U.S. Department of Energy                                   ORDER
     Washington, D.C.                                    DOE 5610.13


1.   PURPOSE.  To establish Department of Energy (DOE) policy, procedures,
     authorities, and responsibilities for addressing joint nuclear weapon
     and nuclear weapon system safety, security, and control activities in
     conjunction with the Department of Defense (DOD).

2.   SCOPE.  The provisions of this Order apply to DOE Headquarters and
     field elements and its contractors and subcontractors that conduct
     nuclear weapon and nuclear weapon system safety, security, and control
     activities in support of the nuclear weapons program, as provided by
     law and/or contract and as implemented by the appropriate contracting

3.   APPLICABILITY.  Requirements set forth in this Order apply to all joint
     DOE/DOD nuclear weapon and nuclear weapon system safety, security, and
     control activities from initial design through the retirement phase of
     each nuclear weapon system.


          10-10-90, which establishes the DOE policy, authorities, and
          responsibilities for nuclear explosive and weapons safety.

     b.   "Memorandum of Understanding Between DOE and DOE on the Objectives
          and Responsibilities for Joint Nuclear Weapon Activities," of
          1-17-83, which supplements previous agreements delineating DOE and
          DOE objectives, responsibilities, and measures to improve
          stockpile planning and acquisition; and ensuring high-level
          attention to nuclear weapon safety, security, and control.

     c.   DOD Directive 3150.2, "Safety Studies and Reviews of Nuclear
          Weapon Systems," of 2-8-84, which provides the policy,
          responsibilities, and procedures for applying safety standards to
          nuclear weapons and weapon systems, for developing and processing
          nuclear weapon system safety rules, and conducting safety studies
          and operational safety reviews of nuclear weapon systems.

     d.   National Security Decision Directive Number 2.

     e.   National Security Decision Directive Number 309.


     a.   DOE Field Review (Field Review).  A DOE-initiated review of DOD
          nuclear weapon and/or nuclear weapon system activities/operations
          to satisfy the DOE's dual-agency responsibility to protect public
          health, safety, and the environment.

     b.   Weapons Design Laboratories.  Those laboratories; i.e., Sandia
          National Laboratories, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and
          Los Alamos National Laboratory, which conduct nuclear weapon
          research, design, and development activities under the auspices of
          the Department of Energy.

6.   POLICY.  DOE shall establish and maintain inter- and intra-Departmental
     procedures for addressing and conducting joint DOE/DOD nuclear weapon
     and nuclear weapon system safety, security, and control activities to
     assure that these areas are adequately addressed from the initial
     conceptual design through the retirement phase of each weapon system.

7.   OBJECTIVE.  To establish and implement systematic procedures to assure
     nuclear weapon and nuclear weapon system safety, security, and control
     are adequately addressed throughout all phases for each nuclear weapon
     system, specifically:

     a.   Phase I, Weapon Concept;
     b.   Phase II, Program Feasibility;
     c.   Phase IIa, Advanced Development;
     d.   Phase III, Development and Engineering;
     e.   Phase IV, Production Engineering;
     f.   Phase V, First Production;
     g.   Phase VI, Quantity Production; and
     h.   Phase VII, Retirement.

     This effort shall include, but not be limited to, the DOE's
     participation in the development, staffing, and implementation of
     safety rules that shall govern all nuclear weapon system operations
     throughout the stockpile-to-target sequence.


     a.   Secretary of Energy (S-1) is responsible for rendering final
          Departmental decisions on nuclear weapon and nuclear weapon system
          safety, security, and control issues.

     b.   Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs (DP-1) is responsible

          (1)  Developing and promulgating Departmental policy regarding
               joint DOE/DOD nuclear weapon and nuclear weapon system
               safety, security, and control activities.

          (2)  Serving as the Department's representative to the Nuclear
               Weapons Council (NWC).

          (3)  Providing DOE concurrence in new or revised DOD safety rules.

     c.   Deputy Assistant Secretary for Military Application (DP-20) is
          responsible for:

          (1)  Providing overall direction for policy implementation and the
               compliance of requirements contained in this Order.

          (2)  Serving as the DOE member to the Nuclear Weapons Council
               Standing Committee (NWCSC).

          (3)  Chairing, and designating DOE members, to the Nuclear Weapons
               Council Weapons Safety Committee (NWCWSC).

          (4)  Monitoring and appraising the DOE Operations Offices conduct
               of joint DOE/DOD nuclear weapon and nuclear weapon system
               safety, security, and control activities, as provided for in
               this Order.

          (5)  Designating DOE Headquarters representatives to serve on
               Project Officer Groups and respective safety subcommittees.

          (6)  Coordinating and approving the results of nuclear weapon and
               nuclear weapon system safety, security, and control
               activities that are conducted by DOE Elements, its
               contractors and subcontractors, prior to the release of such
               results to the Department of Defense.

          (7)  Assuring timely response to Military Service approved Nuclear
               Weapon Safety Study Group (NWSSG) recommendations that
               require Department of Energy action or support.

          (8)  Coordinating requirements for obtaining DOE concurrence in
               DOD safety rules.

          (9)  Preparing and forwarding to DP-1 the recommended DOE position
               on any new or revised DOD safety rules for concurrence

          (10) Providing direction and guidance for conducting DOE
               Field Reviews.

     d.   Manager, Albuquerque Operations Office (AL) is responsible for:

          (1)  Managing, under DP-20 direction, the DOE's program for
               participation in the DOD Safety Studies and Reviews of
               Nuclear Weapon Systems.

          (2)  Serving as the point of contact to the military services and
               their Nuclear Weapons System Safety Groups (NWSSGs)
               concerning matters relating to the military services' safety
               studies and operational safety reviews.

          (3)  Providing a representative to serve as a member of each of
               the military services' NWSSGs.

          (4)  As required, tasking the weapons/design laboratories to:

               (a)  Provide a technical advisor to assist the DOE's NWSSG

               (b)  Provide the NWSSGs with technical support,
                    documentation, and briefings.

               (c)  Provide other safety, security, and control-related
                    functions, as required.

          (5)  Reviewing all DOD safety rules packages forwarded from
               Headquarters (DP-20) for action and submitting appropriate
               recommendations on the rules packages to DP-20.

          (6)  Monitoring the actions of the military services in responding
               to the findings and recommendations of the NWSSGs and making
               appropriate recommendations for DOE action to DP-20.

          (7)  As tasked by DP-20, appointing DOE/AL members to the NWC
               Weapon Safety committee.

          (8)  Designating DOE/AL representatives to the Project Officer
               Groups and respective safety subcommittees for each weapon

     e.   Managers, Nevada and San Francisco Operations Offices are
          responsible for providing support to joint DOE/DOD Nuclear Weapon
          System Safety, Security, and Control Activities.


     a.   General.  A DOE representative shall be designated by DP-20 to
          oversee and concur in all activities throughout each of the
          Nuclear Weapon Program phases to assure adequate attention is
          given to safety, security, and control considerations.

     b.   Oversight Activities.

          (1)  A DOE employee shall participate in all nuclear weapon
               program activities that have or could have an effect on
               nuclear weapon or nuclear weapon system safety, security, or
               control.  This individual will normally be designated by the
               Manager, AL; however, in some cases, and after coordination
               with the Manager, AL, DP-20 will designate this individual or
               additional individuals to assure all relative activities are
               properly monitored.

          (2)  Manager, AL, shall designate an individual to participate in
               all Project Officer Groups and respective safety
               subcommittees with their primary responsibility being to
               assure that all safety, security, and control issues are
               fully considered and adequately resolved.

          (3)  Issues resulting from joint DOE/DOD nuclear weapon and
               nuclear weapon system safety, security, and control
               activities shall be resolved by the following procedures as

               (a)  Coordination between appropriate level DOE and DOD staff

               (b)  Referral to the NWCWSC and/or to the NWC for recommended

               (c)  Submission, with appropriate recommendations, to the
                    Secretary for final disposition.


     a.   General.  The procedures for DOD development, processing, approval
          (both interim and final) and promulgation of DOD nuclear weapon
          system safety rules, including coordination with DOE, are detailed
          in DOD Directive 3150.2.  When operational requirements dictate
          early approval of safety rules by the Secretary of Defense in a
          period that does not permit sufficient time for DOE to complete
          its formal coordination process, the Assistant to the Secretary of
          Defense (Atomic Energy)[ATSD(AE)] will request that DOE provide
          interim concurrence in the rules subject to later completion of
          formal processing within DOE and final DOE concurrence.  The
          procedures for DOE review and evaluation of proposed safety rules
          in support of interim and final approval by the Secretary of
          Defense are specified below.

     b.   Procedures for Interim/Final Approval.

          (1)  DP-1 shall:

               (a)  In the event there are no unresolved safety issues
                    relating to the safety rules package, provide DOE
                    concurrence in granting interim/final approval to DOD,

               (b)  In the event there are unresolved safety issues in the
                    rules package, take appropriate action in accordance
                    with paragraph 9b(3) above.

          (2)  DP-20 shall:

               (a)  Forward the safety rules package to the Manager, AL, for
                    review and recommendations.

               (b)  Conduct a review of the safety rules package based on:
                    1 the concept of operations; 2 the design safety
                    features of the nuclear weapon system; 3 the proposed
                    safety rules; 4 the NWSSG safety study/review
                    recommendations; and 5 AL recommendations.

               (c)  In the event there are no unresolved safety issues
                    relating to the safety rules package, forward the
                    package to DP-1 with a recommendation for concurrence
                    within 30 days, when possible, of receipt of the rules

               (d)  If pending final approval, and it is deemed necessary,
                    coordinate and conduct a field review of the proposed
                    safety rules.

               (e)  In the event that the safety rules package review (or
                    the field review, if conducted) reveals the need for
                    revising the proposed safety rules, coordinate the
                    revision with ATSD(AE).

               (f)  In the event that, following formal efforts in
                    conjunction with the ATSD(AE), unresolved safety issues
                    remain, submit the rules package with appropriate
                    recommendations to DP-1 for resolution.

               (g)  Provide a copy of all pertinent correspondence regarding
                    the safety rules package to the Manager, AL.

          (3)  The Manager, AL, shall:

               (a)  Upon receipt of the proposed safety rules package from
                    DP-20, conduct an analysis and review of:  1 the
                    proposed safety rules; 2 NWSSG findings and
                    recommendations; and 3 the military services' subsequent
                    actions on any NWSSGs findings and/or recommendations.

               (b)  Based on the results of paragraph 10b(3)(a) above,
                    provide comments and recommendations to DP-20 in a
                    timely manner to meet the suspense date.

               (c)  When a field review is directed by DP-20, provide
                    assistance in conducting the review.

               (d)  Task the appropriate weapon/design laboratories to
                    assist in the conduct of the reviews and analyses and in
                    the development of DOE comments and recommendations.

     c.   Procedures for Administrative Change.  DP-20 shall:

          (1)  Determine, in each instance, whether the proposed change is
               nonsubstantive in nature and should be processed
               administratively or whether formal processing action is
               required.  In making this determination, an administrative
               change shall be measured against the following:

               (a)  A nonsubstantive change may be one of the following:

                    1    Changes in nomenclature.

                    2    Editorial changes to bring particular rules into
                         agreement with approved rules of a later date.

                    3    Deletion of weapons and delivery vehicles no longer
                         in the inventory.

                    4    Other changes not involving nuclear safety.

               (b)  A proposed administrative change shall satisfy the
                    following parameters:

                    1    There is no change in established safety policy.

                    2    There is no change to the operational concept upon
                         which the safety rules are based.

                    3    There is no change to any of the nuclear safety
                         features (either by modification, addition, or
                         removal) in either the weapon(s) or delivery

                    4    There are no changes to specific restrictions as
                         set forth in the rules.

                    5    There are no outstanding unresolved recommendations
                         that would degrade nuclear explosive safety.

          (2)  Obtain AL position (in coordination with the appropriate
               laboratories) regarding the proposed administrative change.

          (3)  If determined to be an administrative change, provide DOE
               concurrence in the change to the ATSD(AE).

          (4)  In the event that it is DOE's position that there are
               unresolved safety issues and, therefore, does not constitute
               an administrative change, an action memorandum detailing the
               issues shall be submitted to DP-1 for resolution.

          (5)  Provide a copy of all pertinent correspondence to the
               Manager, AL.


     a.   General.  In accordance with paragraph 4c above, the Secretary of
          each military department ensures the safety of all nuclear weapon
          systems for which that service has operational, custodial, or
          developmental responsibility.  In discharging this responsibility,
          each department Secretary establishes and convenes a NWSSG to
          conduct safety studies and operational safety reviews of each
          nuclear weapon system.  The NWSSG membership includes an appointed
          Chairperson from the military service, representatives of the
          military service(s) concerned, the Defense Nuclear Agency, and

     b.   Guidelines for DOE Participation in NWSSGs.

          (1)  DOE, through the DOE designated weapon/design laboratory,
               shall provide safety, security, and control-related data on
               the specific nuclear weapon to be addressed by the NWSSG.

          (2)  The Manager, AL, shall appoint a DOE member whose primary
               responsibility shall be participation in the activities of
               the NWSSG.

          (3)  The DOE members of NWSSGs shall not have current or have had
               prior responsibility for the design, development, or
               production of the specific weapon or weapon system being

          (4)  The DOE NWSSG member shall be qualified by education and
               experience to identify, analyze, and understand the
               information necessary to conduct a proper evaluation of
               nuclear weapon systems employed by DOD.  The task of the DOE
               NWSSG member is to make unbiased and independent judgments
               regarding the nuclear safety of the nuclear weapon system
               under consideration.  The DOE NWSSG member shall not have
               responsibility for advocacy of special interests of DOE or
               any other agency.

12.  SAFETY STANDARDS.  In evaluating the nuclear safety, security, and
     control of nuclear weapon systems through participation in studies and
     reviews conducted by the DOD NWSSGs, the DOE member shall employ the
     DOD Nuclear Weapon System Safety Standards contained in DOD Directive


     a.   General.  The requirement for a DOE field review of a new or
          stockpiled nuclear weapon system shall be conveyed to DOD when the
          Department of Energy believes such action is necessary to fulfill
          its obligation for dual-agency judgment to protect public health,
          safety, and the environment.  Field reviews shall be employed to
          address the adequacy of proposed safety rules and to identify
          required changes, if any, in the rules prior to DOE final
          concurrence and final approval by the Secretary of Defense.  The
          field review process may also be used to develop the DOE position
          on unresolved safety issues between DOE and DOD or to identify
          safety concerns when significant changes are made to system
          hardware or procedures.

     b.   Procedures for Conducting a DOE Field Review.

          (1)  The need for conducting a DOE field review shall be clearly
               identified by appropriate DOE staff and forwarded through
               management channels to DP-20 for action.

          (2)  Based on a review of the issue(s), DP-20 shall take action to
               coordinate the conduct of a field review, or to resolve the
               issue by other methods, with DOD, ATSD(AE).

          (3)  Should DOD nonconcur with DOE in the need for a field review,
               DP-20 shall take appropriate action as outlined in paragraph
               9b(3) above.

     c.   Field Review Scope.  The DOE field review shall:

          (1)  Be conducted in an as realistic operational environment as

          (2)  Include briefings at the appropriate level of the military
               service having primary responsibility for the system/activity
               being reviewed.

          (3)  Include discussions and demonstrations by elements
               participating in the stockpile-to-target sequence to

               (a)  The adequacy of the nuclear weapon system safety rules.

               (b)  Conformance with the approved concept of operations.

               (c)  An understanding of the implementation of the safety
                    rules at the operational level.

               (d)  Solutions to unresolved safety issues.

     d.   Field Review Responsibilities.

          (1)  DP-20 shall:

               (a)  Coordinate the need for and conduct of field review with
                    DOD, [ATSD(AE)].

               (b)  Notify Manager, Albuquerque Operations Office, of the
                    field review requirements.

               (c)  Appoint a field review chairman.

               (d)  Provide direction and guidance for the conduct of the
                    field review.

          (2)  Manager, Albuquerque Operations Office, shall:

               (a)  As directed by DP-20, provide membership to the field
                    review team.

               (b)  Task appropriate weapon/design laboratories to provide
                    support to the field review.

          (3)  Managers, Nevada Operations and San Francisco Operations
               Offices, shall provide membership to the field review team,
               as directed by DP-20.

          (4)  Reports.  At the conclusion of the field review, a report
               containing appropriate findings and recommendations shall be
               prepared and signed by all field review members.  Minority
               opinions, if any, shall be included in the report.  The final
               report shall be submitted through DP-20 to DP-1, and/or S-1
               (if applicable), with copies to all members.


                                        JIM E. TARRO
                                        Director of Administration and
                                          Human Resource Management