



INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE
ARLINGTON, VA 22202-4704

Ref: 09-0029
August 20, 2009

OCCL

Mr. Matt Schroeder
Federation of American Scientists
1725 Desales Street, NW Ste 600
Washington, DC 20036

Dear Mr. Schroeder:

This is the final response to your November 5, 2008 Freedom of Information Act request, seeking a copy of *"Assessment of the Accountability of Arm[s] and Ammunition provided to the Security Forces of Iraq, SPO-2008-001, published 3 July 2008."* We received your request on November 10, 2008.

Please find enclosed the document you requested. I am, however, withholding portions of this record because they are currently and properly classified under the provisions of Exemptions 1, 2, 5 and 6 of the Freedom of Information Act, specifically 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) and Executive Order 12958, as amended, specifically, Section 1.4 (c) intelligence activities, intelligence sources or methods, or cryptology. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(2)(High), which pertains solely to the internal rules and practices of an agency, the release of which could risk circumvention of a statute, regulation or policy 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(5), which pertains to information that is deliberative in nature, contains subjective evaluations, opinions and recommendations, which if disclosed would inhibit the decision making process and 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6), which pertains to information that if released would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of third parties.

If you are not satisfied with this action, you may submit an administrative appeal to Mr. John R. Crane, Assistant Inspector General, Office of Communications and Congressional Liaison, Room 1021, 400 Army Navy Drive, Arlington, VA 22202-4704.

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Report No. SPO-2008-001

July 3, 2008

Inspector General

United States
Department of Defense



Special Plans and Operations

Assessment of the Accountability of Arms and Ammunition Provided to the Security Forces of Iraq (U)

~~Classified by: Claude M. Kicklighter, Inspector General~~

~~Reason: 1.4 (a) (g)~~

~~Declassify on: July 3, 2018~~

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(U) Additional Information and Copies

The Department of Defense Office of Inspector General Assessment Team on Arms and Ammunition Accountability prepared this report. If you would like to obtain additional copies of this report or to suggest ideas for or to request future assessments, contact Assistant Inspector General Kenneth P. Moorefield at (703) 604- [REDACTED] (DSN 664- [REDACTED]) or [REDACTED] at (703) 604- [REDACTED] (DSN 664- [REDACTED]), [REDACTED]@dodig.mil.

Acronyms

AA&E
BPC
CAATT
CEW
DoDI
DoDIG
FMS
FRAGO
GAO
ILDC
IRRF
ISF
ISFF
JMD
LMAT
MITT
MNC-I
MNF-I
MNSTC-I
MoI
MoD
NPTT
RFF
SAO
SOP
SIGIR
TACOM

TND
USCENTCOM
USD(AT&L)

USD(I)
USD(P)

Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives
Baghdad Police College
Coalition Army Advisory Training Team
Captured Enemy Weapons
DoD Instruction
Department of Defense Inspector General
Foreign Military Sales
Fragmentary Order-a change to an Operations Order
Government Accountability Office
Iraqi Logistics Development Committee
Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund
Iraq Security Forces
Iraq Security Forces Fund
Joint Manning Document
Logistics Management Advisory Team
Military Training Team
Multi-National Corps-Iraq
Multi-National Force-Iraq
Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq
Ministry of Interior
Ministry of Defense
National Police Transition Team
Request for Forces
Security Assistance Office
Standard Operating Procedures
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
U.S. Army Tank, Automotive, and Life Cycle Management Command
Taji National Depot
U.S. Central Command
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

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INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-4704

July 3, 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION (U)

SUBJECT: Report on the Assessment of the Accountability of Arms and Ammunition Provided to the Security Forces of Iraq (Report No. SPO-2008-001/Project No. D2007-D000IG-0239.000) (U)

(U) We are providing this final report for your information and use. We performed this assessment in response to requests from the Secretary of Defense; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; and from Congress.

(U) The follow-up to this assessment was conducted in Iraq from April 26 to May 17, 2008. We note that progress has been made on all of the "in-country" recommendations. The results of the follow-up assessment will be published in a separate report.

(U) For purposes of this report, we request the following additional comments and information within 30 days of the report publication date:

- (U) From the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence—a copy of the memorandum clarifying the applicability of DoDI 5000.64, DoDI 5100.75, and DoD 5200.8-R to accountability, control, and physical security of arms and ammunition. (See management comments to recommendation A.)
- (U) From USCENTCOM—A copy of the formal guidance governing accountability and control of arms and ammunition throughout the CENTCOM area of responsibility until formal handover to Iraq Security Forces. (See management comments to recommendation B.1.)
- (U) From the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy:
 - (U) Reconsideration of their nonconcurrence with recommendation M.1 (coordinated with the Army.) (See management comments and assessment response to recommendation M.1.)
 - (U) Reconsideration of their position on recommendation N.1 (coordinated with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and USCENTCOM). (See management comments and assessment response to recommendation N.1.)
- (U) From the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics—reconsideration of their position on recommendation N.1

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(coordinated with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and USCENTCOM). (See management comments and assessment response to recommendation N.1.)

- (U) From MNF-I—A copy of the FRAGO implementing a Logistics Action Plan directing MNF-I and subordinate units to execute effects-based tasks to increase the ISF logistics capability and capacity. (See management comments to recommendation N.2.c.)

(U) We appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff. Questions should be directed to Assistant Inspector General Kenneth P. Moorefield at (703) 604- [REDACTED] (DSN [REDACTED]) or [REDACTED] at (703) 604- [REDACTED] (DSN [REDACTED]), [REDACTED]@dodig.mil. See Appendix I for the report distribution.


Claude M. Kicklighter

Classified By: ~~Claude M. Kicklighter, Inspector General~~
Reason: ~~1.4 (a) (g)~~
Declassify On: ~~July 3, 2018~~

DISTRIBUTION: (U)

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY, AND LOGISTICS
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE
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COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND
COMMANDER, MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE-IRAQ
COMMANDER, U.S. ARMY MATERIEL COMMAND
COMMANDER, MULTI-NATIONAL CORPS-IRAQ
COMMANDER, MULTI-NATIONAL SECURITY TRANSITION COMMAND-IRAQ
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE SECURITY COOPERATION AGENCY
COMMANDER, JOINT CONTRACTING COMMAND-IRAQ/AFGHANISTAN

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL (U)

Report No. SPO-2008-001

Project No. D2007-D000IG-0239.000 (U)

July 3, 2008

**Assessment of the Accountability of Arms and
Ammunition Provided to the Security Forces of
Iraq (U)**

Executive Summary (U)

Background (U)

(U) DoD Office of Inspector General (OIG) efforts regarding the accountability and control of U.S.-purchased arms and ammunition provided to the Iraq Security Forces (ISF) was triggered by a December 2005 DoD Hotline complaint and other information that a senior U.S. Army officer received illegal gratuities from a DoD contractor. This has evolved into extensive and ongoing DoD criminal investigations involving millions of dollars in bribes and a number of U.S. military officers, noncommissioned officers, civilian officials, and DoD contractors.

(U) **Initiation of the Assessment.** While investigating these complaints, investigators from the OIG Defense Criminal Investigative Service and the U.S. Army Criminal Investigative Division raised further concerns about the accountability, control, and loss of weapons provided to the ISF by the U.S. Government. These concerns were reinforced by a Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction audit report, followed by a Government Accountability Office audit report, which indicated accountability and control problems with particular weapons provided to the ISF in Iraq. Appendix B provides a discussion of these reports.

(U) In December 2006 and January 2007 the DoD OIG received allegations from the Turkish National Police and Ministry of Defense that weapons and explosives the U.S. supplied to the ISF were finding their way into the hands of insurgents, terrorists, and criminals in Turkey.

(U) After being briefed on that situation, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and congressional leadership requested that the DoD Inspector General send a team to review the current accountability and control over arms and ammunition provided to the ISF. The DoD Inspector General organized and deployed an Assessment Team to address the issue and review arms and ammunition accountability. Appendix C provides definitions of terms

used in this report. Appendix D lists organizations contacted and visited.

(U) **Assessment Team Actions.** As the Assessment Team redeployed from Iraq in October 2007, the Inspector General out-briefed the preliminary observations and recommendations to the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq; the Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I); the Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I); and, by video teleconference, the Deputy Commander and key staff members at U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM).

(U) On the basis of our preliminary recommendations, these commands initiated a number of immediate corrective actions. A written status report on the preliminary recommendations that identified those corrective actions was submitted to the Inspector General by the Deputy Commander, USCENTCOM, on December 7, 2007. Input from the status report was considered in the development of the draft report that went out for formal management comments.

(U) That report indicated that USCENTCOM and its subordinate field commands had taken constructive and aggressive action to address the spectrum of our observations and recommendations. Those initiatives included addressing many of the issues we reported on policies and procedures, personnel resources and infrastructure, U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS), and ISF logistics capabilities. Where applicable, we have noted, throughout this report, those actions taken by USCENTCOM in response to our preliminary recommendations.

Objectives (U)

(U) The announced overall objective of the assessment team on arms and ammunition accountability was to determine whether the controls over the distribution of conventional military arms, ammunition, and explosives provided to the security forces of Iraq were adequate.

(U) Subsequently, the team revised its objectives for Iraq to determine whether:

- (U) DoD currently had adequate accountability and control over U.S.-purchased and otherwise obtained arms and ammunition¹ under its control before formal handover to ISF; and
- (U) Whether ISF currently had adequate accountability and controls over U.S.-purchased and otherwise obtained arms and ammunition under its control after receiving them from DoD.

(U) After the team arrived in Iraq, it began an examination of two additional but related issues:

- (U) The effectiveness of the FMS program; and
- (U) The current status of the development of the Iraqi logistics sustainment base.

(U) Both of those issues are extremely important to the ability of the U.S. and

¹ Arms and ammunition captured, seized, donated, turned-in, and obtained through existing U.S. stocks.

ISF to improve accountability and control of arms and ammunition and are key to an independent ISF.

Scope (U)

(U) We examined accountability and control policies and procedures for arms and ammunition in Iraq that were in place at the time of our assessment. The scope of our assessment in Iraq applied to two areas:

1. (U) U.S.-purchased and otherwise obtained arms and ammunition that were under DoD control before DoD formally transferred them to the ISF. Specifically, we reviewed accountability and control of arms and ammunition from the time of arrival at selected Iraq ports of entry until the formal handover to ISF.
2. (U) U.S.-purchased and otherwise obtained arms and ammunition that were under ISF control after DoD formally transferred them to ISF. Specifically, we reviewed arms and ammunition from the time of formal handover to ISF by DoD organizations through the subsequent issuance to selected Iraqi military and police units.

Arms and Ammunition Assessment Team Chronology (U)

(U) June – July 2007	Briefed DoD and Department of State leadership and Congressional Committees
(U) July 2007	DoD Arms and Ammunition Assessment Team established
(U) September – October 2007	Trip to Kuwait, Afghanistan, and Iraq
(U) November 2007	Briefed the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(U) December 2007	Briefed Congressional Committees
(U) December 2007– March 2008	Report writing
(U) March 2008	Draft assessment report issued
(U) April 2008	Management comments received and evaluated
(U) April – May 2008	DoD Arms and Ammunition Assessment Team Follow-up Trip to Iraq

Arms and Ammunition Accountability and Control – What is Working (U)

(U) The DoD has made and continues to make improvements in accountability and control over arms and ammunition being supplied to ISF; however, there is still work to be done.

- (U) MNF-I and its subordinate command, MNSTC-I, began implementing a weapons serialization program in 2006 that accounted for weapons being purchased for and supplied to ISF through the train-and-equip mission.
- (U) MNSTC-I initiated joint inventories of arms and ammunition between U.S forces and ISF at Taji National Depot (the Iraqi national military arms and ammunition depot) and Baghdad Police College (the Iraqi national police arms and ammunition depot).
- (U) U.S. forces transferred responsibility and oversight of equipment and arms and ammunition to ISF by assisting the Iraqi Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the Iraqi Ministry of Interior (MoI) in opening their national, regional, and provincial warehouses for arms and ammunition storage.

(U) The ISF has efforts underway to establish more effective accountability and control for arms and ammunition. Progress is being made, but improvements must continue.

- (U) The Iraqi Army has established a system of property books, by serial number, which includes all weapons issued to its soldiers. As of October 2007, the system was estimated to be 85 percent complete, down to the company level. The Iraqi Army's goal is 100 percent.
- (U) The Iraqi Army was issuing U.S.-supplied M16A4 and M4 rifles to individual soldiers by serial number and using biometric technology, including fingerprints, photographs, and iris scans.
- (U) Since January 2007, the MoI has maintained a centralized database of serial numbers for weapons in the police force inventory and has recorded all serial numbers of weapons coming into Baghdad Police College (BPC), as well as those subsequently issued from BPC to police units.
- (U) The MoI is recording serial numbers of weapons previously issued to the police, with the goal of having the inventory 75 percent complete by the end of 2007.

Arms and Ammunition Accountability and Control – What Issues Need to be Addressed (U)

Part I - DoD and Iraq Security Forces Policy and Procedures: Observations and Recommendations² (U)

(U) **Observation A.** The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD[AT&L]) and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD[I]) had not clarified the applicability of existing DoD policy regarding accountability and control of U.S.-supplied arms and ammunition to ISF.

(U) **Recommendation for Observation A.** The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence should issue a letter to clarify that Department of Defense Instruction 5000.64 governs the accountability and control and Department of Defense Instruction 5100.76 governs the physical security of arms, ammunition, and explosives under U.S. control from the point of entry into the United States Central Command area of responsibility until formal handover to Iraq Security Forces or, as appropriate, to other Coalition partners within the United States Central Command area of responsibility.

(U) Observation B.

(U) USCENTCOM, MNF-I, Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I), and MNSTC-I had not issued written guidance for the accountability and control of arms and ammunition delivered to or transported through the USCENTCOM area of responsibility and subsequently provided to ISF or Coalition partners.

(U) MNF-I had not issued a uniform policy to coordinate the efforts of MNC-I and MNSTC-I for the accountability and control of arms and ammunition delivered to or transported through Iraq.

(U) Recommendations for Observation B.

(U) United States Central Command should issue formal procedures governing the accountability and control of arms and ammunition under U.S. control from the point of entry into and transport through the United States Central Command area of responsibility until formal handover to Iraq Security Forces or, as appropriate, to other Coalition partners within the United States Central Command area of responsibility.

² Unless noted under a specific recommendation in the Executive Summary, management concurred with the recommendations. Detailed management comments are provided in the body of the report and the full version of the comments are in Appendix E.

(U) Multi-National Force-Iraq should issue formal procedures to govern and coordinate the efforts of its subordinate organizations to account for and control arms and ammunition under U.S. control from the point of entry into and transport through Iraq until formal handover to Iraq Security Forces or, as appropriate, to other Coalition partners in Iraq.

(U) **Observation C.** MNF-I had not clearly defined procedures for the accountability, control, and final disposition of weapons captured by U.S. forces, to include recording captured weapons serial numbers, and had not issued uniform procedures to coordinate the efforts of MNC-I and MNSTC-I for the captured weapons.

(U) **Recommendation for Observation C.** Multi-National Force-Iraq should issue formal procedures to govern the accountability, control, and final disposition of weapons captured by U.S. forces and to coordinate the efforts of Multi-National Corps-Iraq and Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq in processing weapons captured by U.S. forces.

(U) **Observation D.** MNF-I had not issued procedures on the missions, roles, and responsibilities applicable to U.S. and Coalition transition teams and senior advisors involved in advising and assisting MoD, MoI, and subordinate ISF organizations or to coordinate the efforts of MNC-I and MNSTC-I transition teams to support the ISF in its efforts to account for and control U.S.-supplied or Iraqi-procured arms and ammunition.

(U) **Recommendation for Observation D.** Multi-National Force-Iraq should issue formal procedures on the missions, roles, and responsibilities applicable to U.S. and Coalition transition teams and senior advisors involved in advising and assisting the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior, and subordinate Iraq Security Forces organizations and to coordinate the efforts of Multi-National Corps-Iraq and Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq transition teams to support the Iraqi Security forces in its efforts to account for and control U.S.-supplied or Iraqi-procured arms and ammunition.

(U) **Observation E.** MoD and MoI had not issued written policies and procedures for military and police national arms and ammunition depots and other storage facilities (such as provincial, regional, unit, or station levels) for the accountability and control of U.S.-supplied or Iraqi-procured arms and ammunition.

(U) **Recommendation for Observation E.** Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq should advise and assist the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior in the preparation and promulgation of formal policies and procedures for military and police national arms and ammunition depots and other storage facilities that address the accountability and control of U.S.-supplied or Iraqi-procured arms and ammunition.

(U) **Observation F.** MoD and MoI had not issued written policies and procedures for the accountability, control, processing, and disposition of weapons captured by ISF or Coalition forces, to include weapons captured by U.S. forces that are subsequently turned over to ISF.

(U) **Recommendation for Observation F.** Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq should advise and assist the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of

Interior in the preparation and promulgation of formal policies and procedures for the accountability, control, processing, and final disposition of weapons the Iraq Security Forces captures or weapons captured and turned over to the Iraq Security Forces by Coalition forces.

Part II - DoD and Iraq Security Forces Operations: Observations and Recommendations (U)

(U) Observation G.

(U) U.S. forces did not always maintain an unbroken chain of custody for the accountability and control of U.S.- controlled arms and ammunition before formal handover to ISF.

(U) U.S. arms and ammunition were placed temporarily in areas that lacked sufficient physical security to prevent misplacement, loss, or theft or sufficient storage capacity to efficiently process high-volume deliveries of arms and ammunition shipments.

(U) U.S. forces and ISF did not always perform joint inventories of U.S.-controlled weapons prior to formal handover to ISF, and serial numbers for weapons were not always recorded.

(U) Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan contracts for the procurement of weapons did not always contain clauses requiring lists of weapons serial numbers be sent in advance of weapons shipments to Iraq, the delivery of arms and ammunition to Iraq through U.S.-controlled ports of entry within Iraq, or that shippers provide enroute visibility, to include the arrival dates and times of arms and ammunition cargo being delivered to Iraq.

(U) Recommendations for Observation G.

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(U) Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, with advice and assistance from the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior, should jointly develop formal procedures for the delivery, joint inventory, and formal handover of U.S.-controlled arms and ammunition delivered to Iraq Security Forces.

(U) Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan should review all contracts issued to procure and deliver arms and ammunition to ensure that clauses are included that require vendors and shippers to:

- (U) Deliver arms and ammunition to Iraq through U.S.-controlled ports of entry within Iraq;
- (U) Provide serial number lists electronically in advance of any weapons shipments to Iraq;
- (U) Post serial number lists on the inside and outside of weapons shipping containers: and
- (U) Provide enroute visibility to include the arrival dates and times of arms and ammunition cargo being delivered to Iraq.

(U) **Observation H.** The process to populate the MNSTC-I centralized database of weapons serial numbers for weapons issued to ISF by U.S. forces lacked internal data input controls.

(U) **Recommendation for Observation H.** Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq should install data input quality controls in its centralized database of weapons serial numbers using a trained database programmer, and U.S. Army Materiel Command Logistics Support Activity should assist Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq with installing data input quality controls in its centralized database to ensure system compatibility.

(U) **Observation I.**

(U) The physical count of three types of Iraqi military weapons maintained at Taji National Depot (TND) did not match the numbers of weapons recorded in the inventory database. In addition, the team was unable to locate all of the three types of weapons in TND because of the disorganized manner in which the weapons were physically stored.

(U) The BPC did not have sufficient storage capacity for the anticipated volume of arms and ammunition shipments procured through the Iraq Security Forces Fund and FMS.

(U) **Recommendations for Observation I.**

(U) Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq should advise and assist the Ministry of Defense in performing a 100 percent inventory to establish a baseline for Iraqi military weapons and ammunition stored at Taji National Depot. Thereafter, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq should advise and assist the Ministry of Defense in performing a 10 percent inventory of Iraqi military weapons and ammunition on a monthly basis.

(U) Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq should advise and assist the Ministry of Defense in establishing effective warehouse management and organization processes at Taji National Depot for storing weapons and ammunition and requesting help from U.S.-based logistics organizations as needed.

(U) Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq should advise and assist the Ministry of Interior to construct sufficient capacity for arms and ammunition storage at Baghdad Police College and other sites as necessary for the anticipated volume of arms and ammunition shipments.

~~(S)~~ [REDACTED]

~~(S)~~ [REDACTED]

(U) Observation K.

(U) Data gathered from U.S. military transition teams supporting four Iraqi Divisions on the accountability of arms and ammunition indicated that approximately 85 percent of the Iraqi Army units in those divisions were accounting for weapons by serial number, with plans to increase to 100 percent. Further, the MoI started recording serial numbers of weapons issued to police forces in January 2007.

(U) Although the MoI has begun to develop a centralized database to record serial numbers of MoI weapons, we found no indication of a similar effort underway in the MoD.

(U) Recommendations for Observation K.

(U) Multi-National Force-Iraq should advise and assist the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior, and their subordinate military and police organizations in attaining and maintaining 100 percent accountability and control of Iraq Security Forces' weapons by serial numbers.

(U) Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq should instruct all U.S. and Coalition military transition teams to assist/mentor the appropriate Iraqi personnel in the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior in development of their own centralized database of weapons' serial numbers.

(U) Management Comment. MNF-I nonconcurred with this recommendation as it was initially written, stating it gave the impression that MNSTC-I should register all Iraqi weapons in the MNSTC-I weapons serial number database. On the basis of the MNF-I management comments, we modified the recommendation as currently written above, encouraging the MoD and MoI to develop their own weapons serial number databases.

**Part III - DoD Personnel Resources:
Observations and Recommendations (U)**

(U) **Observation L.** The MNSTC-I J4 (logistics function) did not have sufficient personnel, and those they had did not have the requisite skills and experience levels, to carry out its mission (including arms and ammunition oversight). Further, MNSTC-I program oversight was hindered because the command did not have an Inspector General and had only one internal audit liaison officer.

(U) **Recommendations for Observation L.**

(U) Multi-National Force-Iraq should approve a Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq Joint Manning Document that provides for sufficient numbers of personnel to successfully execute its logistics mission and establish and staff an Office of the Inspector General and an Office of Internal Review.

(U) United States Central Command and the Joint Staff should expeditiously approve the proposed Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq Joint Manning Document and expedite the assignment of personnel to fill positions designated in Joint Manning Document.

**Part IV – U.S. Foreign Military Sales:
Observations and Recommendations (U)**

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(U) **Recommendations for Observation M.**

(U) The Secretary of Defense should appoint a Department of Defense Executive Agent for the Iraqi Foreign Military Sales program. Consideration should be given to designating the Secretary of the Army as the Executive Agent. The Executive Agent will activate a Joint Program Management Office that will focus full-time on support for ISF, seven days per week to:

- Integrate, expedite, coordinate and drive the Iraqi Foreign Military Sales program in the United States, increase the responsiveness of the support effort for the U.S. commanders, and meet the wartime requirements of the Iraqi Security forces. This is an operational, not a policy, office or another bureaucratic layer. The office's only mission is to ensure the support in the security assistance area is provided to U.S. Central Command, Multi-National Force-Iraq and Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq.

- Ensure U.S. Central Command, Multi-National Force-Iraq, Multi-National Corps-Iraq and Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq have the support needed, as required and on-time, to better assist MoD and MoI to build combat ready military and police forces.

(U) Management Comments.

(U) The Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) (USD[P]) nonconcurred, noting that an Executive Agent for FMS already exists—the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. Furthermore, establishment of a formal Joint Program Management Office for the Iraq FMS program would create unneeded bureaucracy and is not necessary in view of actions already taken to improve the responsiveness of the Iraq FMS program. Moreover, establishment of a U.S.-based Joint Program Management Office to implement integration/coordination of a country's FMS program would, in general, need to be requested by the government of that country and funded by it.

(U) The Secretary of the Army also nonconcurred, noting that the Defense Technology Security Administration was already performing the function of the proposed Joint Program Management Office. The Secretary of the Army also noted that the Army had diverted thousands of items from inventory and accelerated delivery of numerous commodities.

(U) Assessment Response. We did not modify the recommendation. On the basis of our assessment of the management comments, we continue to believe appointing an Executive Agent is the preferred option.

(U) The USD(P) comments noted that an executive agent for FMS already exists. However, DoDD 5106.65 established DSCA as an agency of DoD, not as an "executive agent" of FMS. The Directive further states that the Director, DSCA, shall be appointed by USD(P). DoDD 5101.1 states that only SECDEF or DEPSECDEF may designate a DoD Executive Agent. Since the Director, DSCA is appointed by USD(P), rather than by SECDEF or DEPSECDEF; the Director, DSCA is not an executive agent until and unless so designated by SECDEF or DEPSECDEF.

(U) We also see the Joint Program Management Office as an operational office, vice a policy office. The mission of this office is to solve problems and eliminate bottlenecks.

(U) We ask that USD(P), in coordination with the Army, reconsider their position on Recommendation M.1 and provide additional comments or options within 30 days of the report publication date.

Recommendations for Observation M (continued).

(U) The Secretary of Defense, with appropriate congressional approval, should establish a Defense Coalition Support Account to acquire a pool of high priority, high demand, urgently needed equipment that will be immediately available for shipment to the Iraqi Security Forces to expand forces, modernize forces, and replace combat losses.

(U) Multi-National Force-Iraq should establish and approve authorized positions for its security assistance office in the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq Joint Manning Document that provides sufficient personnel with the requisite skills and experience levels to successfully execute its security assistance mission.

(U) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and United States Central Command should expedite:

- (U) Approval of the Multi-National Security Transition Command- Iraq Joint Manning Document; and
- (U) Assignment of personnel with the requisite skills, experience levels, and rank to fill positions designated in the Joint Manning Document.

(U) Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq should advise and assist the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior in establishing a requirements planning process that forecasts the Iraq Security Forces' equipment and training needs on a multi-year basis to stabilize and improve the responsiveness of the Iraq Foreign Military Sales program.

Part V – Iraq Security Forces Logistics Capabilities: Observations and Recommendations (U)

(U) Observation N.

(U) The ISF logistics system was in the early stages of development; the system was fragile and not capable of totally sustaining independent ISF military operations. MNSTC-I and MNC-I do not have sufficient personnel with the requisite skills and experience levels to carry out their logistics mentoring mission and assist ISF in establishing its logistical sustainment base. Establishing this sustainment capability is a U.S. and Iraqi top priority.

(U) The expeditious approval of the proposed MNSTC-I JMD/Request for Forces and the assignment of personnel with the requisite skills, experience levels, and rank to fill positions for the logistics mentoring functions will greatly enhance ISF efforts to become self sufficient and increasingly take over battle space. This result will greatly reduce the demands on Coalition forces.

(U) Recommendations for Observation N.

(U) The Secretary of Defense should appoint a Department of Defense Executive Agent to integrate, coordinate, and expedite the support needed by the U.S. Central Command, the Multi-National Force-Iraq, the Multi-National Corps-Iraq, and the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq as they advise and assist the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior in planning and building their logistics sustainment base for the Iraq Security Forces. The

Executive Agent would drive the support needed from the United States to support the U.S. Commanders as they assist the Iraq Security Forces build their ability to conduct totally independent operations and expand their battle space.

(U) Management Comments.

(U) USD(P) and USD(AT&L) concurred with the importance of developing the ISF logistics capabilities, agreeing to explore options and mechanisms to assist the government of Iraq in that effort. However, they did not explicitly support or reject the "Executive Agent" proposal, which was part of our recommendation.

(U) Assessment Response.

(U) On the basis of the management comments and our assessment of those comments, we continue to believe appointing a DoD Executive Agent is the preferred option to ensure USCENCOM, MNF-I, MNC-I, and MNSTC-I have the support needed to assist ISF build their capacity to fully support combat operations. MNF-I, MNC-I, and MNSTC-I must have quick reach back capability, through USCENCOM, to a single operational point of contact so that timely support will be provided to USCENCOM and MNF-I related to developing ISF logistics capacity. This DoD Executive Agent must be available twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week and have this as the only mission.

(U) Because we believe that the success of the logistics sustainment program for Iraq is so critical and the USD(P) and USD(AT&L) response did not clearly indicate concurrence or nonconcurrence with the Executive Agent proposal, we recommend that senior management reconsider the proposal to establish an Executive Agent to drive this program, focusing on the areas that need improvement.

(U) If USD(P) and USD(AT&L) disagree with recommendation N.1, we ask that they develop and provide options other than appointing an Executive Agent, as they committed to in their response. We request that they coordinate these options with USCENCOM. We also request this information within 30 days so that we can evaluate the options independently.

Recommendations for Observation N (continued).

(U) Multi-National Force-Iraq should:

- (U) Establish and approve the required positions for senior logistics mentors and military and police transition team logistics mentors in the Multi-National Corps-Iraq and the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq through the Joint Manning Document or Request for Forces processes so as to provide sufficient personnel with the requisite skills and experience levels to successfully execute the logistics mentoring mission.
- (U) Ensure that senior logistics mentors and military transition team logistics mentors assigned to Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq via the Joint Manning

- (U) Establish a logistics training program in Iraq, comparable in comprehensiveness to that currently provided by the Counter-Insurgency Academy, to train U.S. military and police transition team logistics mentors. This could be a block of instruction taught at the Counter Insurgency Academy itself. We need to ensure that logistics mentors/advisors are prepared to perform this critical mission.

(U) Management Comments. MNF-I nonconcurred with recommendation to establish a logistics training program in Iraq, comparable to the Counter-Insurgency Academy. The MNF-I CG established an Iraqi Logistics Development Committee (ILDC), an initiatives group to develop a way ahead to assist the accelerated growth of the ISF life support, maintenance, and logistics system. In late March 2008, the initiatives group provided a decision brief to the Commander, MNC-I and Commander, MNSTC-I. MNF-I planned to publish a FRAGO in late May 2008 that will provide a Logistics Action Plan directing MNF-I and subordinate units to execute effects-based tasks to increase the ISF logistics capability and capacity.

(U) Assessment Response. We did not modify the recommendation. Our recommendation was a request to insure the logistics trainers and mentors were properly trained for the mission they were assigned. We found some very dedicated trainers and mentors that were not properly prepared for the job they were given. In response to the final report, we ask that MNF-I provide us with a copy of the MNF-I FRAGO that will implement the Logistics Action Plan, as developed by the ILDC OPT. We will review this document to determine if meets the intent this recommendation.

Recommendations for Observation N (continued).

- (U) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and United States Central Command should expedite:
- (U) Approval of the Multi-National Corps-Iraq and Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq Joint Manning Document/Request for Forces;
 - (U) A request for the necessary funding; and
 - (U) Assignment of personnel with the requisite skills, experience levels, and rank, to include civilians from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, to fill positions designated in the Joint Manning Document/Request for Forces for the Multi-National Corps-Iraq and Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq logistics mentoring functions.

(U) Assessment Follow-Up. The follow-up to this assessment was conducted in Iraq from April 26 to May 17, 2008. We note that progress has been made on all of the "in country" recommendations. The results of that follow-up assessment will be published in a separate report.

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Background (U)

(U) DoD Office of Inspector General (OIG) efforts regarding the accountability³ and control of U.S.-purchased arms and ammunition⁴ provided to the Iraq Security Forces (ISF) was triggered by a December 2005 DoD Hotline complaint and other allegations alleging that a senior U.S. Army officer received illegal gratuities from a DoD contractor. This has evolved into extensive and ongoing DoD criminal investigations, involving millions of dollars in bribes and a number of U.S. military officers, noncommissioned officers, civilian officials, and DoD contractors.

(U) **Initiation of the Assessment.** While investigating these complaints, investigators from the OIG Defense Criminal Investigative Service and the U.S. Army Criminal Investigative Division raised further concerns about the accountability, control, and loss of weapons provided to the ISF by the United States. Those concerns were reinforced by the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction and Government Accountability Office audit reports that indicated accountability and control problems with particular weapons provided to ISF. Appendix B provides a discussion of those audit reports.

(U) In December 2006 and January 2007 the DoD OIG received allegations from the Turkish National Police and Ministry of Defense that weapons and explosives the U.S. was supplying to the ISF were finding their way into the hands of insurgents, terrorists, and criminals in Turkey.

(U) The Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and congressional leadership requested that the DoD Inspector General (DoDIG) send a team to review the current accountability and control over arms and ammunition provided to ISF. The Inspector General organized an assessment team on arms and ammunition accountability to address the issue.

(U) **Assessment Team Actions.** As the DoDIG assessment team redeployed from Iraq in October 2007, the Inspector General out-briefed the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq; the Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I); the Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) and, by video teleconference, the Deputy Commander, U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) on the preliminary observations and recommendations.

(U) On the basis of our preliminary recommendations, the military commands initiated a number of corrective actions. A written status report that identified those corrective actions was submitted to the DoDIG by the Deputy Commander, USCENTCOM, on December 7, 2007.

(U) The USCENTCOM report indicated that the field commands had already taken constructive and expeditious actions to address the spectrum of our

³ Accountability is defined in Appendix C.

⁴ Arms and ammunition is defined in Appendix C.

observations and recommendations, which included addressing many of the issues we raised on policies and procedures, personnel resources and infrastructure, U.S. Foreign Military Sales⁵ (FMS), and ISF logistics⁶ sustainment capabilities. Where applicable, we have noted those actions taken by USCENCOM throughout this report.

(U) Public Laws. Congress provided more than \$18.6 billion through Public Law 108-106, as amended, to remain available until September 30, 2006, to the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF). IRRF was to be used for the security, relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction of Iraq. Some of these funds were allocated for the procurement of arms and ammunition for ISF.

(U) Congress also provided more than \$15.4 billion to the Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF) through Public Laws 109-13, 109-234, 109-289, 110-28, and 110-161. Some of these funds were allocated for the procurement of arms and ammunition for ISF.

(U) National Priorities. National priorities concerning Iraq are discussed in the National Security Council's "National Strategy for Victory in Iraq," November 2005, and in charts describing the highlights of the National Security Council's "Iraq Strategy Review," January 2007.

(U) The "National Strategy for Victory in Iraq," states in its Strategic Pillar Two, "Transition Iraq to Security Self-Reliance," that the strategic objective is "The Government of Iraq provides for the internal security of Iraq, monitors and controls its borders, successfully defends against terrorists and other security threats." The document states that the U.S. is helping Iraq achieve this objective by pursuing lines of action such as:

Helping to train and equip the Iraq Security Forces, military, and police, so they can combat terrorist and other enemy activity and maintain a secure environment in Iraq.

Assisting in the development of Iraq's security ministries to control, manage, and sustain the Iraq Security Forces and assume greater responsibility for the security of the state.

(U) The "Iraq Strategy Review," states that "while our strategic goal requires a long-term relationship with Iraq, we are at a new phase in the effort and must sharpen the objectives we believe are achievable in the next 12-18 months." One of the objectives in this new phase is to "continue to strengthen Iraq Security Forces and accelerate the transition of security responsibility to the Iraqi Government."

(U) Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq. Specific performance indicators and measures of progress toward political, economic, and security stability in Iraq

⁵ Foreign Military Sales is defined in Appendix C.

⁶ Logistics is defined in Appendix C.

are provided in a DoD report made to Congress quarterly, "Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq," as required by Public Law 109-289, section 9010 (as amended by section 1308 of Public Law 110-28), "Department of Defense Appropriations Act for 2007." The two most recent reports were issued September 14, 2007, and December 14, 2007. The reports complement other reports and information about Iraq provided to Congress and are not intended as a single source of all information about the combined efforts or the future strategy of the United States, its Coalition partners, or Iraq.

(U) Train and Equip Mission. Public Laws 109-13, 109-234, 109-289, and 110-28 define the train and equip mission. Those laws provided ISFF funds to be used to provide funding; equipment; supplies; services; training; facility and infrastructure repair, renovation, and construction for the security forces of Iraq.

(U) Organizations Involved in the Train and Equip Mission. Organizations involved in the train and equip mission are discussed in Appendix F.

(U) Arms and Ammunition. Arms and ammunition for ISF may be obtained through various methods and sources, which are discussed in Appendix G.

Objectives (U)

(U) The announced overall objective of this assessment was to determine whether the controls over the distribution of conventional military arms, ammunition, and explosives provided to the security forces of Iraq and Afghanistan were adequate. Subsequently, we revised the objectives for Iraq to:

- (U) Determine whether DoD currently had adequate accountability and controls over U.S.-purchased and otherwise obtained arms and ammunition under its control before DoD formal handover to ISF, and
- (U) Determine whether ISF currently had adequate accountability and controls over U.S.-purchased and otherwise obtained arms and ammunition under its control after DoD formal handover to ISF.

(U) After our arrival in Iraq, we examined two additional but related issues: implementing the FMS program and building the Iraq logistics sustainment base. For scope and methodology related to the objectives, see Appendix A. For a summary of prior coverage related to the objectives, see Appendix B. Appendix C provides definitions of terms used in this report.

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Part I (U)
**DoD and Iraq Security Forces Policy and
Procedures (U)**

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Observation A.

DoD Policy for the Accountability and Control of Arms and Ammunition in Iraq (U)

(U) The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD[AT&L]) and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD[I]) had not clarified the applicability of existing DoD policy regarding accountability and control of U.S.-supplied arms and ammunition to ISF.

Applicable Criteria (U)

(U) **Title 40 United State Code.** Title 40 United States Code (U.S.C.), section 524 states:

(a) Required. - - Each executive agency shall--(1) maintain adequate inventory controls and accountability systems for property under its control.

(U) **DoD Instructions.** DoD Instructions (DoDI) that apply to accountability and control of arms and ammunition are as follows:

- DoDI 5000.64, "Accountability and Management of DoD-Owned Equipment and Other Accountable Property," November 2, 2006.
- DoDI 5100.76, "Safeguarding Conventional Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives (AA&E) and the AA&E Physical Security Review Board," October 8, 2005; and related guidance cited in those Instructions apply to the accountability, control, and physical security of AA&E and other designated sensitive items in possession or custody of DoD components while awaiting transfer to ISF.
- DoD 5200.8-R, "Physical Security Program," outlines the minimum physical security standards to properly safeguard arms, ammunition, and explosives (AA&E) against loss.

(U) **Public Law 110-181.** In addition, Public Law 110-181, the "National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008," section 1228, "Tracking and Monitoring of Defense Articles Provided to the Government of Iraq and Other Individuals and Groups in Iraq," January 28, 2008, states:

(a) Export and Transfer Control Policy – The President shall implement a policy to control the export and transfer of defense articles⁷ into Iraq, including implementation of the registration and monitoring system under subsection (c).

⁷ Defense articles are defined in Appendix C.

(b) Requirement to Implement Control System – No defense articles may be provided to the Government of Iraq or any other group, organization, citizen, or resident of Iraq until the President certifies to the specified congressional committees that a registration and monitoring system meeting the requirements in subsection (c) has been established.

(c) Registration and Monitoring System – The registration and monitoring system required under this subsection shall include –

- (1) the registration of the serial numbers of all small arms⁸ to be provided to the Government of Iraq or to other groups, organizations, citizens, or residents of Iraq;
- (2) a program of end-use monitoring of all lethal defense articles provided to such entities or individuals; and
- (3) a detailed record of the origin, shipping, and distribution of all defense articles transferred under the Iraq Security Forces Fund or any other security assistance program to such entities or individuals.

(U) Although that legislation does not take effect until July 2008, we believe that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD[AT&L]) and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD[P]) should consider the requirements of this particular act in implementing the recommendations in this report. Other applicable guidance is discussed in Appendix H.

Recommendations (U)

(U) A. We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence issue a letter to clarify that Department of Defense Instruction 5000.64 governs the accountability and control and Department of Defense Instruction 5100.76 governs the physical security of arms, ammunition, and explosives under U.S. control from the point of entry into the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility until formal handover to the Iraq Security Forces or as appropriate to other Coalition partners within the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility.

(U) **Management Comments to Recommendation A.** USD(AT&L), USD(I), and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD[P]) concurred with this recommendation. They stated that the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)

⁸ For the purposes of this legislation, small arms are defined as handguns, shoulder-fired weapons, light automatic weapons up to and including .50 caliber machine guns, recoilless rifles up to and including 106mm, mortars up to and including 81mm, rocket launchers that are man portable, grenade launchers that are rifle and shoulder fired, and individually operated weapons which are portable or can be fired without special mounts or firing devices and which have potential use in civil disturbances and are vulnerable to theft.

will issue a memorandum clarifying the applicability of DoDI 5000.64 and DoD I 5100.75 and will also reiterate the provisions of DoD 5200.8-R, "Physical Security Program."

(U) Assessment Response. The management comments meet the intent of Recommendation A.

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Observation B.

DoD Component Procedures for the Accountability and Control of Arms and Ammunition in the U.S. Central Command Area of Responsibility (U)

(U) USCENTCOM, MNF-I and its subordinate commands had not clearly defined the procedures for the accountability and control of U.S.-supplied arms and ammunition to ISF.

(U) Specifically, USCENTCOM, MNF-I, Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I), and MNSTC-I had not issued written procedures for the accountability and control of arms and ammunition delivered to or transported through the USCENTCOM area of responsibility and subsequently provided to ISF or Coalition partners.

(U) In addition, MNF-I had not issued written procedures to coordinate the efforts of MNC-I and MNSTC-I for the accountability and control of arms and ammunition delivered to or transported through Iraq.

Applicable Criteria (U)

(U) **Title 40 United State Code.** Title 40 U.S.C., section 524 states:

(a) Required. - - Each executive agency shall (1) maintain adequate inventory controls and accountability systems for property under its control.

(U) **DoD Instruction 5000.64.** DoDI 5000.64 provides policy and procedures for DoD-owned equipment and other accountable property and establishes policy and procedures to comply with 40 U.S.C. § 524. DoDI 5000.64 requires that accountable property records shall be established for all property purchased, or otherwise obtained, that are sensitive as defined in DoD 4100.39-M, "Federal Logistics Information System," volume 10, Table 61, November 2007.

(U) **DoD 4000.25-2-M.** DoD 4000.25-2-M, "Military Standard Transaction Reporting and Accounting Procedures," chapter 12, January 2006, discusses the responsibilities of DoD Components for inventory management of small arms and the use of the DoD Registry. The U.S. Army Materiel Command Logistics Support Activity serves as repository for small arms serial numbers provided by the other DoD component registries as part of the DoD Small Arms Serialization Program.⁹

⁹ The DoD Small Arms Serialization Program is defined and discussed in Appendix C.

Procedures (U)

(U) Procedures and orders should be finalized and formalized to provide official guidance. The guidance should be issued in writing by a formal memorandum or fragmentary order that specifies the procedures requiring compliance, and contains the name(s), title(s), signature(s), and date(s) showing the approval of authorized official(s), as applicable. Documents that must be used by Government of Iraq personnel should be translated into the applicable local language.

(U) We also believe that procedures and orders issued within the USCENTCOM area of responsibility should govern the delivery of arms and ammunition purchased through the ISFF, through FMS programs, or other U.S. funding sources. They should also apply to arms and ammunition obtained through capture, seizure, or donation.

Recommendations (U)

(U) B.1. We recommend that the Commander, U.S. Central Command issue formal procedures governing the accountability and control of arms and ammunition under U.S. control from the point of entry into and transport through the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility until formal handover to the Iraq Security Forces or as appropriate to other Coalition partners within the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility.

(U) **Management Comments to Recommendation B.1.** USCENTCOM concurred, noting that the Director of Logistics, USCENTCOM is drafting formal guidance, proposed for publication not later than July 2008.

(U) **Assessment Response.** We will review USCENTCOM's formal guidance, when published, to determine if it meets the intent of the Recommendation B.1.

(U) B.2. We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq, issue formal procedures:

(U) a. Governing the accountability and control of arms and ammunition under U.S. control from the point of entry into and transport through Iraq until formal handover to the Iraq Security Forces or as appropriate to other Coalition partners in Iraq.

(U) b. Coordinating the efforts of the Multi-National Corps-Iraq; the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq; the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Gulf Region Division; and any other command component to provide accountability and control of arms and ammunition under U.S. control from the point of entry into and transport throughout Iraq until formal handover to the Iraq Security Forces or, as appropriate, to other Coalition partners in Iraq.

(U) **Management Comments to Recommendation B.2.** MNF-I concurred,

noting that MNSTC-I is in the final stages of publishing a Logistics Accountability SOP. The SOP provides specific direction for accountability and control of sensitive items (including arms and ammunition) during: Port of Debarkation operations, intra-theatre distribution, and warehouse operations. The SOP was approved and released by the MNSTC-I Commanding General on April 26, 2008.

(U) Assessment Response: The MNF-I response did not meet the intent of the Recommendation B.2. in its entirety. The MNSTC-I Logistics Accountability SOP applies only to MNSTC-I personnel. Unless additional action was taken, the MNSTC-I Logistics SOP would have no impact on the actions of U.S and Coalition personnel assigned to MNC-I and other commands involved in the control and accountability of arms and ammunition being provided to the ISF. We discussed this issue with MNF-I and MNC-I during our follow-up assessment. On June 5, 2008, the MNF-I Chief of Staff issued a memo making the MNSTC-I Logistics SOP applicable to all MNC-I elements "in order to ensure consistent accountability standards across the supply chain in Iraq." This action met the intent of recommendation B.2.

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
Observation C.

Multi-National Force-Iraq Procedures for Captured Weapons (U)

(U) MNF-I had not clearly defined procedures for the accountability, control, and final disposition of weapons captured by U.S. forces, to include recording captured weapons serial numbers. In addition, MNF-I had not issued written procedures to coordinate the efforts of MNC-I and MNSTC-I for the accountability, control, and disposition of weapons captured by U.S. forces.

Visibility over Captured Weapons (U)

(U) We believe that procedures should govern inventory procedures for captured weapons, the recording of the weapons serial numbers, the control of captured weapons during processing, the disposition of weapons by the ISF, and the destruction of weapons that are unserviceable or otherwise unsuitable for military use. Figure 1. shows captured weapons stored in a container at Taji National Depot.



(U) Figure 1. Captured Weapons Stored at Taji National Depot.

Recommendations (U)

(U) C. We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq, issue formal procedures that:

(U) 1. Govern the accountability, control, and final disposition of weapons captured by U.S. forces, to include recording captured weapons serial numbers.

(U) 2. Coordinate the efforts of the Multi-National Corps-Iraq and the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq in processing weapons captured by U.S. forces.

(U) Management Comments to Recommendation C.

(U) MNF-I concurred, noting that, in coordination with MNF-I and MNSTC-I, MNC-I published Fragmentary Order (FRAGO) 085 on January 28, 2008. The FRAGO was designed to coordinate the transfer of captured enemy weapons (CEW) in a controlled and recorded manner between Coalition forces and ISF. The FRAGO received concurrence from MNF-I and MNSTC-I and modifications are being coordinated to refine the FRAGOs language with respect to weapon categories, serial number requirements, and transfer process flow.

(U) The Iraqi Ministry of Defense (MoD) Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics concurred with the MNC-I procedures that FRAGO 085 established. The Ministry of Interior (MoI) Assistant Deputy Minister for Infrastructure has verbally committed to MNC-I procedures as well. The two ministries are drafting policies that will compliment the MNC-I FRAGO.

(U) **Assessment Response.** Publication of MNC-I FRAGO 085 meets the intent of Recommendation C. Acceptance of those procedures at the appropriate levels in the Iraqi MoD and MoI serves to institutionalize processing and accountability of captured enemy weapons in the Iraqi system as well.

Observation D.

Multi-National Force-Iraq Procedures for Transition Teams (U)

(U) MNF-I had not issued procedures on the missions, roles, and responsibilities applicable to U.S. and Coalition transition teams and senior advisors involved in advising and assisting the MoD, the MoI, and subordinate ISF organizations on the accountability and control of U.S.-supplied or Iraqi-procured arms and ammunition.

(U) MNF-I had not issued procedures to coordinate the efforts of MNC-I and MNSTC-I transition teams to support the ISF in its efforts to account and control for U.S.-supplied or Iraqi-procured arms and ammunition.

Roles of Transition Teams (U)

(U) One of the roles of U.S. transition teams and senior advisors is to mentor their ISF counterparts on the accountability and control of U.S.-supplied or Iraqi-procured arms and ammunition. The mentoring by U.S./Coalition transition teams and senior advisors encompasses the gamut of ISF organizations, from national arms and ammunition depots to military companies and police stations. Mentoring is the process by which transition teams support ISF to establish its sustainment logistics base and to provide for the accountability and control of U.S.-supplied or Iraqi-procured arms and ammunition.

(U) **Multi-National Corps-Iraq Responsibilities.** MNC-I has the responsibility for the U.S. transition teams mentoring Iraqi Army divisional units, police transition teams (at police stations), Border Police transition teams, and National Police transition teams (NPTTs).

(U) **Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq Responsibilities.** MNSTC-I has the responsibility for the U.S. senior mentors and logistics transition teams mentoring at the MoD, MoI, Taji National Depot, Baghdad Police College (BPC), and Iraqi Base Support Units (formerly Regional Support Units).

Procedures (U)

(U) The procedures to establish the missions, roles, and responsibilities applicable to U.S. transition teams and senior advisors should address:

- (U) the mission, roles, and responsibilities applicable to U.S. transition teams and senior advisors;
- (U) the movement, receipt, storage, accountability, issuance, and inventory record procedures for arms and ammunition;

- (U) the management of arms and ammunition warehouses;
- (U) the recording of the weapons serial numbers;
- (U) the control of the captured, seized, and donated weapons;
- (U) the disposition or the destruction of arms and ammunition; and
- (U) each organizational level of the ISF separately so that the unique requirements at each level are clearly identified.

Recommendations (U)

(U) D. We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq, issue formal procedures that:

(U) 1. Describe the mission, roles, and responsibilities applicable to U.S. transition teams and senior advisors involved in advising and assisting the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Interior, and subordinate Iraq Security Forces' organizations on the accountability and control of U.S.-supplied or Iraqi-procured arms and ammunition.

(U) 2. Coordinate the efforts of the Multi-National Corps-Iraq and the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq transition teams to support the Iraq Security Forces in its efforts to account for and control U.S.-supplied or Iraqi-procured arms and ammunition.

(U) Management Comments to Recommendation D:

(U) MNF-I concurred, noting that MNSTC-I published a Logistics Accountability SOP on April 26, 2008. The SOP provides specific direction for accountability and control of sensitive items (including arms and ammunition) during: Port of Debarkation operations, intra-theatre distribution, and warehouse operations. MNSTC-I will continue to advise and assist the MoD and MoI in establishing the proposed accountability procedures in the Logistics Accountability SOP.

(U) MNSTC-I works closely with the MNC-I Military Training Teams (MiTTs) and stated that they will continue to ensure that these teams adhere to the accountability procedures developed by MNSTC-I. MNC-I MiTTs have been directed to continue submitting the required documentation resulting from weapons issued to the Iraqi units.

(U) **Assessment Response:** The MNF-I response did not meet the intent of the Recommendation D. in its entirety. The MNSTC-I Logistics Accountability SOP applies only to MNSTC-I personnel. Unless additional action was taken, the MNSTC-I Logistics SOP would have no impact on the actions of U.S and Coalition personnel assigned to MNC-I and other commands involved in the control and accountability of arms and ammunition being provided to the ISF. We discussed this issue with MNF-I and MNC-I during our follow-up

assessment. On June 5, 2008, the MNF-I Chief of Staff issued a memo making the MNSTC-I Logistics SOP applicable to all MNC-I elements "in order to ensure consistent accountability standards across the supply chain in Iraq." This action met the intent of recommendation D.

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Observation E.

Iraq Security Forces Policies and Procedures for the Accountability and Control of Arms and Ammunition (U)

(U) MoD and MoI had not issued written policies and procedures for military and police national arms and ammunition depots and other storage facilities (such as provincial, regional, unit or station levels) for the accountability and control of U.S.-supplied or Iraqi-procured arms and ammunition.

Formal Policies (U)

(U) Policies and procedures had not been institutionalized in writing by MoD and MoI. While some policies and procedures may have been in place or were being executed in practice, many had not been published formally through approved and signed documents.

(U) **Ministry of Defense.** We reviewed nine MoD documents addressing supply and asset accountability. We determined that only two of the nine documents had been completed, translated into Arabic, and contained an appropriate signature by a MoD official. The two documents addressed ammunition management and accountability.

(U) **Ministry of Interior.** We reviewed several written documents addressing logistics procedures and accountability at MoI and those documents were written in English, undated, and appeared to be in draft form. We found no indication that formal MoI-approved logistics and accountability policies and procedures existed. We interviewed personnel from several U.S. National Police Transition Teams (NPTTs). None of the NPTT members we interviewed were aware of any written policies or regulation concerning weapons accountability. Further, we did not see any written regulation concerning weapons accountability at the National Police headquarters.

Recommendations (U)

(U) E. We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq advise and assist the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior in the preparation and promulgation of formal policies and procedures for military and police national arms and ammunition depots and other storage facilities that address the accountability and control of U.S.-supplied or Iraqi-procured arms and ammunition.

(U) **Management Comments to Recommendation E.**

(U) MNF-I concurred, noting that the Iraqi procedures for accountability of equipment, including arms and ammunition, are given in the "Iraqi Supply Handbook," Chapter 3, Property Accountability Guide. That procedure outlines accountability through the use of the Iraqi Army (IA) Form 249 (Blanjo—Iraqi term) and details the procedures. Rather than advising on the creation of an additional policy, MNF-I and MNSTC-I recommended that efforts be focused on assistance of enforcement of policies already in place.

(U) The Iraqi Joint Headquarters Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics has established a committee that will develop procedures for the accountability of both U.S.-supplied and Iraqi-procured arms and ammunition. The initial report of the committee detailed current and future issues related to the tracking of arms and ammunition from their arrival at Um Qasr or Baghdad International Airport. The current procedure involves the Coalition-contracted movement of arms and ammunition from Um Qasr or Baghdad International Airport to the National Ammunition Depot at Bayji. Contractor personnel conduct receipt inspections of all ammunition and update the National Ammunition Depot master inventory. When arms and ammunition are required at one of the five existing Ammunition Supply Points, MNSTC-I J4 coordinates movement of ammunition to the requesting Ammunition Supply Point through Coalition-contracted movement. Inventories at existing Ammunition Supply Points are currently managed by Iraqi forces with MiTT oversight. Regular inventory reports are submitted to MNSTC-I J4. The procedures for future ammunition accountability of arms and ammunition by MoD are being developed by the committee chaired by the Ammunition Section of Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics.

(U) The Government of Iraq MoI issued a memorandum to subordinate units, signed by the Assistant Deputy Minister for Administrative Affairs, dated December 18, 2007, directing that weapons and ammunition be secured with three locks, each with a key maintained by an officer with a minimum of four years of experience. Monthly inventories are to be conducted. Stiff fines are established for the loss of any weapon or ammunition. Fines are restated in a separate memorandum #47 signed by the Minister of Interior.

(U) **Assessment Response:** The management comments meet the intent of the Recommendation E. We encourage MNF-I mentors/trainers throughout all subordinate commands to validate Iraqi implementation of the provisions of Chapter 3 of the Iraqi Supply Handbook throughout MoD and the provisions of the cited memos throughout MoI.

Observation F.

Iraq Security Forces Policies and Procedures for Captured Weapons (U)

(U) MoD and MoI had not issued written policies and procedures for the accountability, control, and disposition of weapons captured by ISF or U.S. forces (weapons captured by U.S. forces that are subsequently turned over to ISF).

Visibility over Captured Weapons (U)

(U) We visited the Iraqi Army captured weapons storage site located within the Iraqi military sector of Taji National Depot (TND).¹⁰ U.S. training team personnel held the keys to the approximately 15 weapons storage containers. The weapons had apparently been captured by U.S. forces and turned over to the ISF. Although they were in the process of conducting an inventory, Iraqi and Coalition personnel present could not provide an accurate assessment as to what type or quantity of weapons were being stored in the containers or for how long the weapons had been stored there.

(U) There was no written guidance on hand from MoD addressing the ultimate disposition of the captured weapons the depot receives.

(U) Policy and procedures should govern the inventory process for the weapons, the recording of weapons serial numbers, the control of captured weapons during processing, the disposition of weapons by ISF, or the destruction of the weapons that are unserviceable or otherwise unsuitable for military use. The make, model, and serial numbers of captured weapons should be reported to the MNSTC-I J4.

Recommendations (U)

(U) F. We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq advise and assist the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior in the preparation and promulgation of formal policies and procedures for accountability, control, processing, and final disposition of weapons the Iraq Security Forces capture or weapons captured and turned over to the Iraq Security Forces by Coalition forces.

(U) Management Comments to Recommendation F.

(U) MNF-I concurred. They reported that MNSTC-I is aware of the issue and are advising MoD Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics on a directive that is being drafted.

¹⁰ (U) Taji National Depot is the national military depot for the Iraqi military forces and falls under the control of MoD. U.S. embedded training teams work from a small compound within the Iraqi sector of the depot. For the purposes of this report, we identify the U.S. compound as the U.S. team sector within the Iraqi military sector of Taji National Depot.

(U) While the MoI has not provided a written copy of current policy, MoI officials at the provincial and ministerial levels have confirmed the following procedures are in place:

- If a police unit captures weapons, they must inventory and inspect each weapon by serial number.
- The inventory is passed to the MoI Auditing Department and compared against their weapons databases to determine the source.
- The capturing unit may request to retain the weapons to fill shortages or permission to destroy the weapons. The MoI Director of Logistics will provide disposition instructions.
- If the weapons are destroyed, a committee of three senior officers must witness the destruction and provide certification to the MoI Logistics Officer.

(U) **Assessment Response.** The management comments meet the intent of Recommendation F. MNSTC-I should continue to follow-up with MoD and MoI on this issue.

Part II (U)

DoD and Iraq Security Forces Operations (U)

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Observation G.

Chain of Custody, Delivery Process, and Storage of U.S.-Controlled Weapons Provided to the Iraq Security Forces (U)

(U) U.S. forces did not always maintain an unbroken chain of custody for the accountability and control of U.S.-controlled arms and ammunition before formal handover to the Iraq Security Forces (ISF). Further, U.S. arms and ammunition were placed temporarily in areas that lacked sufficient physical security to prevent misplacement, loss, or theft and sufficient storage capacity to efficiently process deliveries for the anticipated volume of arms and ammunition shipments procured through the ISFF and FMS.

(U) In addition, U.S. forces and ISF did not always perform joint inventories of U.S.-controlled weapons prior to formal handover to ISF at TND or BPC. Serial numbers for weapons were not always recorded at TND. Finally, Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan contracts for the procurement of weapons did not always contain clauses requiring lists of weapons' serial numbers be sent in advance of weapons' shipment to Iraq, the delivery of arms and ammunition to Iraq through U.S.-controlled ports of entry within Iraq, or that shippers provide enroute visibility to include the arrival dates and times of arms and ammunition cargo being delivered to Iraq.

Chain of Custody for Controlled Inventory Items (U)

(U) According to DoDI 5000.64, controlled inventory items include property with characteristics that may require them to be identified, accounted for, secured, segregated, or handled in a special manner to ensure their safekeeping and integrity. DoD 4100.39-M, "Federal Logistics Information System," Volume 10, Table 61, November 2007, includes AA&E as controlled inventory items.

(U) An unbroken chain of custody for arms and ammunition needs to be maintained throughout the logistics supply chain to include shipping, handling, delivery, receipt, storage, and issuance process. The main objective of a chain of custody is to ensure that arms and ammunition are tracked through the process between procurement and delivery to the ultimate recipient and that the arms and ammunition received by the ultimate recipient are in the same condition, type, and count as originally shipped.


(U) A chain of custody requires that every transfer of goods from organization to organization be documented by authorized individuals, and that those records contain evidence for the entire chain of custody process.

(U) The chain of custody process to provide weapons to ISF should require that serial numbers of weapons be recorded at the point of formal handover to ISF to

strengthen U.S. and ISF accountability and control. This is necessary to provide specific accountability of receipt of weapons delivered to ISF by the U.S. and to facilitate ISF establishing a chain of custody for the U.S.-provided weapons.


(U) In addition, a chain of custody by serial number would enable U.S. forces and Government of Iraq law enforcement agencies to obtain serial numbers for weapons found to be missing, lost, or stolen to identify the last accountable entity for those weapons. That information would provide a starting point for investigative officials to trace weapons and determine the cause of the loss.

In-Country Delivery Process through Baghdad International Airport (U)



Source: DoD IG personnel - October 2007.

(U) **Figure 2. U.S.-supplied Equipment being Unloaded by Iraqi Airways Personnel at Baghdad International Airport.**



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Temporary Storage for Weapons in the Delivery Process (U)

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(U) Storage Capacity at Baghdad International Airport and Balad Air Base. The DoD report to Congress entitled "Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq," December 17, 2007, stated:

(U) During this quarter, substantially increased quantities of Iraqi-funded equipment ordered through the U.S Foreign Military Sales (FMS) system have entered into the transportation and distribution pipeline, resulting in a significant buildup of materiel extending from Iraq back to the departure point in Charleston, South Carolina. For example, there are approximately 75 pallets and nearly 250 vehicles awaiting transportation in Charleston.

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¹¹ (U) Balad Air Base is operated by the U.S. Air Force and is the primary air port-of-entry for delivering cargo to U.S. forces in Iraq.

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

~~(S)~~

[REDACTED]

In-Country Delivery Processes to Taji National Depot (U)

(U) There were two different delivery processes for U.S.-controlled weapons flowing through the port of entry at Baghdad International Airport to Iraqi military forces at Taji National Depot. We observed problems with the chain of custody during our review of both processes.

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[REDACTED]

~~(S)~~

[REDACTED]