As a result, Russia, which has already found itself playing a secondary role in the world economy, could also lose its status as a military superpower over the next few years. If the current level of financing is maintained, its nuclear deterrent forces will collapse over the next few years. Its conventional forces seem to have already lost their fighting efficiency, as was evident in the Chechen war. In the next two or three years, the Russian Army will have to be cut down to 12 or 15 divisions. That seems to be the maximum that the federal budget can sustain. But that level would be clearly insufficient to stage any kind of war, save for a small border conflict of low intensity.6
In short, the crash and ensuing political vacuum represented another deep shock to a Russian state system that has been struggling with military reform for almost a decade without much success. It came at a time when Kokoshin, in spite of fiscal constraints, seemed to have achieved a position of institutional leverage to move the reform process forward in a direction that would result in the reconstitution of military power to fit the needs of Russia in a new domestic and international environment.
Advanced military forces are dependent on computers, radio and other communications, and satellites, for reconnaissance, navigation, and communications. Attacking the enemy's "brain and stomach" need no longer depend on tanks racing round a flank, or aircraft pounding headquarters and industrial centres from above. The enemy's brain and nerve system can be seared and paralyzed by jamming, and various types of electromagnetic weapons. Electronic warfare, and other "soft kill" weapons are likely to usurp the position envisaged for tanks and aircraft in much of the 1930s military theory. Low-frequency weapons and application of bio-electronics may severely reduce the effectiveness and alertness of enemy forces, commanders, and political leaders.26
Bellamy thus linked Kokoshin and the current Revolution in Military Affairs with Bloch's mass industrial war and the mechanization of war in the 1930s. Kokoshin's ties to these two revolutions are explicit. Like Bloch, Kokoshin has called for a methodological breakthrough in the military-political studies and cited the need to apply "a systems approach, systems analysis, and operations research" and the development of new methods.27 Kokoshin cited the positive accomplishments of the Hague Conference of 1899 in limiting weapons development in his co-authored work on preventing war.28 However, in these works Kokoshin did not break with the Leninist interpretation of general war in the early twentieth century contributing to revolutionary potential for social transformation. What was for Bloch a disaster for states and societies was a necessary instrument of intensified, international class struggle for Lenin. With regard to the late twentieth century, however, Kokoshin fully accepted the necessity of preventing the outbreak of general war between East and West and its escalation into a nuclear exchange.
The most important basis for determining the nature of war is the character of the condition of productive forces of the opposing sides, the assessment of possible coalitions etc. From the time of the Civil War many had the impression of future war as our revolutionary war, that is, lightning warfare, based on revolutionary elan etc. Of course, only a few suffer from such sins now.42
Tukhachevsky described such sentiments as "revolutionary idealism" that had nothing in common with Marxism.
Thus, just as the experience of the World War so also the experience of 1920 shows that: a) one should not build on horse transport the logistical base of modern troops, even if very few in number, at a great distance; b) a sufficiently rapid reestablishment of the railroads behind advancing troops and the structure of their rear remains an unresolved task for contemporary technology. Therefore, the operational capabilities of contemporary armies still remain limited.46
The point became one of conducting each operation so that it would be decisive within its own depth, i. e., bring about the destruction of the opposing enemy forces throughout the depth of their deployments by means of breakthroughs and encirclements. On this point the study cited no less an authority than J. F. C. Fuller, Britain's leading proponent of mechanized warfare. The architect of Plan 1919 and the prime promoter of the mechanization of the British Army, had written in 1926 of the possibility of using new technology in deep battle:
At present aviation can attack the enemy rear; tanks can break through the front and attack the rear; armored cars can turn his flank and once again attack his rear, i. e., mount attacks against the most sensitive part of the force, in his stomach. The attack of the rear at the present time is quite possible and in my opinion has become one of the most important tactical operations in war.47
These partial destructions could not prevent a large and economically-developed state from redeploying forces to meet the threat and from mobilizing additional resources. However, the combination of such operations was the most likely road to decisive victory.48 At the same time the study admitted that the threat of exhaustion and positional warfare could not be precluded. In that case, the Soviet Union had to prepare for protracted war and mobilize its entire economy and society.49 This had been a central theme of Svechin's strategy and his call for the general staff to serve as an "integral commander" to coordinate the state's preparations for and conduct of war. The key to overcoming the threat of positional warfare, according to Tukhachevsky, was the mechanization of the armed forces to assist in breakthrough and exploitation. Thus, the Red Army assumed that it had found an answer to Bloch's pessimism with successive, deep operations. Modern war and revolution could, in this guise, become complementary instruments of an industrialized and militarized Soviet state. By the mid 1930s that confidence was shaken by the emergence of a new threat configuration with the rearmament of Nazi Germany. In 1937 Stalin turned on the Soviet military elite and, in a blood purge, eliminated Tukhachevsky, Svechin, Berzin and many others who had taken part in the RKKA's 1928 study of future war.
Now we can speak about a turning point in the development of military science and military art. In general, a new qualitative leap in the development of military affairs, connected with the modernization of nuclear weapons and especially the appearance of new types of conventional weapons, is ripening. In connection with this [process] there has arisen the need to rethink the basic military-political and operational-strategic problems of the defense of the socialist Fatherland.64
Gareev's call for a military-political response to this technological revolution represented a sharp break with the Brezhnev era and was a harbinger of things to come. Yet, because of the nature of the Soviet system, military forecasters focused on military-technical issues, leaving the military-political issues in the hands of the Politburo. Under Marshal Sergei Akhromeev, who replaced Ogarkov as Chief of the General Staff in 1984, Soviet military thought began to examine the possibility of a general war fought with advanced conventional weapons.65 Given the ongoing war in Afghanistan and the increasing evidence of economic decline and technological stagnation in the face of a renewed arms race with the United States, hard choices had to be made. These choices began to be made when Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary of the CPSU.
Any carelessness in the military sphere, which in the past was devoid of democratic control, can in the context of acute mistrust and universal suspicion, cost the country a great deal and have the most severe economic side effects. . . . Many losses of this kind could have been averted if interpretation of national security interests had not become the exclusive province of several departments, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs included, which, moreover, were shielded from criticism, as was the case in the past.67
The majority of leading states, undertaking specific measures toward lessening the global confrontation, arms reduction, and the support of partnership relations with the former socialist countries, continue to act out of their own national interests, strengthening only their own military security. The very same is being done to the degree of their capabilities by the former republics of the USSR. It appears that world community is still not ready for the realization in practice of the policy of "new thinking." One must conclude from this that the previous sources and causes of wars have not disappeared and that between various states new contradictions are created.76
A qualitative "technological explosion," widespread computerization and the creation of artificial intellect, the farthest development of microelectronics, of "thinking," intelligent weapons, the introduction into the process of control of automatized systems and robotics can to a significant degree change the material base of armed struggle.82
The Defense Ministry's demand to allocate 163,000 billion roubles exceeds its official quota by 60 percent. This implies that the state must completely stop the financing of health care, education, science, culture, and government investment programs designed to revitalize the Russian economy and to channel the released funds to maintain the army in its present state.99
At the same time he also recognized that downsizing the military, which he supported, was not a matter of simply cutting troop strength but required additional funding. Without that, the Ministry would have to take funds for other vital purposes: "it is difficult to apportion from the 1997 defense budget [R104 trillion] the funds necessary to cut the armed forces, as long as such financing will be detrimental to the army's current needs, i.e. personnel upkeep, arms purchases, and development of military science and technologies."100 In short, Arbatov agreed with Baturin's goal but accepted Rodionov's assertion that downsizing would cost money. The dilemma was that the 1997 defense budget had earmarked only R3.7 trillion for force reductions, sufficient funding for a 50,000 man reduction.
An unprecedented decline in production, a financial crisis, the growth of foreign debt and the heavy loss of gold reserves have made Russia depend on the Big Seven financial powers, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank.103
At the same time Russia retains the attributes of a great power in terms of size, population, natural resources, industrial base, and military power. He argues that Russia's current force levels are too high and repeated his call for substantial troop reductions, arguing that even with significant reductions in its nuclear arsenal over the next decade Russia would retain sufficient deterrence capability. Arbatov based his call for force reductions on his reading of the international situation, in which he argued that the emerging international order would be multipolar, in which the key actors would be "the United States, Western Europe, China, Japan, and a number of strong sub-regional states and associations of states." If Russia manages to halt its own decline and finds an appropriate place in the international system, then it will retain its great power status. In an assessment of military capabilities and intentions of the states around Russia Arbatov concluded that various possible threats could be managed if Russia adopted appropriate means to achievable ends. But it was precisely here that Arbatov identified the key problems associated with military reform, what he called the "current paradoxes in Russian defense posture."104
Russia's armed forces would not be capable of defending the nation from external threats. They may, indeed, become a major threat to Russia's own internal security and stability. And this is a very frightening possibility.108
And although the Armed Forces have been cut to the planned figure of 1.5 million men, the promised prosperity has not arrived, nor is there any sign of savings for the people's social needs. Where have the resources gone? I have a suggestion: They have been directed at the "other forces" (the Federal Government Communications and Information Agency, the Ministry for Affairs of Civil Defense, Emergency Situations, and Elimination of Natural Disasters, the Interior Ministry, the Federal Border Service . . . ), where reform really is under way, but reform that is the direct opposite of the changes in the Army and Navy, whereby their numbers are growing.122
The issue of civilian control over these expanding militaries is one of the most important issues for the sustainment of Russian democracy and sovereignty.
On the other hand, the president, and the government and parliament as well, are forced to deal with a community of security services (the FSB, the SVR, FAPSI, the SBP and GUO, and the GRU), which has its own interests in the country's political life. The absence of a clear legal base, and of any control from the legislative and executive branches and public opinion, ensured that the security services would have their attention fixed exclusively on the president and the political interests of their leaders in the presidential elections.128
What is politics? This is involvement in state affairs. I am involved in the molding of internal policy -- this is the salt of my authority. From this point of view, yes, I can be considered a politician, but not a public politician. I categorically disagree with this viewpoint. Do I hew to any party ideology? Do I belong to any political movement? No.131
While Kulikov was not affiliated with any party, he did have an ideology, one connected with his view of the threats facing the Russian state and society. The core threats to Russia are internal and arise from challenges to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the state itself.
In Russia many party-ideological structures have existed for a long time. By now these structures have acquired their own armed formations. The majority of them are in a half preserved state under the "roof" [krysha] of various types of private security firms and subunits.
But it is a well-known fact that part of these formations are deeply ideological, while others, unfortunately, have already tasted the "easy bread" of racketeering. It is also know that the tentacles of all spets-terrorist, international organizations, i.e., the Black, Islamic, and Green, are reaching into all regions of Russia.132
I am not going to go into any politics as you understand them. God speed me to cope with my duties. You see the problems yourself. But there is just one single goal: To convince people that they can trust the authorities. I am very much afraid, I simply fear lest the people once again shudder at the word "MVD" [abbreviation for the Internal Affairs Ministry] and lower their voices to a whisper when speaking candidly. This was a terrible period, an era of the Inquisition. Yet the democratic process is irreversible, and the MVD can do much to accelerate it.133
By adding the Tax Police, Custom's Service and economic police to his span of control in early 1997 he achieved significant potential leverage over the financial markets, banking system and economy.
In performing the tasks in preventing and countering internal threats to the Russian Federation's national security, priority belongs to the Russian Federation of Internal Affairs, the Russian Federation Federal Security Service, and the Russian Federation Ministry of Civil Defense, Emergencies and Natural Disasters, which have the appropriate forces, resources, and organs capable of fulfilling specialized tasks.147
1. Interfax, Moscow, 1145 GMT, 3 March 1998, in English.
3. Sergey M. Rogov, The Russian Crash of 1998, (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analysis, 1998), p. 13.
4. "Sovet bezopasnosti RF razrabotal paket mer s tsel'yu stabilizatsii ekonomicheskogo polozheniya v strane," Interfax, Moscow, (10 September 1998) 1336GMT.
5. "Rossiyskie finansisty ne isklyuchayut svyazi otstavki Kokoshina s ego ekonomicheskimi initsativami," Interfax, Moscow, (10 September 1998) 1927 GMT.
6. Rogov, The Russian Crash of 1998, p. 3.
7. Reform of the Armed Forces refers to measures directed at the military forces under the control of the Ministry of Defense, while military reform embraces all the military and paramilitary forces of all the so-called "power ministries" and includes the restructuring of the military-industrial complex and the national system of industrial mobilization.
8. RIA, Moscow, 1205 GMT, 3 March 1998, in English.
9. Ivan Petrov, "Vice Premier Representing Berezovsky," Kommersant-Daily, (3 March 1998), p. 1.
10. Pavel Felgenhauer, "Defense Dossier: Phoney Security Promotion," Moscow Times, (5 March 1998).
11. Aleksandr Konovalov, "Chto bylo, chto budit," Nezavisimaya gazeta, (17 September 1998), p. 3.
12. ITAR-TASS, Moscow, 1738 GMT, 3 March 1998, in English.
13. "Acting Prime Minister Pushes for Military Reform," Jamestown Foundation Monitor, (7 April 1998).
15. I. S. Bliokh, Budushchaya voyna v tekhnicheskom, ekonomicheskom i politicheskom otnosheniyakh, six volumes, (St. Petersburg: Tipografiya I. A. Efrona, 1898).
16. Jacob W. Kipp, "Soldiers and Civilians Confronting Future War: Lev Tolstoy, Jan Bloch and Their Russian Military Critics," in: Stephen D. Chiabotti, ed., Tooling for War: Military Transformation in the Industrial Age. (Chicago, Imprint Publications, 1996), pp. 189-230.
17. The very best study of Bloch and his career is: Ryszard Kolodziejczyk, Jan Bloch (1836-1902) (Warsaw: Panstwowy Institut Wydawniczy, 1983).
18. Lenin also saw the relationship between war and revolution and concluded that war was the catalyst for the revolution that he sought. See: Jacob W. Kipp, "Lenin and Clausewitz: The Militarization of Marxism," revised version of article republished with permission of The Journal of Military History for inclusion in: Philip S. Gillette and Willard C. Frank, Jr., eds. Soviet Military Doctrine, Westport: Greenwood Press, 1992, pp. 63-84.
19. V. D. Ryabchuk, "Nauka, obrazovanie, reforma," Voyennaya mysl', No. 2 (February 1994), pp. 39-41.
20. V. D. Ryabchuk et al., Elementy voyennoy sistemologii primenitel'no k reshenyu problem operativnogo iskusstva i takitiki obshchevoyskobykh ob'edineniy, soyedineniy i chastey: Voyenno-teoreticheskiy trud (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Akademii, 1995).
21. Ryabchuk, "Nauka, obrazovanie, reforma," Voyennaya mysl', No. 2 (February 1994), pp. 39-41.
22. Ryabchuk et al., Elementy voyennoy sistemologii primenitel'no k resheniyu problem operativnogo iskusstva i taktiki obshchevoyskovykh ob'edineniy, soyedineniy i chastey: Voyenno-teoreticheskiy trud, p. 3.
23. Christopher Bellamy, "'Civilian Experts' and Russian Defence Thinking: The Renewed Relevance of Jan Bloch," RUSI, (April 1992), pp. 50-55.
24. Krasnaya zvezda, (11 April 1992).
25. Sovset, RFE/RL Daily Report, (11 May 1992).
26. Christopher Bellamy, The Evolution of Modern Land Warfare (London: Routledge, 1990), pp. 242-243. For the views of the author on this topic see: Jacob W. Kipp, "The Evolution of Soviet Operational Art: The Significance of 'Strategic Defense' and 'Premeditated Defense' in the Conduct of Theatre-Strategic Operations," The Journal of Soviet Military Studies IV, No. 4 (December 1991), pp. 629-648; and "Soviet Military Foresight and Forecasting in an Era of Restructuring," in: Derek Leebaert and Timothy Dickinson, eds., Soviet Strategy and New Military Thinking (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 248-275.
27. A. A. Kokoshin, V poiskakh vykhoda: Voyenno-politicheskie aspekty mezhdunarodnye bezopasnosti (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo politicheskoy literatury, 1989), p. 6. It is interesting that Kokoshin did not mention Bloch in either this work or his later work on the army and politics. He did address war prevention and foresight as critical elements of military-political studies, but here he invoked dialectical and historical materialism and "leninist teachings about war and peace." Kokoshin cited Friederich Engels' forecast on a future general war in Europe, its nature, scale, and, what is esepcially important, its consequences." [p. 6]
28. Valentin Larionov and Andrei Kokoshin, Prevention of War: Doctrines, Concpets, Propsects (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1991), p. 6.
29. Ivan Fedorov, "Chestnost' i professionalizm v Kremle nakazuemy" Rossiya, (18 September 1998).
30. S. Tatishchev, Imperator Aleksandr Vtoroy: Ego zhizn' I tsarstvovanie, (Moscow: Charli, 1996), I, p. 253. ["La Russie boude, dit-on. La Russie ne boude pas. La Russie se recueille."]
31. B. H. Sumner, Russian and the Balkans, 1820-1880 (London: 1937), pp. 18-35.
32. Tatishchev, Imperator Aleksandr Vtoroy, II, pp. 438-499.
33. Evgeniy Primakov, "Russia in World Politics: A Lecture in Honor of Chancellor Gorchakov," International Affairs, 44, no. 3 (1998), pp. 7-12.
34. Jacob W. Kipp, "Soldiers and Civilians Confronting Future War: Lev Tolstoy, Jan Bloch and Their Russian Military Critics," in: Stephen D. Chiabotti, ed., Tooling for War: Military Transformation in the Industrial Age. Chicago, Imprint Publications, 1996, 189-230.
35. Timothy L. Thomas, "Soviet Military Theoretician A. A. Kokoshin" The Journal of Soviet Military Studies, V, No. 1 (March 1992), pp. 1-27 and Jacob W. Kipp, "General of the Army V. N. Lobov: One of Gorbachev's Genshtabisty," The Journal of Soviet Military Studies, II, No. 3 (September 1989), pp. 403-416.
36. A. A. Kokoshin, Armiya i politika: Sovetskaya voyenno-politicheskaya i voyenno-strategicheskaya mysl' (Moscow:"Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya,"1995), pp. 46-48.
37. Andrei Kokoshin, "Voyenno-politicheskie i ekonomicheskie aspekty reformy Vooruzhennykh Sil Rossii," Voyennaya mysl', No. 6, (November-December 1996), pp. 5-11.
38. A. Kokoshin, "Protivorechiya formirovaniya i puti razvitiya voyenno-tekhnicheskoy politiki Rossii," Voyennaya mysl' , No. 2 (February 1993), p. 5; and V. D. Dotsenko, et al., "Kakoy flot nuzhen Rossii?" (Voyenno-nauchnaya konferentsiya) (St. Petersburg: Unpublished manuscript of the Conference Proceedings, 1993).
39. USSR, RKKA, IV Upravlenie Shtaba, Budushchaya voyna (Moscow, 1928), pp. i-iv.
40. Ibid., p. vii.
41. Ibid, p. xi.
42. Ibid., p. xii.
43. Ibid., pp. 724-735.
44. Ibid., p. 638.
45. Ibid., pp. 645-646.
46. Ibid., p. 650.
47. Ibid., p. 653.
48. Ibid., pp. 653-654.
49. Ibid., pp. 656-657.
50. Kokoshin, Armiya i politika, pp. 4-5.
51. Ibid., pp. 45-54.
52. Ibid., pp. 55-56.
53. Oleg Penkovskiy, The Penkovskiy Papers (Garden City: New York: Doubleday & Company, 1965), pp. 225-227.
54. Kokoshin, Armiya i politika, p. 60.
55. M. D. Sokolovsky et al., Voyennaya strategiya, 1st Edition, (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1962).
56. P. M. Derevyanko, "Nekotorye osobennosti sovremennoy revolyutsii v voyennom dele," in: P. M. Derevyanko, ed., Problemy revolyutsii v voyennom dele (Sbornik Statey), (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1965), p. 101.
57. Kokoshin, Armiya i politika, p. 61.
58. "Interv'yu: Voyenno-tekhnicheskaya politika: Retrospektivnyy Analiz" [Interview: Military-Technical Policy: Retrospective Analysis], Problemy prognozirovaniya, No. 3 (1996), pp. 170-174.
59. "Interv'yu: Ugrozy real'nye i mnimye, Beseda s polkovnikom v otstavke V. V. Shylkovym," Problemy prognozirovaniya, No. 4 (1996), p. 131.
60. Ibid., p. 132.
61. Sovetskaya voyennaya entsiklopediya, (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1979), 7, p. 82.
62. N. V. Ogarkov, Istoriya uchit bditel'nosti, (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1985), p. 17.
63. Kokoshin, Armiya ii politika, p. 158.
64. M. A. Gareev, M. V. Frunze -- voyennyy teoretik (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1985), p. 438.
65. Kokoshin, Armiya i politika, p. 164.
66. N. N. Moiseev, Sotsializm i informatika (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo politicheskoy literatury, 1988), pp. 62 ff.
67. International Affairs, No. 10, (October 1988), pp. 19-21.
68. "Interv'yu: Ugrozy real'nye i mnimye, Beseda s polkovnikom v otstavke V. V. Shylkovym," Problemy prognozirovaniya, No. 4 (1996), p. 137.
69. "Interv'yu: Voyenno-tekhnicheskaya politika: Retrospektivnyy analiz," Problemy prognozirovaniya, No. 3 (1996), pp. 170-174.
70. Committee of Soviet Scientists in the Defense of Peace and against the Threat of Nuclear War," Annotsiya," [uncirculated report of Soviet paper delivered at Pugwash Conference in Washington, DC, in 1984/ 14, prilozhenie 2.
71. "Interv'yu: Voyenno-tekhnicheskaya politika: Retrospektivnyy Analiz," Problemy prognozirovaniya, No. 3 (1996), pp. 170-174.
72. A. A. Kokoshin and V. V. Larionov, "Origins of the Intellectual Rehabilitation of A. A. Svechin," in: Kent Lee, ed., Strategy, by A. A. Svechin, (Minneapolis: East View Publications, 1992), pp. 4-5.
73. Andrei Kokoshin, "Alexander Svechin: On War and Politics," International Affairs, No. 11 (1988), pp. 118-126.
74. Andrei Kokoshin, "Edinaya voyennaya doktrina," Nezavisimoe voyennoe obozrenie, No. 42, (November 1997), pp. 1,5.
75. M. A. Gareev, "Armiya i politika," Voyennaya mysl', No. 6 (November-December 1996), p. 75.
77. Ibid., p. 76.
78. Ibid., p. 77.
79. M. A. Gareev, Esli zavtra voyna? . . (Chto izmenitsya v kharaktere vooruzhennoy bor'by v blizhayshie 20-25 let (Moscow: VlaDar, 1995), p. 5.
80. Ibid., pp. 50-51.
81. Ibid., p. 51.
82. Ibid., p. 52. The term informatization of warfare, as used by Gareev and Captain 1st Rank Shevelev can also be translated as "'intellectualization', [ i. e., computerization]" meaning a combination of smart weapons and advanced automated C3I. See: V. Larionov, "Possible Consequences of the Intellectualization of Weaponry," Paper prepared for 16th USAF Academy Symposium on Military History," (Colorado Springs: USAF Academy, 1995), translated by Robert R. Love, pp. 2-3.
83. Ibid., pp. 52-53.
84. Ibid., pp. 54-55.
85. Ibid., p. 56.
86. Ibid., p. 57.
87. Ibid., pp. 61-67.
88. Ibid., pp. 69-71.
89. Ibid., pp. 72-73.
90. Ibid., pp. 74-75.
91. Ibid., pp. 77-78.
92. Makhmut Gareev, "V chem smysl' sluzheniya otechestvu," Nezavisimoe voyennoe obozrenie, No. 28 (1998).
93. Georgiy Arbatov, The System: An Insider's Life in Soviet Politics, (New York: Random House, 1993), p. 298.
94. A. G. Arbatov, "Oboronitel'naya dosdostatochnost' i voyennaya perestroyka," in: E. M. Primakov, et. al, eds., Razoruzhenie i bezopasnost', ezhegodnik, 1988-1989 (Moscow: Institut mirovoy ekonomiki i mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniy AN SSSR, 1989), p. 247.
95. Kokoshin, Armiya ii politika, p. 173.
96. Alexei Arbatov, "Parity and Reasonable Sufficiency," International Affarirs, No.10, (1988), pp. 76-87.
97. Aleksei Arbatov, A Soviet View on Nuclear Weapons (New York: Praeger, 1988).
98. Aleksei Arbatov et al., "Parametry venskogo mandata," Moskovskie novosti, No. 12 (19 March 1989), p. 9.
99. Russian Executive and Legislative Newsletter,, No. 55 (1997), RIA Novosti.
102. Aleksei Arbatov, The Russian Military in the 21st Century (Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, 1997), p. 2.
103. Ibid., p. 3.
104. Ibid., pp. 5-6.
105. Ibid., p. 8.
106. Ibid., p. 10.
108. Ibid., p. 11.
109. Ibid., p. 12.
110. Aleksei Arbatov, "Voyennaya reforma: Doktrina, voyska, finansy," Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnie otnosheniya No. 4, (April 1997), p. 7.
111. Ibid., p. 6.
112. National Public Radio, (September 27, 1997).
113. Arbatov, "Voyennaya refroma: Doktrina, voyska finansy," Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnie otnosheniya No. 4, (April 1997), p. 10.
115. Arbatov, "The Russian Military in the 21st Century," p. 13.
116. Ibid., pp. 13-14.
117. Ibid., p. 15.
118. Ibid., pp. 16-17.
119. Arbatov, "Voyennaya refroma: Doktrina, voyska finansy," Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnie otnosheniya No. 4, (April 1997), pp. 5-6.
120. Alexei G. Arbatov, "Russia's Foreign Policy Alternatives," International Security, 18, No.2 (Fall 1993), pp. 26-43.
121. Fred Weir, "Kremlin Power Struggle," Johnson's Russia List, 17 August 1996, [email protected] Nezavisimaya gazeta, (17 October 1996), p 1.
122. Valdimir Maryukha, "The Center's Poor Relations," Trud, (22 January 1997).
123. The Soviet system had three power pillars: the Party and its apparatus, the Security services, composed of the KGB and MVD, and the Armed Forces. It was the conservative leadership of these institutions which sought to reverse perestroyka and restore order in the summer of 1991 to preempt a new union treaty, which led to the August Putsch and the end of the Soviet Union.
124. Vasily Andreev, "The Russian Security Services and Their Participation in the 1996 Presidential Elections," The Jamestown Foundation Prism, (February 1997), III, Pt. 4, pp. 1-2.
125. Sovershenno sekret'no TV!" RTV Moscow, ( December 1994).
126. Kokoshin, Armiya i politika, p. 258. Although signed to press in August 1995 and published later that year, this book by the First Deputy Minister of Defense contains not a single reference to the War in Chechnya, which had become so divisive an issue in the Russian polity, society, and Armed Forces.
127. "Federal'nyy zakon ob oborone," Krasnaya zvezda, (5 June 1996), p. 2.
128. Andreev, "The Russian Security Services and Their Participation in the 1996
Presidential Elections," p. 4.
129. Regarding Nikolaev's resignation/dismissal in December 1997 see: Il'ya Bulavinov, "Komandiry v deputatskom korpuse," Kommersant Vlast', No. 26  (14 July 1998), p. 18. Nominal explanation of the resignation was President Yeltsin's confirmation of the movement of a Russian post on the border with Georgia 1400 meters inside Russia. Observers pointed out, however, that Nikolaev was not satisfied with changes being imposed upon the Border Guard Service. The firings of Kulikov, Chernomyrdin, and Chubais in March 1998 is a very murky affair. and the reasons for the removal of Kovalev from the command of the FSB is also very unclear. The point is that three chiefs of power ministries were removed in the last eight months.
130. M. Fedorov, "Gosudarstvennyy perevorot vozmozhen," Zavtra: Spetsial'nyy vypusk 1, (March 1996), p. 2.
131. Moskovskie novosti No.42, (20-27 October 1996).
132. Sergey Kurginyan, Yuriy Byalyy, and Mariya Podkopaeva, "Terrorizm kak global'naya ugroza i kak instrument mirovoy politiki," (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnyy Obshchesoyuznyy Fond/ Korporatsiya "Eksperimental'nyy Tvorcheskiy Tsentr," 1996), p. 33. On the Kurginyan - Kulikov-MVD connection see: Obshchaya gazeta, No. 41, (17-23 October 1996).
134. Valery Borisenko, "Gendarmerie or Army?" Moscow News, No. 9 (February 15-21, 1996), p. 3. The actual number of divisions inside the MVD, as reported by Colonel-General Anatoliy Afanaso'evich Shkirko, Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs and C-in-C Internal Troops, to be "20 divisions and 29 independent brigades, regiments and battalions totaling 257,000 men." See: "Anatoliy Shkirko, "V gosudarstve dolzhny tsarit' tishina i spokoystvie," Nezavisimoe voyennoe obozrenie, (22-28 March 1997), p. 1. The Internal Troops are in their armaments, organization and training a gendarmerie. If they most engage in heavy combat, as was the case in Chechnya, tank and artillery subunits of the ground forces are attached to their units. For the sake of comparison, estimates of strength of the ground forces of the Russian Army before the recently announced cuts were 730,000 billets and 460,000 men in service.
135. Moskovskiy komsomolets, (23 January 1998), pp. 1-2.
136. Moskovskie novosti, No.42, (20-27 October 1996).
137. OMRI Daily Digest, No. 30, Part I, (12 February 1996).
138. Vladimir Todres, "Method gaishnika," Itogi, (29 January 1997), p 14.
140. Moskovskie novosti, No.42, (20-27 October 1996).
141. Moscow, RIA in English, 1758 GMT, (3 October 1997).
142. Moscow, Interfax in English, 1331 GMT, (7 October 1997).
143. Krasnaya zvezda, (7 October 1997), p 1.
144. Rossiyskaya gazeta, (30 December 1997), p. 4.
145. Interfax, Moscow, 0837 GMT, (2 January 1998), in English.
146. Rossiyskaya gazeta, (30 December 1997), p. 5. The document bore the character of an interagency compromise in which each of the power ministries managed to get some mention of its particular roles and missions.
148. RIA Novosti, Nezavisimaya gazeta, (10 February 1998).
149. Aleksandr Yanov, "Troynaya aberratsiya," Interesnaya gazeta - golos Russkoy Ameriki, No. 8 (28 February - 7 March 1998), p. 2.
150. Ibid. pp. 2-3.
151. Kremlin Approves Major Defense Policy Document," Jamestown Foundation Monitor, Iv, No. 149 (4 August 1998) on: [email protected]
152. Nezavisimaya gazeta (4 August 1998).
153. Kremlin Approves Major Defense Policy Document," Jamestown Foundation Monitor, Iv, No. 149 (4 August 1998) on: [email protected]
154. Kommersant-Daily, (30 July 1998).
155. Itar-Tass, RTR, (27 July 1998).
156. Interview with General-Major Filatov in the editorial offices of Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal, Moscow, 10 December 1990.
157. V. S. Pirumov, "Some Elements of Research Methodology Related to the problem of National Security under Present Conditions," in: General Staff of the Czech Armed Forces, Military Doctrine and Military Reconstruction in Post-Confrontational Europe (Prague: Vojenske rozhledy/Czech Military Review, 1994), p. 200.
158. Aleksandr Yanov, "Krovavaya i oslpitel'naya sud'ba," Moskovskie novosti, No 3 (25 January - 1 February 1998), p. 10.
159. Aleksandr Dugin, Osnovy geopolitiki: Geopoliticheskoe budushchee Rossii. in the series Bol'shoe prostranstvo, (Moscow: "Arktogeya," 1997).
160. Ibid., 214ff.
161. Ibid., pp. 439-448. On Dugin's views on the third path as uniting the extreme left and right in an assault on a liberal democratic order in the name of "the Absolute Revolution" see: Aleksandr Dugin, Konservativnaya revolyutsiya (Moscow: "Arktogeya," 1994), pp. 319ff.
162. Yanov, "Krovavaya i oslpitel'naya sud'ba," Moskovskie novosti, No 3 (25 January - 1 February 1998), pp. 10-11.
163. Ibid., p. 11.
164. Dugin, Osnovy geopolitiki: Geopoliticheskoe budushchee Rossii. in the series Bol'shoe prostranstvo, pp. 263-271.
165. Ibid., p. 299.
166. Yanov, "Krovavaya i oslpitel'naya sud'ba," Moskovskie novosti, No 3 (25 January - 1 February 1998), p. 11.
167. On Zhirinovsky's ideas see: Jacob W. Kipp, "The Zhirinovsky Threat," Foreign Affairs, Volume 73, No. 3 (May-June 1994), pp. 72-86.
168. Zavtra No. 47 (207), (November 1997), p 5.
169. G. A. Zyuganov, Voyennaya reforma: Vooruzhennye Sily Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Moscow: Dukhovnoe Nasledie, 1998), p. 7.
170. Ibid., p. 9.
171. "Kokoshin's Comments on Timing of Fatherland Founding Congress," ITAR-TASS, (16
December 1998) in: Johnson's Russia List, #2525, 18 December 1998, ([email protected]).