Republic of China 1998 National Defense Report [April 1998]

Chapter 3 Mainland China's (PRC) Military Situation


Ⅰ.Strategic Environment

Mainland China considers that the collapse of the Soviet Union and a gradual deterioration of the United States powers give the “middle-size states” or regional powers chances to expand their influence in international politics. To Beijing, the PRC's position will be equal to that of Japan, EU, and Russia to dominate the operations in the new world order. Beijing has been fully devoted to enhancing its military strength and engaged in pomoting the multi-polarized international political affairs. In 1997, Mainland China, in turn, signed “the Strategic Partnership Agreements” or created similar relations with Russia, ASEAN, India, France, and the United States.(note 5) Beijing desired that its activities would boost the PRC's international position to sway the behaviors of its neighboring states and to create an environment favorable to Mainland China's development.

1.The United States

Beijing believed that Washington forged “the Theory of PRC's Threat”. PRC considered that Washington's China policy is to engage the PRC in promoting the global strategic interests on the one hand, contain the Mainland China on the other hand so as to bow to U.S. criterion and value. In consideration of an overall strategy and the economic development, Beijing is earnestly to promote the relationship with Washington. Thus, the PRC recognizes:

a.The PRC-US bilateral relationship should be centered upon the strategic and global context with a view forward the 21st century.

b.The bilateral relation, should be based upon the “Three Communiqués” and only adherence to these three communiqué can they set up a stable relationship.

c.Each should respect the other, treat the other in equal position and seek agreements on things in common.

d.They should be carefully to deal with the Taiwan issue.

The United States thinks that it is necessary to have an engagement policy with Mainland China in order to stabilize the Asian Pacific Region and international situation. Frequent exchange of visits of high-level officials signified that, the U.S.-PRC relation has been significantly improved.


Right now, the PRC is taking advantage of Russia's political and economic hardship to strengthen their cooperative relations in the field of economy, trade, and military, hoping to obtain some advanced weapons and defense technology from Moscow. A model for the exchange of visits conducted by high-ranking officials of the two countries has been formed, and the signed agreements, the designed balance power from Japan and the United States in the region include: “Mutual Trust Agreement on the Military Zone Along the Sino-Russian Border,” “Force Reduction Agreement of Sino-Russian Border,” and “Strategic Partnership Agreement.”

3. Japan

The guideline for the PRC's policy toward Japan is something like this: “Cooperation benefits both, and struggle certainly backfires.” As their relations get closer, friction and disputes accumulate. They have entered into such a phase as friendship, friction, coordination, and contradiction are all simultaneously in existence. In the future, although Tokyo will keep providing assistance to Beijing without asking compensation, it won't slacken vigilance to the PRC.

4. The Korean Peninsula

Mainland China's policy toward the Korean Peninsula is a pragmatic. It means that China maintains good economic and trade ties with ROK, while keeping traditional friendship with North Korea in the field of ideology and politics so as to preserve its influence in the Peninsula.

5. Southeast Asian Countries

The PRC considers that the “U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation” and the U.S.-Australia alliance are designed to make a strategic containment against Mainland China from the north and the south. In view of this, the PRC is enhancing diplomatic ties with ASEAN, Burma, Cambodia, and Laos, and reestablishing diplomatic relation with Vietnam. Furthermore, Beijing is now making efforts to hinder the ROC's southward policy and the implementation of the Asian Pacific Regional Operations Center by developing Southwest China to balance the economic gap between the mainland's coastal area and the inland to draw closer relation with Southeast Asian countries.

6. South Asian Countries

China and India had engaged in two largescale wars along the China-Burma-India borders in 1962. Rounds of talks and negotiations between these two states, several agreements were signed, including one that both sides agreed to pull out some troops deployed in the area and construct “ the Constructive Partnership.”

The PRC is said to have adopted a balanced policy toward the sub-continent. Mainland China still supports Pakistan's claim over sovereignty of Kashmir while improving the links with India in order to get better relations with Burma, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka by supplying types of weapons.

7. Taiwan Waters

Mainland China claims that: “One China means that it includes Chinese mainland, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao, and the PRC is the government representing China. “ To Beijing, the Taiwan authorities have departed from the principle of one China, trying to create two Chinas, one China, one Taiwan in the world by constitutional reforms, pragmatic diplomacy, and other secessionist moves.” The PRC has repeatedly stressed: “The PRC vowed its determination to preserve every inch of land even at the sacrifice of thousands of soldiers. It does not rule out the use of forces to resolve the Taiwan issue provided that once Taiwan independence or comes under foreign control.”


5: The Strategic Partnership is a post-Cold War term which generally refers to the close relationship between two nations, while its substance depends on the contents of the agreement. For example, the Russia-PRC “Strategic Coordination and Cooperation Partnership” designed to promote a multi-polarized world, oppose any domination over the international affairs, and establish a fair and reasonable new order of the international economy. The U.S.-PRC “Constructive Strategic Partnership” establishes a broader framework under which they can develop a cooperation relationship on human rights, non-nuclear proliferation, and trade. “The Strategic Partnership” may possibly include military relations, but it is not equal to the military alliance. In order to execute and put the agreement into force, both parties must stress the overall situation so as to continuously expand the cooperative relations by putting aside conflicts of less importance.

Ⅱ. Military Strength

According to the PRC's “Defense Law,” the Armed Forces are composed of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), the People's Police, and the People's Militia. The PLA, organized into the active troops and the reserves, is a regular force, responsible for the major operational missions, and at the same time, it renders assistance in maintaining the social order when necessary. In peaceful time, the reserves are required to receive their training accordingly. While at wartime, they are asked to serve the active services in accordance with the Mobilization Order issued. The People's Armed Police is in charge of keeping the social security and order. And the People's Militia is charged with the services of the combat readiness, the defensive missions, and the assistance in keeping the social order.

1. The PLA

a. Total strength: More than 2.7 million .

(1)Army: Troops total 1.87 million, of which the infantry troops are about 900,000, the armored troops are around 150,000 persons, the artillery troops are about 120,000, the air defense force is approximately 100,000 persons, the garrison troops are some 360,000, and the professional troops are about 240,000 persons. The Army is equipped with the following weapons and equipment: types of tanks: more than 14,000, tractor artillery: 13,000, multiple-barrel rocket: more than 2,100, and self-propelled artillery: 1,500.

(2)Navy: Current strength amounts to 360,000 persons, of which the fleet force is more than 130,000, the Naval Aviation is about 40,000 persons, the Marine Corps is around 8,000, and the professional force is some 190,000 persons. It is equipped with 2,700 all types of warships.

(3)Air Force (including the combat aircraft of the Naval Aviation): more than 350,000 are organized into the following units: The aviation troops:140,000 (not including Naval Aviation); the air defense force : more than 100,000 persons; the radar troops : about 70,000; the airborne troops: some 30,000;and other professional force : some 9,000 persons. The PRC Air Force together with the Naval Aviation (Flying College and Training Center included) consists of some 5,000 aircrafts.

(4)The Second Artillery: The Second Artillery, numbering 120,000, is composed of the following units: The missile troops: some 50,000 persons; the technical-equipped force: about 17,000; the construction troops : some 20,000; the anti-chemical and communication troops: 50,000 for each; the training units: some 10,000 persons, and the logistic support troops : some 20,000 persons. It is equipped with hundreds of strategic and tactical missiles of various types.

Chart 1-2 The situation map of PLA's force disposition

b.The PLA deployment is still in accordance with the strategic direction of “active defense.” Its strategic theater concept is designed on the main basis of the mainland geo-strategy, with threats of hypothetical enemy. The forces are deployed into seven great military regions, and Army, Navy, Air Force, the Second Artillery (See Chart 1-2 for situation map of PLA's force disposition) combined in deployment.

(1)Army: The key points of the PLA's force disposition have been re-diverted to the southeast area of Chinese mainland since the signature of the “PRC-Russia Bilateral Force Reduction Agreement.”

(a)The Southeast Area (Nanjing Military Region and Guangzhou Military Region): 5 army groups are deployed, numbering about 480,000 in total.

(b)The Northeast Area (Shenyang Military Region): The total strength is approximately 310,000 persons, organized into 5 army groups.

(c)The Southwest Area (Chengdu Military Region): The total manpower amounts to 180,000 persons, composed of 2 army groups.

(d)The Northwest Area (Lanzhou Military Region): Two army groups are deployed in the area, a force numbering more than 220,000 in total.

(e)The Capital Area (Beijing Military Region): The total strength amounts to about 410,000 persons, organized into 6 army groups.

(f)The Strategic Reserve (Jinan Military Region): The total manpower is some 240,000 persons, consisting of 4 army groups.

(2)Navy: The PRC believes that the greatest potential for sea conflicts might erupt at the East China Sea and the South China Sea. Thus, the “Emergency Mobile Force” is assigned to the East Sea Fleet and the South Sea Fleet. Although the North Sea Fleet has a better equipment, yet generally speaking, the total combat capabilities of the East Sea Fleet and the South Sea Fleet are superior to others.

(a)The North Sea Fleet (deployed in an area Yalu Jiang, Liaoning, to Lianyungang, Jiangsu): This fleet possesses the major bases in Lushun and Qingdao. It has about 950 plus ships.

(b)The East Sea Fleet (deployed in an area from Lianyungang, Jiangsu, to Zhaoan, Fujian): This fleet has the major bases in Shanghai, Zhoushan, and Fuzhou, deployed in the area with 980 plus ships.

(c)The South Sea Fleet (deployed in an area from Zhaoan, Fujian, to Beilunhekou; Guangxi, and the parcel and sparely waters): It has the major bases in Guangzhou, Zhanjiang, Yulin with 800 plus ships.

(3)Air Force: The concept of the deployment is to set up one air command at each military region. At present, stationed on the air bases within 500 nautical miles from Taiwan are 1,300 aircrafts, of which some 600 airplanes has a radius of operation over Taiwan proper. In addition, the SU-27 with a radius of operation of about 810 nautical miles, now based at Wu Hu, Anhui Province, and Juixi, Guangdong Province, also covers Taiwan (See Chart 1-3).

(4)The Second Artillery: The strategic (tactical) disposition of the PRC's missile forces still mainly aims at Russia and the United States with only a portion targetting the neighboring states potential threat. The disposition of missiles is deployed in a small number and scattered throughout the Chinese mainland so as to increase the survival opportunity at a nuclear war. At present, the PRC has completed its disposition of DF-3 (Dongfeng-3), DF-4, DF-5, DF-15, and DF-21, etc., of which the DF-15 (M-9) tactical mobile missile is deployed in the area of Leping, Jiangxe, while its forward positions are scattered along the Jiangxi-Fujian area with ranges covering whole Taiwan (See Chart 1-4).[LM]

Chart 1-3 The SU-27's radius of operation

Chart 1-4 The range coverage of DF-15 (M-9) missiles

c. Right after taking over Hong Kong, the PRC directed the Guangzhou Military Region to organize forces to station in Hong Kong. It's total strength approximately amounts to 6,000 persons with the following equipment: armored vehicles: 21, helicopters: 9, and combat crafts: 12. In addition, the PLA has selected stonecutters island in Hong Kong as a gate for the construction of a large deep-water harbor to anchor the ships based in Hong Kong. Besides, it may be used as a forward base of the South Sea Fleet as well as a relay harbor in support of the operations at the South China Sea, which poses a threaten to the security of our islands.

2. The People's Armed Police

The People's Armed Police, one of the PRC's three Armed Forces, numbering 1.1 million plus, has military and security missions. The Armed Police is divided into the following in accordance with the nature of missions and T/O: security guards, defense for borders, fire teams, traffic, public utility, gold, woods and mobile division. In a peaceful time, it is responsible for the interior security in coordination with the public security units, the national-level construction works, and guards. At wartime, it is under military command to carry out missions such as battlefield security, anti-infiltration, and coast guards.

Since “the Democratic Movement June, 4 1989 in Tianmen Square,” the status and importance of the People's Armed Police have seen rapidly elevated. The CCP's Central Military Committee has made public that in case there is any domestic upheaval, the People's Armed Police will be first mobilized. In other words, the Armed Police is PRC's main force in charge of the domestic security and social stability.

a. Command System: There are two chains of Command for People's Armed Police. The Armed Police is simultaneously under the command of the CCP's Central Military Committee and the State Council. Since the issuance of “the SOP of the PRC's Armed Police GHOs” in June 1996, the People's Armed Police GHOs has been upgraded to a great military-region level. And over the last two years, it was time and again found that 14 PLA field divisions were restructured into the People's Armed Police. Furthermore, there is a tendency that the command system of the People's Armed Police is going to be transferred from under the Ministry of Interior to the military system, and its military function is beefed up.

b. The Future Development: The PRC's Armed Police with a mixed function between the military police and the police of the democratic countries is equipped with the light weapons. In recent years, its forces have been beefed up with the wheel armored vehicles, command vehicles, and patrol cars, etc. Besides, the air patrol units like the fly boat and helicopter units have been activated with the capabilities in the field of the mobile and long-range disposition. Its contingencies have capabilities better than those of the public security police in general. Some of the GHO-level units of the Armed Police are given the PLA's military training and exercise, functioning as the main force of the domestic public security.

3. The People's Militia and the Reserve

The People's militia and reserve are the main reserve strength of the PLA's mobilization. The reserve is mainly composed of the retired and separated officers and soldiers, numbering more than 1 million persons in total. The people's militia consists of the members of enterprise and production units and organizations at districts, villages, and towns, through a “two-in-one (labor and military)” alignment. The troop trainings may either be conducted by themselves, or in lieu of the PLA. The training duration is shorter and the performance for training is lower. However, the People's willingness to join in the militia organizations is dropping due to changing economic development, social atmosphere, and the value system. Of course, their function is also shrinking. However, the reserve is under expansion by means of the surplus manpower separated from the PLA's force and by 2,000, one reserve division will be activated in each of the 316 Corps Districts.

Ⅲ. Defense Mobilization

According to the 1984 PRC's Military Service Law,“The PRC defense mobilization adheres to the principle: ”Uniting the military and civilians, treating the peace time as war times, and training soldiers out of civilians.“ In peace time, the retired servicemen and civilians at draft ages (at the ages from 18 to 35), pending their regular military services are drafted into a militia and reservist, primarily engaged in economic production. At wartime, they have to receive the combat readiness and mobilization training to be assigned to the armed, economic, air defense, technological, political, and traffic activities so as to meet the requirements of a high-technological warfare.

In order to integrate the chain of command and strengthen the management of mobilization, the CCP's Central Committee in 1994, established a defense mobilization committee with members from People's Armed Mobilization Committee and those technological, postal, sanitary, statistical, rail, and navigational personnel of “the People's Armed Committee,” “the Combat Readiness Directory Team,” and “the Radio Management Committee” to exclusively in charge with the defense mobilization operation, direct and investigate the defense potentiality for the provinces and districts, collect information of the scattered manpower and material, and establish the storage depots for the strategic supplies as well as the mobilization units of the autonomous government. In March 1996, the CCP's Central Committee reassigned “the People's Armed Department” to be under the command of the General Staff Department and commissioned the chiefs and commanders military ranks to strengthen the local mobilization and management and training for the militias and reservists.

Ⅳ. Defense Budget

The PRC's defense budget amounted to 80.57 billion RMBs in 1997, up 12.68% from the previous year, doubling from the figure five years ago. (See Table 1-3)

The Mainland China's published defense budget only represented at the portion of its defense outlay, not including the following items: the expenditure of the defense technological, R&D, the expenditure of the militia establishment, the spending of the special projects and other outlays. Besides, there are a great deal of overheads hidden in items for the pension and social welfare relief, the People's armed police, the education, culture, science and hygiene units. Funds earned from the commercial businesses run by the military are also hidden. According to 1997 statistics, the PLA's hidden funds exceeded 160 billion RMBs and the actual defense budget was 240 billion RMBs, three times PRC's announced amount. (See Table 1-4 for An Assessment of PRC's National Defense Budget by Other Nations)

Table 1-3 PRC's Published National Defense Budget from 1988to 1997

Table 1-4 An Assessment of the PRC's National Defense Budget by Other Nations

Ⅴ. Military Development, Training and Exercise

1. Military Development

CCP Central Military Committee requires that “The defense technology and the troops' equipment should be given a higher priority to be in a salient position.” The PLA stresses the point that its development of weapons and equipment has to meet the requirements of a future war. By means of copying, self-manufacturing and purchasing the parts, the PLA is undertaking the R&D and replacement of the high-tech weaponry, hoping to achieve an objective of uniting the strategic weapons and conventional hardware, and integrating the advanced weaponry and other arms in general.

a. Army

(1)Some of the mechanized divisions and the Emergency Mobile Force have been already equipped with the T-80 and T-85Ⅱtanks. And the R&D and tests of the T-85 Ⅲ and the 3rd-generation MBT have been completed and will be mass produced and deployed in the forseeable future.

(2)The new types of 122mm, 130mm and 152mm self-propelled artilleries and the 273mm rocket are allocated to the troops for their use.

(3)The series of the Red-Arrow-73 and the Red-Arrow-8 anti-tank missiles have started mass production, ready to equip the mechanized and motorized army groups.

(4)The ground forces have completed the automation for operational command and fire control system for the armored and artillery troops, as well as revamped the automation of command system and the mobile command network system of the small-sized fire control exchanges for the army groups.

b. Navy

(1)Having completed the R&D and manufacture of the new types of ships and crafts such as the Luhu-class destroyer, the Jiangwei-class escort, the Huxin-class and Hujan-class patrol crafts, Dateng-class landing ship, the Sung-class submarine, etc.

(2)Having deployed the Russia-made K-class submarines and signed a contract to purchase from Russia 2 Sovermenny-class destroyers.

(3)Having equipped the ships with the C-802 anti-ship missile, Red-Flag-61, and the sea sidewinder ship-to-air missiles.

(4)Continuously retiring and replacing old ships and crafts, and manufacturing the large-sized combat ships, the surveillance radar ship, the military PACV-patrol air cushion vehicle, the large-sized supply ship, and new types of nuclear submarines.

(5)Continuing the R&D of aircraft carriers, and the PRC's Navy will probably have a light aircraft carrier in 2005.

c. Air Force

(1)To continue the R&D and manufacture of the J-10, and J-8Ⅲ, of which the J-10 will start mass production in 2000.

(2)To complete the prototype test of J-7 bomber and started mass production.

(3)To renovate the avionics and weapon system of the J-7, J-8, Q-5, and H-6 with a view to increasing their endurance of air operational capabilities.

(4)To continuously procure from Russia large carriers, the SU-27, and possibly introduce into China the manufacturing technique of SU-27 so as to do self-manufacture.

(5)To develop the air tanker, the ship board fighter, the electronic warfare aircraft, and AWACS to upgrade the Air Force long-range attack capability.

d. Second Artillery

(1)To continue production and disposition of the DF-5 multi-warhead and DF-31 mobile strategic missiles.

(2)To replace the aging DF-3 and DF-21 with DF-21A and expedite the R&D and manufacture of the DF-41 mobile strategic missile and the ZL-2 (Zhulang-2)submarine-launched missile.

e. Nuclear Weapons and Satellites

(1)The PRC possesses about 1,000 nuclear warheads of 1,000 to one million tons. It is actively conducting R&D and production of the small-sized tactical nuclear weapons in order to meet the requirements of the local war under the high-technological condition.

(2)To keep launching such satellites as the reconnaissance, exploration, weather, and communications satellites, research the manned space vehicles and the navigational and positioning satellite systems; obtain the advanced electronic warfare techniques, and strengthen the capability of the C3I.

2. Military Training and Exercise

PLA's training and exercise are oriented toward future wars, with an emphasis on active defense strategy and an operational concept of offensive and defensive basis. Meanwhile, the PLA is fully engaged itself in the study of joint operations, refocusing on sea and air combatness from the land operations. And the frequency of the training and exercise has been sharply increased since the publication of the “New In-Lieue-of-Training Outline.” (See Table 1-5 for the General Situation of the PLA's Training and Exercise in Recent Years)

Table 1-5The General Situation of PLA's Training and Exercise in Recent Three Years

Note: 1.MR—Military Region

2.“Specific Exercise” means the ones which the PLA officials claimed as responses to the pragmatic foreign policy of R.O.C.

In July 1995 and March 1996, the PLA, with a theater for Nanjing Military Region, conducted 7 actual maneuvers as if invading Taiwan. In recent two years, its naval and Air Forces in bases like Nanking, Guangzhou, Jinan have carried out several times of the simulated maneuvers with the new generation of ROC's force as its hypothetical enemy. It is estimated that except expanding its scope of activities so as to show its military blockade capability of the Taiwan Strait, rattling its sabre toward the ROC and announcing its sovereignty over Taiwan to the world, the PLA also took advantage of this good opportunity to test the water for branch coordination operations, have a drill for command procedures, and to understand the operational plan against Taiwan in the future local war under high-technological condition.

Ⅵ. Military Diplomacy

The PRC recognizes that the military exchange activities should serve the interest of national diplomacy and the military modernization. In recent years, Mainland China has escalated its military diplomacy. After the crisis of the Taiwan Strait, both the quality and quantity of Beijing's military diplomacy have been significantly increased. In 1996 and 1997, the PLA received more than 220 military missions from more than 100 countries. Additionally, it has sent numerous military delegations of the CCP's Central Military Committee, the General Staff Department, the General Political Department and the General Logistics Department, led by high-ranking generals and admirals of various services, to visit 70 states for promoting military exchanges, explaining defense policy, and purchasing military items. In 1997, the PLA's naval fleet reciprocated goodwill port calls on the Southeast Asia, the United States, and the Latin American countries.

In order to elaborate on its “one China” policy and rebut the theory of PRC's threat, Beijing has reiterated the followings during its military exchanges:

1. The PRC's defense policy is defensive in nature and designed to protect its territory, territorial space, and territorial waters from invasion for the purpose of maintaining a “unified China.”

2. There is only one China in the world, and Taiwan is an in-separable part of China. If foreign powers are involved in “the unification of China” or “Taiwan independence,” the PRC will take all means including the use of forces to defend the integrity of national territory and the sovereignty.


3.“The Theory of PRC's Threat” is groundless and fabricated to sabotage Mainland China's relations with its neighboring states.

The PRC fully understands that it is important and necessary for Beijing to strengthen its military exchanges with Washington. As such, in the recent two years, PRC President Jiang Zemin, Chairman of the CCP's Central Military Committee, Defense Minister Chi Haotian; General Chief of Staff Fu Quan; Deputy General Chief of Staff Wei Fuling; Deputy General Chief of Staff Xiung Guang-kai, President of the National Defense University Xing Shizhong, C-in-C of the Air Force Yu Zhenwu paid in turn courtesy calls on the United States. In addition, the following agreements have been reached during Jiang Zemin's visit to Washington in October 1997:

a. To jointly establish “the Constructive Strategic Partnership” between the PRC and the United States.

b. To arrange regular exchange of visits by the state heads of the two nations and install a Washington-Beijing hot line.

c. To regularly hold conference to discuss politics, military , security, and arms reduction.

Ⅶ.The Impact of Mainland China's Military Situation upon R.O.C. on Taiwan

In sum, the PLA's military development in recent two years can be summarized as defense budget increase and the military buildup. The PLA has accomplished partial force reduction and readjustment, the activation of the “Emergency Mobile Force,” the combat readiness constructions along the southeast coastal area, the R&D and replacement of the weapons and equipment, and the establishment of the combat tactics against Taiwan and C3I. In particular, the PLA's major military establishment has been shifted to the southeast coastal area since the signature of “the PRC-Russia Border Force Reduction Agreement.”Thus, PRC's threat to ROC's defense security has substantially increased to such an extent that the PLA is capable of launching its air and naval attacks against Taiwan, conducting local and overall blockade, and invading offshore islands. It is estimated that the forces available to the PLA for the invasion of Taiwan are as follows:

1. Ground Forces

In addition to about 80,000 troops of the 31st Army Group deployed in Fujian region, the PLA could reshuffle in a short period some of the“Rapid Reaction Force” of other military regions, the troops with stronger combat capability, and 260,000 strategic reserves to the area.

2. Naval Forces

They are able to set out submarines and motorized fishing vessels to make a long-standing sea blockade. They can lay mines over the peripheral waters of Taiwan proper and the offshore islands, concentrate the amphibious landing crafts transporting one reinforced division to conduct a regular landing operation, or make a good use of the motorized fishing vessels to render a sea blockade and carry by batches 350,000 light infantry to undertake an irregular landing operation.

3. Air Force

At the 13 military-civilian airports within 250 NM away from the Taiwan proper, the PRC's Air Force can station 1,200 combat aircrafts and maneuver 59 air transports to carry two airborne regiments for operational mission.

4. The Second Artillery

The DF-15 (M-9) and DF-21 may directly attack our key political, economical, and military targets. This is the most serious type of operations the PRC may choose to invade Taiwan by the use of force.

PRC has written into “the Defense Law,” adopted at the 5th Session of the 8th Convention of the National People's Congress in March 1997, that the military action may be taken for the sake of the sovereignty, unification of China, integrity of territory, and security. The law serve as a legal basis to settle the Taiwan problem in the future by use of forces declaration that it has the determination to safeguard the integrity of territory. The people in all walks of life here in Taiwan should fully understand and be alert that only defense capability can maintain national secruity.