INDEX



DATE:     JANUARY 17, 1997

REPLY TO
ATTN OF:  OFFICE OF ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT, HR-6

SUBJECT:  COORDINATION OF DRAFT DOE O 452.4, SECURITY AND CONTROL OF
          NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS

TO:       DIRECTIVES POINTS OF CONTACT

The subject Draft Order, developed by the Office of Defense Programs, is attached for your review
and comment.  Draft DOE O 452.4, SECURITY AND CONTROL OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES
AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS, was developed to clarify and formalize requirements for the
Department's Nuclear Explosives and Weapons Use Control Program.  The Directives Management
Document for this Order was coordinated on June 20, 1996.  Numerous comments were received
from Headquarters, Operations Offices, and contractors concerning the draft order.  The Office of
Defense Programs has resolved all major issues and addressed and incorporated suggested comments,
where appropriate.

A set of definitions have been provided to assist in your review of the draft Order.  Upon final
issuance of DOE O 452.4, the definitions will be included in the DOE Directives System Glossary to
be published in Spring 1997.

Comments on the Draft Order are due by March 10, 1997.  MAJOR ISSUES and SUGGESTED
COMMENTS should be designated as such when submitted.  MAJOR ISSUES shall be limited to
instances where a directive in its entirety, or its requirements, would have an adverse effect on
Departmental policy objectives, mission accomplishment, economy, efficiency, or other management
concerns that would preclude its publication.  The following procedures shall be followed for the
submission of comments:

Headquarters, Field Elements, and Power Marketing Administrations:

     Submit comments to Mr. Jon Todd,  DP-21, A-368, GERMANTOWN,  send facsimile to
     (301) 903-8628 or INTERNET address: [email protected]; or forward via other
     electronic mail.  Submit a second set of comments to Ms. Susan C. Smith, Corporate
     Management Practices Group, HR-62, Room 4B-222, FORRESTAL; send facsimile to (202)
     586-9585, INTERNET addresses: [email protected]

Field Elements:

     The package submitted by Field Elements shall include as an attachment, the comments
     provided by contractors.

     Operations Offices will send an additional copy of their comments to the Associate Deputy
     Secretary for Field Management.

Contractors:  Submit comments directly to their appropriate Field Element.

You may also obtain these directives by accessing Explorer, DOE Directives On-line using the
following address: http:\\www.explorer.doe.gov/.

If there are any questions concerning the Draft Order, please contact one of the following individuals
for assistance.  For issues pertaining to the content of the Draft Order, please contact Mr. Todd at
(301) 903-3545.  Contact Ms. Smith at (202) 586-3296 for questions pertaining to the Directives
System or the processing of these directives.

AttachmentDecember 6, 1996

DP-21 (J. Todd, 3-3545)

SECURITY AND CONTROL OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS


M. L. Morris, Director, Office of Organization and Management, HR-6

I am requesting that the attached subject draft order be issued for formal Departmental coordination.

The Directives Management Document (DMD) for this order was issued June 20, 1996.  Numerous
comments were received from Headquarters, operations offices, and national laboratories concerning
the DMD and draft order.  All comments have been addressed and incorporated, where appropriate.
As a result, the subject order is ready for formal coordination.

If you have any questions, please call me or have your staff contact Jon Todd of my staff at 301-903-
3545.




                              Thomas P. Seitz
                              Deputy Assistant Secretary for
                              Military Application and
                              Stockpile Management
                              Defense Programs

Attachment

cc:
S. Smith, HR-62 DP-21:JTODD:ws:3-3463:11/27/96:Q:\DP-21\coordmem.o

Distribution:
3bcc:     Std DASMA
1bcc:     DP-21 Rdr
1bcc:     DP-21 Corres. Book
1bcc:     Team Leader


DP-21 Correspondence Review________________12/  /96
DP-20.3 Correspondence Review_______________12/  /96
DP-20 Executive Correspondence Review________12/  /96


DP-21          DP-21          DP-21          DP-22          DP-23

Todd      Rich      McConagha Hahn      Gordon-Hagerty
12/  /96  12/  /96  12/  /96  12/  /96  12/  /96



DP-16          NN-51     DP-20.1   DP-20

DeWitt    McCallum  Brown     Seitz
12/  /96  12/  /96  12/  /96  12/  /96

U.S. Department of Energy                              ORDER
     Washington, D.C.                                  DOE O 452.4
                                                 Draft: 1-17-97


SUBJECT:  SECURITY AND CONTROL OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES AND NUCLEAR
          WEAPONS



1.   OBJECTIVES.

     a.   Establish Department of Energy (DOE) requirements and
          responsibilities  to prevent the deliberate
          unauthorized use (DUU) of nuclear weapons and nuclear
          explosives.

     b.   Support the maintenance of a research and development
          program on a broad range of security and control
          methods and devices for nuclear weapons.

     c.   Develop positive measures to maintain control of all
          nuclear weapons and nuclear explosives during all
          phases of their life cycles.

     d.   Protect  public health and safety in conjunction with
          the Department of Defense (DoD) through dual agency
          judgment and responsibility for the surety of nuclear
          weapons.

     e.   Require the development, implementation, and
          maintenance of an integrated system of positive
          measures to protect all nuclear weapons and nuclear
          explosives in the custody of the DOE against DUU.

2.   CANCELLATION.    None.

3.   APPLICABILITY.

     a.   DOE Elements.  This Order applies to DOE Headquarters
          and field elements involved in the DOE Nuclear
          Explosive and Weapon Surety (NEWS) Program.

     b.   Contractors.  As set forth in the Contractor
          Requirements Document (CRD, Attachment 1), this Order
          applies to all laboratories, contractors, and
          subcontractors that manage, oversee, or conduct the DOE
          NEWS Program as provided by law and/or contract and
                    implemented by the appropriate contracting officer.4.   REQUIREMENTS.

     a.   The Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Security and Control
          Program (hereafter known as the Program) comprises an
          integrated system of positive measures to maintain
          control of nuclear explosives and nuclear weapons at
          all times.  These measures allow use when authorized
          and directed by proper authority and  protect against
          deliberate unauthorized use.  Major elements of the
          Program include the following.

          (1)  Interim Personnel Assurance Program (PAP)
               Procedures and Standards, dated October 2, 1996,
               to ensure the reliability of DOE and contractor
               employees requiring access to nuclear weapons or
               nuclear explosives.

          (2)  Measures for the use control of nuclear explosives
               and nuclear weapons,  including design features
               for nuclear weapons that are incorporated and
               employed at the earliest practical point during
               assembly and removed at the latest practical point
               during disassembly or dismantlement.

          (3)  Measures to assist the timely recapture or
               recovery of lost or stolen nuclear weapons or
               nuclear explosives.

     b.   The DOE shall conduct research and development for
          positive measures that can prevent the DUU of nuclear
          weapons.

     c.   All DOE nuclear explosive operations shall meet the
          following qualitative DOE Surety Standards to prevent
          deliberate unauthorized nuclear detonation, fissile
          material dispersal from the pit, or loss of control.
          There shall be positive measures to:

          (1)  minimize the possibility of or delay deliberate
               unauthorized nuclear detonation, and

          (2)  minimize the possibility of deliberate
               unauthorized acts that could lead to high
               explosive deflagration or high explosive
               detonation.

     d.   DUU evaluations shall be performed and may be specific
          to a DOE nuclear explosive, nuclear explosive
          operation,  class of operations, or a facility or site.
           The evaluation shall address  DOE nuclear explosive
          operations to help ensure that positive measures are
          adequate to meet the surety standards given in
          paragraph 4c.  These positive measures shall be
          continually evaluated at the direction of the
          Operations Office Manager against all existing and
          emerging threats as well as technological advancements.

     e.   To the maximum extent practical, control criteria and
          methods shall be integrated into the process design for
          nuclear explosive operations.

     f.   The responsible Operations Office shall conduct annual
          program reviews.  These reviews will fulfill the
          requirements of the appraisal process as defined in the
          DOE NEWS Program and shall cover:

          (1)  relevant ongoing activities;

          (2)  future plans/projects;

          (3)  resource requirements, including the necessary
               resources to implement and administer this Order;
               and

          (4)  major concerns and issues.

     g.   DOE shall cooperate with the DoD and other Federal
          agencies as  required to provide protection against DUU
          and to assess the effectiveness of surety features for
          all U.S. nuclear weapon systems throughout their life
          cycles.

     h.   Nuclear weapon design features shall support secure
          critical command and control communications whenever
          practical.

     i.   DOE shall assist DoD in designating nuclear command and
          control critical equipment and components to ensure
          that these items are developed and maintained to meet
          the criteria designated in National Security Decision
          Directive-281.

5.   RESPONSIBILITIES.

     a.   Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs (DP-1).

          (1)  Recommends and implements DOE policy concerning
               the DUU of nuclear weapons and nuclear explosives
               in DOE custody.

          2)   With DoD, ensures dual agency oversight of the
               surety of nuclear explosives and nuclear weapons.

     b.   Deputy Assistant Secretary for Research and Development
          (DASRD/DP-10).
          Allocates research and development (R&D) resources and
          directs R&D of positive measures to prevent the DUU of
          nuclear weapons and nuclear explosives.

     c.   Deputy Assistant Secretary for Military Application and
          Stockpile Management (DASMASM/DP-20).

          (1)  Establishes and oversees all aspects of the
               Program.

          (2)  Establishes programs for coordinating and
               assisting DoD and other Federal agencies in the
               recapture and recovery of nuclear explosives or
               nuclear weapons for which physical control has
               been lost.

          (3)  Represents DOE regarding nuclear weapons and
               nuclear weapon systems control to the DoD and
               other Federal agencies.

          (4)  Assists the DoD and other Federal agencies in
               designating nuclear command and control critical
               equipment and ensuring that they are developed to
               meet criteria specified in National Security
               Decision Directive-281.

          (5)  Directs the assessment of the effectiveness of
               control features of nuclear weapons in DOE and DoD
               custody.

          (6)  Establishes programs to incorporate improved use
               control measures in the enduring stockpile and
               promotes those programs found to be cost effective
               and feasible within the Military Services.

          (7)  Creates and sustains advisory committees as needed
               to consider and assess  control issues and to make
               programmatic recommendations to the DASMASM.

          (8)  In coordination with the Director, Office of
               Security Affairs, ensures proper integration of
               safety and use control with security.

     d.   The Director, Office of Security Affairs (NN-50).

          (1)  Develops and establishes DOE policies for the
               safeguards and security of nuclear explosives and
               nuclear weapons and their components.

          (2)  Directs evaluation of physical protection
               technology and equipment to meet present and
               future safeguards and security requirements for
               nuclear explosives and nuclear weapons.

          (3)  Advises the DASMASM on DOE Safeguards and Security
               requirements to implement the security element of
               the surety standards as defined in the DOE NEWS
               Program.

          (4)  Represents DOE security policy to the DoD and
               other Federal agencies.

          (5)  Establishes the security programs and policies for
               coordinating with DoD and other Federal agencies
               in the recapture and recovery of nuclear
               explosives or nuclear weapons.

     e.   Managers of Operations Offices.

          (1)   Ensure implementation of the Program.

          (2)  Conduct an annual Program review for the DASMASM
               and other DOE senior-level managers.

          (3)  Assess the effectiveness of the integrated system
               of positive measures to protect nuclear explosives
               under their cognizance against DUU.

          (4)  Certify to the DASMASM that all nuclear explosive
               operations under their cognizance meet the Surety
               Standards in paragraph 4c, and specify the basis
               for making this certification.  Specification may
               be by reference to other documents that do not
               need to be included in the certification
               memorandum.

6.   IMPLEMENTATION.  Contractors shall refer to the attached CRD
     for implementation requirements.


7.   REFERENCES.

     a.   Interim Personnel Assurance Program Procedures and
          Standards (U), October 2, 1996 (Unclassified), the rule
          that defines a voluntary human reliability program and
          provides requirements and guidance for personnel
          performing nuclear explosive operations.

     b.   "Joint Policy Statement on Nuclear Weapons Surety (U),"
          June 27, 1991 (Unclassified), signed by the Secretaries
          of Defense and Energy.

     c.   Memorandum of Understanding, "Department of Defense and
          the Department of Energy on Objectives and
          Responsibilities for Joint Nuclear Weapon Activities
          (U)," January 17, 1983 (Unclassified).

     d.   National Security Decision Directive-309, "Nuclear
          Weapons Safety, Security, and Control (U)," June 27,
          1988 (Confidential), which defines the joint, dual-
          agency surety responsibilities to protect the public
          health and safety between the DoD and DOE.

     e.   National Security Decision Directive-281, "United
          States Nuclear Weapons Command and Control (U)," August
          21, 1987 (Top Secret), which provides the basis for the
          attainment and maintenance of a nuclear command and
          control system under the authority and direction of the
          Commander-in-Chief.

     f.   DOE O 452.1, NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE AND WEAPON SURETY
          PROGRAM (U), 4-29-96 (Unclassified), which establishes
          DOE objectives, standards,  criteria, authorities, and
          responsibilities for the nuclear explosive and weapon
          surety program.

     g.   DOE O 452.2, SAFETY OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE OPERATIONS
          (U), 4-29-96 (Unclassified), which establishes DOE
          objectives, procedures, authorities, and
          responsibilities for nuclear explosive and weapon
          safety.

     h.   DOE O 470.1, SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY PROGRAM (U),  9-
          26-95 (Unclassified), which establishes basic
          requirements and responsibilities for the DOE
          Safeguards and Security Program.

     i.   DOE 5530.1A,  ACCIDENT RESPONSE GROUP (U), 9-20-91
          (Unclassified), which establishes DOE policy for
          response to accidents and significant incidents
          involving nuclear weapons or nuclear weapon components.

     j.   DOE 5530.2, NUCLEAR EMERGENCY SEARCH TEAM (U), 9-20-91
          (Unclassified), which establishes DOE policy for
          Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST) operations in
          response to malevolent radiological incidents.

     k.   DOE 5610.13, JOINT DOE/DOD NUCLEAR WEAPON SYSTEM
          SAFETY, SECURITY, AND CONTROL ACTIVITIES (U), 10-10-90
          (Unclassified), which establishes DOE policy,
          procedures, authorities, and responsibilities for joint
          nuclear weapon and nuclear weapon system safety,
          security, and control activities.

     l.   DOE 5610.14, TRANSPORTATION SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM PROGRAM
          OPERATIONS (U), 5-12-93 (Unclassified), which
          establishes the DOE policies for and implementation of
          the management and operation of the Transportation
          Safeguards System Program.

     m.   DOE 5632.1C, PROTECTION AND CONTROL OF SAFEGUARDS AND
          SECURITY INTERESTS (U), 7-15-94 (Unclassified), which
          establishes policy, authorities, and responsibilities
          for the protection and control of safeguards and
          security interests.

     n.   DOE M 5632.1C-1, MANUAL FOR PROTECTION AND CONTROL OF
          SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY INTERESTS (U), 7-15-94
          (Unclassified), which provides supplementary
          requirements for the protection and control of
          safeguards and security interests applicable to the
          design, modification, and/or operation of DOE
          facilities.

     o.   DOE 5632.7A, PROTECTIVE FORCE PROGRAM (U), 2-13-95
          (Unclassified), which establishes the Protective Force
          responsibilities to conduct on-site protection of DOE
          nuclear weapons using deadly force and to conduct
          recapture/recovery operations, including fresh pursuit
          off DOE facilities in the effort to recover stolen
          weapons.


     p.   DOE 5633.3B, CONTROL AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF NUCLEAR
          MATERIAL (U), 9-7-94 (Unclassified), which prescribes
          minimum requirements and procedures for control and
          accountability  of nuclear materials at DOE-owned and
          -leased facilities and DOE-owned nuclear materials at
          other facilities exempt from licensing by the Nuclear
          Regulatory Commission.

8.   CONTACT.  DASMASM,  Office of Weapons Surety, (301)903-3463.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY:



                                   ARCHER L. DURHAM
                                   Assistant Secretary for
                                   Human Resources and
                                   Administration
Contractor Requirements Document
for
 Security and Control of Nuclear Explosives and Nuclear Weapons


1.   A system for protecting nuclear weapons and nuclear explosives against deliberate,
     unauthorized use (DUU) shall be established and shall include the following.

     (a)  An integrated system of positive measures to maintain security and control of
          nuclear explosives and weapons at all times.  These measures shall allow use when
          authorized and directed by proper authority and prevent or delay unauthorized use.

     (b)  Personnel assurance programs to ensure the reliability of employees requiring
          access to nuclear weapons or nuclear explosives.

     (c)  Use control measures that deter or delay unauthorized acts by anyone who gains
          access to nuclear weapons.  Measures for the control of nuclear explosives and
          weapons shall include design features that are incorporated and employed at the
          earliest practicable point during assembly and removed at the latest practical point
          during disassembly.

     (d)  Methods to ensure timely recapture or recovery of nuclear weapons or nuclear
          explosives in the event physical control is lost.

2.   Positive measures for safety, security, and use control shall be effectively balanced to
     achieve the surety standards as follows to prevent unintended nuclear detonations, fissile
     material dispersal from the pit, or loss of control.

     (a)  Positive measures shall be established to minimize the possibility of deliberate
          unauthorized acts that could lead to high explosive deflagration or high explosive
          detonation.

     (b)  Positive measures shall be established to minimize the possibility of or delay
          unauthorized nuclear detonation.

3.   The Design Laboratories shall:

     (a)  Conduct R&D on a broad range of security and control
          methods and devices for nuclear weapons and nuclear
          explosives.

     (b)  Provide support to the Program.

4.   The Production Agencies shall provide support to the Program
     as required by the responsible Operations Office.

 DEFINITIONS

1.   Control.  The application of systems, devices or procedures
     that allow timely authorized use while precluding or
     delaying unauthorized use.

2.   Deliberate Unauthorized Use (DUU).  A nuclear detonation,
     high explosive detonation or deflagration, launch, release,
     or transfer for use of nuclear explosives or weapons, or
     termination of nuclear operations, not authorized by the
     President, resulting from a deliberate attempt by one or
     more individuals to circumvent critical elements of the
     Nuclear Command and Control System.

3.   High Explosive Deflagration.  A rapid chemical reaction in
     which the output of heat is sufficient for the reaction to
     proceed and accelerate without input of heat from another
     source.  Deflagration is a surface phenomenon, with the
     reaction products flowing away from the unreacted material
     along the surface at subsonic velocity.

4.   High Explosive Detonation.  A violent chemical reaction
     within a chemical compound or mechanical mixture evolving
     heat and pressure.  A detonation is a reaction that proceeds
     through the reacted material toward the unreacted material
     at a supersonic velocity.

5.   Launch.  Propulsion of a missile with a nuclear warhead into
     controlled flight or uncontrolled flight beyond the
     immediate area of the launch site.

6.   Nuclear Command and Control.  The exercise of authority and
     direction by the President, as Commander in Chief, through
     established command lines, over nuclear weapon operations of
     military forces; as Chief Executive over all government
     activities that support those operations; and as Head of
     State over required multinational actions that support those
     operations.

7.   Nuclear Command and Control Critical Equipment.
     Specifically designated equipment including software used to
     build, encode, decode, transmit, or receive emergency action
     messages; that identify nuclear targets, select nuclear
     weapons to be used against specific targets, and route
     nuclear-weapons-carrying platforms to appropriate launch
     points;  support or inhibit the delivery, arming, fuzing,
     and firing of nuclear weapons themselves; positive control
     material and devices; and nuclear weapons hardware.

8.   Nuclear Command and Control System.  The designated
     combination of flexible and enduring elements including
     facilities, equipment, communications, procedures,
     personnel, and the structure in which these elements are
     integrated, all of which are essential for planning,
     directing, and controlling nuclear weapon operations of
     military forces and the activities that support those
     operations.

9.   Nuclear Detonation.  An energy release through a nuclear
     process, during a period of time on the order of one
     microsecond, in an amount equivalent to the energy released
     by detonating four or more pounds of trinitrotoluene.

10.  Nuclear Explosive.  Any assembly containing fissionable
     and/or fusionable materials and main charge high explosive
     parts or propellants capable of producing a nuclear
     detonation (e.g., a nuclear weapon or test device).

11.  Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety.  The safety, security,
     and use control of nuclear explosives and weapons.

12.  Nuclear Explosive Operation.  Any activity involving a
     nuclear explosive, including activities in which main charge
     high explosive parts and pit are collocated.

13.  Nuclear Weapon.  A nuclear explosive configured for the
     Department of Defense use.

14.  Nuclear Weapon System.  A nuclear weapon and its intended
     means for delivering it to the target.  This includes
     associated support equipment, noncombat delivery vehicles,
     facilities, procedures, and personnel.

15.  Pit.  A fissile component or set of fissile components
     designed to fit in a cavity of an implosion system and which
     if placed therein will create a nuclear explosive.

16.  Positive Measures.  Design features, rules, procedures, or
     other controls used individually or collectively to provide
     nuclear explosive surety.

17.  Recapture.  Locating and/or regaining control of a nuclear
     weapon and/or special nuclear material (SNM), which is under
     unauthorized possession,  while still within the confines of
     a DOE site/facility.

18.  Recovery.  Locating and/or regaining control of a nuclear
     weapon and/or SNM, which is under unauthorized possession,
     that has been removed from within the confines of a DOE
     site/facility or DOE possession.

19.  Release.  The separation of a missile or gravity bomb with a
     nuclear warhead from a delivery aircraft.

20.  Unauthorized Act.  Any intentional action taken by one or
     more individuals who have not been authorized and approved
     by proper authority.

21.  Use Control.  The application of systems, devices, or
     procedures that allow timely authorized use of a nuclear
     explosive while precluding or delaying deliberate
     unauthorized nuclear detonation.