DATE: JANUARY 17, 1997
ATTN OF: OFFICE OF ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT, HR-6
SUBJECT: COORDINATION OF DRAFT DOE O 452.4, SECURITY AND CONTROL OF
NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS
TO: DIRECTIVES POINTS OF CONTACT
The subject Draft Order, developed by the Office of Defense Programs, is attached for your review
and comment. Draft DOE O 452.4, SECURITY AND CONTROL OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES
AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS, was developed to clarify and formalize requirements for the
Department's Nuclear Explosives and Weapons Use Control Program. The Directives Management
Document for this Order was coordinated on June 20, 1996. Numerous comments were received
from Headquarters, Operations Offices, and contractors concerning the draft order. The Office of
Defense Programs has resolved all major issues and addressed and incorporated suggested comments,
A set of definitions have been provided to assist in your review of the draft Order. Upon final
issuance of DOE O 452.4, the definitions will be included in the DOE Directives System Glossary to
be published in Spring 1997.
Comments on the Draft Order are due by March 10, 1997. MAJOR ISSUES and SUGGESTED
COMMENTS should be designated as such when submitted. MAJOR ISSUES shall be limited to
instances where a directive in its entirety, or its requirements, would have an adverse effect on
Departmental policy objectives, mission accomplishment, economy, efficiency, or other management
concerns that would preclude its publication. The following procedures shall be followed for the
submission of comments:
Headquarters, Field Elements, and Power Marketing Administrations:
Submit comments to Mr. Jon Todd, DP-21, A-368, GERMANTOWN, send facsimile to
(301) 903-8628 or INTERNET address: [email protected]; or forward via other
electronic mail. Submit a second set of comments to Ms. Susan C. Smith, Corporate
Management Practices Group, HR-62, Room 4B-222, FORRESTAL; send facsimile to (202)
586-9585, INTERNET addresses: [email protected]
The package submitted by Field Elements shall include as an attachment, the comments
provided by contractors.
Operations Offices will send an additional copy of their comments to the Associate Deputy
Secretary for Field Management.
Contractors: Submit comments directly to their appropriate Field Element.
You may also obtain these directives by accessing Explorer, DOE Directives On-line using the
following address: http:\\www.explorer.doe.gov/.
If there are any questions concerning the Draft Order, please contact one of the following individuals
for assistance. For issues pertaining to the content of the Draft Order, please contact Mr. Todd at
(301) 903-3545. Contact Ms. Smith at (202) 586-3296 for questions pertaining to the Directives
System or the processing of these directives.
AttachmentDecember 6, 1996
DP-21 (J. Todd, 3-3545)
SECURITY AND CONTROL OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS
M. L. Morris, Director, Office of Organization and Management, HR-6
I am requesting that the attached subject draft order be issued for formal Departmental coordination.
The Directives Management Document (DMD) for this order was issued June 20, 1996. Numerous
comments were received from Headquarters, operations offices, and national laboratories concerning
the DMD and draft order. All comments have been addressed and incorporated, where appropriate.
As a result, the subject order is ready for formal coordination.
If you have any questions, please call me or have your staff contact Jon Todd of my staff at 301-903-
Thomas P. Seitz
Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Military Application and
S. Smith, HR-62 DP-21:JTODD:ws:3-3463:11/27/96:Q:\DP-21\coordmem.o
3bcc: Std DASMA
1bcc: DP-21 Rdr
1bcc: DP-21 Corres. Book
1bcc: Team Leader
DP-21 Correspondence Review________________12/ /96
DP-20.3 Correspondence Review_______________12/ /96
DP-20 Executive Correspondence Review________12/ /96
DP-21 DP-21 DP-21 DP-22 DP-23
Todd Rich McConagha Hahn Gordon-Hagerty
12/ /96 12/ /96 12/ /96 12/ /96 12/ /96
DP-16 NN-51 DP-20.1 DP-20
DeWitt McCallum Brown Seitz
12/ /96 12/ /96 12/ /96 12/ /96
U.S. Department of Energy ORDER
Washington, D.C. DOE O 452.4
SUBJECT: SECURITY AND CONTROL OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES AND NUCLEAR
a. Establish Department of Energy (DOE) requirements and
responsibilities to prevent the deliberate
unauthorized use (DUU) of nuclear weapons and nuclear
b. Support the maintenance of a research and development
program on a broad range of security and control
methods and devices for nuclear weapons.
c. Develop positive measures to maintain control of all
nuclear weapons and nuclear explosives during all
phases of their life cycles.
d. Protect public health and safety in conjunction with
the Department of Defense (DoD) through dual agency
judgment and responsibility for the surety of nuclear
e. Require the development, implementation, and
maintenance of an integrated system of positive
measures to protect all nuclear weapons and nuclear
explosives in the custody of the DOE against DUU.
2. CANCELLATION. None.
a. DOE Elements. This Order applies to DOE Headquarters
and field elements involved in the DOE Nuclear
Explosive and Weapon Surety (NEWS) Program.
b. Contractors. As set forth in the Contractor
Requirements Document (CRD, Attachment 1), this Order
applies to all laboratories, contractors, and
subcontractors that manage, oversee, or conduct the DOE
NEWS Program as provided by law and/or contract and
implemented by the appropriate contracting officer.4. REQUIREMENTS.
a. The Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Security and Control
Program (hereafter known as the Program) comprises an
integrated system of positive measures to maintain
control of nuclear explosives and nuclear weapons at
all times. These measures allow use when authorized
and directed by proper authority and protect against
deliberate unauthorized use. Major elements of the
Program include the following.
(1) Interim Personnel Assurance Program (PAP)
Procedures and Standards, dated October 2, 1996,
to ensure the reliability of DOE and contractor
employees requiring access to nuclear weapons or
(2) Measures for the use control of nuclear explosives
and nuclear weapons, including design features
for nuclear weapons that are incorporated and
employed at the earliest practical point during
assembly and removed at the latest practical point
during disassembly or dismantlement.
(3) Measures to assist the timely recapture or
recovery of lost or stolen nuclear weapons or
b. The DOE shall conduct research and development for
positive measures that can prevent the DUU of nuclear
c. All DOE nuclear explosive operations shall meet the
following qualitative DOE Surety Standards to prevent
deliberate unauthorized nuclear detonation, fissile
material dispersal from the pit, or loss of control.
There shall be positive measures to:
(1) minimize the possibility of or delay deliberate
unauthorized nuclear detonation, and
(2) minimize the possibility of deliberate
unauthorized acts that could lead to high
explosive deflagration or high explosive
d. DUU evaluations shall be performed and may be specific
to a DOE nuclear explosive, nuclear explosive
operation, class of operations, or a facility or site.
The evaluation shall address DOE nuclear explosive
operations to help ensure that positive measures are
adequate to meet the surety standards given in
paragraph 4c. These positive measures shall be
continually evaluated at the direction of the
Operations Office Manager against all existing and
emerging threats as well as technological advancements.
e. To the maximum extent practical, control criteria and
methods shall be integrated into the process design for
nuclear explosive operations.
f. The responsible Operations Office shall conduct annual
program reviews. These reviews will fulfill the
requirements of the appraisal process as defined in the
DOE NEWS Program and shall cover:
(1) relevant ongoing activities;
(2) future plans/projects;
(3) resource requirements, including the necessary
resources to implement and administer this Order;
(4) major concerns and issues.
g. DOE shall cooperate with the DoD and other Federal
agencies as required to provide protection against DUU
and to assess the effectiveness of surety features for
all U.S. nuclear weapon systems throughout their life
h. Nuclear weapon design features shall support secure
critical command and control communications whenever
i. DOE shall assist DoD in designating nuclear command and
control critical equipment and components to ensure
that these items are developed and maintained to meet
the criteria designated in National Security Decision
a. Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs (DP-1).
(1) Recommends and implements DOE policy concerning
the DUU of nuclear weapons and nuclear explosives
in DOE custody.
2) With DoD, ensures dual agency oversight of the
surety of nuclear explosives and nuclear weapons.
b. Deputy Assistant Secretary for Research and Development
Allocates research and development (R&D) resources and
directs R&D of positive measures to prevent the DUU of
nuclear weapons and nuclear explosives.
c. Deputy Assistant Secretary for Military Application and
Stockpile Management (DASMASM/DP-20).
(1) Establishes and oversees all aspects of the
(2) Establishes programs for coordinating and
assisting DoD and other Federal agencies in the
recapture and recovery of nuclear explosives or
nuclear weapons for which physical control has
(3) Represents DOE regarding nuclear weapons and
nuclear weapon systems control to the DoD and
other Federal agencies.
(4) Assists the DoD and other Federal agencies in
designating nuclear command and control critical
equipment and ensuring that they are developed to
meet criteria specified in National Security
(5) Directs the assessment of the effectiveness of
control features of nuclear weapons in DOE and DoD
(6) Establishes programs to incorporate improved use
control measures in the enduring stockpile and
promotes those programs found to be cost effective
and feasible within the Military Services.
(7) Creates and sustains advisory committees as needed
to consider and assess control issues and to make
programmatic recommendations to the DASMASM.
(8) In coordination with the Director, Office of
Security Affairs, ensures proper integration of
safety and use control with security.
d. The Director, Office of Security Affairs (NN-50).
(1) Develops and establishes DOE policies for the
safeguards and security of nuclear explosives and
nuclear weapons and their components.
(2) Directs evaluation of physical protection
technology and equipment to meet present and
future safeguards and security requirements for
nuclear explosives and nuclear weapons.
(3) Advises the DASMASM on DOE Safeguards and Security
requirements to implement the security element of
the surety standards as defined in the DOE NEWS
(4) Represents DOE security policy to the DoD and
other Federal agencies.
(5) Establishes the security programs and policies for
coordinating with DoD and other Federal agencies
in the recapture and recovery of nuclear
explosives or nuclear weapons.
e. Managers of Operations Offices.
(1) Ensure implementation of the Program.
(2) Conduct an annual Program review for the DASMASM
and other DOE senior-level managers.
(3) Assess the effectiveness of the integrated system
of positive measures to protect nuclear explosives
under their cognizance against DUU.
(4) Certify to the DASMASM that all nuclear explosive
operations under their cognizance meet the Surety
Standards in paragraph 4c, and specify the basis
for making this certification. Specification may
be by reference to other documents that do not
need to be included in the certification
6. IMPLEMENTATION. Contractors shall refer to the attached CRD
for implementation requirements.
a. Interim Personnel Assurance Program Procedures and
Standards (U), October 2, 1996 (Unclassified), the rule
that defines a voluntary human reliability program and
provides requirements and guidance for personnel
performing nuclear explosive operations.
b. "Joint Policy Statement on Nuclear Weapons Surety (U),"
June 27, 1991 (Unclassified), signed by the Secretaries
of Defense and Energy.
c. Memorandum of Understanding, "Department of Defense and
the Department of Energy on Objectives and
Responsibilities for Joint Nuclear Weapon Activities
(U)," January 17, 1983 (Unclassified).
d. National Security Decision Directive-309, "Nuclear
Weapons Safety, Security, and Control (U)," June 27,
1988 (Confidential), which defines the joint, dual-
agency surety responsibilities to protect the public
health and safety between the DoD and DOE.
e. National Security Decision Directive-281, "United
States Nuclear Weapons Command and Control (U)," August
21, 1987 (Top Secret), which provides the basis for the
attainment and maintenance of a nuclear command and
control system under the authority and direction of the
f. DOE O 452.1, NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE AND WEAPON SURETY
PROGRAM (U), 4-29-96 (Unclassified), which establishes
DOE objectives, standards, criteria, authorities, and
responsibilities for the nuclear explosive and weapon
g. DOE O 452.2, SAFETY OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE OPERATIONS
(U), 4-29-96 (Unclassified), which establishes DOE
objectives, procedures, authorities, and
responsibilities for nuclear explosive and weapon
h. DOE O 470.1, SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY PROGRAM (U), 9-
26-95 (Unclassified), which establishes basic
requirements and responsibilities for the DOE
Safeguards and Security Program.
i. DOE 5530.1A, ACCIDENT RESPONSE GROUP (U), 9-20-91
(Unclassified), which establishes DOE policy for
response to accidents and significant incidents
involving nuclear weapons or nuclear weapon components.
j. DOE 5530.2, NUCLEAR EMERGENCY SEARCH TEAM (U), 9-20-91
(Unclassified), which establishes DOE policy for
Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST) operations in
response to malevolent radiological incidents.
k. DOE 5610.13, JOINT DOE/DOD NUCLEAR WEAPON SYSTEM
SAFETY, SECURITY, AND CONTROL ACTIVITIES (U), 10-10-90
(Unclassified), which establishes DOE policy,
procedures, authorities, and responsibilities for joint
nuclear weapon and nuclear weapon system safety,
security, and control activities.
l. DOE 5610.14, TRANSPORTATION SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM PROGRAM
OPERATIONS (U), 5-12-93 (Unclassified), which
establishes the DOE policies for and implementation of
the management and operation of the Transportation
Safeguards System Program.
m. DOE 5632.1C, PROTECTION AND CONTROL OF SAFEGUARDS AND
SECURITY INTERESTS (U), 7-15-94 (Unclassified), which
establishes policy, authorities, and responsibilities
for the protection and control of safeguards and
n. DOE M 5632.1C-1, MANUAL FOR PROTECTION AND CONTROL OF
SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY INTERESTS (U), 7-15-94
(Unclassified), which provides supplementary
requirements for the protection and control of
safeguards and security interests applicable to the
design, modification, and/or operation of DOE
o. DOE 5632.7A, PROTECTIVE FORCE PROGRAM (U), 2-13-95
(Unclassified), which establishes the Protective Force
responsibilities to conduct on-site protection of DOE
nuclear weapons using deadly force and to conduct
recapture/recovery operations, including fresh pursuit
off DOE facilities in the effort to recover stolen
p. DOE 5633.3B, CONTROL AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF NUCLEAR
MATERIAL (U), 9-7-94 (Unclassified), which prescribes
minimum requirements and procedures for control and
accountability of nuclear materials at DOE-owned and
-leased facilities and DOE-owned nuclear materials at
other facilities exempt from licensing by the Nuclear
8. CONTACT. DASMASM, Office of Weapons Surety, (301)903-3463.
BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY:
ARCHER L. DURHAM
Assistant Secretary for
Human Resources and
Contractor Requirements Document
Security and Control of Nuclear Explosives and Nuclear Weapons
1. A system for protecting nuclear weapons and nuclear explosives against deliberate,
unauthorized use (DUU) shall be established and shall include the following.
(a) An integrated system of positive measures to maintain security and control of
nuclear explosives and weapons at all times. These measures shall allow use when
authorized and directed by proper authority and prevent or delay unauthorized use.
(b) Personnel assurance programs to ensure the reliability of employees requiring
access to nuclear weapons or nuclear explosives.
(c) Use control measures that deter or delay unauthorized acts by anyone who gains
access to nuclear weapons. Measures for the control of nuclear explosives and
weapons shall include design features that are incorporated and employed at the
earliest practicable point during assembly and removed at the latest practical point
(d) Methods to ensure timely recapture or recovery of nuclear weapons or nuclear
explosives in the event physical control is lost.
2. Positive measures for safety, security, and use control shall be effectively balanced to
achieve the surety standards as follows to prevent unintended nuclear detonations, fissile
material dispersal from the pit, or loss of control.
(a) Positive measures shall be established to minimize the possibility of deliberate
unauthorized acts that could lead to high explosive deflagration or high explosive
(b) Positive measures shall be established to minimize the possibility of or delay
unauthorized nuclear detonation.
3. The Design Laboratories shall:
(a) Conduct R&D on a broad range of security and control
methods and devices for nuclear weapons and nuclear
(b) Provide support to the Program.
4. The Production Agencies shall provide support to the Program
as required by the responsible Operations Office.
1. Control. The application of systems, devices or procedures
that allow timely authorized use while precluding or
delaying unauthorized use.
2. Deliberate Unauthorized Use (DUU). A nuclear detonation,
high explosive detonation or deflagration, launch, release,
or transfer for use of nuclear explosives or weapons, or
termination of nuclear operations, not authorized by the
President, resulting from a deliberate attempt by one or
more individuals to circumvent critical elements of the
Nuclear Command and Control System.
3. High Explosive Deflagration. A rapid chemical reaction in
which the output of heat is sufficient for the reaction to
proceed and accelerate without input of heat from another
source. Deflagration is a surface phenomenon, with the
reaction products flowing away from the unreacted material
along the surface at subsonic velocity.
4. High Explosive Detonation. A violent chemical reaction
within a chemical compound or mechanical mixture evolving
heat and pressure. A detonation is a reaction that proceeds
through the reacted material toward the unreacted material
at a supersonic velocity.
5. Launch. Propulsion of a missile with a nuclear warhead into
controlled flight or uncontrolled flight beyond the
immediate area of the launch site.
6. Nuclear Command and Control. The exercise of authority and
direction by the President, as Commander in Chief, through
established command lines, over nuclear weapon operations of
military forces; as Chief Executive over all government
activities that support those operations; and as Head of
State over required multinational actions that support those
7. Nuclear Command and Control Critical Equipment.
Specifically designated equipment including software used to
build, encode, decode, transmit, or receive emergency action
messages; that identify nuclear targets, select nuclear
weapons to be used against specific targets, and route
nuclear-weapons-carrying platforms to appropriate launch
points; support or inhibit the delivery, arming, fuzing,
and firing of nuclear weapons themselves; positive control
material and devices; and nuclear weapons hardware.
8. Nuclear Command and Control System. The designated
combination of flexible and enduring elements including
facilities, equipment, communications, procedures,
personnel, and the structure in which these elements are
integrated, all of which are essential for planning,
directing, and controlling nuclear weapon operations of
military forces and the activities that support those
9. Nuclear Detonation. An energy release through a nuclear
process, during a period of time on the order of one
microsecond, in an amount equivalent to the energy released
by detonating four or more pounds of trinitrotoluene.
10. Nuclear Explosive. Any assembly containing fissionable
and/or fusionable materials and main charge high explosive
parts or propellants capable of producing a nuclear
detonation (e.g., a nuclear weapon or test device).
11. Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety. The safety, security,
and use control of nuclear explosives and weapons.
12. Nuclear Explosive Operation. Any activity involving a
nuclear explosive, including activities in which main charge
high explosive parts and pit are collocated.
13. Nuclear Weapon. A nuclear explosive configured for the
Department of Defense use.
14. Nuclear Weapon System. A nuclear weapon and its intended
means for delivering it to the target. This includes
associated support equipment, noncombat delivery vehicles,
facilities, procedures, and personnel.
15. Pit. A fissile component or set of fissile components
designed to fit in a cavity of an implosion system and which
if placed therein will create a nuclear explosive.
16. Positive Measures. Design features, rules, procedures, or
other controls used individually or collectively to provide
nuclear explosive surety.
17. Recapture. Locating and/or regaining control of a nuclear
weapon and/or special nuclear material (SNM), which is under
unauthorized possession, while still within the confines of
a DOE site/facility.
18. Recovery. Locating and/or regaining control of a nuclear
weapon and/or SNM, which is under unauthorized possession,
that has been removed from within the confines of a DOE
site/facility or DOE possession.
19. Release. The separation of a missile or gravity bomb with a
nuclear warhead from a delivery aircraft.
20. Unauthorized Act. Any intentional action taken by one or
more individuals who have not been authorized and approved
by proper authority.
21. Use Control. The application of systems, devices, or
procedures that allow timely authorized use of a nuclear
explosive while precluding or delaying deliberate
unauthorized nuclear detonation.