders and ISF. It is critical that the Joint Program Management Office be established now.



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AT&L/L&MR Response: non-concur



**Recommendation N:** DoD IG recommends the Secretary of Defense appoint a DoD Executive Agent to expedite support to USCENTCOM, MNF-I and MNSTC-I to advise and assist MOD and MOI in planning and building their logistics sustainment base for the Iraq Security Forces.

**AT&L/L&MR Response:** partially concur - DOD recognizes the importance of the observations regarding the development of the Iraqi Security Forces logistics capabilities. DOD will explore options to further assist - and if possible, accelerate - the Government of Iraq in developing and improving its logistics, acquisition, and sustainment capabilities.



Gary J. Motsek  
Assistant Deputy Under Secretary  
of Defense (Program Support)

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GLOBAL SECURITY  
AFFAIRS

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2900 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2900

The Honorable Claude M. Kicklighter  
Department of Defense Inspector General  
400 Army Navy Drive  
Arlington, VA 22202-4702

MAY - 5 2008

Dear Mr. Kicklighter:

As requested, this letter responds to the recommendations contained in Part I (A), Part IV (M), and Part V (N) of the Department of Defense Inspector General (DoD IG) draft report, *Assessment of the Accountability of Munitions Provided to the Security Forces of Iraq*.

As the report notes, since the data collection period of this report concluded in October 2007, many steps have been taken to improve the processes and procedures utilized to train, equip, and mentor the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).

**Recommendation A:** The DoD IG recommends issuing a letter to clarify that DoD Instruction 5000.64 governs the accountability and control and DoD Instruction 5100.76 governs the physical security of munitions under U.S. control from the point of entry into the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility until formal handover to the Iraqi Security Forces, or, as appropriate, to other national partners within the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility.

**USD(P)/USD(AT&L/L&MR) Response:** We concur. The Office of the Secretary of Defense will issue a statement clarifying the applicability of DoD Instruction 5000.64 and DoD Instruction 5100.76.

**Recommendation M (1):** The DoD IG recommends that the Secretary of Defense appoint a DoD Executive Agent for the Iraqi Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program to:

- Improve program performance and to ensure the responsive delivery of equipment, including munitions, in support of the train and equip mission in Iraq.
- Establish a U.S.-based Joint Program Management Office to implement integration and coordination of the Iraqi FMS program, increase the responsiveness of the support effort, and meet the wartime requirements



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of U.S. commanders and the Iraqi Security Forces. It is critical that the Joint Program Management Office be established now.

**USD(P) Response:** We do not concur.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

**Recommendation M (2):** The Secretary of Defense, with appropriate congressional approval, establish a Defense Coalition Support Account to acquire a pool of critically needed equipment that will be immediately available for shipment to the Iraqi Security Forces to expand forces, modernize forces, and replace combat losses.

**USD(P) Response:** We concur. The Department of Defense included the establishment of a Defense Coalition Support Account in its package of legislative proposals, which is currently pending Congressional action.

**Recommendation N:** The DoD IG recommends that the Secretary of Defense appoint a DoD Executive Agent to expedite support to USCENTCOM, MNF-I,

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and MNSTC-I to advise and assist the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior in planning and building their logistics sustainment base for the Iraq Security Forces.

**USD(P)/USD(AT&L/L&MR) Response:** The Office of the Secretary of Defense concurs with the importance of the observations regarding the development of Iraqi Security Forces logistics capabilities and will explore options and mechanisms to assist the Government of Iraq in improving its logistics capabilities.



Joseph A. Benkert  
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense

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UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
5000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-5000

APR 30 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Draft Report: Department of Defense Inspector General (DoD IG)  
Assessment of the Accountability of Munitions Provided to the Security  
Forces of Iraq (Project No. D2007-D000IG-0239.000)

In response to the Recommendation for Observation A made to the Secretary of Defense in the DoD IG draft report, dated March 18, 2008, "Assessment of the Accountability of Munitions Provided to the Security Forces of Iraq, I provide the following:

Recommendation for Observation A: *The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence issue a letter to clarify that DoD Instruction 5000.64 governs the accountability and control and DoD Instruction 5100.76 governs the physical security of munitions under U.S. control from the point of entry into the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility until formal handover to the Iraqi Security Forces or as appropriate to other national partners within the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility.*

USD(I) Response: I concur with the DoD IG Recommendation for Observation A. My staff will prepare a memorandum to reiterate and clarify that DoD Instruction 5100.76 is applicable for any arms, ammunition, and explosives that are in the possession or the custody of a DoD component. The memorandum will also reiterate the provisions of DoD 5200.8-R, Physical Security Program, which governs minimum physical security standards.

In addition, editorial comments to the report are provided for your consideration. My point of contact is [REDACTED] at (703) 604-[REDACTED] or [REDACTED]@osd.mil.

  
James R. Clapper, Jr.


Attachment:  
As stated



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USD(I) EDITORIAL COMMENTS



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THE JOINT STAFF  
WASHINGTON, DC

Reply ZIP Code:  
20318-0300

DJSM-0510-08  
27 May 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF  
DEFENSE

Subject: Response to Report on the Assessment of the Accountability of  
Munitions Provided to the Security Forces of Iraq (Project No D2007-  
D000IG-0239.000)

1. Thank you for the opportunity to review the subject report.<sup>1</sup> The Joint Staff responses to the IG recommendations are provided below:

a. Recommendation L.2.a and L.2.b: Recommends expediting the staffing of the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) Joint Manning Document (JMD). The Joint Staff actively pursues the staffing of all JMDs that have been validated and forwarded by combatant commands. The MNSTC-I requested and USCENTCOM validated requirements articulate the specific skill sets and experience levels required. These requirements are provided to the Services to determine ability to source. Overall MNSTC-I manning is at 95 percent. As a sub-set of this manning, their Individual Augment billets show a Service commitment to sourcing of 94 percent. USJFCOM, as the joint force provider, ensures that the assigned force-providing Service identifies military/civilian personnel that meet the requisite skills, experience, and ranks/rate necessary to meet the requirements. There are numerous situations in which demand for a given skill set exceeds available supply. In these areas, prioritization of available assets and resources weigh heavily in the decision making process.

b. Recommendation M.4.a. and M.4.b: Recommends expediting staffing of the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) portion of the MNSTC-I JMD. The Joint Staff continues to source and staff all combatant command -validated and -forwarded requirements. The MNSTC-I FMS division has a current manning of 32 of 36 positions. The remaining four billets have Service commitment for sourcing. An additional five billets, to support the MNSTC-I FMS division as a Functional Capability Team, were recently approved for sourcing by the Secretary of Defense and will be manned in positions in theater by 1 Jul 08. USJFCOM, as the joint force provider, ensures that the assigned force-providing Service identifies military/civilian personnel that meet the requisite

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skills, experience, and ranks/rate necessary to meet the requirements. As stated above, prioritization is a critical element in the sourcing process.

c. Recommendation N.3.a. and N.3.b: Recommends expediting staffing of the Multi-National Command Iraq (MNC-I) and MNSTC-I JMDs. The Joint Staff continues to source and staff all combatant command -validated and -forwarded requirements. The overall MNC-I JMD manning is 95 percent, and MNSTC-I overall manning is 95 percent. USJFCOM, as the joint force provider, ensures that the assigned force-providing Service identifies military/civilian personnel that meet the requisite skills, experience, and ranks/rate necessary to meet the requirements.

2. Your continued support and the efforts shown in this report are appreciated and will have an impact on the future ability of the U.S. military to continue to conduct these vital missions.



STEPHEN M. GOLDFEIN  
Major General, USAF  
Vice Director, Joint Staff

Reference:

- 1 IG, DOD memorandum, 18 March 2008, "Report on the Assessment of the Accountability of Munitions Provided to the Security Forces of Iraq (Project No. D2007-D000IG-0239.000) (U)"

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UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF  
7115 SOUTH BOUNDARY BOULEVARD  
MACDILL AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA 33621-5101

28 April 2008

FOR: OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: United States Central Command Response to Draft Report, "Assessment of the Accountability of Munitions Provided to the Security Forces of Iraq," dated 18 March 2008

1. Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the recommendations presented in the draft report.
2. Attached are the United States Central Command consolidated comments, incorporating the responses from Multi-National Force – Iraq, Multi-National Corps – Iraq, and Multi-National Security Transition Command – Iraq.
3. The Point of Contact is [REDACTED], USCENTCOM Inspector General, [REDACTED].

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "J W Miller", is positioned above the printed name.

J. W. MILLER  
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy

Enclosure  
As Stated

UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND (USCENTCOM)  
MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE, IRAQ (MNF-I)  
CONSOLIDATED COMMAND COMMENTS  
DODIG DRAFT REPORT (MARCH 18, 2008)  
PROJECT NO. D2007-D000IG-0239.000

"Assessment of the Accountability of Munitions Provided to the  
Security Forces of Iraq"

**Part I - DoD and Iraq Security Forces Policy and Procedures:  
Observations and Recommendations (U)**

**(U) Observation A.** The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence had not clarified the applicability of existing DoD policy regarding accountability and control of U.S.-supplied munitions to ISF.

**(U) Recommendation for Observation A.** Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, issue a letter to clarify that DoD Instruction 5000.64 governs the accountability and control and DoD Instruction 5100.76 governs the physical security of munitions under U.S. control from the point of entry into the USCENTCOM area of responsibility until formal handover to the ISF or as appropriate to other national partners within the USCENTCOM area of responsibility.

**(U) Observation B.**

(U) USCENTCOM, MNF-I, the Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I), and MNSTC-I had not issued written guidance for the accountability and control of munitions delivered to or transported through the USCENTCOM area of responsibility and subsequently provided to ISF or Coalition partners.

(U) MNF-I had not issued uniform policy to coordinate the efforts of MNC-I and MNSTC-I for the accountability and control of munitions delivered to or transported through Iraq.

**(U) Recommendations for Observation B.**

(U) USCENTCOM issue formal procedures governing the accountability and control of munitions under U.S. control from the point of entry into and transport through the USCENTCOM area of responsibility until formal handover to ISF or as appropriate to other national partners within the USCENTCOM area of responsibility.

**CENTCOM RESPONSE:** Concur. The Director of Logistics, USCENTCOM is

drafting formal guidance, proposed for publication not later than 1 June 2008.

(U) MNF-I issue formal procedures to govern and coordinate the efforts of its subordinate organizations to account for and control munitions under U.S. control from the point of entry into and transport through Iraq until formal handover to ISF or as appropriate to other national partners in Iraq.

**MNF-I RESPONSE: Concur.**

(U) MNSTC-I is in the final stages of publishing a Logistics Accountability SOP. The SOP provides specific direction for accountability and control of sensitive items (including munitions) during: POD operations, intra-theatre distribution and warehouse operations. The SOP is in coordination and is expected to be approved and released by the MNSTC-I CG NLT 30 April 2008.

(U) **Observation C.** MNF-I had not clearly defined procedures for the accountability, control, and final disposition of weapons captured by U.S. forces, to include recording captured weapons serial numbers, and had not issued uniform procedures to coordinate the efforts of MNC-I and MNSTC-I for the captured weapons.

**(U) Recommendations for Observation C.**

(U) MNF-I issue formal procedures to govern the accountability, control, and final disposition of weapons captured by U.S. forces and to coordinate the efforts of MNC-I and MNSTC-I in processing weapons captured by U.S. forces.

**MNF-I RESPONSE: Concur.**

(U) In coordination with MNF-I and MNSTC-I, MNC-I published FRAGO 085 (Tab A) on 24 JAN 08. This FRAGO was designed to coordinate the transfer of captured enemy weapons (CEW) in a controlled and recorded manner between Coalition Forces and Iraq Security Forces. This FRAGO received concurrence from MNF-I and MNSTC-I and modifications are now being coordinated to refine the FRAGOs language with respect to weapon categories, serial # requirements, and transfer process flow.

(U) MoD/LTG Abdulla (DCOS LOG) concurs with MNC-I procedures that are in place. MoI/MG Adbul Ameer (Asst Deputy Minister for Infrastructure) has verbally committed to MNC-I procedures as well. The two ministries are drafting policies that will compliment MNC-I's FRAGO.

(U) **Observation D.** MNF-I had not issued procedures on the missions, roles, and responsibilities applicable to U.S. transition teams and senior advisors involved in advising and assisting MOD, MOI, and subordinate ISF organizations or to coordinate the efforts of MNC-I and MNSTC-I transition teams to support the ISF in its efforts to

account for and control U.S.-supplied or Iraqi-procured munitions.

**(U) Recommendations for Observation D.** MNF-I issue formal procedures on the missions, roles, and responsibilities applicable to U.S. transition teams and senior advisors involved in advising and assisting MOD, MOI, and subordinate ISF organizations and to coordinate the efforts of MNC-I and MNSTC-I transition teams to support ISF in its efforts to account for and control U.S.- supplied or Iraqi-procured munitions.

**MNF-I RESPONSE: Concur.**

(U) MNSTC-I is in the final stages of publishing a Logistics Accountability SOP. The SOP provides specific direction for accountability and control of sensitive items (including munitions) during: POD operations, intra-theatre distribution and warehouse operations. The SOP is in coordination and is expected to be approved and released by the MNSTC-I CG NLT 30 April 2008. MNSTC-I will continue to advise and assist the Ministries of Defense and Interior in establishing the proposed accountability procedures in the draft Logistics Accountability SOP.

(U) MNSTC-I works closely with the MNC-I Military Training Teams (MiTTs) and will continue to ensure that these teams adhere to the accountability procedures developed by MNSTC-I. MNC-I MiTTs are directed to continue submitting the required documentation and images resulting from weapons issued to the Iraqi units.

**(U) Observation E.** MOD and MOI had not issued written policies and procedures for military and police national munitions depots and other storage facilities (such as provincial, regional, unit or station levels) for the accountability and control of U.S.-supplied or Iraqi-procured munitions.

**(U) Recommendation for Observation E.** MNSTC-I advise and assist MOD and MOI in the preparation and promulgation of formal policies and procedures for military and police national munitions depots and other storage facilities that address the accountability and control of U.S.-supplied or Iraqi-procured munitions.

**MNF-I RESPONSE: Concur.**

(U) The Iraqi procedures for accountability of equipment, including munitions, are given in the "Iraqi Supply Handbook," Chapter 3, Property Accountability Guide. This procedure outlines accountability through the use of the IA Form 249 (Blanjo) and details their procedures. Rather than advising on the creation of an additional policy, it is recommended that efforts be focused on assistance of enforcement of policies already in place.

(U) JHQ DCoS Logistics has established a committee that will develop procedures for

the accountability of both U.S.-supplied and Iraqi-procured munitions. The initial report of the committee detailed current and future issues related to the tracking of munitions from their arrival at Um Qasr or BIAP. The current procedure involves the Coalition contracted movement of munitions from Um Qasr or BIAP to the National Ammunition Depot (NAD) at Bayji. Contractor personnel conduct receipt inspections of all ammunition and update the NAD master inventory. When munitions are required at one of the five existing Ammunition Supply Points (ASP), MNSTC-I J4 coordinates movement of ammunition to the requesting ASP through Coalition contracted movement. Inventories at existing ASPs are currently managed by Iraqi forces with MiTT oversight. Regular inventory reports are submitted to MNSTC-I J4. The procedures for future ammunition accountability of munitions by MoD are being developed by the committee chaired by the Ammunition Section of Deputy Chief of Staff (DCoS) Logistics.

(U) Reference memorandum from the Government of Iraq Ministry of Interior, to subordinate units signed by the Assistant Deputy Minister for Administrative Affairs, dated 18 Dec 07, weapons and ammunition must be secured with three locks, each with a key maintained by an officer with a minimum of four years of experience. Monthly inventories are to be conducted. Stiff fines are established for the loss of any weapon or ammunition. Fines are restated in a separate memorandum #47 signed by the Minister of Interior.

**(U) Observation F.** MOD and MOI had not issued written policies and procedures for the accountability, control, and disposition of weapons captured by ISF or Coalition forces (weapons captured by U.S. forces that are subsequently turned over to ISF).

**(U) Recommendation for Observation F.** MNSTC-I advise and assist MOD and MOI in the preparation and promulgation of formal policies and procedures for the accountability, control, processing, and final disposition of weapons the ISF captures or weapons captured and turned over to the ISF by Coalition forces.

**MNF-I RESPONSE: Concur.**

(U) MNSTC-I is aware of the issue and is advising MoD DCoS Logistics on a directive that is being drafted.

(U) While the Mol has not provided a written copy of current policy, Mol officials at the provincial and ministerial levels have confirmed the following procedures are in place: If a police unit captures weapons, they must inventory and inspect each weapon by serial number. The inventory is passed to the Ministry of Interior Auditing Department and compared against their weapons databases to determine the source. The capturing unit may request to retain the weapons to fill shortages, or permission to destroy the weapons. The Ministry of Interior Director of Logistics will provide disposition instructions. If the weapons are destroyed, a committee of three senior officers must witness the destruction and provide certification to the Ministry of Interior Logistics Officer.

**Part II - DoD and Iraq Security Forces Operations:  
Observations and Recommendations (U)**

**(U) Observation G.**

(U) U.S. forces did not always maintain an unbroken chain of custody for the accountability and control of U.S.- controlled munitions before formal handover to ISF.

(U) U.S. munitions were placed temporarily in areas that lacked sufficient physical security to prevent misplacement, loss, or theft or sufficient storage capacity to efficiently process high volume deliveries of munitions shipments.

(U) U.S. forces and ISF did not always perform joint inventories of U.S.- controlled weapons prior to formal handover to ISF, and serial numbers for weapons were not always recorded.

(U) Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan contracts for the procurement of weapons did not always contain clauses requiring lists of weapons serial numbers be sent in advance of weapons shipment to Iraq, the delivery of munitions to Iraq through U.S.- controlled ports of entry within Iraq, or that shippers provide enroute visibility to include the arrival dates and times of munitions cargo being delivered to Iraq.

**(U) Recommendations for Observation G.**

~~(S)~~ [REDACTED]

**MNF-I RESPONSE: Concur.**

~~(S)~~ [REDACTED]

~~(S)~~ [REDACTED]

**MNF-I RESPONSE: Concur.**

(U) Tasking to MNSTC-I is forthcoming.

(U) MNSTC-I, with advice and assistance from MOD and MOI, jointly develop formal procedures for the delivery, joint inventory, and formal handover of U.S.-controlled munitions delivered to ISF.

MNF-I RESPONSE: Concur.

(S) [REDACTED]

(U) Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan review all its contracts issued to procure and deliver munitions to ensure that clauses are included requiring vendors and shippers: deliver munitions to Iraq through U.S.-controlled ports of entry within Iraq, provide serial number lists electronically in advance of any weapons shipments to Iraq, post serial number lists on the inside and outside of weapons shipping containers, and provide enroute visibility to include the arrival dates and times of munitions cargo being delivered to Iraq.

MNF-I RESPONSE: Concur.

(S) [REDACTED]

The applicable information included in solicitations and contracts for weapons is shown below:

(S) [REDACTED]



[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) **Observation H.** The process to populate the MNSTC-I centralized database of weapons serial numbers for weapons issued to ISF by U.S. forces lacked internal data input controls.

(U) **Recommendations for Observation H.** MNSTC-I install data input quality controls in its centralized database of weapons serial numbers using a trained database programmer, and U.S. Army Materiel Command Logistics Support Activity assist the MNSTC-I with installing data input quality controls in its centralized database to ensure system compatibility.

**MNF-I RESPONSE: Concur.**

(U) MNSTC-I requested AMC assistance and a visit was conducted in February 2008. The AMC representative identified required corrections and they have been implemented. MNSTC-I is now sourcing a contracted solution for a commercial database to further enhance data integrity and provide continuity.

**(U) Observation I.**

(U) The physical count of three Iraqi military weapon types maintained at Taji National Depot did not match the numbers of weapons recorded in the inventory database. In addition, the team was unable to locate all of the three types of weapons in Taji National Depot because of the disorganized manner in which the weapons were physically stored.

(U) The Baghdad Police College did not have sufficient storage capacity for the anticipated volume of munitions shipments procured through the Iraq Security Forces Fund and FMS.

(U) **Recommendations for Observation I.**

(U) MNSTC-I advise and assist MOD in performing a 100 percent inventory that will establish a baseline for Iraqi military weapons and ammunition stored at Taji National Depot. Thereafter, MNSTC-I advise and assist MOD in performing a 10 percent inventory of Iraqi military weapons and ammunition on a monthly basis.

**MNF-I RESPONSE: Concur.**

(U) MNSTC-I is conducting a 100% inventory check of all procured weapons (from either Iraq Security Forces Fund [ISFF] or Foreign Military Sales [FMS] funds) held at Taji National Depot ICW the Iraqis. MOD is conducting checks of ammunition at Taji each week and reports stocks on hand to MNSTC-1. A 100% inventory of ammunition has not yet been completed by MNSTC-I personnel. Once weapons are transferred to the ISF, MNSTC-I does not have the manpower required to conduct monthly 10% checks, but will recommend to ISF Commanders that such an inventory be included in their regulations.

(U) MNSTC-I agrees that Baghdad Police College (BPC) provides inadequate storage capacity for MoI. Accordingly, MNSTC-I has undertaken an initiative ICW GRD to embed a MoI property team at Abu Ghraib Warehouse (AGW) in an effort to speed direct delivery from AGW to MoI units. Additionally, MNSTC-I recently approved a facilities project for a National Police Sustainment Brigade. These facilities will include warehouse space for NP supplies and commodities thereby reducing the storage requirements at BPC.

(U) MNSTC-I advise and assist MOD in establishing effective warehouse management and organization processes at Taji National Depot for the storage of weapons and ammunition and requesting help from U.S.-based logistics organizations as needed.

**MNF-I RESPONSE: Concur.**

(U) MNSTC-I has directed the serial number inventories of weapons and sensitive items in order to transfer the inventory to the Iraqis. A 100 percent serial number joint inventory of weapons will be conducted upon receipt at Taji National Depot at the time of transfer to the Iraqis. New warehouse construction projects with anticipated completion dates in late September 2008 will enhance the ability of the Iraqis to better manage the inventory and storage of weapons and sensitive items. Coalition Army Advisory Training Team (CAATT) is focusing on the mentoring of the Taji National Supply Depot leadership to effectively manage warehouse operations, stock control procedures and inventory management. The goal is to have the Iraqis accurately receive, store, and inventory stocks. Additionally, the Iraqis must also manage the workload to pick, pack and ship stocks to the Locations Commands and the ISF. The Logistics Management Advisory Team (LMAT) will over watch the progress of the Iraqis in these areas to enable the Iraqis to execute supply depot operations. Throughout this process, it must be realized that the end state is successful transition to MOD control. The route map

to this end state includes the following measures:

(U) a. The initiation and completion of a 100% joint inventory of weapons and munitions at TND. A MNSTC-I team is on the ground conducting the inventory by serial number of weapons at TND. The process for issuing weapons from TND has also been addressed to ensure that the correct documentation is completed.

(U) b. An ammunition storage facility for the MoD Taji Location Command has been built. This is sufficient to handle all the ammunition storage and issue requirements for its dependency. MoD manning of the facility is expected to occur in Jun 08 after students begin graduating from the Ammo Handlers Course offered by the Iraqi Army Service School Institute. The first Ammo Handlers Course is offered on 13 April and the course last five weeks.

(U) c. A refurbishment program is in place to improve the warehouse storage facilities at TND. MNSTC-I has initiated a contract to provide for shelving/storage at the Taji National Depot. It is expected that this will be awarded before 30 April 08. The development of a Central Receiving and Shipping Point (CRSP) will provide better visibility of equipment and materiel at TND.

(U) d. Close liaison with the MOD through the Senior Advisor and the Functional Capabilities Team- Sustainment to DCOS Logistics to:

(U) (1) Advise on the development of robust accountability procedures for all sensitive materiel including weapons and ammunition.

(U) (2) Advise MOD personnel at the tactical level-e.g. at TND, of the correct procedures.

(U) (3) Effect successful transition to complete MOD control, with minimal CF oversight.

(U) MNSTC-I advise and assist MOI to construct sufficient capacity for munitions storage at Baghdad Police College and other sites as necessary for the anticipated volume of munitions shipments.

**MNF-I RESPONSE: Concur.**

(U) The Mol is constrained for storage space for inbound weapons and ammunition and employs a 3-pronged approach to alleviate this problem. The first step is to increase the

rate of throughput to subordinate organizations. The second step is to use temporary container storage in the newly constructed container yard. The third step is to divert ammunition to the Abu Gharib warehouse complex, where Mol is planning on establishing a permanent workforce within the next 60 days. The Coalition is funding the construction of 12K square meters of storage space under a K-span design on Baghdad Police Collage. This project is estimated to be completed by 28 May 2008. Once completed, this will free up all of the hard warehouses for ammunition storage.

~~(S)~~ [REDACTED]

~~(S)~~ [REDACTED]

MNF-I RESPONSE: Concur.

~~(S)~~ [REDACTED]

(U) Observation K.

(U) Data gathered from U.S. military transition teams supporting four Iraqi Divisions on the accountability of munitions indicated that approximately 85 percent of the Iraqi Army units in those divisions were accounting for weapons by serial number, with plans to attain 100 percent. Further, the MOI started recording serial numbers of weapons issued to police forces in January 2007.

(U) MNC-I had not issued instructions to all Coalition military transition teams to request the Iraq military and police units they advise to provide weapons serial numbers to MNSTC-I to be recorded in its centralized database of weapons serial numbers.

**(U) Recommendations for Observation K.**

(U) MNF-I, advise and assist MOD and MOI and their subordinate military and police organizations in attaining and maintaining 100 percent accountability and control of ISF weapons by serial numbers.

**MNF-I RESPONSE: Concur.**

(U) MNF-I will continue to direct MNSTC-I to advise and assist MoD and MoI with regard to directing their subordinate organizations to gain and maintain 100% accountability of all weapons by serial number.

(U) MNC-I instruct all Coalition military transition teams to request the Iraq military and police units they advise to provide weapons serial numbers to MNSTC-I to be recorded in its centralized database of weapons serial numbers.

**MNF-I RESPONSE: Nonconcur.**

(U) [REDACTED]

(U) [REDACTED]

(U) [REDACTED]

(U) [REDACTED].

(U) [REDACTED]

(U) [REDACTED]

(U) [REDACTED]

(U) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) [REDACTED]

(U) [REDACTED]

(U) f. Concur with the recommendation that MNSTC-I advisory teams continue to assist the GoI (MoD and MoI) to achieve 100% serial number accountability in their own weapons databases of choice, using the MNSTC-I process as a baseline.

**Part III - DoD Personnel Resources:  
Observations and Recommendations (U)**

(U) **Observation L.** The MNSTC-I J4 (logistics function) did not have sufficient personnel with the requisite skills and experience levels to carry out its mission (including munitions oversight). Further, MNSTC-I program oversight was hindered because the command did not have an Inspector General and had only one internal audit liaison officer.

**(U) Recommendations for Observation L.**

(U) MNF-I approve a MNSTC-I Joint Manning Document that provides for sufficient numbers of personnel to successfully execute its logistics mission and establish and staffs an Office of Inspector General and an Office of Internal Review.

**MNF-I RESPONSE: Concur.**

(U) MNSTC-I completed a comprehensive personnel manning review in the fall of 2007 which resulted in the recommendation to modify the JMD in order to source the requirements shortfalls identified above. In February 2008, GEN Petraeus approved the MSNTC-I JMD change proposal (Tab D). If approved and sourced by the Joint Staff, this JMD change increases overall manning in the MNSTC-I J4 by 46% (an increase from 64 to 94 personnel).

(U) USCENTCOM and the Joint Staff expeditiously approve the proposed MNSTC-I Joint Manning Document and expedite the assignment of personnel to fill positions designated in Joint Manning Document.

**CENTCOM RESPONSE: Concur.**

(U) USCENTCOM received the MNF-I out-of-cycle request to modify the MNSTC-I

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JMD in March 2008. The proposed JMD was further refined during the USCENTCOM JMD Conference, 9-11 April 2008. In addition to the J4 increases noted by MNF-I, the proposed JMD also reflects a net increase of five personnel within the MNSTC-I Office of the Inspector General, to include an internal review function. USCENTCOM Directors are in the process of validating the MNSTC-I JMD, for submission to the Combatant Commander for approval. We expect to submit an approved document to the Joint Staff not later than 1 June 2008.

**Part IV – U.S. Foreign Military Sales:  
Observations and Recommendations (U)**

~~(FOUO)~~ [REDACTED]

~~(FOUO)~~ [REDACTED]

~~(FOUO)~~ [REDACTED]

**(U) Recommendations for Observation M.**

(U) Secretary of Defense appoint a DoD Executive Agent for the Iraqi FMS program to:

- Improve program performance and to ensure the responsive delivery of equipment, including munitions, in support of the train and equip mission in Iraq.

**USCENTCOM GENERAL COMMENT:**

(U) In August 2007, OSD established an Iraq FMS Task Force to address these concerns, with Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (PDASD) for Global Security Affairs (GSA) as the Task Force lead. The Task Force continues to identify initiatives which have substantially improved the procurement and delivery cycle of FMS-procured defense articles and services supporting Iraq. In February 2008, a U.S.-Iraq Security Cooperation Working Group was held in Amman, Jordan to examine ongoing initiatives and discuss methods for greater FMS process improvements with our Iraqi counterparts.

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**MNF-I GENERAL COMMENT:**

(U) Merits further consideration. The Iraq FMS Task Force, under the direction of the PDASD(GSA), has made some progress towards implementing solid change particularly in the development of a common operating picture which includes in-transit visibility of goods in delivery. Further, both the speed with which goods are delivered and the total manning of the security assistance office has increased. However, although overall personnel strength has grown, only 4 of 21 assigned officers have had any FMS experience prior to being assigned to MNSTC-I. This fact contributes to difficulties which hinder the efficiencies of the FMS program. Another contributing factor is the exponential speed at which the Iraqi FMS program has grown - from \$ 0 in Oct 06 to \$3.2B as of 1 Jan 08. The processing times for turning Letters of Request (LORs) into Letters of Offer and Acceptance (LOAs) by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, as well as getting LOAs staffed and signed within the Iraqi Security Ministries, while improving, need to continue this upward trend.

- Establish a U.S.-based Joint Program Management Office to implement integration and coordination of the Iraqi FMS program, increase the responsiveness of the support effort, and meet the wartime requirements of U.S. commanders and ISF. It is critical that the Joint Program Management Office be established now.

**MNF-I GENERAL COMMENT:**

(U) Merits further consideration. The identification or establishment of a U.S.-based, JPO-like organization to facilitate integration/coordination among the multiple CONUS and OCONUS Iraq FMS stakeholders, and to provide day-to-day support for the current OSD FMS Task Force, may have merit.

(U) Secretary of Defense, with appropriate congressional approval, establish a Defense Coalition Support Account to acquire a pool of critically needed equipment that will be immediately available for shipment to ISF to expand forces, modernize forces, and replace combat losses.

(U) MNF-I establish and approve authorized positions for its security assistance office in the MNSTC-I Joint Manning Document office that provides sufficient personnel with the requisite skills and experience levels successfully execute its security assistance mission.

**MNF-I RESPONSE: Concur.**

(U) MNSTC-I J1, with support from MNF-I C1, worked extensively with CCJ1 to add 18 positions to the MNSTC-I JMD. These positions were approved in November 2007. Total manning of the security assistance office is currently at approximately 90%;



however, officers who have had any FMS experience prior to being assigned to MNSTC-I continue to be a challenge. The Joint Staff J5 continues to be a strong advocate and provides invaluable assistance in identifying the correct personnel to fill these positions.

(U) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and US CENTCOM expedite: approval of the MNSTC-I Joint Manning Document; a request for the necessary funding; and assignment of personnel with the requisite skills, experience levels, and rank to fill positions designated in the Joint Manning Document.

**CENTCOM RESPONSE: Concur.**

(U) The additional JMD positions for the MNSTC-I Security Assistance Office were forwarded to the Joint Staff on 27 August 2007, and approved by SECDEF on 5 November 2007. The military services are working to fill these new positions with personnel possessing requisite skills and experience levels.

**MNF-I GENERAL COMMENT:**

(U) The requested additional positions were approved effective November 2007. The optimal manning solution would be assigning personnel with significant FMS experience to no less than 25% of all SAO positions and 100% of all O-6 positions. Notable efforts have been made to improve the assignment of personnel with FMS experience.

(U) MNSTC-I advise and assist MoD and MoI in establishing a requirements planning process that forecasts the ISF equipment and training needs on a multi-year basis to stabilize and improve the responsiveness of the Iraqi FMS program.

**MNF-I RESPONSE: Concur.**

(U) MNSTC-I will continue to work with both MoD and MoI to refine their processes for identifying, prioritizing and resourcing requirements.

**Part V – Iraq Security Forces Logistics Capabilities:  
Observations and Recommendations (U)**

**(U) Observation N.**

(U) The ISF logistics system was in the early stages of development; the system is fragile and currently is not capable of sustaining most independent ISF military operations. MNSTC-I and MNC-I do not have sufficient personnel with the requisite skills and experience levels to carry out its logistics mentoring mission and assist ISF in establishing its logistical sustainment base, which is a U.S. and Iraqi strategic priority.

(U) The expeditious approval of the proposed MNSTC-I Joint Manning Document and the assignment of personnel with the requisite skills, experience levels, and rank to fill positions for the logistics mentoring functions will greatly enhance ISF to become self sufficient and take over more and more battle space; which will greatly reduce the demands on Coalition forces.

**(U) Recommendations for Observation N.**

(U) Secretary of Defense appoint a DoD Executive Agent to expedite support to USCENTCOM, MNF-I and MNSTC-I to advise and assist MOD and MOI in planning and building their logistics sustainment base for the Iraq Security Forces.

(U) Establish and approve authorized positions for senior logistics mentors and military and police transition team logistics mentors in the MNC-I and MNSTC-I Joint Manning Documents that provide for sufficient personnel with the requisite skills and experience levels to successfully execute the logistics mentoring mission.

**MNF-I RESPONSE: Concur with comment.**

(U) MNSTC-I to determine requirements for logistics mentors needed for the MNC-I and MNSTC-I staffs, and coordinate with MNF-I C1 to ensure requisite skills and experience levels are incorporated in the Joint Manning Documents. Note that logistics mentors for MiTTs are not sourced through Joint Manning Documents. Requirements are submitted as a Request for Forces (RFF), through the Global Force Management process.

- (U) Ensure that senior logistics mentors and military transition team logistics mentors in the Joint Manning Documents are assigned to MOD, MOI, the Iraqi Joint Headquarters, and ISF as needed.


**MNF-I RESPONSE: Concur with comment.**

(U) MNSTC-I to determine requirements for logistics mentors needed for the MNC-I and MNSTC-I staffs, and coordinate with MNF-I C1 to ensure requisite skills and experience levels are incorporated in the Joint Manning Documents. Note that logistics mentors for MiTTs are not sourced through Joint Manning Documents. Requirements are submitted as a Request for Forces (RFF), through the Global Force Management process.


- (U) Establish a logistics training program in Iraq, comparable to that currently provided by the Counter-Insurgency Academy, to train U.S. military and police transition team logistics mentors.

MNF-I RESPONSE: Nonconcur.

(U)



(U)



CENTCOM RESPONSE: Concur with comment.

(U) USCENTCOM will review and validate future requirements for logistics mentors approved by Commander, MNF-I for addition to MNC-I and MNSTC-I Joint Manning Documents. However, logistics mentors within MiTTs are not sourced through Joint Manning Documents. Requirements are submitted as a Request for Forces (RFF), through the Global Force Management (GFM) process.

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SECRETARY OF THE ARMY  
WASHINGTON

JUN 03 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Responses to Department of Defense Inspector General (DoDIG) Draft  
Report D2007-D000IG-0239.000

1. In accordance with the memorandum, DoDIG, March 18, 2008, subject: Inspector General Draft Report D2007-D000IG-0239.000.
2. The U.S. Army appreciates the opportunity to comment on the subject report. While the majority of the issues are focused on the U.S. Central Command, the Multi-National Force-Iraq, and the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, several observations and recommendations have U.S. Army equities. Comments and recommendations applicable to the U.S. Army are addressed at enclosure.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Pete Geren", is positioned above the printed name.

Pete Geren

Encl

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Department of Defense Inspector General (DoDIG)  
DRAFT REPORT ON THE ASSESSMENT  
OF THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF MUNITIONS PROVIDED  
TO THE SECURITY FORCES OF IRAQ

PROJECT NUMBER D2007-D000IG-0239.000

Observation H2: Executive Summary, page vii and page 27: "Recommend that the Commander U.S. Army Materiel Command Logistics Support Agency (LOGSA) assist the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) with installing data input quality controls in its centralized database of weapons serial numbers to ensure system compatibility."

U.S. Army Response: The U.S. Army concurs. Over the past two years, the LOGSA Soldier Support Center has been working with MNSTC-I to build MNSTC-I serial number files for weapons transferred to Iraq. A LOGSA representative reviewed and made recommendations on the MNSTC-I reporting requirements in March 2008. LOGSA offered follow-on assistance, to include assistance with the database build. LOGSA reviewed the MNSTC-I draft Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and forwarded its recommendations on the weapons portion of the SOPs. LOGSA continues to assist MNSTC-I.

Observation M, Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Performance, page 40: "At the time of this assessment, the FMS program has not yet demonstrated that it can responsively meet the urgent need to build and sustain Iraq's security forces."

U.S. Army Response: The U.S. Army nonconcur.



Observation M, Iraqi FMS Issues and Opportunities, Joint Program Management Office, page 42: "The disparate elements in the long FMS organizational processing chain, including elements dealing with export control (such as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Defense Exports and Cooperation (DASA(DE&C)) and program oversight (Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA)), could be co-located in a Joint Program Office (JPO)."

(Encl)

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
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U.S. Army Response: The U.S. Army nonconcurs.



Observation M, Iraqi FMS Issues and Opportunities, Planning Cases, page 42: "The use of Price and Availability (P&A) cases (planning cases) could improve the efficiency and responsiveness of the Iraqi FMS program by projecting multi-year planning assumptions."

U.S. Army Response: The U.S. Army partially concurs.



Recommendation M.1.b., page 43: "Establish a U.S.-based Joint Program Management Office (JPMO) to implement integration and coordination of the Iraqi FMS program, increase the responsiveness of the support effort, and meet the Wartime requirements of U.S. commanders and the Iraq Security Forces. It is critical that the JPMO be established now."

U.S. Army Response: The U.S. Army nonconcurs.



Recommendation M.3., page 43: "We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq establish and approve authorized positions for its security assistance office in the MNSTC-I Joint Manning Document office that provides sufficient personnel with the requisite skills and experience levels to successfully execute its security assistance mission."

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U.S. Army Response: The U.S. Army concurs. The lack of trained and experienced FMS personnel has severely hindered DoD's ability to accelerate delivery of defense articles to Iraq Security Forces. This inexperience often results in poorly prepared Letters of Request (LORs) containing poorly defined requirements which results in protracted FMS processing times. A detailed requirements document is one of the most important elements of the FMS process.

Since February 2006, the U.S. Army Security Assistance Command (USASAC) has deployed an active duty colonel with extensive experience in tactical and operational logistics planning and a civilian employee on six-month assignments. Although they were initially assigned as liaisons to MNSTC-I, they are currently embedded with MNSTC-I's Security Assistance Office (SAO), headed by Major General George Smith. The U.S. Army also has a call-out for three volunteers with substantial experience in international acquisition and Security Cooperation.

The DoD can increase MNSTC-I's FMS experience factor by cross-leveling experienced personnel between Combatant Commands (COCOMs). Accordingly, I recommend the Joint Staff review SAO (or equivalent organizations') manning levels across all COCOMs and move people as required. While this will not be popular, it is needed.

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## Appendix F. Organizations Supporting the Train and Equip Mission (U)

### (U) Government of Iraq Organizations.<sup>18</sup>

(U) **Iraqi Ministry of Defense.** Ministry of Defense (MoD) forces are composed of the Joint Headquarters-Command and Control (responsible for the operational command and control of all Iraqi military forces except special operations forces), the Iraqi Ground Forces Command (Army), the Iraqi Navy, the Iraqi Air Force, and the Iraqi Training and Doctrine Command.

(U) **Iraqi Ministry of Interior.** Ministry of Interior (MoI) forces are composed of the Iraqi Police Service (local police), the National Police (a nationally deployable force), the Directorate of Border Enforcement, the Directorate of Ports of Entry, the National Information and Investigation Agency, and other smaller forces. MoI also continues to consolidate the Facilities Protection Services that were assigned to the various ministries within the Government of Iraq.

(U) **Iraq Security Forces.** Iraq Security Forces (ISF) are composed of three components: the forces assigned<sup>19</sup> to MoD, which the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) estimated to have assigned more than 326,000 Service members; the forces assigned to MoI, which the MNF-Iraq estimated to have assigned more than 161,000 civilian security personnel; and the forces assigned to the Counter-Terrorism Bureau (special operations forces), which MNF-I estimated to have assigned more than 3,000 Service members.

### (U) DoD Organizations in Southwest Asia.

(U) **U.S. Central Command.** The U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) is one of the combatant commands and is headquartered at MacDill Air Force Base, Tampa, Florida. Its area of responsibility includes 27 nations that stretch from the Horn of Africa, throughout the Arabian Gulf Region, into Central Asia. USCENTCOM established MNF-I and the Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) on May 15, 2004, to replace Combined Joint Task Force 7 and assume responsibility for conducting military operations in Iraq.

(U) **Multi-National Force-Iraq.** MNF-I is headquartered at Camp Victory, Baghdad, Iraq, with the mission to create a secure environment in Iraq. MNF-I concurrently conducts stability operations to support the Government of Iraq, which will help restore essential services and develop the economy.

(U) **Multi-National Corps-Iraq.** MNC-I is a subordinate command of MNF-I and is headquartered at Camp Victory, Baghdad, Iraq. MNC-I is the

<sup>18</sup> (U) The information concerning Government of Iraq organizations was obtained from a DoD report made to Congress, "Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq," December 14, 2007.

<sup>19</sup> (U) The definition of assigned is derived from monthly payroll data for both MoD and MoI forces and includes all personnel, trained and untrained (ministry staffs are not included), who received pay the previous month but do not reflect present for duty totals.

tactical unit responsible for command and control of combat operations by Coalition forces throughout Iraq and its primary mission is to conduct counterinsurgency, stability, and support operations.

**(U) Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq.** The Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) is headquartered in the International Zone, Baghdad, Iraq, and is a subordinate command of MNF-I. MNSTC-I manages the use of Iraq Security Forces Fund funds in Iraq.

(U) The primary mission of MNSTC-I is to assist the Government of Iraq in developing, organizing, training, equipping, and sustaining ISF. This mission was previously performed by three components of MNSTC-I. The Coalition Military Assistance Training Team organized, trained, equipped, and mentored the Iraq Armed Forces. The Civilian Police Assistance Training Team organized, trained, equipped, and mentored the Iraq Civilian Police Forces and other components of MoI. The Joint Headquarters Advisory Support Team assisted the Joint Headquarters of the Iraq Armed Forces in developing a command and control system.

(U) As of January 6, 2008, MNSTC-I reorganized itself into the following components. The MNSTC-I headquarters includes the Primary and Special Staff and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission. MNSTC-I provides assistance and mentoring using training and transition teams.

- Civilian Police Assistance Training Team
- Coalition Air Force Transition Team
- Coalition Army Advisory Training Team
- Intelligence Transition Team
- Iraqi National Counter-Terrorism Task Force Transition Team
- Joint Headquarters Transition Team
- Maritime Strategic Transition Team
- Ministry of Defense Transition Team
- Ministry of Interior Transition Team

**(U) Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan.** The Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan is headquartered in the International Zone, Baghdad, Iraq, and is a subordinate command of MNF-I. The Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan provides guidance policies and procedures governing contracting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Secretary of the Army delegated the Commander, Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan to be the Executive Agent and Head of Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan.

## Appendix G. Arms and Ammunition (U)

(U) The scope of our assessment applied to the accountability and control of U.S.-purchased and otherwise obtained arms and ammunition that were under DoD control before DoD formal handover to the Iraq Security Forces. It also applied to the accountability of arms and ammunition under control of the Iraq Security Forces after DoD formal handover to them, regardless of how those arms and ammunition were procured or obtained.

Means to obtain arms and ammunition for Iraq include:

(U) Arms and ammunition may be funded by:

- U.S. appropriated funds such as Defense Appropriation Acts, the Iraq Security Forces Fund, and the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund
- Iraqi national funds that flow through the security assistance process such as Foreign Military Sales programs

(U) Arms and ammunition may be obtained physically through:

- Existing DoD stock
- Capturing, seizing, and donating
- Private security firms turn-ins

(U) Arms and ammunition may be purchased from:

- U.S. manufacturers
- Foreign manufacturers
- Arms dealers or middlemen merchants

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## Appendix H. United States Code and DoD Policies (U)

(U) United States Code (U.S.C.) requires accountability and control over U.S. Government property. DoD policies that apply to the accountability and control and the physical security of property to include arms and ammunition that implement the U.S.C. are outlined in this appendix. In addition, DoD policy governing the management of security assistance is also discussed.

(U) **Title 40 United State Code.** Title 40 U.S.C., section 524 states:

- (a) Required. - - Each executive agency shall - -
- (1) maintain adequate inventory controls and accountability systems for property under its control

(U) **DoD Instruction 5000.64, "Accountability and Management of DoD-Owned Equipment and Other Accountable Property," November 2, 2006.** DoDI 5000.64 provides policy and procedures for DoD-owned equipment and other accountable property and establishes policy and procedures to comply with 40 U.S.C. § 524. DoDI 5000.64 requires that accountable property records shall be established for all property purchased, or otherwise obtained, that are sensitive as defined in DoD 4100.39-M, "Federal Logistics Information System," Volume 10, Table 61, November 2007.<sup>20</sup>

(U) **DoD Instruction 5100.76, "Safeguarding Conventional Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives (AA&E) and the AA&E Physical Security Review Board," October 8, 2005.** DoDI 5100.76 and related guidance cited in those Instructions apply to the accountability and control of AA&E and other designated sensitive items provided to ISF. DoDI 5100.76 outlines the authorities, responsibilities, and functions relative to worldwide uniform policy, standards, and guidance for the physical security of conventional arms, ammunition, and explosives in the possession or custody of the DoD Components.

(U) **DoD 5105.38-M, "Security Assistance Management Manual," October 3, 2003.** DoD 5105.38-M provides guidance for the administration and implementation of Security Assistance<sup>21</sup> and related activities in compliance with the Foreign Assistance Act, the Arms Export Control Act, and related statutes and directives.

DoD 5105.38-M states that "title to FMS materiel normally transfers from the USG [U.S. Government] to the purchaser immediately upon its release from a DoD supply activity<sup>22</sup> (point of origin). However, USG security responsibility does not cease until the recipient Government's or international organization's

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<sup>20</sup> Sensitive items as defined by DoD 4100.39-M is shown in Appendix C.

<sup>21</sup> Security Assistance is defined in Appendix C.

<sup>22</sup> DoD 5105.38-M states a supply activity can be either a DoD storage depot or a commercial vendor that furnishes materiel under a DoD-administered contract.

Designated Government Representative (DRG) assumes final control of the consignment.”

(U) DoD 5105.38-M also states that DoD 5100.76-M defines sensitive AA&E and outlines mandatory procedures for handling, storing, protecting, securing, and transporting it. The AA&E procedures in DoD 5100.76-M also apply to FMS transfers. Sensitive AA&E are items such as small arms<sup>23</sup> weapons, various types of ammunition, explosives, and special items, such as night vision sights and goggles that pose a special danger to the public if they fall into the wrong hands.

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<sup>23</sup> Small arms are defined in Appendix C.

## **Appendix I. Report Distribution (U)**

### **(U) Department of State**

Secretary of State  
U.S. Ambassador to Iraq  
Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs  
Inspector General, Department of State

### **(U) Office of the Secretary of Defense**

Secretary of Defense\*  
Deputy Secretary of Defense\*  
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff\*  
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics\*  
Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer  
    Deputy Chief Financial Officer  
    Deputy Comptroller (Program/Budget)  
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy\*  
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence\*  
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff\*  
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Legislative Affairs)  
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)  
Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation  
Director, Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy  
Director, Joint Staff  
    Director, Operations (J-3)  
    Director, Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5)

### **(U) Department of the Army**

Secretary of the Army\*  
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology  
Commander, U.S. Army Materiel Command\*  
    Executive Director for Conventional Ammunition  
    Commander, U.S. Army Joint Arms and Ammunition Command  
    Commander, U.S. Army Materiel Command Logistics Support Activity  
    Commander, U.S. Army Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command  
    Commander, U.S. Army Security Assistance Command  
    Commander, U.S. Army TACOM and Life Cycle Management Command  
Commander/Chief of Engineers, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers  
    Commander, Gulf Region Division, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers  
Auditor General, Department of the Army  
Inspector General of the Army

\*Recipient of the draft report

**(U) Department of the Navy**

Naval Inspector General  
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (International Programs)

**(U) Department of the Air Force**

Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management and Comptroller)  
Commander, Air Force Security Assistance Center  
Inspector General of the Air Force

**(U) Combatant Commands**

Commander, U.S. Central Command\*  
Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq\*  
Commander, Multi-National Corps-Iraq\*  
Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq\*  
Commander, Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan\*  
Commander, U.S. Transportation Command  
U.S. Air Force Air Mobility Command

**(U) Other Defense Organizations**

Director, Defense Contract Audit Agency  
Director, Defense Logistics Agency  
Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency\*  
The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction

**(U) Other Non-Defense Federal Organizations**

Comptroller of the United States  
Office of Management and Budget

\*Recipient of the draft report



**(U) Congressional Committees and Subcommittees, Chairman  
and Ranking Minority Member**

Senate Committee on Appropriations

Senate Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations

Senate Committee on Armed Services

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations

Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

House Committee on Appropriations

House Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations

House Committee on Armed Services

House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

House Subcommittee on Government Management, Organization, and Procurement

House Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs

House Committee on International Relations

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Inspector General  
Department of Defense

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