INDEX
U.S. Department of Energy ORDER
Washington, D.C. DOE 5630.13A
6-8-92
SUBJECT: MASTER SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY AGREEMENTS
1. PURPOSE. To establish the Department of Energy (DOE) policy,
requirements, responsibilities, and authorities for the development and
implementation of Master Safeguards and Security Agreements (MSSA's).
2. CANCELLATION. DOE 5630.13, MASTER SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY AGREEMENTS,
of 2-3-88.
3. SCOPE. The provisions of this Order apply to Departmental Elements and
contractors performing work for the Department as provided by law
and/or contract and as implemented by the appropriate contracting
officer.
4. APPLICABILITY.
a. Facilities which have Category I quantities of special nuclear
material (SNM) or those facilities that have Category II
quantities within the same protected area that roll-up to a
Category I quantity,
b. Facilities which have a radiological sabotage threat which would
cause an unacceptable impact on the health and safety of the
public,
c. Facilities which have an industrial sabotage threat which would
cause an unacceptable impact to those DOE programs supporting
national defense and security, and/or
d. Other facilities that Heads of Departmental Elements deem
appropriate.
5. POLICY.
a. Levels of protection shall be provided in consideration of the
potential risks to national security and the health and safety of
the public.
b. The levels of protection identified in approved facility MSSA's
shall be the basis for facility planning, executing, and
evaluating the protection program.
6. DEFINITIONS. See Attachment 1.
7. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS.
a. The MSSA establishes a formal agreement requiring the joint
approval of the field element manager and the cognizant Program
Secretarial Officer(s) for the levels of protection of graded
safeguards and security interests from theft, sabotage, and other
malevolent acts associated with SNM or vital assets which may
adversely affect national security or the health and safety of the
public. Such agreements take into account DOE policy applicable
to specific sites and/or programs, to achieve acceptable
protection levels that minimize inherent risks on a cost-effective
basis.
b. The MSSA's contain summary level information adequate to describe
the basis supporting the agreement, assumptions, exceptions, and
conclusions.
c. The MSSA includes statements of the facility's safeguards and
security performance levels based on the status of several
complementary performance indicators such as the results of
vulnerability assessments, system performance tests, surveys,
inspections, evaluations, and training levels as well as the field
element managers' judgment of the effectiveness of the protection
system.
d. MSSA's are supported by backup documentation, adequate to validate
the MSSA maintained at the field organization or contractor
facility. This may include vulnerability assessments, cost/
benefit analyses, implementation procedures, guidelines,
performance exercises, and other studies.
e. The MSSA may be used to document exceptions to safeguards and
security policy and to provide the basis for relief from certain
safeguards and security requirements.
f. Each signatory agrees to support the safeguards and security
commitments set forth in MSSA's under their cognizance to the
fullest extent practicable. Planning and budget submittals shall
be consistent with the commitments made in the MSSA. Funding
constraints applied as part of the budget submission and
authorization process may necessitate changes in plans documented
in the MSSA's.
g. The MSSA is reviewed and updated annually.
h. If tests or other indicators demonstrate that the actual level of
protection is less than that approved in the MSSA, action must be
taken to compensate for identified vulnerabilities.
i. All Departmental Elements managing facilities included in
paragraph 3 shall prepare MSSA's. An MSSA shall designate
facility levels of protection which the appropriate field
organization, Program Secretarial Officer, and Headquarters
safeguards and security responsible official acknowledge to be
adequate.
8. RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITIES.
a. Program Secretarial Officers (PSOs) shall:
(1) Approve MSSA's that apply to their programs (including
subsequent modifications requiring Headquarters approval).
(2) Support commitments made in the MSSA to the fullest extent
possible through the budget process.
(3) Coordinate the review and approval process with all
appropriate organizations.
b. Director of Security Affairs (SA-1) shall:
(1) Establish safeguards and security policies, design basis
threat statements, standards, and guidance for the DOE.
(2) Support commitments made in the MSSA to the fullest extent
possible through the budget process.
(3) Review, comment, and concur in MSSAs.
c. Director of Safeguards and Security (SA-10), shall:
(1) Formulate safeguards and security policies, threat
statements, standards, and guidance for DOE.
(2) Issue guidelines for the preparation, review, revision, and
approval of MSSA's.
(3) Review and verify MSSA's to ensure that they are complete,
assumptions are supported by technical justification, and
that the conclusions are supported by appropriate analyses
and detailed documentation.
d. Director of Security Evaluations (EH-4) shall verify compliance
with specific provisions of the MSSA's through inspections and
evaluations.
e. Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program shall, in accordance
with the responsibilities and authorities assigned by Executive
Order 12344 (statutorily prescribed by 42 U.S.C. 7158, note) and
to ensure consistency throughout the joint Navy/DOE organization
of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program, implement and oversee all
policy and practices pertaining to this DOE Order for activities
under the Director's cognizance.
f. Heads of Field Elements shall:
(1) Prepare, review, and approve MSSA's for selected safeguards
and security interests under their jurisdiction.
(2) Implement, enforce, and maintain the protection measures and
terms of the MSSA's under their management jurisdiction.
(3) Prepare and maintain adequate documentation for validation of
MSSA's in support of the requirement of paragraph 7d.
(4) Inspect, evaluate, and review protection systems to validate
assumptions made in the formulation of MSSA's.
(5) Direct the review and consolidation of appropriate changes
and updates to the MSSA's.
(6) Advise the Office of Safeguards and Security, and appropriate
Program Secretarial Officers of significant delays in
implementing protection features documented in the MSSA.
(7) Support commitments made in the MSSA to the fullest extent
possible through the budget process.
9. REVIEW AND REVISION OF MSSA'S.
a. Changes that significantly alter the agreed-on protection
philosophy or performance standards of protection systems shall
require the approval of the cognizant Program Secretarial
Officer(s), the Head of the Field Element, and the concurrence of
SA-1.
b. Changes that are consistent with agreed-on protection policy may
be made by the Heads of Field Elements with a copy of changes
provided to the Office of Safeguards and Security and the
cognizant program manager(s).
BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY:
DONALD W. PEARMAN, JR.
Acting Director
Administration and Human
Resource Management
DEFINITIONS
1. ACCEPTED RISK. The acknowledgement that a protection system may not
achieve 100 percent protection against all occurrences, but further
improvement in the system is not justified.
2. CATEGORY I AND CATEGORY II QUANTITIES OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL. See
DOE 5633.3, CONTROL AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS.
3. CONTRACTOR. An entity or person who contracts directly or indirectly
to supply goods or services to the DOE. Note: This includes
subcontractors of any tier, consultants, agents, and cooperative
agreement participants.
4. DESIGN BASIS THREAT POLICY. A policy statement that describes threats
that are postulated for the purpose of establishing requirements for
safeguards and security significant programs, systems, components,
equipment, information or material.
5. EVALUATION. Determination of the effectiveness of a safeguards and
security system or program element relative to approved standards.
6. FACILITY. An educational institutions, manufacturing plant,
laboratory, office building, or complex of buildings located on the
same site that is operated and protected as one unit by the Department
or its contractor(s).
7. INSPECTION. The process of gathering information to determine the
effectiveness with which protection programs are implemented.
8. LEVEL OF PROTECTION. The degree of safeguards and security provided to
protect Departmental interests.
9. MASTER SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY AGREEMENT (NSSA). A formal
understanding among cognizant managers regarding levels of protection
and accepted risk.
10. PROGRAM SECRETARIAL OFFICERS (PSO). A senior outlay program official
and includes the Assistant Secretaries for Conservation and Renewable
Energy, Defense Programs, Fossil Energy, Nuclear Energy, and
Environmental Restoration and Waste Management, and the Directors of
Energy Research; Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, and New
Production Reactors. A lead PSO is the PSO assigned line management
responsibility and accountability for Headquarters and field operations
and to which one or more multiprogram field offices report directly.
11. ROLL-UP. Accumulation of a Category I quantity of special nuclear
material from Category II quantities located within the same protected
area, or for category determinations, the summation of smaller
quantities of special nuclear material to obtain a higher category
quantity.
12. SABOTAGE.
a. Industrial. Any deliberate act, not involving radiological
releases, which could have unacceptable impact to DOE programs.
b. Radiological. A deliberate act directed against a nuclear
materials facility or its components, or a nuclear material or
weapon shipment, which could cause an uncontrolled release of
radiation or radioactive material.
13. THEFT. The removal of Government property and/or materials from a DOE
or DOE contractor-operator facility without permission or authorization
and contrary to law, or the unauthorized removal of special nuclear
material.
14. VALIDATION. The confirmation by testing that an implemented,
operational system or critical system element meets established
requirements.
15. VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT. A systematic evaluation process in which
qualitative and/or quantitative techniques are applied to arrive at an
effectiveness level for a safeguards and security system to protect
specific targets from specific adversaries and their acts.