U.S. Department of Energy ORDER
Washington, D.C. DOE 5610.14
SUBJECT: TRANSPORTATION SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM PROGRAM OPERATIONS
1. PURPOSE. To establish Department of Energy (DOE) policies for and
implementation of the management and operation of the Transportation
Safeguards System (TSS) program.
2. SCOPE. The provisions of this Order are to be applied to DOE elements
and covered contractors, and they will apply to the extent implemented
under a contract or other agreement. A covered contractor is a seller
of supplies or services involving TSS program operations awarded a
management and operating contract. DOE facilities, projects, and
programs which are licensed and regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, are not covered by the provisions of this Order.
3. APPLICABILITY. This Order applies to all operations of the DOE
Transportation Safeguards System Program Operations, managed and
operated by the Albuquerque Operations Office (AL), in the contiguous
4. REFERENCES AND DEFINITIONS. See Attachment 1.
5. POLICY. It is Departmental policy to ensure TSS operations are
accomplished in a manner commensurate with established practices and
procedures for cargo safeguards protection, potential risks to national
security, safety of personnel, the public, the environment, and program
continuity. Nuclear explosives, DOE-owned Categories I and II
quantities of SNM, classified configurations of nuclear weapon systems,
limited life components, and other forms and quantities of strategic
materials as approved by AL, shall be provided safeguards protection by
6. RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITIES.
a. The Secretary of Energy (S-1) has the ultimate responsibility for
the TSS program.
b. Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs (DP-1), through the Under
Secretary, is responsible for implementing the Secretary's policy
and for exercising line management responsibility for the TSS
c. Deputy Assistant Secretary for Military Application (DP-20) is
responsible for serving as the Headquarters official for all
matters relating to the offsite transportation of components,
special assemblies, and weapons program related radioactive
materials including the following:
(1) Assures that line managers are meeting their responsibilities
for the application of safety and safeguards emphasis to all
aspects of the TSS program operations, as outlined in this
(2) Serves as an advisor to senior DOE management regarding all
aspects of Nuclear Explosives Weapon Safety, including:
(a) Manages policy development and promulgation for all
aspects of weapons surety, and
(b) Appraises operations offices and their contractors
having nuclear explosive responsibilities regarding
compliance with DOE nuclear weapon safety Orders.
(3) Provides program management, oversight, and direction
including coordination of the operating and capital budgets
for TSS operations.
(4) Assures that line managers are meeting their responsibilities
to comply with this Order and relevant transportation
management laws, regulations, and directives.
(5) Coordinates with appropriate Departmental elements in the
development of policy and standards for operation of TSS.
(6) Conducts periodic appraisals of TSS operations, at least once
in 2 years, to review compliance with this Order and relevant
(7) Reviews and concurs in the safeguards and security planning
documents for TSS.
d. Assistant Secretary for Environment, Safety, and Health (EH-1) is
responsible for assisting the Assistant Secretary for Defense
Programs in the specialized environment, safety, and health
disciplines as requested.
e. Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security Evaluation (EH-4) is
responsible for conducting safeguards and security inspections of
TSS program operations and making the inspection reports available
to appropriate Headquarters program elements.
f. Director, Office of Intelligence (IN-1), shall develop, define,
update, and provide threat models/assessments for TSS and provide
such assessments to DP-20.
g. Director, Office of Security Affairs (SA-1), shall:
(1) Establish and implement policy for the classification and
declassification of Restricted Data, Formerly Restricted
Data, and National Security Information and the control of
certain sensitive information within DOE's jurisdiction.
(2) Set DOE-wide policy in matters associated with the security
of classified information, work, or materials, and with the
authority to make arrests and carry firearms for the
protection of materials, facilities, and installations under
the cognizance of the Department.
h. Director, Office of Safeguards and Security (SA-10), shall:
(1) Develop safeguards and security policy, Orders, planning
documents,and strategies to protect against threats affecting
the TSS program operations in coordination with DP-20.
(2) Assist in providing oversight of safeguards and security
program requirements for TSS operations.
(3) Conduct safeguards and security research and development
programs responsive to operations office user needs.
i. Deputy Assistant Secretary for Naval Reactors (NE-60), shall, in
accordance with the responsibilities and authorities assigned by
Executive Order 12344 (statutorily prescribed by 42 U.S.C. 7158,
note) and to ensure consistency throughout the joint Navy/DOE
organization of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program, implement
and oversee all policy and practices pertaining to this Order for
activities under the cognizance of NE-60.
j. Manager, Pittsburgh Naval Reactors Office, shall, through the
Director of Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program:
(1) Establish and implement special arrangements for shipments of
Categories I and II quantities of SNM to or from Naval
Nuclear Propulsion Program cognizant facilities.
(2) Coordinate with the Weapon Transportation Safeguards Program
for appropriate support for shipments of Categories I and II
quantities of SNM to or from Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program
k. Manager, AL, shall:
(1) Manage the day-to-day operations of the TSS program; provide
for the administration, operation, and resources needed for
(2) Arrange for, and coordinate federal, State, Tribal, and local
law enforcement support as may be required for protection of
(3) Assure that program protection strategy, level of protection,
and security procedures are in accordance with all applicable
Departmental Orders and policy directives.
(4) Designate positions that are considered operationally
sensitive within the program.
(5) Plan and conduct annual safety and security self assessments
of TSS operations.
(6) Establish and maintain a transportation emergency management
plan in accordance with the DOE 5500 series.
(7) Report periodically, and at least annually, to DP-20 the
(a) Status of the program operations.
(b) Findings from inspections, surveys, self assessments,
and status of corrective actions of all elements of TSS
(c) Status of technology development and engineering efforts
to improve near- and long-term system operations.
(8) Assure that procedures are in place for responding to any
unusual event or emergency that could affect program
operation, personnel, public safety, and the environment.
(9) Document, approve, and implement operations, policies, and
procedures for TSS through management directives or Standard
Operating Procedure Manuals.
(10) Develop and implement a training program, which shall include
preventive maintenance, technical support, project/contract
management and administration, operational safety, logistics
of operation, and general training in equipment maintenance.
(11) Assure that all procurement request packages related to the
TSS program, include the following:
(a) Identification of this Order,
(b) Identification of the specific requirements with which
the contractor or other awardee is to comply, or, if
this is not practicable, identification of the specific
paragraphs or other portions of this Order with which a
contractor or other awardee is to comply, and
(c) Requirements for the flowdown of provisions of this
Order to any subcontract or subaward. For application
to awarded management and operating contracts, the
Manager, AL, may set forth this information in a written
communication to the Contracting Officer rather than in
a procurement request package.
7. PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS. See Attachment 2.
BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY:
LINDA G. SYE
Acting Director of Administration
1. DOE 5000.3B, OCCURRENCE REPORTING AND PROCESSING OF OPERATIONS
INFORMATION, of 1-19-93, which establishes a system for reporting of
operations information related to DOE-owned or operated facilities and
processing of that information to provide for appropriate corrective
2. DOE 5400.5, RADIATION PROTECTION OF THE PUBLIC AND THE ENVIRONMENT, of
2-8-90, which establishes DOE standards and requirements for operations
with respect to the public and the environment against undue risk from
3. DOE 5480.11, RADIATION PROTECTION FOR OCCUPATIONAL WORKERS, of
12-21-88, which establishes DOE standards and requirements for
operations with respect to workers against undue risk from radiation.
4. DOE 5480.16, FIREARMS SAFETY, of 1-12-88, which provides standards and
procedures for the safe use of firearms by DOE and contractor personnel
involved in carrying out Departmental activities in DOE installations.
5. DOE 5500.1B, EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, of 4-30-91, which describes
DOE policy for planning, preparedness, and readiness assurance for
response to emergencies involving DOE or requiring DOE assistance.
6. DOE 5500.2B, EMERGENCY CATEGORIES, CLASSES, AND NOTIFICATION AND
REPORTING REQUIREMENTS, of 4-30-91, which describes the DOE emergency
notification and reporting system and establishes response levels.
7. DOE 5500.4A, PUBLIC AFFAIRS POLICY AND PLANNING REQUIREMENTS FOR
EMERGENCIES, of 6-8-92, which establishes requirements for public
affairs actions for emergency situations.
8. DOE 5610.10, NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE AND WEAPON SAFETY PROGRAM, of 10-10-90,
which establishes the DOE policy, objectives, standards and criteria,
authorities, and responsibilities for its Nuclear Explosive and Weapon
9. DOE 5610.1, PACKAGING AND TRANSPORTING OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES, NUCLEAR
COMPONENTS, AND SPECIAL ASSEMBLIES, of 9-11-79, which establishes DOE
policy and responsibilities and authorities for the packaging and
transporting of nuclear explosives, nuclear components and special
10. DOE 5610.11, NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE SAFETY, of 10-10-90, which establishes
the DOE policy, procedures, authorities, and responsibilities for
assuring the safe conduct of nuclear explosive activities under the
Department's Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Safety program.
11. DOE 5610.13, JOINT DOE/DOD NUCLEAR WEAPON SYSTEM SAFETY, SECURITY, AND
CONTROL ACTIVITIES, of 10-10-90, which establishes the DOE policy,
procedures, authorities, and responsibilities for addressing joint
nuclear weapon and nuclear weapon system safety, security, and control
activities in conjunction with the Department of Defense.
12. DOE 5631.6A, PERSONNEL SECURITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM, of 9-15-92, which
defines the policies, objectives, and responsibilities for the DOE
Personnel Security Assurance Program (PSAP).
13. DOE 5632.1B, PROTECTION PROGRAM OPERATIONS, of 2-8-92, which
establishes DOE policy for the physical protection of security
interests and baseline physical protection standards.
14. DOE 5632.2A, PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL AND VITAL
EQUIPMENT, of 2-9-88, which prescribes the DOE policy for physical
protection of SNM and vital equipment.
15. DOE 5632.5, PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF CLASSIFIED MATTER, of 2-3-88, which
establishes baseline protection requirements and standards for
classified matter in use and in-transit.
16. DOE 5632.7, PROTECTIVE FORCES, of 2-9-88, which is the policy
foundation for protective forces elements.
17. DOE 5632.8, PROTECTION PROGRAM OPERATIONS: SYSTEM PERFORMANCE TESTS,
of 2-4-88, which addresses requirements for the evaluation of
protection systems capabilities through system performance tests.
18. DOE 5632.9A, ISSUANCE AND CONTROL OF SECURITY BADGES, CREDENTIALS, AND
SHIELDS, of 9-23-92, which establishes and prescribes DOE policies and
procedures for the issuance, control, and use of badges, passes, and
19. DOE 5633.3A, CONTROL AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS, of
2-12-93, which prescribes DOE minimum requirements and procedures for
control and accountability of nuclear materials.
20. DOE 5639.7, OPERATIONS SECURITY, of 4-30-92, which establishes the DOE
operations security program.
21. DOE 5639.6, CLASSIFIED COMPUTER SECURITY PROGRAM, of 9-15-92, which
establishes uniform policies for the development and implementation of
a classified computer security program to ensure security of classified
information in automatic data processing systems.
22. DOE 5700.6C, QUALITY ASSURANCE, of 8-21-91, which establishes DOE
policy, sets forth requirements, and assigns responsibilities for
establishing, implementing, and maintaining plans and actions to assure
quality achievement in DOE programs.
23. Title 10 CFR Part 71, Packaging and Handling of Radioactive Material.
24. Title 10 CFR Part 710, Criteria and Procedures for Determining
Eligibility for Access to Classified Matter or Significant Quantities
of SNM, which is used in those cases in which there are questions of
eligibility for DOE access.
25. Title 10 CFR Part 871, Air Transportation of Plutonium.
26. Title 10 CFR Part 1047, Limited Arrest Authority and Use of Force by
Protective Force Officers.
27. Title 49 CFR Part 100-180, Hazardous Materials Regulation, Part
173.7(b), See Exemptions.
28. Title 49 CFR Part 390-397, Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulation.
29. Research and Development Standard RDTBF-11T: Fuel shipping container
tie-down for truck transport, January 1975, U.S. Research and
Development Administration (ERDA), and Technical Manual, DOE-DNA TP
45-51 series, Transportation of Nuclear Weapon Materiel (U).
30. DOE 1540.1A, MATERIALS TRANSPORTATION AND TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT, of
7-8-92, which provides the Departmental policies and procedures for the
management of materials transportation activities.
31. DOE 1540.2, HAZARDOUS MATERIALS PACKAGING FOR TRANSPORT -
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES, of 9-30-86, which establishes administrative
procedures for the certification and use of radioactive and other
hazardous materials packaging by DOE.
32. DOE N 5480.6, RADIOLOGICAL CONTROL, of 6-17-92, which provides the
Department's radiological control policy and establishes practices for
the conduct of radiological control activities.
1. IN-TRANSIT. Movement of assigned cargo between facilities, including
fuel and subsistence stops but excludes rest-over-night (RON).
2. LAYOVER FACILITY/SAFE HAVEN. A DOE, DOE contractor, or Department of
Defense (DOD) facility that provides proper security for shipment
vehicles, material, and equipment while personnel are in RON status.
3. NUCLEAR MATERIAL COURIERS (NMCs). Armed "Q" cleared TSS Federal
Officers who have been authorized under Section 161k of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954, as amended, or other appropriate statutory
authority, to carry firearms, make arrests without warrant, and are
authorized to use deadly force in accordance with 10 CFR 1047.4
(Limited Arrest and Use of Force by Protective Force Officers). The
NMCs are charged with the responsibility for the safe secure movement
of nuclear weapons, weapons components, and other identified cargo/
matter/materials requiring in-transit physical protection. NMCs
possess a Commercial Drivers License with the Hazardous Materials
endorsement and receive related biannual training in transportation of
4. NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFEGUARDS CATEGORIES. Refer to Figure I-2, DOE
5633.3A CONTROL AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL, of 2-12-93.
5. OVERSIGHT. Those activities involving validation, verification,
survey, and inspection of any aspect of a program to ensure adequacy of
and compliance with existing Orders, guidance, policies, standard
operating procedures, or program goals.
6. PROTECTIVE PERSONNEL. Guards, security inspectors, couriers,
authorized escorts, and personnel assigned to protective duties
involving the security interests of the DOE.
7. REST-OVER-NIGHT (RON). A scheduled overnight rest stop for TSS
8. SAFE SECURE TRAILER (SST). A specially designed semi-trailer, pulled
by an armored tractor, which is used for the safe, secure
transportation of cargo.
9. SAFEGUARDS. An integrated system of physical protection, material
accounting, and material control measures designed to deter, prevent
detect, and respond to unauthorized access, possession, use, or
sabotage of nuclear materials.
10. SECURITY. An integrated system of activities, systems, programs,
facilities, and policies for the protection of Restricted Data and
other classified information or matter, nuclear materials, nuclear
weapons and nuclear weapons components, and/or Departmental contractor
facilities, property, and equipment.
11. SECURITY COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM (SECOM). A communications system
operated by AL, to communicate with and monitor TSS shipments
12. TRANSPORTATION ESCORT (TE). An armed "Q" cleared TSS Federal Officer
who has been authorized under Section 161k of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954, as amended, or other appropriate statutory authority, to carry
firearms, make arrests without warrant and who are charged with the
responsibility of safely and securely transporting and/or escorting
Non-Special Nuclear Material (SNM) and identified classified material,
or matter assigned to the TSS program.
13. TRANSPORTATION SAFEGUARDS DIVISION (TSD). A DOE organizational element
of AL, responsible for the administration of the TSS program operation.
14. TRANSPORTATION SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM (TSS). A DOE system, managed and
operated by the Manager, AL, administered by the TSD, under the
programmatic direction of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Military
Application, used for the safe and secure movement of nuclear weapons,
nuclear components, special assemblies, SNM, and other cargos deemed
appropriate by responsible program elements and approved by AL, within
the contiguous United States.
15. STRATEGIC MATERIAL. "Category I quantities of Special Nuclear Material
(2 or more kilograms of uranium 233 or plutonium, 5 or more kilograms
of uranium 235 enriched to 20 percent or greater)." Also referred to
as `target' or `goal' quantities. (Reference: DOE 5633.3A)
16. SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL (SNM). "As defined in Section 11 of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, is material not subject to a
Nuclear Regulatory Commission license." For the purpose of this Order,
SNM in one shipment is divided into the two Categories I and II.
(Reference: DOE 5633.3A)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. PHYSICAL PROTECTION 1
a. Transportation Vehicles 1
b. In-Transit Protection 1
c. Layover Protection 1
2. COMMUNICATIONS 1
a. System Redundancy 1
b. Intra-Convoy 1
c. Extra-Convoy 1
d. Emergency Notification 1
3. PROTECTION EQUIPMENT 1
a. Armament 1
b. Escort Vehicles 1
4. TRAINING AND CERTIFICATION 2
a. Nuclear Material Couriers and Transportation Escort
b. Security Communications System Personnel Training 2
c. Nuclear Material Couriers, Transportation Escort, and Other
Appropriate Transportation Safeguards System Operation
Related Personnel 2
5. READINESS AND MODERNIZATION 2
a. Readiness 2
b. Modernization 2
6. PERFORMANCE TESTING AND VALIDATION 2
a. Performance Testing 2
b. Validation 2
7. HUMAN RELIABILITY PROGRAMS 2
a. Evaluation 2
b. Certification 3
8. TRANSPORTATION SAFETY 3
a. Safety Reviews 3
b. Shipping Containers 3
c. Safety Requirements 4
9. THREAT GUIDANCE 4
a. Design 4
b. Planning 4
c. Spectrum 4
d. Threat Assessment and Response 4
10. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 5
11. QUALITY ASSURANCE 5
a. Maintenance 5
b. Audits 5
12. MAINTENANCE 5
1. PHYSICAL PROTECTION.
a. Transportation Vehicles. Highway movements of materials requiring
protection shall be accomplished using specially designed armored
tractors and SSTs, which offer penetration resistance and delay
mechanisms to prevent unauthorized cargo removal. Alternate
equipment, such as DOE-owned or leased vehicles or aircraft, may
be required to support mission goals.
b. In-Transit Protection. All highway SNM shipments which require
protection shall be protected by NMCs. As a minimum, a sufficient
number of NMCs shall be assigned to the protection of each
shipment to assure the material remains in the custody of the U.S.
Government. Non-SNM materials, as approved by AL, shall be
escorted by TEs.
c. Layover Protection. All shipments in RON status shall be provided
an equivalent level of protection as those in-transit either by
protective force personnel assigned to the layover facility or
equally qualified TSS program personnel.
a. System Redundancy. Independent and redundant communication
systems shall be provided to assure communications between
vehicles in convoy with one another and SECOM. The SECOM shall be
used to provide shipment tracking and communications capability.
b. Intra-Convoy. Two-way communications shall be provided between
all vehicles and personnel assigned to each shipment while
c. Extra-Convoy. Two-way communications shall be provided between
each vehicle and the in-transit convoy and SECOM Control Center.
d. Emergency Notification. A system for reporting and processing of
operations information shall be maintained to ensure effective and
appropriate action is taken to mitigate circumstances.
3. PROTECTION EQUIPMENT.
a. Armament. All personnel assigned to the protection of in-transit
cargo shall be provided with weapons sufficient to protect
b. Escort Vehicles. Each highway shipment shall be accompanied by an
approved number of escort vehicles sufficient to protect shipment.
4. TRAINING AND CERTIFICATION.
a. Nuclear Material Couriers and Transportation Escort Personnel
shall be qualified for in-transit assignment through a
comprehensive, well-documented training and medical examination
program administered and certified by AL. NMC and TE personnel
shall meet periodic requalification requirements as established by
b. Security Communications System Personnel Training shall also
include, preventive maintenance, technical support, project/
contract management and administration, and general training in
c. Nuclear Material Couriers, Transportation Escort, and Other
Appropriate Transportation Safeguards System Operation Related
Personnel shall be trained and certified as hazardous materials
employees in accordance with 49 CFR 172.700-704.
5. READINESS AND MODERNIZATION.
a. Readiness. All transportation vehicles, communications and
personal protection equipment shall be maintained in a high state
of readiness to assure availability for all normal and emergency
duties through an approved and documented preventive maintenance
b. Modernization. An active and effective research and development
program shall be maintained to support TSS operation.
6. PERFORMANCE TESTING AND VALIDATION.
a. Performance Testing. Performance testing of the security system
shall be conducted during NMC and TE training to achieve and
maintain high individual and group competency levels. Joint
training exercises will be conducted annually, as a minimum, to
exercise and evaluate the tactical, command, control, and
communications and should include, to the extent feasible,
Federal, State, Tribal, and local law enforcement agencies.
b. Validation. Validation of the effectiveness and efficiency of the
NMC and TE force and associated security system shall be approved
by AL and will be subject to review by Headquarters Elements.
7. HUMAN RELIABILITY PROGRAMS.
a. Evaluation. AL will provide for a continuous evaluation which
identifies those individuals whose position meet the eligibility
criteria for designation in DOE 5631.6A, PERSONNEL SECURITY
ASSURANCE PROGRAM. Identified positions will be processed
b. Certification. AL will certify nuclear explosive duty positions
for the Personnel Assurance Program (PAP), in accordance with DOE
5610.11, NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE SAFETY.
8. TRANSPORTATION SAFETY.
a. Safety Reviews. The safety program shall consist of a safety
review process consistent with this and all other applicable DOE
5610 series. In addition, the following program elements shall be
(1) Personnel shall be qualified and trained in radiation
protection that provides for both normal and emergency
protection of workers and personnel, the public, and the
(2) Route planning shall consider safety, security, and shipment
accident consequences to minimize public risk.
(3) Tie-down configurations to prevent movement and shifting of
cargo during transport shall be approved and periodically
validated by AL. Tie-downs will be in accordance with
TP-45-51 series and RDTBF-11T requirements, and approved
official guidance. (See reference 29.)
(4) Shipper shall provide shipping request information to TSD,
pursuant to 49 CFR.
(5) AL shall plan and conduct self assessments of all safety and
health protection elements of TSS operation at least
annually, and provide to DP-20 for review and comment. Such
appraisals shall be conducted by independent reviewers having
no operational responsibility for TSS.
(6) The TSS program shall be in compliance with firearms and
range safety Occupational Safety and Health Act requirements.
b. Shipping Containers. All users of the shipping containers shall
have an approved DOE Offsite Transportation Certificate/
Authorization or Nuclear Regulatory Commission Certificate for the
specific mode of transportation used for the shipment.
(1) Hazardous materials shall be packaged, marked, labeled, and
documented and transported in accordance with applicable DOE
5610 series, applicable Department of Transportation
Regulations 49 CFR 100-180, and 10 CfR 71, Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, unless specifically exempted.
(2) The transportation container system hardware shall have an
approved safety analysis report or equivalent process to
document the safety of operations and equipment.
c. Safety Requirements for the containers and transport vehicles
shall be followed, audited, improved when required, and remain a
matter of the highest priority. Requirements for the transport of
nuclear explosives, weapons, components, special assemblies, and
radioactive material associated with the nuclear weapons program
shall be based on applicable requirements in the DOE 5610 series.
9. THREAT GUIDANCE.
a. Design. Threats shall be considered in the design of safeguards
and security systems to protect against acts of sabotage and other
adversary actions which might cause unacceptable impact on
national security or health and public safety.
b. Planning. Levels of protection shall be identified in the
safeguards and security planning documents. Identified levels
shall be the basis for designing and implementing a balanced,
graded, and cost-effective safeguards and security program.
c. Spectrum. In addressing the threat spectrum, emphasis must be
placed on providing an effective system capability to detect,
identify, and inhibit unauthorized access to material in-transit.
d. Threat Assessment and Response.
(1) Near-Term. AL shall provide for a constant assessment of the
threats that could impact near-term operations. AL shall
maintain close liaison with IN-10 in coordination with DP-20,
and take such actions as may be required to assure the
continued safety and security of TSS operations.
(2) Long-Term. AL shall provide for a long-term evaluation of
the threat guidance and recommend changes in operational
practices and/or equipment. AL shall notify appropriate
Headquarters elements of any permanent change in adversary
threat or TSS mission, and initiate actions to revise the
general threat guidance.
10. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI). The DOE CI program is designed to provide
timely foreign intelligence information to DOE personnel to assist in
protecting weapon shipments in-transit. DOE AL personnel must
immediately notify DOE's Office of Counterintelligence (IN-20) or the
nearest DOE CI Operations Office Manager when threat data, regardless
of how nebulous, is received.
11. QUALITY ASSURANCE. The TSS operations shall be conducted with a
documented quality assurance program, in compliance with Headquarters
guidance, and DOE 5700. 6C, QUALITY ASSURANCE.
a. Maintenance. A quality assurance program shall be maintained for
all elements of TSS operations including the contractor operated
b. Audits. TSD shall conduct annual audits of the contractor
operated activities within its purview, to determine compliance
with the DOE 5700 series.
12. MAINTENANCE. A comprehensive and documented preventive maintenance
program shall be maintained on all equipment and software systems to
ensure their continued reliability.