DOE G 452.2A-1A


                       IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE


                        DOE ORDER 452.2A,



                   U.S. Department of Energy

DISTRIBUTION                                        INITIATED BY:
All Department Elements                Office of Defense ProgramsDOE G 452.2A-1A                                                 i

     1.   INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1
          a.   Authorization and Applicability . . . . . . . .  1
          b.   General Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2

     2.   PRINCIPLES AND PROCESSES . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
          a.   Configuration Management. . . . . . . . . . . .  3
               (1)  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
               (2)  CM Program Elements. . . . . . . . . . . .  3
               (3)  Applicable Standards . . . . . . . . . . .  5
               (4)  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
          b.   Issues Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
               (1)  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
               (2)  Corrective Action and Commitment Tracking.  6
               (3)  Applicable Standards . . . . . . . . . . .  7
               (4)  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
          c.   Occurrence Reporting. . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
               (1)  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
               (2)  Emergency Occurrences. . . . . . . . . . .  7
               (3)  Unusual Occurrences. . . . . . . . . . . .  8
               (4)  Off-Normal Occurrences . . . . . . . . . .  8
               (5)  Applicable Orders. . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
               (6)  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
          d.   Performance Indicators. . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
               (1)  Use of Performance Indicators. . . . . . .  9
               (2)  Addition or Deletion of Performance Indicators 10
               (3)  Applicable Orders and Standards. . . . . . 10
               (4)  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
          e.   Safety Analysis - Facility/Operations Interfaces 10
               (1)  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
               (2)  Facility SAR Content . . . . . . . . . . . 11
               (3)  Operation-Specific HAR Content . . . . . . 13
               (4)  Safety Measures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
               (5)  Safety Basis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
               (6)  Applicable Orders and Standards. . . . . . 17
               (7)  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
          f.   Process Design. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
               (1)  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
               (2)  Tooling and Equipment. . . . . . . . . . . 19
               (3)  People . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
               (4)  Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
               (5)  Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
               (6)  Applicable Orders and Standards. . . . . . 22
               (7)  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
ii                                                DOE G 452.2A-1A

                       CONTENTS (continued)

          g.   Internal Safety Reviews . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
               (1)  Internal Safety Review Program . . . . . . 23
               (2)  Applicable Standards . . . . . . . . . . . 24
               (3)  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
          h.   Readiness Reviews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
               (1)  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
               (2)  Essential Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . 25
               (3)  Additional Guidance. . . . . . . . . . . . 26
               (4)  Additional Considerations for Nuclear Explosive
                    Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
               (5)  Applicable Orders and Standards. . . . . . 27
                              (6)  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271.   INTRODUCTION.

     a.   Authorization and Applicability.

          (1)  This Department of Energy (DOE) Implementation Guide for use with
               DOE O 452.2A is approved by the Deputy Assistant Secretary for
               Military Application and Stockpile Management.  It is applicable to DOE
               components and contractors responsible for nuclear explosive operations
               and associated activities and facilities.

          (2)  Implementation Guides are used to identify government and non-
               government standards for implementing the Department's requirements.
               Applicable DOE directives are included as a list following each section of
               this Guide.  In addition, each section includes a list of references, which
               provide other sources of information.

          (3)  Beneficial comments (recommendations, additions, deletions) and any
               pertinent data that may improve this document should be sent to:

                    Deputy Assistant Secretary for Military Application
                       and Stockpile Management
                    Office of Weapons Surety
                    (DP-21, GTN)
                    U.S. Department of Energy
                    19901 Germantown Road
                    Germantown, MD 20874-1290
                    Phone:  (301) 903-3463
                    Fax:  (301) 903-8628

          (4)  DOE Implementation Guides are part of the DOE directives system and
               are issued to provide supplemental information regarding the
               Department's requirements as contained in Rules, Orders, Notices, and
               Regulatory Standards.  Implementation Guides may also provide methods
               for implementing these requirements.  Implementation Guides are not
               substitutes for requirements, nor do they replace Technical Standards that
               are used to describe established practices and procedures that implement

          (5)  This Implementation Guide addresses some of the safety programs
               discussed in DOE O 452.2A.  Other programs are addressed in other DOE
               Orders, Standards, and Guides, as referenced in DOE O 452.2A.  Except
               as mandated by a regulation, contract, or administrative means, the
               provisions in this Implementation Guide are DOE's views concerning
               acceptable methods of program implementation and are not mandatory.

          (6)  Where appropriate, the scope and depth of the application of the methods
               and guidelines in this Guide are to be determined by the use of a graded
               approach.  The level of rigor necessary to meet the requirements should be
               based on grading factors, such as the relative importance to safety and the
               magnitude of hazards involved.  The graded approach shall not be used to
               obtain relief from requirements.

     b.   General Information.

          (1)  Many safety programs prescribed for DOE nuclear facilities have
               application to nuclear explosive operations and associated activities and
               facilities.  For some of these programs, the existing standards and
               guidelines for nuclear facilities are sufficient; these documents are
               identified in DOE O 452.2A.  For other programs, DOE standards specific
               to nuclear explosive operations provide the necessary standards and
               guidelines.  This Guide does not duplicate any existing material, but
               provides additional guidance for implementing DOE O 452.2A.

          (2)  The following general hazard types may be present.

               (a)  Nuclear explosive.

               (b)  High explosive.

               (c)  Electro-explosive and pyrotechnic devices.

               (d)  High-pressure vessels, with and without radioactive gases.

               (e)  Criticality.

               (f)  Occupational hazards (industrial, radiological, and chemical).

          (3)  Implementation of requirements to prevent or mitigate one hazard shall
               ensure that the likelihood of a safety significant incident involving another
               hazard is not increased.  If any such instance is identified, alternative
               methods should be investigated to attempt to implement the requirement
               without increasing the risk associated with other hazards.  Requirements
               that are not fully implemented because doing so would increase the
               overall risk of the operation will be identified and documented in the
               Safety Analysis Report (SAR) for the facility or the Hazard Analysis
               Report (HAR) for the operation.

          (4)  Guidelines, best management practices, or other implementation guidance
               that is not mandatory will be similarly treated, but justification for not
               incorporating non-mandatory guidance need not be documented in the
               SAR or HAR.

          (5)  Several references are being revised at this time.  Until such time as all
               contractual documentation is adjusted to reflect changes in the DOE
               directives system, implementation plans should include the most current
               applicable directive(s) and an assessment of the possible impact of
               anticipated changes from the specific reference used.  When the word "or"
               is used, several references may apply; when the word "and" is used, the
               intent is that all references apply.


     a.   Configuration Management.

          (1)  Introduction.  DOE O 452.2A requires design laboratories and operating
               contractors to develop and implement a configuration management (CM)
               program for nuclear explosive operations and associated activities and
               facilities.  The purpose of the CM program is to establish and maintain
               consistency among design requirements, physical configuration,
               processes, and documentation.

          (2)  CM Program Elements.

               (a)  The CM program for nuclear explosive operations and associated
                    activities should be coordinated with the facility CM program.
                    The facility CM program may address CM activities for nuclear
                    explosive operations and associated activities rather than establish
                    separate CM program plans.  The CM program plan should serve
                    as an integrating document, identifying where specific elements of
                    the program are addressed.  DOE-STD-1073-93, should be used in
                    developing the CM program and in preparing the CM plans.  As a
                    minimum, the CM program plan should include the following

                    1    Program management.

                    2    Design requirements.

                    3    Document control.

                    4    Change control.

                    5    Assessments.

               (b)  General CM program elements for nuclear explosive operations
                    and associated activities and facilities should include measures to
                    do the following.

                    1    Control the physical configuration of the equipment and
                         systems so they are consistent with design requirements,
                         documentation, and the safety basis.

                    2    Ensure that only proper, authorized equipment is used.

                    3    Review proposed changes to facilities, equipment, and
                         operations in accordance with an approved change control
                         process that identifies revisions in safety documentation.

                    4    Incorporate approved changes into all affected documents
                         (such as design documents and procedures) and programs
                         (such as the maintenance and training programs).

               (c)  DOE-STD-1073-93 provides acceptable methods and practices for
                    implementing CM and also provides guidance on applying the
                    graded approach.

               (d)  A unique consideration for nuclear explosive operations is to
                    ensure that all proposed changes are reviewed for potential impact
                    on nuclear explosive safety.  In addition to changes to obvious
                    items, such as tooling and the operating procedures, the change
                    control process must also capture changes that are not obviously
                    related to nuclear explosive safety but may have an adverse
                    impact.  Examples include changes to facility support systems,
                    security procedures, and personnel training programs.  CM
                    program plans should specify responsibilities for reviewing
                    proposed changes.

               (e)  CM controls for tooling and equipment should include the

                    1    Applicable controls specified by the criteria of paragraph
                         (c) of 10 CFR Part 830.120.

                    2    Interfaces between CM controls for tooling and equipment
                         and those for the facility.

                    3    Documentation and control of authorized tooling and
                         equipment; a formal layout scheme can facilitate these

                    4    Uniquely marked tooling and equipment.

                    5    Positive identification of tooling and equipment in a
                         calibration/performance testing control program.

          (3)  Applicable Standards.

               DOE-STD-1073-93, Guide for Operational Configuration Management
               Program, of 11/93.

          (4)  References.

               (a)  10 CFR Part 830, Nuclear Safety Management, Section 120,
                    "Quality Assurance Requirements."

               (b)  G-830.120, Implementation Guide for use with 10 CFR Part
                                        830.120, Quality Assurance, of 4-15-94.     b.   Issues Management.

          (1)  Introduction.  DOE and DOE contractors shall develop and implement
               corrective action tracking and commitment tracking systems.  These
               systems are key management tools to manage, plan, and assign work
               priorities, trend information to identify generic problems, and assess the
               effectiveness of safety programs.  These objectives can be met with
               separate or combined tracking systems.

          (2)  Corrective Action and Commitment Tracking.

               (a)  A corrective action tracking system should monitor and track all
                    safety-related corrective actions, including actions from Nuclear
                    Explosive Safety Studies and Surveys; internal and external audits,
                    appraisals, assessments, inspections, and reviews; and corrective
                    actions resulting from reportable occurrences.

               (b)  Corrective actions should be based on root cause analyses to
                    identify the underlying causes.  Findings and corrective action data
                    should be periodically reviewed to identify adverse trends or
                    opportunities for improving safety.

               (c)  A corrective action tracking system should be formally established
                    and implemented to ensure that all corrective actions are entered
                    into the system and that their status is current.  A formal system
                    should have features that will do the following.

                    1    Identify the initiating source for the action, an assignment
                         of a responsible organization or individual, and a scheduled
                         completion date.

                    2    Identify significant or priority actions (e.g., actions that
                         address prestart findings from a readiness review).

                    3    Report corrective action data to responsible managers in a
                         manner that assists them in completing their assigned
                         activities and also informs them of related actions being
                         completed by other organizations.

                    4    Track corrective actions to closure, with follow-up

               (d)  In addition to corrective actions, other commitments important to
                    safety should be tracked.  Examples are commitments to
                    implement new requirements, upgrade programs, and incorporate
                    new Technical Standards.  A commitment tracking system should
                    consider the applicable features listed above.

          (3)  Applicable Standards.


          (4)  References.


     c.   Occurrence Reporting.

          (1)  Introduction.  DOE O 232.1 establishes a system for reporting operations
               information related to DOE-owned or -operated facilities and for
               processing that information to provide for appropriate corrective action.
               This section provides guidance for categorizing occurrences related to
               nuclear explosive safety.

          (2)  Emergency Occurrences.  An emergency occurrence is the most serious
               type of occurrence and shall be reported immediately in accordance with
               DOE O 151.1.  An emergency occurrence requires an increased alert
               status for onsite personnel and, in specific cases, for offsite authorities.  In
               addition to the situations described in Chapter V, DOE O 151.1, the
               following are categorized as emergency occurrences.

               (a)  Unplanned nuclear or high-explosive detonation, or high-explosive

               (b)  Dispersal of fissile material from a nuclear explosive.

               (c)  Seizure, theft, or loss of a nuclear explosive.

               (d)  Inadvertent or deliberate unauthorized arming of a nuclear

               (e)  Safeguards or security event, or a transportation accident,
                    involving nuclear explosives that is a credible threat to DOE
                    operations, facilities, or personnel, and results or could result in
                    significant effects on the public health and safety and/or national

          (3)  Unusual Occurrences.  An unusual occurrence is a significant unplanned
               occurrence involving a nuclear explosive and shall be categorized and
               reported in accordance with the provisions of DOE M 232.1-1 for Group
               9, Nuclear Explosive Safety. The following are categorized as unusual

               (a)  The unauthorized introduction of electrical energy into a nuclear

               (b)  The unauthorized compromise of a nuclear explosive safety feature
                    when installed on a nuclear explosive.

               (c)  Damage to a nuclear explosive that results in a credible threat to
                    nuclear explosive safety.

               (d)  Inadvertent substitution of a nuclear explosive for a nuclear
                    explosive-like assembly (NELA) or vice versa.

               (e)  A violation of a nuclear explosive safety rule (NESR).

          (4)  Off-Normal Occurrences.  An off-normal occurrence is an abnormal or
               unplanned event or condition that adversely affects nuclear explosive
               safety but is not in the emergency or unusual occurrence category.  It shall
               be categorized and reported in accordance with the provisions of DOE M
               232.1-1 for Group 9, Nuclear Explosive Safety.  The following are
               categorized as off-normal occurrences.

               (a)  A "near miss," a situation that could (but did not) result in a
                    credible threat to nuclear explosive safety.

               (b)  A violation of the two-person concept of operations.

               (c)  Revocation of the Personnel Assurance Program (PAP)
                    certification of an individual (for cause).

               (d)  Damage to a training unit during training operations indicative of a
                    hazard to a nuclear explosive.

               (e)  The use of uncertified personnel or unauthorized
                    equipment/tooling during a nuclear explosive operation.

          (5)  Applicable Orders.

               (a)  DOE O 151.1, COMPREHENSIVE EMERGENCY
                    MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, dated 9-25-95.

               (b)  DOE O 232.1, OCCURRENCE REPORTING AND
                    PROCESSING OF OPERATIONS INFORMATION, dated 9-25-

               (c)  DOE M 232.1-1, OCCURRENCE REPORTING AND
                    PROCESSING OF OPERATIONS INFORMATION, dated 9-25-

          (6)  References.


     d.   Performance Indicators.

          (1)  Use of Performance Indicators.  Contractors and laboratories are required
               to implement a Performance Indicator Program in accordance with DOE
               O 210.1 and the guidance of DOE-STD-1048-92.  Operations Offices,
               contractors, and laboratories should develop nuclear explosive safety
               performance indicators tailored to the specific operations and unique site
               facilities and conditions.  The following are examples of performance
               indicators for nuclear explosive operations and associated activities and

               (a)  PAP immediate removals.

               (b)  Two-person concept violations.

               (c)  NESR violations.

               (d)  Technical Safety Requirement (TSR) and Operational Safety
                    Control (OSC) violations.

               (e)  Radiation dose to personnel.

               (f)  Occupational Safety and Health Administration recordable

               (g)  Nuclear explosive area reportable occurrences.

          (2)  Addition or Deletion of Performance Indicators.  Based on a review of
               operations, appraisal results, and management assessments, performance
               indicators should be added or deleted as appropriate.

          (3)  Applicable Orders and Standards.

               (a)  DOE O 210.1, PERFORMANCE INDICATORS AND
                    ANALYSIS OF OPERATIONS INFORMATION, dated 9-27-95.

               (b)  DOE-STD-1048-92, DOE Performance Indicators Guidance
                    Document, dated 12-92.

          (4)  References.


     e.   Safety Analysis - Facility/Operations Interfaces.

          (1)  Introduction.

               (a)  DOE O 452.2A requires safety analyses of all nuclear explosive
                    operations and associated activities and facilities.  A facility safety
                    analysis, documented in a SAR, generically addresses nuclear
                    explosive operations that are expected to be performed in the
                    facility.  The HAR is a detailed hazards analysis involving a
                    specific nuclear explosive operation.  Taken together, the facility
                    SAR and the operation HAR constitute the safety analysis for the
                    nuclear explosive operation in a specific facility.  The HAR
                    documents the systematic evaluation of hazards to workers, the
                    public, and the environment.  The Nuclear Explosive Hazards
                    Assessment (NEHA) is the portion of the HAR that contains a
                    systematic evaluation of hazards that could lead to nuclear
                    detonation, high-explosive detonation or deflagration, or fire.
                    NESRs are those safety limits, operating limits, surveillance
                    requirements, safety boundaries, and management and
                    administrative controls that minimize the possibility of nuclear
                    detonation, high-explosive detonation or deflagration, or fire, and
                    are included in the NEHA for review and consideration by the
                    Nuclear Explosive Safety Study Group (NESSG).  OSCs are safety
                    limits, operating limits, surveillance requirements, safety
                    boundaries, and management and administrative controls that
                    protect workers, the public, and the environment from hazards
                    other than nuclear detonation, high-explosive denotation and
                    deflagration, and fire.  OSCs are documented in the HAR and
                    approved by the Operations Office manager.  NESRs are
                    documented in the NESSG report and must be approved by

               (b)  For facilities in which nuclear explosive operations are performed,
                    SARs shall be prepared and processed in accordance with DOE
                    5480.23 and DOE-STD-3009-94.  DOE 5480.23 specifies that a
                    graded approach shall be used for analyzing, documenting, and
                    providing for the safety of facilities.  The rigor of the safety
                    program should correspond to the level of the hazards.  Section
                    2e(2), below, provides specific guidance for using DOE-STD-
                    3009-94 to prepare SARs for facilities in which nuclear explosive
                    operations and associated activities are performed.

               (c)  Facility TSRs shall be developed and implemented in accordance
                    with DOE 5480.22.  Similar operation-specific controls are
                    specified in NESRs and OSCs.  Section 2e(4), below, describes the
                    roles and interrelationships of NESRs and OSCs, and provides
                    guidance on developing, documenting, and implementing them.

          (2)  Facility SAR Content.

               (a)  DOE-STD-3009-94 should be used for preparing SARs.  Each
                    chapter contains a section titled, "Application of the Graded
                    Approach."  For some chapters, this guidance is keyed to a nuclear
                    facility hazard category.  For the purpose of preparing SARs for
                    facilities in which nuclear explosive operations and associated
                    activities are conducted, the graded approach guidance for a hazard
                    category 2 nuclear facility should be used.

               (b)  Specific supplementary guidance for the referenced chapters of
                    DOE-STD-3009-94 is provided in the following paragraphs.

                    1    Chapter 3, Hazard and Accident Analyses.  DOE O 452.2A
                         requires the facility SAR to describe the analysis of the full
                         spectrum of hazards involved in nuclear explosive
                         operations and associated activities.  The SAR should
                         contain hazards analyses, in general, and an accident
                         analysis for potential bounding hazards for each accident
                         type.  Definition of a bounding accident should be based on
                         the expected worst-case nuclear explosive operation or
                         associated activity characteristics associated with the
                         accident type.  The goal is to identify and analyze hazards
                         that will bound future operations.

                    2    Chapter 5, Derivation of Technical Safety Requirements.
                         TSR information is based on material detailed in Chapters
                         3 and 4 of the SAR and is developed and maintained in
                         accordance with DOE 5480.22.  TSRs address facility
                         structures, systems, and components (SSCs) and
                         administrative controls related to plant programs.  NESRs
                         and OSCs address operation-specific controls (see Section
                         2e(4), below).  NESRs and OSCs should complement
                         TSRs, not overlap them.

                    3    Chapter 6, Prevention of Inadvertent Criticality.  Maximum
                         inventory limits for fissile material shall be specified in the
                         TSRs based on guidance contained in DOE O 420.1 or
                         DOE 5480.24 and appropriate Joint DOE/Department of
                         Defense Technical Publications (e.g., TP 20-7).

                         a    The SAR addresses the criticality protection policy
                              and program for the general handling and staging of
                              single and multiple nuclear explosives and
                              components.  However, the SAR is not required to
                              address the criticality safety of a specific nuclear
                              explosive and its components since it is addressed
                              in the design process, certified by the design
                              laboratories, and documented in the HAR.

                         b    The safety analysis in the SAR shall document
                              bounding events to identify and describe control
                              measures and limits.

                    4    Chapter 13, Human Factors.  SARs should address human-
                         to-machine interfaces that affect facility safety-class SSCs
                         and safety-significant SSCs.  Human factor aspects of
                         specific nuclear explosive operations and associated
                         activities are addressed in HARs.

          (3)  Operation-Specific HAR Content.  Refer to DOE-DP-STD-XXXX-96 for
               detailed requirements on operations-specific HAR content.

          (4)  Safety Measures.

               (a)  TSRs are facility limits and/or controls that apply to all operations.
                    Facility safety limits, requirements, and controls contained in
                    TSRs are derived from analyses in the SAR.  NESRs and OSCs are
                    derived in the HARs employing methods similar to those used to
                    derive TSRs in the SAR.  DOE 5480.22 and DOE 5480.23 provide
                    an acceptable model for developing, documenting, and
                    implementing NESRs and OSCs.  The purpose of NESRs is to
                    minimize the possibility of accidents involving nuclear detonation,
                    high-explosive detonation or deflagration, and/or fire.  OSCs are
                    focused on worker health and safety and are directed toward
                    minimizing the frequency and/or consequences of accidents not
                    involving nuclear detonation, high-explosive detonation or
                    deflagration, and/or fire.  For example, in order to minimize
                    personnel exposure from an uncontrolled tritium release, an OSC
                    might be established for the operability of a gas exhaust system
                    collector hose positioned directly over the nuclear explosive during
                    tritium reservoir removal.  This would provide a capability to
                    collect and control the tritium gas that might be involved in an
                    accidental tritium release.

               (b)  NESRs and OSCs consist of the following.

                    1    Safety Limits.  Bounding process limits to prevent release
                         of radioactivity or other hazardous material, or explosive
                         detonation/deflagration.  Safety limits are normally
                         associated with safety-class SSCs and any controls
                         associated with non safety class SSCs.

                    2    Operating Limits.  Limiting Control Settings (LCSs) on
                         safety systems are control process variables to prevent
                         exceeding safety limits.  Limiting Conditions for Operation
                         (LCOs) are the lowest functional capability or performance
                         level of safety SSCs and their support systems required for
                         normal safe conduct of operations.  Such limits may
                         include restricting the number of hazardous components
                         present in a work area, the quantity of components or
                         hazardous material present, or the temperature of a fluid

                    3    Surveillance or Status Verification Requirements.  Test,
                         calibration, inspection, or verification requirements that
                         ensure operability and quality of safety-related systems or
                         components, or the status of a safety feature.

                    4    Administrative Controls.  Organization and management
                         procedures, reviews, and other administrative elements that
                         ensure safe operation.

               (c)  As appropriate, the operating contractor and/or the responsible
                    design laboratory shall propose NESRs and OSCs, as derived from
                    the safety analysis in the HAR/NEHA.  Additional NESRs and
                    OSCs may be proposed during preoperational safety reviews, such
                    as the operation-specific readiness assessments or Nuclear
                    Explosive Safety Studies.  The Nuclear Explosive Safety Study
                    includes review of all recommended NESRs and provides final
                    recommended NESRs in the Nuclear Explosive Safety Study

               (d)  NESRs and OSCs shall be recorded in controlled documents and
                    maintained current.  Revisions should be approved by the same
                    authority that approved the original NESR or OSC.  For ongoing
                    operations, NESRs and OSCs should be reviewed annually,
                    concurrent with the annual HAR review.

               (e)  NESR or OSC violations include the following.

                    1    Exceeding a safety limit.

                    2    Failing to take the actions required within the required time
                         limit following:  (1) exceeding an LCS, (2) failure to meet
                         an LCO, or (3) failure to successfully meet a surveillance
                         or status verification requirement.

                    3    Failing to perform a surveillance or status verification
                         when required.

                    4    Failing to comply with an administrative control

               (f)  A violation of a NESR is an occurrence as listed in DOE M 232.1-
                    1 and is subject to the reporting requirements of DOE O 232.1.
                    Although not specifically listed, a violation of an OSC should be
                    reported as an occurrence in accordance with DOE O 232.1.

               (g)  An acceptable format for specific NESRs and OSCs is depicted in
                    Attachment 1 of DOE 5480.22.  Other formats may be used,
                    provided the required information is presented clearly.

               (h)  As stated in the guidelines of DOE 5480.22, TSRs are not based
                    on maintaining some acceptable level of worker safety; rather, the
                    risk to workers is controlled by reducing the likelihood and
                    potential impact of a significant event (one that can cause serious
                    personnel injury or an acute fatality).  This is accomplished by
                    developing TSRs for those systems and components that are
                    barriers preventing uncontrolled release of radioactive or other
                    hazardous materials, or that mitigate such releases.

               (i)  In a similar fashion, NESRs and OSCs should also establish
                    barriers to prevent an uncontrolled release of radioactive or other
                    hazardous material, or to mitigate the releases.  Specific to nuclear
                    explosive operations, NESRs and OSCs should also establish
                    measures that prevent uncontrolled release of energy from
                    explosives (i.e., main charge high-explosive or other explosive
                    devices present in the nuclear explosive).  The objective is for
                    NESRs and OSCs to implement limits and controls that will
                    reduce the likelihood or consequences of a significant event.  Plant
                    safety programs are relied on to contribute to the safety basis of
                    the facility and its operation by providing worker safety for other

          (5)  Safety Basis.

               (a)  DOE 5480.23 defines the safety basis as the combination of
                    information relating to controlling hazards at a nuclear facility,
                    including design, engineering analyses, and administrative
                    controls.  While the safety basis of a facility typically includes all
                    operations performed in the facility, the nature of nuclear
                    explosive operations and associated activities requires an
                    operations-specific safety basis in addition to a general safety
                    basis.  A graphic depiction of the safety basis development for
                    nuclear explosive operations and associated activities is shown in
                    Figure 1.

               (b)  For facilities used for nuclear explosive operations and associated
                    activities, the facility safety basis includes the Nuclear Explosive
                    Safety Master Studies required by DOE-STD-3015-97, the generic
                    accident analysis documented in the facility SAR, and the
                    derivative TSRs.  A generic accident is a synthesis of accident
                    factors related to one or more nuclear explosive(s) that contain the
                    largest quantity of explosives and nuclear materials expected to be
                    resident in the facility.  This enables the facility SAR to be
                    developed for any nuclear explosive operation(s) likely to be
                    performed in the facility.  Specific nuclear explosive operations
                    and technical details may (or may not) have been developed when
                    the SAR is being produced.  The facility safety basis also includes
                    facility safety programs described in the SAR.

               (c)  The operation safety basis for nuclear explosive operations and
                    associated activities includes the Nuclear Explosive Safety Studies
                    required by DOE-STD-3015-96, the operation-specific hazard
                    analysis documented in the HAR, and the derivative NESRs and
                    OSCs.  The safety basis for performing a specific nuclear
                    explosive operation in a specific facility is the combination of the
                    general facility safety basis and theoperation-specific safety basis.
                    This is depicted in Figure 1.

               (d)  A nuclear explosive operation considered for introduction into a
                    facility must be evaluated to ensure that the operation is within the
                    facility safety basis.  DOE-DP-STD-XXXX-96 specifies the
                    process for evaluating whether the operation safety basis is within
                    the facility safety basis.

          (6)  Applicable Orders and Standards.

               (a)  DOE O 232.1, OCCURRENCE REPORTING AND
                    PROCESSING OF OPERATIONS INFORMATION, dated 9-25-

               (b)  DOE O 420.1, FACILITY SAFETY, dated 10-13-95.

               (c)  DOE 5480.22, TECHNICAL SAFETY REQUIREMENTS, dated

               (d)  DOE 5480.23, NUCLEAR SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORTS,
                    dated 3-10-94.

               (e)  DOE 5480.24, NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY, dated 8-12-

               (f)  DOE M 232.1-1, OCCURRENCE REPORTING AND
                    PROCESSING OF OPERATIONS INFORMATION, dated 9-25-
                                   (g)  DOE-STD-3009-94, Preparation Guide for U.S. Department of
                    Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Safety Analysis Reports, dated

               (h)  DOE-STD-3015-97, Nuclear Explosive Safety Study Process,dated 10-96.

               (i)  DOE-DP-STD-XXXX-96, Preparation Guide for U.S.
                    Department of Energy Hazard Analysis Reports for Nuclear
                    Explosive Operations, TBD.

          (7)  References.

               TP 20-7, Nuclear Safety Criteria, dated 9-1-86.

     f.   Process Design.

          (1)  Introduction.  Defense-in-depth is a safety management concept for
               process design that considers the synergistic effects of multiple layers of
               protection (e.g., equipment and facilities design, procedures, training),
               which collectively contribute to accident prevention and/or consequence
               mitigation.  These layers of protection include equipment, people,
               facilities, and procedures.

          (2)  Tooling and Equipment.

               (a)  The following design criteria guidance applies.

                    1    Safety critical equipment should be designed to remain in a
                         safe condition should a system or component fail.

                    2    Tooling, equipment, and layout should be designed and
                         used in a manner that precludes introduction of unintended
                         energy to nuclear explosives, including mechanical,
                         thermal, electrical, radiation, and chemical energy.

                    3    Tooling and equipment should not include or otherwise
                         introduce hazardous chemicals that could create hazardous
                         or mixed (radioactive and hazardous) wastes.

                    4    The layout design should preclude the possibility of the
                         tooling or equipment from making unintended contact with
                         or striking the high explosive.

                    5    All tooling and equipment that apply energy to the nuclear
                         explosive should have documented design criteria.

                    6    The tooling and equipment design process should
                         incorporate human factors engineering to:

                         a    minimize the likelihood of accident initiation from
                              human interactions and to enhance worker safety;

                         b    protect workers from serious injury caused by
                              industrial or radiological accidents; and

                         c    apply industry standards and guidelines, where
                              appropriate, as early as practical in the tooling and
                              equipment design process.

                    7    Safety-critical tooling and equipment should be designed to
                         contain two or more independent physical safety features
                         with no common mode of failure.

                    8    Tooling and equipment should be designed, fabricated,
                         tested, approved, and available for credible contingencies
                         and alternate processes.

                    9    Tooling, equipment, and layout should be designed to
                         minimize exposure of personnel to hazards.

               (b)  Reliability measures provide a layer of defense against equipment
                    failures that may have an adverse impact on safety.  The following
                    guidance applies.

                    1    Reliability of tooling and equipment should be optimized
                         by applying appropriate standards to their design,
                         fabrication, installation, testing, inspection, maintenance,
                         storage, and use.  The use of industry standards criteria
                         should be based on their applicability to nuclear explosive

                    2    Preventive and predictive maintenance programs should be
                         established for tooling and equipment.

                    3    Post-maintenance testing procedures should be established
                         for safety class and safety significant tooling and

               (c)  A checkout on a trainer with the actual tooling and equipment
                    should be considered where possible to verify that potential human
                    interactions with significant safety impact are not overlooked in
                    the design process.

          (3)  People.  Personnel selection, training, and qualification requirements
               provide a layer of defense that ensures that personnel performing nuclear
               explosive operations are reliable and adequately qualified to carry out
               operations.  A system should be established to verify that personnel are
               qualified and, as appropriate, certified to perform their functions.  The
               fitness for duty requirements of the PAP along with a personnel
               management system that can effectively process derogatory information
               and reach decisions concerning acceptability/removal of personnel
               assigned nuclear explosive duties are key factors to ensure personnel

          (4)  Facilities.  The facility safety basis requirements provide a layer of
               defense that ensures the facilities are designed, built, modified, and
               maintained in a manner that recognizes and controls the hazards
               associated with expected operations.  Safety envelope control
               requirements ensure that facilities are maintained and controlled in a
               manner consistent with the requirements of the SAR and TSRs.  A formal
               program for tracking SAR/TSR surveillance requirements and status and a
               system for positive verification of compliance should be established.

          (5)  Procedures.  A rigorous approach to preparing and adhering to procedures
               provides a layer of defense in conducting nuclear explosive operations and
               associated activities.  Procedures should have the following attributes.

               (a)  Comply with design specifications and technical requirements.

               (b)  Clearly state cautions and warnings.

               (c)  Have design laboratory review and approval.

               (d)  Place proper emphasis on preventing an accident, detecting
                    abnormal conditions, and protecting the worker, the public, and the

               (e)  Identify appropriate points to safely interrupt work.

               (f)  Consider and incorporate waste minimization practices.

               (g)  Include sufficient information to perform the operation.

               (h)  Be organized so that operating personnel are not required to
                    consult more than one document to accomplish a single process.

          (6)  Applicable Orders and Standards.

               (a)  DOE M 440.1-1, DOE EXPLOSIVES SAFETY MANUAL, dated

               (b)  MIL-STD-1472D, Human Engineering Design Criteria for
                    Military Systems, Equipment and Facilities.

          (7)  References.


     g.   Internal Safety Reviews.

          (1)  Internal Safety Review Program.  As required by DOE O 452.2A, DOE
               contractors and laboratories must establish an internal, objective, and
               independent safety review program.  The safety review program normally
               functions in an advisory capacity to line management.  An internal safety
               review program should do the following.

               (a)  Be defined and delineated in writing (e.g., purposes, objectives,
                    functions, authority, responsibility, composition, quorum, meeting
                    frequency, and reporting requirements).

               (b)  Allow for the safety review function to report to a designated
                    official at a sufficiently high level of management who will take
                    necessary corrective action.

               (c)  Be recorded in sufficient detail to permit contractor management
                    and DOE to evaluate the system's effectiveness.

               (d)  Be performed by personnel with technical discipline competence
                    in the areas being reviewed.

               (e)  Be performed by independent personnel, i.e., those who did not
                    perform or direct the work.

               (f)  Provide an opportunity for group discussions among safety

               (g)  Serve as an independent determination of whether a proposed
                    activity involves an unreviewed safety question (USQ), violation
                    of a TSR/OSC/NESR, deviation from a safety analysis premise, or
                    any other safety concern.

               (h)  Include the following.

                    1    Proposed modifications to facilities and equipment
                         affecting safety;

                    2    Administrative, operating, maintenance, repair, testing,
                         quality assurance (QA), immediate-action, and emergency

                    3    Training programs, qualification and certification
                         requirements, and associated procedures;

                    4    Reports of occurrences, root cause analyses, and corrective
                         action plans;

                    5    Safety analyses and evaluations;

                    6    Nuclear Explosive Safety Study input documents;

                    7    CM program plans and procedures;

                    8    QA program plan;

                    9    Maintenance implementation plan;

               (i)  Be reviewed for adequacy by management at least once every 3

          (2)  Applicable Standards.


          (3)  References.


     h.   Readiness Reviews.

          (1)  Introduction.

               (a)  The essential attributes of DOE 5480.31 or DOE O 425.1
                    readiness reviews should be applied to nuclear explosive
                    operations and associated activities to establish readiness review
                    requirements for startup and restart of specific nuclear explosive
                    operations.  Some facility-based requirements do not apply to an
                    operations-based activity.  Also, there are additional requirements
                    for readiness reviews that are specifically relevant to nuclear
                    explosive operations.

               (b)  This section identifies the attributes of DOE 5480.31 or DOE O
                    425.1 readiness reviews that are considered essential and are
                    expected to be included in the readiness review process for nuclear
                    explosive operations.  This section also provides examples of some
                    features of nuclear explosive operations that require special

          (2)  Essential Attributes.

               (a)  Both the organization responsible for the operation and DOE
                    perform independent readiness reviews.

               (b)  The readiness reviews provide independent reviews of readiness
                    and will not be used as management tools to achieve readiness.

               (c)  The readiness review is formally documented in a manner
                    equivalent to the specifications of DOE 5480.31 or DOE O 425.1
                    (plan-of-action, implementation plan, final report, and finding

               (d)  Contractor line management certification of readiness is a
                    prerequisite for beginning the independent contractor readiness

               (e)  Certification of readiness by contractor management to DOE line
                    management and by DOE line management to the operation
                    approval authority is a prerequisite for beginning the DOE
                    readiness review.

               (f)  Readiness reviews are conducted by qualified personnel with
                    assessment expertise, who are independent of the operation being
                    reviewed.  Independent in this context means that personnel will
                    not review their own work or work for which they were
                    responsible.  Senior members should not be from the line
                    organization responsible for the operation; variance from this
                    requirement may be granted by the appropriate approval authority.

               (g)  The breadth of readiness reviews includes applicable core
                    requirements derived by the cognizant Operations Office from
                    DOE 5480.31 or DOE O 425.1, plus any review areas unique to
                    the operation.

               (h)  The readiness review team develops and documents the criteria
                    and reviews approaches prior to beginning the review.

               (i)  DOE readiness review findings are categorized as prestart or post-

               (j)  All prestart findings are corrected prior to startup or restart of the
                    operation and verified as closed by DOE.

          (3)  Additional Guidance.  Refer to DOE 5480.31 or DOE O 425.1 and DOE-
               STD-3006-93 for additional guidance.

          (4)  Additional Considerations for Nuclear Explosive Operations.

               (a)  DOE 5480.31 or DOE O 425.1 requirements do not specifically
                    address the startup or restart of an operation within an operating
                    facility.  A comparable process for startup and restart of nuclear
                    explosive operations is needed to fulfill DOE O 452.2A
                    requirements.  In addition, there are nuclear explosive safety
                    requirements that must be satisfied prior to authorizing the

               (b)  The following are some of the aspects of nuclear explosive
                    operations that should be considered in the readiness review
                    program for these operations.

                    1    DOE O 452.2A and Operations Office-specified criteria for
                         when a readiness review is required.

                    2    Grading of readiness review requirements for startup or
                         restart of operations where a full scope readiness review is
                         not necessary (e.g., startup of an operation that is
                         essentially the same as a fully reviewed and approved

                    3    Interfaces between the operation and the facility, facility
                         support systems, and facility environment, safety, and
                         health programs.

                    4    A conditional startup authorization based on reviewing the
                         operation conducted on a trainer, followed by a final
                         authorization based on reviewing the operation conducted
                         on a nuclear explosive.

                    5    Integrating the expertise of the design laboratories into the
                         review process.

                    6    Additional nuclear explosive safety activities that are
                         required prior to authorizing the operation (e.g., the
                         Nuclear Explosive Safety Study).

          (5)  Applicable Orders and Standards.

               (a)  DOE 0 425.1, STARTUP AND RESTART OF NUCLEAR
                    FACILITIES, dated 9-29-95.

               (b)  DOE 5480.31, STARTUP AND RESTART OF NUCLEAR
                    FACILITIES, dated 9-15-93.

               (c)  DOE-STD-3006-93, Planning and Conduct of Operational
                    Readiness Reviews (ORRs), dated 11-93.

          (6)  References.