KCNA 'Detailed Report' Explains NPT Withdrawal  

P'yongyang KCNA
January 22, 2003

[FBIS Translated Text] 
    To cope with the grave situation where our state security and 
national sovereignty are being threatened due to the United States and 
forces following the United States and the US tyrannical nuclear crushing 
policy toward the DPRK, the DPRK Government took an important measure to 
immediately withdraw from the NPT. 

    KCNA [Korean Central News Agency] issues the following detailed 
report relating the circumstances where the Republic government declared 
its withdrawal from the NPT. 

    Details on becoming a NPT member 

    Our country's purpose for entering the NPT lay in removing the US 
nuclear threat and importantly, in smoothly resolving the country's 
energy issue with nuclear power [haekdongnyok]. 

    We have actively encouraged hydroelectric and thermoelectric 
generation capabilities to meet the increasing energy demand in the 
people's economy.   However, this was limited in its potential power.   
Accordingly, we decided to develop the nuclear power industry 
[haekdongnyok kongop], which is the best method for resolving the 
electricity issue in our country's conditions.   Thus, we adopted the 
atomic power law [wonjaryok pop] in 1974 and legally restricted the usage 
of atomic power to only peaceful purposes. 

    We promoted scientific research tasks to develop our country's 
nuclear power industry.   At the same time, we exerted efforts to receive 
an atomic power plant on a turnkey basis from other countries.   This is 
because at that time, the worldwide trend for nuclear power plants was on 
LWRs, based on low-enriched uranium, and [a nuclear power plant] was too 
much [arumch'an gosiotgi ttaemunida] for us to [build] by ourselves due 
to the technological complexity. 

    We decided to introduce LWRs and make them the pillars in our 
country's energy production, so we negotiated with some developed 
countries.   However, this project did not develop smoothly, and no 
country wanted to sell us LWRs. 

    The only countries that were exporting atomic power plant facilities 
in the 1960s and 1970s were Western countries, including the former 
Soviet Union and the United States, and some countries in West Europe.   
First, we tried to purchase developed LWRs by paying money to the Western 
countries, including Canada, Sweden, and France.   However, this could 
not be realized due to hampering by the US COCOM [Coordinating Committee 
for Export Control to Communist Areas]. 

    Thus, we negotiated the LWR supply issue with the former Soviet 
Union, although it was not as technologically developed as the Western 
countries.   At that time, the Soviet Union said that if we were to 
receive nuclear-related technologies, we must enter the NPT and sign 
safeguard agreements [tambo hyopchong] with the International Atomic 
Energy Agency [IAEA]. 

    We prudently studied the issue of entering the NPT.   In particular, 
the basic spirit of the NPT drew our, who are receiving the US nuclear 
threat under conditions where the state land is divided, natural 
attention.   The NPT's basic spirit notes that countries possessing 
nuclear weapons should not threaten or use nuclear weapons on other 
countries, should not create an emergency situation that endangers the 
basic interests of non-nuclear countries, and should exert all efforts to 
avoid a nuclear war. 

    On 12 December 1985, we entered the NPT with the purpose to realize 
international cooperation in the nuclear power industry sector, remove 
nuclear threats toward us, and make the Korean peninsula a non-nuclear 

    Details on the postponement of the signing of the safeguard agreement 

    According to the NPT, non-nuclear countries without nuclear weapons 
are supposed to sign a safeguard agreement with the IAEA within 18 months 
after entering the NPT.   However, after we entered the treaty, the 
United States continuously heightened its nuclear threats against us.   
Thus, we were faced with a grave situation where we could not sign the 
safeguard agreements even if we wanted to. 

    The United States recklessly violated its international legal 
obligations as a nuclear weapons possessing country, brought all kinds of 
nuclear weapons to South Korea on a massive scale, and escalated the 
joint exercise "Team Spirit," a nuclear-test war exercise, against us. 

    In order to sign the safeguards agreement, we proposed the following 
to the United States: withdrawing nuclear weapons from South Korea, 
removing the US nuclear threat to us, pledging legally-binding security 
safeguards for us and simultaneous inspections. 

    The United States finally responded to our demands because the 
assertions we proposed were just and supportive international opinions 

    On 17 January 1991, the US deputy assistant secretary of state said, 
"[the United States] will not pose a nuclear threat on North Korea" and 
the US guarantee of not using nuclear weapons "applies to all countries 
that have signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty [NPT], including 
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea." 

    On 27 September 1991, US President Bush announced the withdrawal of 
short-range tactical nuclear weapons from US territory and sea bases. 

    On 8 November and 18 December 1991, the South Korean person in 
authority [tanggukja] (No T'ae-u) announced the Declaration on the 
Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the Declaration of No 
Nuclear Weapons [in South Korea]. 

    On 7 January 1992, the South Korean "Defense Ministry," the US 
Department of Defense, and the South Korea-US "Combined Forces Command" 
jointly declared a halt to the "Team Spirit" joint military exercise. On 
22 January 1992, high-level talks were held between the Democratic 
People's Republic of Korea and the United States. 

    In a situation where the conditions and climate for signing the 
agreement were created because the United States and South Korea 
promised, although verbally, we signed the safeguards agreement with the 
International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] on 30 January 1992. 

    On 9 April 1992, the third session of the DPRK Ninth Supreme People's 
Assembly approved the safeguards agreement "on the premise that none of 
the NPT member countries will deploy nuclear weapons on the Korean 
peninsula and pose a nuclear threat to us." The next day, 10 April, [the 
DPRK] notified the IAEA of this fact. 

    Accordingly, the safeguards agreement between the DPRK and the IAEA 
entered into force on 10 April 1992. 

    Background of Our Withdrawal from the NPT 

    After signing the DPRK-IAEA nuclear safeguards agreement, the United 
States created a "nuclear crisis" by spreading the rumor of "suspicions" 
over our graphite-moderated reactors and nuclear activities in related 

    We opted for a graphite-moderated reactor for the following reasons: 

    In 1985, after we joined the NPT, we signed an agreement with the 
former Soviet Union on economic and technical cooperation in building a 
nuclear power plant. 

    According to this agreement, the former Soviet Union was to supply a 
nuclear power plant with three pressure LWRs -- 635 MW in power output 
respectively -- each to start operation successively each year starting 
toward the end of the 1990s. 

    Nevertheless, this agreement ended with just a land survey to build a 
power plant. 

    Therefore, we announced, as policy, the creation of the atomic energy 
industry suitable for our situation in order to keep living in our own 
way and started to buckle down to develop an atomic energy technology of 
our own. 

    In building a self-reliant atomic power industry, we selected "a 
natural uranium -- graphite-moderation -- carbon dioxide cooler" reactor 
type for the type of nuclear power plant after comprehensively taking 
into account the country's industrial foundation, its technical 
standards, and nuclear fuel cycle to be formed in the future. 

    This type of reactor is called a graphite-moderated reactor. 

    Graphite-moderated reactor means natural uranium is used for fuel, 
graphite for moderation, and carbon dioxide as a cooling agent. 

    We selected the graphite-moderated reactor because of advantageous 
conditions. Although it is inferior to the LWR in terms of technical, 
economic aspects, and safety, it is technically simple. It takes natural 
uranium, which requires less funds and labor, and we could easily obtain 
graphite, which is used as the reactor's moderating agent, by slightly 
upgrading the graphite refining technology because our country had 
maintained an artificial graphite industry since the 1930s. 

    More importantly, abundant uranium and graphite are buried in our 

    Therefore, in developing the atomic energy industry, we opted for a 
graphite-moderated reactor in order to develop it with our technology, 
relying on abundant native raw materials without having to depend on 
other countries' raw materials. 

    Those days, we faithfully fulfilled our obligations in accordance 
with the safeguards agreement. 

    We sent an initial nuclear inventory report and a design notification 
for our nuclear facilities on 4 May, ahead of schedule.   These reports 
were to be sent to the IAEA Secretariat in 1992 according to Article 42 
and Article 62 of the safeguards agreement. 

    From 11 to 16 May 1992, IAEA representatives, led by the IAEA 
director general, visited our country, and we showed them all the objects 
of our nuclear facilities that they demanded to see and the objects about 
which they were suspicious. 

    We extended active cooperation to the work of irregular inspection 
teams on six occasions. 

    The first inspection took place from 25 May to 6 June 1992; the 
second inspection from 7 to 20 July 1992; the third inspection from 31 
August to 12 September 1992 (visits to two "suspicious facilities" were 
held on 12 and 14 September); the fourth inspection from 2 to 14 November 
1992; the fifth from 14 to 19 December; and the sixth from 26 January to 
6 February 1993. 

    Nevertheless, the United States and some circles in the IAEA 
Secretariat following the United States abused the inspections held in 
compliance with the NPT and the IAEA safeguards agreement as a way to spy 
on our interior and crush our socialist system. 

    From the outset, the IAEA inspections were not conducted in 
compliance with the agency's rules and safeguards agreement, but under US 

    In Article 5 of the safeguards agreement, the obligation is specified 
to strictly protect all data obtained in the process of inspecting other 
countries' nuclear facilities. 

    Nevertheless, some IAEA Secretariat circles systematically delivered 
the inspection results of our country to the United States, and the 
United States came forward demanding "special inspections" of our 
military facilities with the excuse of some "inconsistencies" or other, 
which the United States created, complicating the nuclear issue on the 
Korean peninsula. 

    Despite the fact that the so-called "inconsistencies," created in the 
process of inspecting our nuclear-related facilities, were scientifically 
and technologically clarified, the IAEA demanded "special inspections" 
over two of our "facilities" on the basis of intelligence data provided 
by the United States. This was strictly the result of US manipulation. 

    The data also clearly shows that the United States called the IAEA 
director general to a US House of Representatives' "joint hearing" on 22 
July 1992 to receive notification on our nuclear program and forced him 
to conduct a "special inspection," a "surprise inspection" of us. 

    In addition, a US Central Intelligence Agency report submitted to the 
National Security Council at the time says, "The United States must lead 
North Korea to accept special inspections immediately, and it must 
establish a North Korea policy in accordance with the nuclear inspection 

    Bringing up non-existent "suspicions of our nuclear development," the 
United States manipulated some circles of the IAEA Secretariat and 
certain member countries, making the IAEA adopt, in an IAEA Board of 
Governors' meeting in February 1993, an unjust "resolution" that coerced 
inspections over our military facilities that had nothing to do with 
nuclear activities. 

    As for these military facilities, they had nothing to do with the 
nuclear facilities that were supposed to comply with the safeguards 
agreement, and, besides, inspections for them was not an issue that fell 
under the IAEA authority. 

    Accepting unjust IAEA inspections based on US manipulated 
"intelligence data" meant we would make the act of reconnaissance 
legitimate for the United States, the counterpart of our war. 
Furthermore, it was impossible to imagine we would open the military 
bases to our enemies under the special circumstances in which the country 
was divided, and we were constantly under the US nuclear threat. 

    It was a violent infringement on our Republic's sovereignty and an 
intention to crush our socialist system by disarming us. It became a 
serious military and political issue that threatened our country's 
supreme interests. 

    The resolution, artificially created by the United States and its 
followers, was a part of the maneuver to crush the Republic and nothing 
could justify it, not from an international law perspective nor from a 
science and technology perspective. 

    In time, with the adoption of the unjust IAEA resolution, the United 
States resumed once again the "Team Sprit" joint military exercise, which 
had already been stopped, threatening our sovereignty and our right to 
survive in a grave manner. 

    In the end, the United States thwarted our efforts -- joining the NPT 
from the mid-1980s and signing the nuclear safeguards agreement in a bid 
to develop an atomic energy industry to solve the country's power 
problem, and remove the nuclear threat from the Korean peninsula -- every 
step of the way. 

    The basis of our economic hardship in the 1990s originated from this, 
and we began to firmly believe that until the United States abandoned its 
hostile policy toward us, our country's economic development would be 
curtailed, not to mention the issue of peace and security on the Korean 

    During this period, because of our demands, talks were held between 
the DPRK and the United States regarding the "nuclear issue," but they 
broke down due to longtime hostility and mistrust between the two 

    We could not help but enhance, as much as possible, the awareness 
that the NPT and the IAEA -- which internationally have the sacred goal 
and mission of preventing the diffusion of nuclear weapons and 
guaranteeing the peaceful use of atomic energy -- were being appropriated 
to realize the impure US political goal of eliminating our system when it 
came to their relations with us. 

    To defend the country's sovereignty and security in response to the 
created situation, we entered a semi-war situation and on 12 March 1993, 
took a measure to withdraw from the NPT to defend our supreme interests. 

    Article 10 of the NPT clearly states that each treaty participant may 
withdraw when a special situation is created in which its supreme 
interests are threatened. Therefore, our measure was an exercise of our 
legitimate right, which no one could contradict. 

    On 13 June 1994, we took the measure of withdrawing from the IAEA in 
the aftermath of the adoption of the "resolution" that stated "IAEA 
cooperation" with us "would be suspended," and demanding, in the 10 June 
1994 Board of Governors meeting, the opening of our military facilities 
with regards to our "nuclear issue." 

    From then on, all the unjust IAEA "resolutions" taken in connection 
with us became nullified, and we were not bound by any IAEA rules and 

    The DPRK's Unique Status 

    When our statement on the withdrawal from the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty [NPT] was announced, the world expressed grave 
concerns about the creation of a dangerous touch-and-go situation on the 
Korean peninsula due to the United States' arbitrariness and demanded a 
peaceful resolution of the Korean peninsula's nuclear issue through 
dialogue and negotiations. 

    Our Republic's sincere efforts to prevent the danger of the outbreak 
of a war on the Korean peninsula and to ensure regional peace and 
stability, and the strong demands of the peace-loving people of the world 
compelled the United States to come to the negotiating table for a 
peaceful resolution of the Korean peninsula's nuclear issue. 

    The DPRK-US Joint Statement was adopted on 11 June 1993, after 
several rounds of bilateral negotiations. 

    In the Joint Statement, the United States promised not to use or 
threaten us with force, including nuclear weapons, but to respect our 
sovereignty and refrain from interfering in our internal affairs. We 
decided to temporarily suspend the effect of our withdrawal from the NPT 
as long as we deemed necessary. 

    And thus, we came to be placed in a unique status regarding our 
relations with the NPT. 

    As for the Safeguards Agreement, because it had been concluded in 
accordance with Paragraph 4 of Article 3 of the NPT, its legal validity 
came to be placed in a state of virtual suspension from 12 June 1993, 
simultaneously with our withdrawal from the treaty, as long as no special 
agreement is reached between the organization and the DPRK. 

    Accordingly, we only had to receive inspections for ensuring the 
continuity of the safeguards measures but not the full-scale inspections 
under the Safeguards Agreement. 

    The United States and the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] 
Secretariat also recognized our unique status. 

    On 10 December 1993, Thomas Hubbard, then US deputy assistant 
secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, said "the United 
States expresses its understanding of Korea's unique status caused by the 
temporary suspension of the effect of its withdrawal from the NPT." 

    On 24 March 1994, IAEA General Director Hans Blix, while reporting 
the results of the IAEA's March inspection of our country to the UN 
Security Council, said: "Because the DPRK is in a unique situation, it is 
necessary to only ensure the continuity of the safeguards. In this 
respect, the DPRK accepted the agency's inspections in May and August 
1993 to replace the recording tapes and storage batteries in the 
monitoring equipment." 

    This was recognition of the fact that the inspections for ensuring 
the continuity of the safeguards measures were not the regular and 
irregular inspections under the Safeguards Agreement, but inspections to 
ensure the continuity of the safeguards for the purpose of simply 
confirming that our nuclear material had not been misappropriated, from 
February 1993, when inspections under the Safeguards Agreement were 

    After the announcement of DPRK-US Joint Statement, three-phased talks 
took place between the United States and our country, and they resulted 
in the adoption of the DPRK-US Agreed Framework on 21 October 1994, which 
pledged to fundamentally resolve the nuclear issue on the Korean 

    As our obligations, the DPRK-US Agreed Framework stipulated we would 
come into full compliance with the Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA 
only when a significant portion of the LWRs, or the non-nuclear 
components, including turbines and generators, were delivered. This made 
our unique status even clearer. 

    Circumstances Of the DPRK's NPT Withdrawal Placed on Temporary 
Moratorium Taking Effect 

    From the beginning, the United States had no will to implement the 
DPRK-US Agreed Framework, and it has systematically violated the 
agreement, staking their hopes on our "alleged collapse." 

    First of all, it did not faithfully honor its commitment to provide 
the LWRs. The key point in the DPRK-US Agreed Framework is the US 
provision of LWRs, in return for our nuclear freeze. 

    Under the DPRK-US Agreed Framework, the United States was to 
organize, under its leadership, an international consortium to guarantee 
the funds and facilities for the LWRs to be provided to the DPRK. The 
United States, representing the consortium, was to serve as the principal 
point of contact with the DPRK and conclude a supply contract with the 
DPRK within six months of the date of concluding the Agreed Framework for 
the provision of the LWR project. 

    The United States, however, even though four or five countries in the 
world at that time were fully capable of constructing LWRs and also had 
plenty of experience in exporting them, deliberately delayed the 
conclusion of a contract to provide LWRs, while urging us to receive 
South Korean-type LWRs, which did not even actually exist at the time and 
whose safety and technology had yet to be verified. 

    As a result, the agreement between the DPRK and the US-led Korean 
Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) to provide LWRs was 
concluded on 15 December 1995, almost eight months after 21 April 1995, 
the deadline specified in the Agreed Framework. 

    As for the construction of the LWRs, the first groundbreaking 
ceremony only took place in August 1997, more than a year after the 
schedule. Using the pretext of one or another "circumstances" within the 
KEDO, it did not actively pursue the construction. 

    As a result, only basic site preparations have been made thus far in 
the LWR project, which the United States committed itself to provide to 
the DPRK by 2003 under the DPRK-US Agreed Framework. 

    If the LWR construction schedule had been pursued smoothly as 
promised, a significant portion of the facilities, including turbines and 
generators, would have been delivered around 2000, and we would have 
accepted the full IAEA inspections. As a result, electricity would have 
been generated from the LWRs starting this year, and we would have 
returned to the treaty. 

    Due to the LWR construction delay, however, we had to suffer a huge 
loss of electricity and also experienced a grave economic crisis, as a 
result of which even our right to existence is being seriously threatened 

    What is more, the United States did not faithfully honor its legal 
obligation to supply 500,000 tonnes of heavy fuel oil [HFO] to us every 
year in compensation for the energy loss caused by our freeze on the 
graphite-moderated reactors and their related facilities until No. 1 LWR 
power plant is completed in accordance with Paragraph 2 of Article 1 of 
the DPRK-US Agreed Framework. 

    They attempted to unfairly use the HFO supply as a pressure means to 
obtain some kind of concession from us. 

    The United States agreed with us to deliver the annual supply of 
500,000 tonnes of HFO in equal installments of about 40,000 tonnes each 
month, but it never once kept this promise. Finally, it misled public 
opinion as though the HFO supply to us is based on some type of "good 
will" on its part, while causing great economic confusion in our country 
by suspending the HFO supply for a long time and then delivering great 
quantities all at once. 

    The United States should have devised countermeasures to compensate 
for our loss of 2 million kilowatts of electricity beginning in 2003, due 
to the delay in the LWR construction. 

    The 500,000 tonnes of HFO to be supplied annually by the United 
States until the completion of the No. 1 LWR, under the Agreed Framework, 
were to be delivered as payment for freezing the 50,000 kilowatts and two 
million kilowatts of power generating capacity graphite-moderated 
reactors, which were capable of producing electricity right away if we 
had begun operations at the time of adopting the Agreed Framework. 

    Accordingly, the annual supply of 500,000 tonnes of HFO could not 
replace the loss of the two million electricity kilowatts caused by 
freezing the construction of the nuclear power plants, which we had 
planned to have built by 2003. 

    During the DPRK-US talks held in New York in March 2000, we presented 
a proposal to the United States on compensating for the loss of 
electricity caused by the delayed construction of the LWRs. 

    In relations among countries, compensating for the loss caused by one 
party's failure to fulfill its obligation is an officially recognized 
norm, and this cannot change just because there has been an 
administration transfer. 

    On 14 November last year, the United States decided to suspend the 
supply of HFO to us beginning in December, and thus it abandoned the last 
and the only commitment it had been honoring thus far under the DPRK-US 
Agreed Framework. 

    This compelled us to unavoidably re-activate our nuclear facilities, 
which had been frozen under the Agreed Framework, in order to make up for 
the vacuum created in the power generation due to the US decision to stop 
the HFO supply. 

    Article 2 of the DPRK-US Agreed Framework stipulates that the two 
sides shall move toward full normalization of political and economic 
relations. As a part of these efforts, it stipulates that within three 
months of the document's date, both sides shall reduce barriers to trade 
and investment, including the lifting of restrictions on 
telecommunications services and financial transactions. 

    Accordingly, the DPRK Government decided to lift the measures on 
restricting US goods from entering our country and on prohibiting US 
trading vessels from entering our country's ports when involved in trade 
between the DPRK and other countries, beginning from mid-January 1995, 
three months since the adoption of the DPRK-US Agreed Framework. 

    They were all the restrictions we had been applying in the economic 
and trade relations with the United States. 

    The United States, however, lifted only part of such highly symbolic 
sanctions applied against our country in travel, telecommunications, 
finance, and territorial air passage, and it refused to take any 
substantial measures to ease sanctions in such fields as trade and 
investment barriers. 

    It was only on 17 September 1999 that the Clinton administration, as 
a result of the DPRK-US talks in Berlin, announced the easing of a series 
of economic sanctions applied against us for several decades under the 
Trading with the Enemy Act, Export Administration Regulations, and the 
Defense Production Act by stipulating our country as an "enemy." 

    This, however, was no more than the rudimentary obligation the United 
States was committed to meet under Article 2 of the DPRK-US Agreed 
Framework, and the United States' hostile policy against Korea and 
economic sanctions have continued ceaselessly. 

    Under Article 3 of the DPRK-US Agreed Framework, the United States is 
committed to giving us formal assurances against the use or threat of 
nuclear weapons. 

    Instead of providing such assurances, however, the United States 
continued to build up the armed forces of a nuclear attack in South Korea 
and have annually raised the commotion of conducting military exercises 
aimed at northward aggression, whose name was simply changed from "Team 

    In 1993 when DPRK-US talks were underway for a peaceful resolution of 
the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula, the United States mapped out a 
"new operation plan 5027" for crushing us through a preemptive nuclear 
attack behind the curtain of negotiating with us and systematically 
stepped up preparations to put the plan into practice. 

    Stockpiling countless nuclear weapons and up-to-date offensive 
weapons in South Korea, the United States increased nuclear war exercises 
against our Republic every year. 

    From early 1995, "Foal Eagle 95," "Hoguk 96," "RIMPAC 98," "Hwarang 
98," and "Ulchi Focus Lens" joint military exercises and other nuclear 
war exercises targeting our Republic were frantically staged on the land, 
sea, and in the air in all parts of South Korea almost every day, every 

    In February 1997, the United States moved depleted uranium shells, 
which are globally recognized as inhuman weapons, from its Okinawa base 
in Japan to South Korea to deploy them there for an actual war. Then on 8 
June 1994, it issued an "interim report" on the re-examination of the 
"US-Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines" in Honolulu. 

    The report newly specifies the US use of all the Japanese territory 
as a base for assaults and logistics "in case of an emergency in areas 
surrounding Japan," as well as Japan's "Self Defense Forces" sharing of 
overseas combat duties, including minesweeping activities, vessel 
inspections, and supply of military intelligence. 

    No sooner was this "interim report" announced than the world and even 
news media in the United States pointed out that the US-Japan defense 
"cooperation guidelines" were aimed at the Korean peninsula. 

    That the United States, while on one hand was discussing dialogue and 
negotiations with us, but on the other hand was legally settling a plan 
to share offensive combat actions, proved they had established our 
Republic as a primary target and were attempting to make a preemptive 

    In January 1999, the US defense secretary and the chairman of the US 
Joint Chiefs of Staff crawled into South Korea to hold the 20th meeting 
of the "Military Commission" and the 30th "annual Security Consultative 
Meeting" with South Korean military heads and released a "Joint 
Statement," in which they claimed we remained a "constant threat to their 
national interests" and they would "strongly retaliate against us with 
nuclear weapons and all other means in the case of emergency." 

    The harsh US remark on "nuclear punishment" is a flagrant violation 
of the DPRK-US Agreed Framework that assumes as a core provision not 
using or threatening to use nuclear weapons. 

    Since the Bush administration came to office, anti-DPRK stifling 
maneuvers have reached an extreme and DPRK-US relations have fallen into 
the worst situation. 

    As soon as the Bush administration officials took power, they made it 
a policy to crush the DPRK with force of arms, and completely blocked the 
already-begun DPRK-US dialogue. 

    Even before they faced us, they labeled the DPRK a "dictatorial 
state," "rogue state," and the like, and openly declared they would 
"break down" our system. Moreover, they threw cold water on progress in 
North-South relations. 

    In February 2001, the new US administration's diplomatic and security 
team went so far as to say North Korea dragged around the former Clinton 
administration, only giving in charity, and that unlike the Clinton 
administration's intent, the new administration would implement a "policy 
of strength," openly raving about its so-called "hard-line stance" toward 
the DPRK. 

    Bush even spoke ill of our supreme leadership. Not content with that, 
he went so far as to make harsh remarks, describing us as part of "axis 
of evil" in his "State of the Union Address" to Congress on 30 January 

    There is no such case in the history of recent DPRK-US relations as 
the US President personally making an open aggressive threat against our 
nation, an independent and sovereign state, through his policy speech. 
This is, in fact, little short of declaring war against us. 

    In connection with KEDO beginning to pour the concrete structure of 
the basic nuclear reactors in August 2002, the US administration claimed 
that now we must accept IAEA nuclear inspections. Otherwise, it can no 
longer support the LWR project. 

    US Undersecretary of State Bolton, making a junket of South Korea in 
August 2002, let loose a string of vituperation that the DPRK possesses 
"the most powerful offensive biological weapon program in the world," 
that the DPRK is a "nation that threatens with the development of weapons 
of mass destruction and exports missiles and related technology," that 
the DPRK "must accept nuclear inspections," and the like. Thus, he 
viciously slandered the DPRK. 

    In particular, in listing the DPRK as a target for its nuclear 
preemptive attack, the Bush administration completely destroyed the basis 
of the Agreed Framework. As such, it flagrantly infringed on the basic 
spirit of the NPT. 

    In March 2002, US media revealed the Bush administration designated 
seven nations, including Russia, China, the DPRK, Syria, Libya, Iran, and 
Iraq, as targets of its nuclear attack, and decided to develop small 
tactical nuclear weapons for "limited nuclear attacks." 

    The Bush administration's nuclear attack plan showed that the United 
States, paying no attention to any international agreement, is pursuing 
world domination with force of arms and that the United States is not 
hesitant in launching a nuclear attack on any nation if it is regarded as 
an obstacle to this end, even by reversing a bilateral agreement. 

    Through the US Presidential special envoy's visit to P'yongyang in 
early October 2001, we came to realize the Bush administration's 
antagonistic attempt has now reached the summit, and again confirmed that 
the judgment we have made so far was right. 

    The Bush administration blamed us without any evidence and facts, 
stating we violated the Agreed Framework by pushing ahead with the 
nuclear weapons program, and pressured us. It insisted that if we do not 
suspend this program, there will be no dialogue between the DPRK and the 
United States. In addition to this, it claimed that DPRK-Japan relations 
and North-South relations would fall into a catastrophe. As such, the 
Bush administration, taking a high-handed attitude, completely severed 
DPRK-US relations, which had been narrowly maintained so far. 

    Moreover, Bush designated our republic as an attack target following 
Afghanistan and Iraq, and frantically staged nuclear war exercises 
intended to crush the DPRK. By making a junket in South Korea, he 
personally toured the foremost front-line and US military bases and 
incited a war fever against us. 

    Recently, a nuclear attack scenario designating our republic as a 
nuclear attack target was recently distributed in the United States. 

    Such US military moves are extremely dangerous war provocation 
maneuvers aimed at igniting the blasting fuse of nuclear war by all means 
by putting its "preemptive attack plan" against our republic into 

    The Bush administration, which even discarded the pledge for a 
nuclear non-use guarantee, which has been observed by previous 
administrations, rashly threatened it would eradicate our people from the 
earth even by using nuclear weapons. In this regard, we repeatedly warned 
that this is, in fact, little short of declaring war against us. 
Therefore, we were forced to draw up measures to cope with this 
situation, without being stuck in the DPRK-US Agreed Framework. 

    The United States, however, did not listen to our warnings. Instead, 
it put forward brigandish logic, urging us to accept nuclear inspections 
despite the fact that we are subject to inspections only after 
"non-nuclear parts, including turbine and generators" for the LWRs are 
completely delivered, pursuant to Article 4 in the DPRK-US Agreed 
Framework and to Clause 7 of the closed memorandum of understanding 
provided in the Agreed Framework. As such, the United States drove the 
situation into an even more perilous state than the early 1990's. 

    The United States again incited the IAEA to adopt a "resolution" 
against the DPRK on 6 January 2003, following 29 November 2002. 

    Thus, the United States undisguisedly abolished the DPRK-US Agreed 
Framework and internationalized its anti-DPRK stifling maneuvers by 
mobilizing even the IAEA. The United States began executing a declaration 
of war against us. As this was the case, we were forced to withdraw from 
the NPT, which has been used as a tool for implementing the United 
States' anti-DPRK hostile policy, in order to cope its declaration of 
war, and defend and safeguard the nation's sovereignty and right to 

    As we can see from the aforementioned facts, the nuclear problem on 
the Korean peninsula is a product of the US anti-DPRK hostile policy. At 
the same time, it is thoroughly an issue between the DPRK and the United 
States and a problem that should be resolved between the DPRK and the 
United States by sitting face to face with each other. 

    Therefore, the most realistic measure for basically resolving the 
nuclear problem on the Korean peninsula and peacefully breaking through 
the prevailing grave situation is only to conclude a non-aggression 
treaty between the DPRK and the United States. 

    In the event that the United States legally pledges non-aggression, 
including the non-use of nuclear [weapons] against us, through a 
non-aggression treaty, we will disperse the US security worries. 

    Although we withdrew from the NPT, our nuclear activities will be 
limited to the peaceful purpose of electricity production at the present 

    If the United States discards its hostile policy against the DPRK and 
discontinues making nuclear threats, we will be ready to prove, through a 
separate verification between the DPRK and the United States, that we 
will not make nuclear weapons. 

    It is a consistent stance of the DPRK Government to peacefully 
resolve the nuclear problem on the Korean peninsula on equal footings 
between the DPRK and the United States through just and fair negotiations 
that will simultaneously dispel the two sides' worries. 

    [Date]   21 January 2003, Chuch'e 92, P'yongyang 

[Description of Source: P'yongyang KCNA (Internet version-WWW) in Korean 
-- WWW home page of official DPRK news agency, provided by Tokyo-based 
Korea News Service.   Root URL on filing date:   http://www.kcna.co.jp]