ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE ANALYSIS OF THE TREATY TEXT

bbbb The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms ( START Treaty") consists of the main Treaty text and nine associated documents:

- the Annex on Agreed Statements ("Agreed Statements Annex");

- the Annex on Terms and Their Definitions ( "Definitions Annex");

- the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Conversion or Elimination of the Items Subject to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms; ( "Conversion or Elimination Protocol");

­ the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Related to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, with 12 annexes, ( "Inspection Protocol");

­ the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms; ( "Notification Protocol");

­ the Protocol on ICBM and SLBM Throw-weight Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms ( "Throw-weight Protocol");

­ the Protocol on Telemetric Information Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms ( "Telemetry Protocol");

­ the Protocol on the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (" Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC) Protocol"); and

­ the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, with 10 annexes ("Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)").

bbbbbb All Protocols, Annexes and the Memorandum of Understanding are integral parts of the Treaty.

bbbbbb Associated with the START Treaty are four related, separate agreements signed by the U.S. Secretary of State and the Soviet Foreign Minister. The first three separate agreements, all signed in Moscow on July 31, 1991, include:

­ The Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Early Exhibitions of Strategic Offensive Arms Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (Agreement on Early Exhibitions of Strategic Offensive Arms.")

This Agreement will allow extensive exhibitions to confirm the technical characteristics specified in the Memorandum of Understanding for existing ICBMs, SLBMs, heavy bombers, mobile launchers of ICBMs, and long-range nuclear ALCMs required under the Treaty to take place prior to entry into force of the Treaty

­ The Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics On the Early Exchange of Lists of Inspectors, Monitors and Aircrew Members Proposed for Inspection and Continuous Monitoring Activities Conducted Pursuant to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms ( Agreement on the Proposed for Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities.")

This Agreement will allow the Parties to exchange and approve the lists of inspectors and monitors before entry into force of the Treaty and thus allow inspections and continuous monitoring to begin promptly upon entry into force of the Treaty.

­ The Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Exchange of Geographic Coordinates and Site Diagrams Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms ( "Agreement on Exchange of Coordinates and Site Diagrams").

This Agreement provides a listing of geographic coordinates of facilities subject to the Treaty and includes the site diagrams. This Agreement is classified and will not be released to the public.

bbbbbbThe fourth separate agreement, signed at Jackson Hole, Wyoming on September 23, 1989, is:

This Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Reciprocal Advance Notification of Major Strategic Exercise ("Agreement on Reciprocal Advance Notification of Major Strategic Exercises"). This Agreement provides for the advance notification of one major strategic forces exercise that includes the participation of heavy bomber aircraft to be held during each calendar year.

bbbbbbAlso associated with the START Treaty are seven legally binding letters, each of which has the status of an executive agreement. Each of these letters was signed by the Heads of Delegation in Moscow on either July 30 or 31, 1991. They include:

­ An obligation to eliminate at least 22 Soviet heavy ICBM launchers each year during the seven-year reduction period.

­ Detailed provisions for verifying that silo launch control centers are not converted into silo launchers.

­ Detailed provisions to provide confidence that the B-1 bomber is not equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs.

­ An obligation to provide photographs of certain equipment before Treaty signature and a list of the photographs of strategic offensive arms to be provided at and after Treaty signature.

­ Procedures to deal with expended mobile ICBM launch canisters to help verify that they do not contain ICBMs.

­ Provisions for dealing with the Soviet naval airplane designated Bear D (Soviet designation TU-95RTs). The 37 existing Bear D airplanes will not be covered by the Treaty. The letters provide Soviet assurances, verified by exhibitions, that they are equipped exclusively for maritime operations; the letters also place basing restrictions on the airplane.

­ An obligation to provide certain engineering data before Treaty entry into force in order to facilitate establishment of continuous monitoring sites soon after Treaty signature.

bbbbbbThere are also a variety of supporting documents related to the Treaty. These include certain correspondence between Ministers on the topics of third-country basing, long-range ALCMs with multiple nuclear warheads, the Tacit Rainbow system, and the relocation of heavy ICBM silos. The supporting documents also include 12 joint statements and 20 other statements made by the Parties. Most of these statements were made at the final plenary meeting of the START Delegations, on July 29, 1991, in Geneva, but the fact that a statement was or was not made at the final plenary does not have any particular significance. The texts of the various statements and correspondence specified above are included herein, and all are analyzed in this analysis.

bbbbbbFinally, also included are two independent, politically binding declarations made by the Parties, one concerning the TU-22 Backfire bomber and the other concerning the planned deployment of long-range nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs). The texts of these declarations and an analysis of them are attached.

TITLE AND PREAMBLE

bbbbbb The title of the Treaty is the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms." The phrase reduction and limitation" is significant because the Treaty reduces, and does not merely limit, strategic offensive arms.

bbbbbbThe term "strategic offensive arms" is undefined. "Strategic" indicates that, in general, the forces covered are those of intercontinental range, in contrast to shorter-range and intermediate-range weapons which are covered by the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range missiles (INF Treaty)1. During the negotiations the United States rejected proposals by the Soviet Union to treat so-called forward-based systems" (e.g., aircraft based in Europe or on aircraft carriers) as strategic offensive arms. As a result, the Parties agreed not to include constraints on such systems in the Treaty. Offensive" is in contrast to defensive strategic arms, such as anti-ballistic missile systems.

bbbbbbThe Preamble serves as an introduction to the Treaty and sets forth the intentions of the Parties in broad terms. The first line of the Preamble sets forth and defines the Parties" to the Treaty, that is, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The next three paragraphs of the Preamble state the Parties' considerations upon entering into the Treaty. These paragraphs state first, that the Parties are conscious that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all humanity. They also state, drawing from a statement by former President Reagan, that such a war cannot be won and must never be fought. Furthermore, these paragraphs state that the Parties are convinced that the measures for the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms and the other obligations set forth in the Treaty will help to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war and strengthen international peace and security, and that the Parties recognize that their interests and the interests of international security require the strengthening of strategic stability.

bbbbbbThe final preambular paragraph makes reference to three other commitments of the Parties with regard to strategic offensive arms. These references include, first, Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) of July 1, 19682; which provides, in part, that the NPT Parties undertake to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date.

bbbbbb The second reference is to Article XI of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 19723; in that Article the United States and Soviet Union undertake to continue active negotiations for limitations on strategic offensive arms. Note that this is the only direct reference in the START Treaty to the ABM Treaty, and it refers only to Article XI, which is the portion of the ABM Treaty concerned with continued negotiations on strategic offensive arms.

bbbbbbThe third reference is to the Washington Summit Joint Statement of June 1, 1990, which includes a joint statement on future negotiations on nuclear and space arms and on further enhancing strategic stability.

Article I

bbbbbbArticle I sets forth the general undertaking by each Party to reduce and limit its strategic offensive arms in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty, and to carry out the other obligations set forth in the Treaty and its Annexes, Protocols, and Memorandum of Understanding. Provisions that are comparable to Article I are found in paragraph 1 of Article I of the ABM Treaty and Article I of the INF Treaty. Note that Article XVII of the START Treaty provides that the Annexes, Protocols, and Memorandum of Understanding are integral parts of the Treaty.

bbbbbbAlthough the Parties did not agree on a definition of the term "strategic offensive arms," they overcame any need for such a definition by listing the specific types of systems to be limited and by defining those systems so as to capture their modernized replacements. As a practical matter, the strategic offensive arms" constrained by the Treaty are nuclear-capable. If a non-nuclear arm were to fall within a definition established by the Treaty, however, it would be captured. For example, if an ICBM or SLBM were to have a non-nuclear rather than nuclear warhead, it would still be an ICBM or SLBM for purposes of the Treaty.

bbbbbbRegarding "new kinds" of weapons systems, the Parties understand that new kinds of nuclear arms that are comparable to strategic offensive arms would be subject to the Treaty, even though, as new kinds," such arms would not fall within any existing definition established by the Treaty. The Parties did not reach agreement, however, on the applicability of the Treaty to future non-nuclear systems. During the negotiations, the United States stated its view that a future non-nuclear system could not be considered a new kind of strategic offensive arm and, thus, would not be subject to the Treaty. The Soviet Union did not accept this view.

bbbbbbThe Parties agreed, in the Second Agreed Statement, that, if "new kinds" of arms emerge in the future and if the Parties disagree about whether they are strategic offensive arms, then such arms would be subject to discussion in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. Of course, if one Party deploys a new kind of arm that it asserts is not subject to the Treaty, and the other Party challenges this assertion, the deploying Party would be obligated to attempt to resolve the issue. There is, however, no obligation to delay deployment pending such resolution. (See the discussion of new kinds of strategic offensive arms in the analysis of the Article XV of the Treaty and the Second Agreed Statement.)

ARTICLE II

bbbbbbArticle II consists of three paragraphs setting forth the central numerical limits of the Treaty. It specifies the numbers of deployed offensive delivery systems and accountable heavy bomber and ballistic missile warheads allowed to each Party at the end of each of the three phases of the reduction period. It also specifies the aggregate throw-weight of deployed ballistic missiles allowed to each Party at the end of the reduction period.

bbbbbbParagraph 1 of Article II sets forth the limits that will be reached following the seven-year period of reductions. It provides the following limits, as counted in accordance with Article III of the Treaty:

(a) a total of 1600 deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and their associated launchers, deployed submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and their associated launchers, and deployed heavy bombers. This limit is sometimes referred to as a limit on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles," SNDVs," deployed strategic offensive systems," or strategic delivery vehicles," although none of those terms is used in the Treaty.

(b) 154 deployed heavy ICBMs and their associated launchers. As a practical matter, this limit applies only to the Soviet Union, since the United States has no heavy ICBMs, and the deployment of new types of heavy ICBMs is prohibited by paragraph 2 of Article V.

(c) a total of 6000 warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers. Within this total of 6000, there are sublimits of:

(i) 4900 warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs;

(ii) 1100 warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs on mobile launchers of ICBMs;

(iii) 1540 warheads attributed to deployed heavy ICBMs.

bbbbbb Note that Article II cross-references Article III; this is significant because that Article, as is discussed below, provides the rules for how the arms subject to reduction and limitation are to be counted. The definitions of these arms are found in the Definitions Annex. Note also that warhead" is not a physical object, but a unit of account under the Treaty. (See analysis of paragraph 4 of Article III, below.)

bbbbbbDue to these counting rules and the fact that the Soviets, because of their larger forces, generally must make greater reductions under the Treaty, no single percentage value can give an accurate representation of the reductions that are required by the Treaty. An examination of percentage reductions is best done on a category-by-category basis.

bbbbbbThe following data from the Memorandum of Understanding, based on the agreed Treaty counting rules, are effective as of September 1, 1990, and will be updated 30 days after the Treaty enters into force:

As a result of the Treaty, the above values will be reduced by the following percentages:

bbbbbbThe table above refers to accountable warheads and accountable ballistic missile warheads. Due to START warhead accountability rules for heavy bombers and ballistic missiles, the actual number of weapons deployed will be different. As regards throw-weight, each Party is limited to 3600 metric tons of throw-weight in paragraph 3 of Article II.

bbbbbbThe Treaty prohibits the Parties from producing, flight-testing, or deploying an ICBM or SLBM with more than the number of warheads that are attributed to it; however, in certain cases the attributed number of warheads may be greater than the number actually deployed. (See the discussion of subparagraphs 4(b) and 4(d) of Article III, below). Conversely, because the Treaty's counting rules have the effect of discounting" bomber weapons, the number of heavy bomber weapons actually deployed almost certainly will be higher than the attributed number.

bbbbbb Paragraph 2 of Article II sets forth the three phases whereby the levels listed in paragraph 1 are to be reached. The first phase ends 36 months after entry into force; the second phase ends 60 months after entry into force; while the final levels (those specified in paragraph 1 of this Article) must be attained no later than 7 years (84 months) after entry into force of the Treaty.

bbbbbbIntermediate levels to be achieved at the end of each of the first two phases are provided for total delivery vehicles, for total warheads, and for total ballistic missile warheads. No intermediate levels are provided for ballistic missile warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs on mobile launchers of ICBMs, since neither Party exceeded the ultimate limit at the time of Treaty signature.

bbbbbb Although no intermediate levels are provided for in the Treaty for deployed heavy ICBMs and their associated launchers or for ballistic missile warheads attributed to deployed heavy ICBMs, the phasing of reductions of deployed heavy ICBMs and their associated launchers is provided for in an exchange of letters dated July 30, 1991. These letters, signed by the U.S. and Soviet Heads of Delegation, specify that the deployed heavy ICBMs of the Soviet Union and their associated launchers shall be reduced by no less than 22 each year until the 154 limit is reached. In addition, the letters specify that the reduction of heavy ICBMs and their associated launchers will be through elimination, not conversion. In a separate letter signed on July 31, 1991, Soviet Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh confirmed that the Soviet commitments on the phasing of reductions of heavy ICBMs are legally binding. It should be understood that certain other letters in which agreements were made concerning the START Treaty are also legally binding. The reason that a separate letter was needed to confirm this for the Soviet commitment on the phasing of heavy ICBM reductions is that the language of the commitment, which had been negotiated earlier than those other letters, was ambiguous as to whether the commitment was in fact legally binding.

bbbbbbParagraph 3 of Article II limits the aggregatethrow-weight of each Party's deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs. This limit provides that seven years after entry into force of the Treaty, and thereafter, such aggregate throw-weight may not exceed 3600 metric tons (a metric ton is 1000 kilograms). This level would reflect a reduction to approximately 54 percent of the current Soviet level. There are no intermediate limits on aggregate throw-weight during the seven-year reductions period.

ARTICLE III

bbbbbbArticle III consists of ten paragraphs that describe how to count the launchers, ballistic missiles, bombers, and warheads that are subject to the Treaty limits set forth in Article II. It establishes when newly-constructed strategic offensive arms become subject to the Treaty. Article III also lists the types of strategic offensive arms that are considered to be existing types as of Treaty signature, and provides limits for reducing the number of warheads on missiles (sometimes referred to as downloading").

bbbbbbParagraph 1 of Article III provides one of the most fundamental counting rules. It states that each deployed ICBM and its associated launcher shall be counted as one unit, that each deployed SLBM and its associated launcher shall be counted as one unit, and that each deployed heavy bomber shall be counted as one unit. This rule is the foundation upon which subsequent counting rules operate.

bbbbbbParagraph 2 of Article III sets forth the rules for counting deployed missiles and launchers.Subparagraph 2(a) states that, for the purposes of counting deployed ICBMs and SLBMs and their associated launchers, each deployed launcher of an ICBM or SLBM shall be considered to contain one deployed ICBM or one deployed SLBM, respectively. This means that when a Party observes a deployed launcher of an ICBM or SLBM of the other Party, the launcher is considered, for counting purposes, to contain a deployed ICBM or SLBM, respectively, even if the missile has been removed from the launcher.

bbbbbbSubparagraph 2(b) of Article III provides a rule to avoid a situation where an ICBM is double-counted as both a deployed and a non-deployed missile while removed from its launcher. Since, under subparagraph (a), the launcher is assumed to contain an ICBM, under subparagraph (b), if a deployed ICBM has been removed from its launcher and another missile has not been installed in that launcher, the ICBM that has been removed from the launcher continues to be considered to be contained in that launcher, provided it is located at that ICBM base. Thus, the combined effect of subparagraphs (a) and (b) is that a Party is precluded from claiming that deployed ICBM launchers should not count as containing an ICBM because they are empty, but at the same time an ICBM that has been removed will not be double counted.

bbbbbbSubparagraph 2(c) of Article III provides a similar rule for a deployed SLBM removed from its launcher. If a deployed SLBM has been removed from its launcher and another missile has not been installed in that launcher, such an SLBM removed from its launcher shall be considered to be contained in that launcher. Subparagraph (c) also contains a locational restriction on such an SLBM removed from its launcher. Such an SLBM may be located only at a facility at which non-deployed SLBMs may be located, as listed in subparagraph 9(a) of Article IV of the Treaty, or be in movement to such a facility.

bbbbbbParagraph 3 of Article III provides the counting rules for ICBMs, SLBMs, and launch canisters. The rules reflect the fact that, for maintenance, storage, and transportation, some missiles are found in stages, others as assembled missiles without launch canisters, and others as assembled missiles in launch canisters. The Twenty-eighth Agreed Statement, in the Agreed Statements Annex, provides locational restrictions on canisterized ICBMs outside of their launch canisters, and on the first stages of ICBMs and SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles (with or without launch canisters).

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (a) of paragraph 3 provides that, for ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported in stages, the first stage of an ICBM or SLBM of a particular type shall be considered to be, for counting purposes, an ICBM or SLBM of that type.Subparagraph (b) provides that, for ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles without launch canisters, an assembled missile of a particular type shall be considered to be an ICBM or SLBM of that type. Subparagraph (c) provides that, for ICBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles in launch canisters, an assembled missile of a particular type, in its launch canister, shall be considered to be an ICBM of that type. For the United States, all existing types of ICBMs and SLBMs are considered to be maintained, stored, and transported in stages. For the Soviet Union, all existing types of ICBMs are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles in launch canisters, except for the SS-13, which is maintained, stored, and transported in stages. For the Soviet Union, all existing types of SLBMs are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles without launch canisters. (The Soviet SS-N-6 SLBM has only one stage.)

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (d) of paragraph 3 provides a counting rule for launch canisters of ICBMs. It provides that each launch canister shall be considered to contain an ICBM from the time it first leaves a facility at which an ICBM is installed in it, until an ICBM has been launched from it or until an ICBM has been removed from it for elimination. It also provides an exception, in that a launch canister shall not be considered to contain an ICBM if it contains a training model of a missile or if it has been placed on static display. Note that training models of missiles are not subject to the same locational restrictions as actual missiles­i.e., there is no requirement that they be located only at declared facilities. This raises the possibility that a Party might observe, through national technical means, a launch canister containing a training model of a missile at an undeclared facility. This could lead to compliance concerns, since a Party cannot discriminate by national technical means between canisters with real missiles and canisters with training missiles. Such a situation could be raised in the JCIC. The Party possessing the missile would be expected to make efforts (which could include offering a special access visit) to demonstrate that the canister did not contain a real missile. Note that the definition of a training model of a missile requires that such a missile differ from a real one on the basis of functional and external differences visible during inspections.

bbbbbbb Note finally, that subparagraph (d) of paragraph 3 provides a distinguishability rule, by requiring that launch canisters for ICBMs of a particular type shall be distinguishable from launch canisters for ICBMs of a different type. (See the discussion of the term "distinguishable" in the analysis of the Definitions Annex.) Also, subparagraph 13(b)(iii) of Section XIV of the Inspection Protocol obligates the inspected Party to demonstrate, in certain circumstances, that the launch of a mobile ICBM of a new type cannot be carried out from a launch canister for a mobile ICBM of an existing or previously declared new type, and vice versa.

bbbbbbbSubparagraphs (c) and (d) reflect Soviet elevation to the level of a fundamental principle the association of a launch canister with its missile. Throughout the negotiations, Soviet negotiators insisted that the launch canister was an inseparable part of an ICBM; they based their negotiating position in a number of areas on this principle. Consequently, the provisions on launch canisters throughout the Treaty and its associated documents were crafted as a compromise between the U.S. desire for effective verification and the Soviet insistence that this principle be preserved.

bbbbbbb Paragraph 4 of Article III sets forth rules to be used for the purposes of counting warheads. The term warhead" is used as the unit of account for the purpose of the 6000 limit in subparagraph 1(b) of Article II, whereas the term reentry vehicle" is used elsewhere in the Treaty text to describe the physical object carried by a missile. Each of these terms is defined in the Definitions Annex. Also note that this paragraph is written in terms of attributing" a certain number of warheads to a missile or heavy bomber; it is the number attributed that counts for purposes of Treaty ceilings.

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (a) of paragraph 4 provides that the number of warheads attributed to an ICBM or SLBM of each existing type shall be the number specified in the Memorandum of Understanding. This means that the number of warheads attributed to ICBMs and SLBMs of existing types (i.e., those types deployed at the time of Treaty signature) is established, and will not need to be further calculated. All warhead attributions for existing types of ICBMs and SLBMs were agreed in the Joint Summit Statement of December 1987, except for the attribution for the SS-N-18 SLBM of the Soviet Union, which, by agreement, was subsequently changed, as is explained in the analysis of subparagraph 5(c) below. By signing the Memorandum of Understanding, the Parties have agreed on the number of warheads that will be attributed to each existing type of ICBM or SLBM. (This agreement is stated in the first unnumbered paragraph in the text above the signature block of the Memorandum of Understanding, and it is discussed in the analysis of that Memorandum.) Note that the Parties have a limited right to "download" or reduce the number of warheads attributed to ICBMs and SLBMs, and are prohibited from increasing the number of warheads attributed to ICBMs and SLBMs. This is discussed below in the analysis of paragraph 5 of Article III and paragraph 12 of Article V, respectively.

bbbbb Since the number of warheads to be attributed to new types of ICBMs and SLBMs (that is, types of ICBMs and SLBMs that come into existence after Treaty signature) cannot be stipulated now, rules have been agreed for attributing warheads to such types if and when they are created over the life of the Treaty. Subparagraph (b) of paragraph 4 states that the number of warheads that will be attributed to an ICBM or SLBM of a new type shall be the maximum number of reentry vehicles with which an ICBM or SLBM of that type has been flight-tested. Subparagraph (b) also contains a rule for warhead attribution for the case in which a Party deploys an ICBM or SLBM of a new type that has been tested with a certain number of warheads but that is capable of carrying more. This rule provides that the number of warheads that will be attributed to an ICBM or SLBM of a new type with a front section of an existing design with multiple reentry vehicles (regardless of whether they are independently targetable), or to an ICBM or SLBM of a new type with one reentry vehicle, shall be no less than the nearest integer that is smaller than the result of dividing 40 percent of the accountable throw-weight of the ICBM or SLBM by the weight of the lightest reentry vehicle flight-tested on an ICBM or SLBM of that type. This is often referred to informally as the 40 percent rule". (For example, in the hypothetical case of a new type of ICBM with accountable throw-weight of 1100 kilograms, for which the lightest reentry vehicle flight-tested weighed 100 kilograms, the minimum number of warheads attributed would be determined by dividing 100 into 40 percent of 1100. The result­4.4­would be rounded down to the next lower integer, or 4.) The purpose of the 40 percent rule" is to prevent a side from attributing an unrealistically low number of warheads to a new type of ballistic missile by significantly under-demonstrating its reentry vehicle-carrying capability. For modern ICBM and SLBM designs, roughly half of the missile's throw-weight capability is used for reentry vehicles. The rest is used for fuel, the self-contained dispensing mechanism, guidance devices, and other items. Since some inefficient Soviet missile designs may result in their being able to use less than half their throw-weight for reentry vehicles, the Soviet Union insisted that the Treaty use 40 percent to avoid any possibility of over-attributing warheads.

bbbbbbbIn the case of an ICBM or SLBM of a new type with a front section of afundamentally new design that carries multiple reentry vehicles, the question of the applicability of the 40 percent rule" to such an ICBM or SLBM shall be subject to agreement within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

bbbbbbbIn order to avoid a situation in which an ICBM or SLBM of a new type can exist, even temporarily, without an attribution, subparagraph (b) of paragraph 4 also provides that until agreement has been reached regarding the counting rule that will apply to an ICBM or SLBM of a new type with a front section of a fundamentally new design, the number of warheads that will be attributed to such an ICBM or SLBM shall be the maximum number of reentry vehicles with which an ICBM or SLBM of that type has been flight-tested. This subparagraph also stipulates that the number of new types of ICBMs or SLBMs with a front section of a fundamentally new design shall not exceed two for each Party as long as the Treaty remains in force.

bbbbbbb In this regard, it should be noted that the Twenty-fourth Agreed Statement, in the Agreed Statements Annex, provides clarification of what is meant by a front section of a fundamentally new design." Such a front section would not have the essential features that are characteristic of any existing design of a front section with multiple reentry vehicles that has been deployed or tested on any ICBM or SLBM as of the date of entry into force of the Treaty. (See the analysis of Agreed Statement 24 below.)

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (c) of paragraph 4 provides the rule that the number of reentry vehicles with which an ICBM or SLBM has been flight-tested shall be considered to be the sum of the number of reentry vehicles actually released during the flight test, plus the number of procedures for dispensing reentry vehicles performed during that same flight test when no reentry vehicle was released. This means that even if no reentry vehicles were actually released, the number of reentry vehicles with which that ICBM or SLBM shall be considered to have been flight-tested shall be equal to the number of such procedures. This rule does not apply to procedures for dispensing penetration aids, provided that the procedure for dispensing penetration aids differs from a procedure for dispensing reentry vehicles.

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (d) of paragraph 4 provides that each reentry vehicle of an ICBM or SLBM shall be considered to be one warhead. Thus, a reentry vehicle," used to describe the physical object, always counts as a warhead," which is the unit of account. The terms are not equivalent, however, because under rules such as that of subparagraphs (b) and (c) of this paragraph, more warheads may be attributed to an ICBM or SLBM than there are reentry vehicles actually on the ICBM or SLBM. It should also be noted that the Third Agreed Statement, in the Agreed Statements Annex, provides an exception to subparagraph 4(d) for the SS-11 ICBMs of the Soviet Union. The SS-11 is the only existing type of ICBM or SLBM of either Party that is equipped with multiple reentry vehicles that are not independently targetable. Some SS-11 ICBMs are deployed with three such reentry vehicles. But, in light of the fact that the three reentry vehicles cannot be independently targeted, an SS-11 is only attributed with one warhead for purposes of the limits in Article II. If a Party develops a new type of ICBM or SLBM that is equipped with multiple reentry vehicles that are not independently targetable, however, it will be attributed with warheads in accordance with subparagraphs 4(b), 4(c), and 4(d) of Article III.

bbbbbbbSubparagraphs (e) and (f) of paragraph 4 provide the counting rules for heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs of the U.S. and U.S.S.R., respectively. The different limits that are applicable to each Party reflect the differing practices of the sides and compromises that were reached in the course of the negotiations.

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (e) provides that, for the U.S., each heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, up to a total of 150, shall be attributed with ten warheads. Each U.S. heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs in excess of 150 such bombers shall be attributed with a number of warheads equal to the maximum number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which a heavy bomber of the same type and variant is actually equipped. Taken together, these two provisions mean that 150 U.S. heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs will count at ten warheads each, regardless of the number of such ALCMs with which they are equipped, while such bombers in excess of 150 count as having a number of warheads equal to the maximum number of such ALCMs for which that type/variant has actually been equipped. (For example, any B-52G declared to be over the 150 threshold would count as 12 warheads. On the other hand, because some B-52Hs are equipped for 12 long-range nuclear ALCMs and some for 20, any B-52H over the 150 threshold will be attributed with 20 warheads. If the United States declared separate variants of what is now declared simply as B-52H equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, such separate variants over the 150 threshold would then count as 12 or 20 warheads, respectively.)

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (e) also provides that the U.S. will specify the heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs that are in excess of 150 such heavy bombers by number, type, variant, and the air bases at which they are based. The as equipped" rule for U.S. heavy bombers in excess of 150 is a compromise intended to ameliorate Soviet concerns that the basic heavy bomber warhead attribution rule undercounts the actual number of long-range nuclear ALCMs carried by a heavy bomber. It should also be noted that in paragraph 20 of Article V of the Treaty, the United States is limited to no more than 20 long-range nuclear ALCMs on an existing or future heavy bomber.

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (f) of paragraph 4 sets forth the counting rules for heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs of the Soviet Union. It states that each such heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, up to a total of 180 such heavy bombers, shall be attributed with eight warheads. This is in contrast to the attribution of 10 warheads to each U.S. heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs. This difference is due to the fact that Soviet heavy bombers are equipped to carry fewer long-range nuclear ALCMs than U.S. heavy bombers. Subparagraph (f) also provides rules for heavy bombers of the Soviet Union in excess of these 180 bombers. It provides that each heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs in excess of 180 such heavy bombers shall be attributed with a number of warheads equal to the maximum number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which a heavy bomber of that type/variant is actually equipped. Subparagraph (f) requires the Soviet Union to specify its heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs that are in excess of 180 such heavy bombers by number, type, variant, and the air bases at which they are based. It should also be noted that in paragraph 21 of Article V, the Soviet Union is limited to 16 long-range nuclear ALCMs on an existing or future heavy bomber. (Note that the U.S. limit of 20 long-range nuclear ALCMs on 150 existing and future heavy bombers and the Soviet limit of 16 long-range nuclear ALCMs on 180 existing and future heavy bombers result in a roughly comparable number of potentially unaccountable warheads on heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs: 1500 for the United States and 1440 for the Soviet Union.)

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (g), the final subparagraph of paragraph 4, addresses "categories" of heavy bombers. (A term defined in the Definitions Annex.) Subparagraph (g) provides that for each Party, each heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs shall be attributed with one warhead. With specified exceptions, subparagraph (g) also provides that all heavy bombers not equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs shall be considered to be heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs. Thus, the general rule is that heavy bombers will be counted under the Treaty, either as being equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs and having a number of warheads attributed pursuant to the other subparagraphs of paragraph 4, or as being equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs and being attributed with one warhead. The specified exceptions to this general rule, are for heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, test heavy bombers, and training heavy bombers. Also, note that former heavy bombers" are not considered to be heavy bombers" and do not count under the central limits. Former heavy bombers are reconnaissance, tanker, or jamming airplanes converted from heavy bombers or initially constructed on the basis of the airframe of an existing heavy bomber. They must not be equipped for air-to-surface armaments.

bbbbbbbParagraph 5 of Article III limits the extent to which a Party can "download" or reduce the number of warheads attributed to its ICBMs and SLBMs of existing types. (No downloading is permitted on new types of ICBMs or SLBMs.) It provides that each Party has the right to be credited with such reductions up to an aggregate number of 1250 at any one time. Subparagraph (a) provides that the 1250 aggregate shall consist, for the United States of America, of the reduction in the number of warheads attributed to the Minuteman III, plus the reduction in the number of warheads attributed to ICBMs and SLBMs of no more than two other existing types. Subparagraph (a) also provides that the 1250 aggregate shall consist, for the Soviet Union, of four multiplied by the number of deployed SLBMs of the SS-N-18 type, plus the reduction in the number of warheads attributed to ICBMs and SLBMs of no more than two other existing types.

bbbbbbb As regards the SS-N-18, it should be understood that the United States and the Soviet Union had attributed seven warheads to this missile in the Washington Summit Joint Statement of December 1987. In late 1990, representatives of the Soviet Union stated that they had reduced all SS-N-18s to three warheads and had destroyed all the reentry vehicle platforms for the SS-N-18 that were designed to hold seven reentry vehicles. In addition, in a December 30, 1990, letter from Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze to Secretary of State Baker, the Soviet Union offered the explicit assurance that it had retired front ends for the SS-N-18 SLBM with seven reentry vehicles, that the stockpile of such front ends had been destroyed entirely, that the Soviet Union no longer produced and did not intend to produce such front ends, and that all SS-N-18s are equipped with front ends that carry three reentry vehicles and that are designed so that carrying more than three reentry vehicles would be impossible. As part of the overall agreement on downloading, the Parties thereafter agreed to handle the SS-N-18 as a special case. It is attributed with three warheads in the Memorandum of Understanding, which means that it is already listed at the reduced level of warheads for purposes of the Treaty. But the four warheads that have already been reduced on the SS-N-18 count as part of the Soviet Union's 1250 permitted downloading" aggregate, which is why subparagraph 5(a) provides that the 1250 limit will consist, in part, for the Soviet Union, of four times the number of deployed SLBMs of the SS-N-18 type. The Soviet Union is not permitted to take further credit for additional downloading" the SS-N-18, since part (ii) of subparagraph (a) is explicit that downloading is permitted only on two other" existing types.

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (b) of paragraph 5 provides three rules for reductions in the number of warheads attributed to Minuteman III ICBMs. First, Minuteman III ICBMs to which different numbers of warheads are attributed shall not be deployed at the same ICBM base. Second, any such reductions shall be carried out no later than seven years after entry into force of this Treaty. Third, the reentry vehicle platform of each Minuteman III ICBM to which a reduced number of warheads is attributed shall be destroyed and replaced by a new reentry vehicle platform. (See the analysis of subparagraph 5(c) of this Article for a discussion of the phrase reentry vehicle platform.")

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (c) of paragraph 5 provides six rules for reductions in the number of warheads attributed to ICBMs and SLBMs of types other than Minuteman III, that are to be applied to downloading after entry into force. Since the downloading of the Minuteman III has not yet occurred, the phrase other than the Minuteman III" is necessary. Because the Soviets have said that the downloading of the SS-N-18 has already occurred, no comparable phrase is necessary for that missile. Nevertheless, these rules would never be applied to the SS-N-18, since, as is explained above, subparagraph 5(a)(ii) prohibits further downloading of the SS-N-18.

bbbbbbb The first rule of subparagraph (c) of paragraph 5 is that the additional reductions shall not exceed 500 warheads at any one time for each Party. This is a rolling" aggregate, meaning that if ICBMs or SLBMs of two existing types (other than Minuteman III or SS-N-18) that a Party has downloaded to make up all or part of the 500 limit are removed from accountability under the central numerical limits, then additional ICBMs or SLBMs of those two existing types can be downloaded up to the 500 limit, provided that all the other limitations of paragraph 5 are met. The second rule of subparagraph (c) of paragraph 5 is that, after a Party has reduced the number of warheads attributed to ICBMs or SLBMs of two existing types, that Party shall not have the right to reduce the number of warheads attributed to ICBMs or SLBMs of any additional type. Third, the number of warheads attributed to an ICBM or SLBM shall be reduced by no more than four below the number attributed as of the date of signature of this Treaty.

bbbbbbbThe fourth rule of subparagraph (c) of paragraph 5 is that ICBMs of the same type, but to which different numbers of warheads are attributed, shall not be deployed at the same ICBM base. Fifth, SLBMs of the same type, but to which different numbers of warheads are attributed, shall not be deployed on submarines based at submarine bases adjacent to the waters of the same ocean. This means, for example, that if the Soviet Union reduces the number of warheads attributed to its SS-N-23 SLBMs, all such SLBMs must be downloaded because they are deployed at bases adjacent to one ocean. If SS-N-23s were deployed at bases adjacent to two oceans, then the Soviets could download a portion of the force. But all downloaded SS-N-23s would have to be based adjacent to one ocean. The sixth and final rule of subparagraph (c) of paragraph 5 is that, if the number of warheads attributed to an ICBM or SLBM of a particular type is reduced by more than two, the reentry vehicle platform of each ICBM or SLBM to which such a reduced number of warheads is attributed shall be destroyed and replaced by a new reentry vehicle platform. The phrase reentry vehicle platform" is not defined in the Treaty nor was any attempt made during the negotiations to reach any more detailed understanding of exactly what needed to be destroyed. As a result, each Party is free to determine exactly what to destroy, taking into account the design of the specific ICBM or SLBM to be downloaded. There are no verification measures associated with the destruction of reentry vehicle platforms.

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (d) of paragraph 5 provides that a Party shall not have the right to deploy ICBMs of a new type to which is attributed a number of warheads greater than the smallest number of warheads attributed to any ICBM to which that Party has attributed a reduced number of warheads pursuant to subparagraph (c) of paragraph 5. A Party shall not have the right to deploy SLBMs of a new type to which is attributed a number of warheads greater than the smallest number of warheads attributed to any SLBM to which that Party has attributed a reduced number of warheads pursuant to subparagraph (c) of paragraph 5. This subparagraph would thus constrain the number of warheads on future ICBMs or SLBMs of new types should a Party reduce the number of warheads attributed to an ICBM or SLBM of an existing type. It means, for example, that if a Party downloaded an existing type of ICBM so that it was attributed with six warheads, that Party could not deploy any new type of ICBM to which more than six warheads are attributed. A similar ceiling would apply for future types of SLBMs if an existing SLBM were downloaded. Because these ICBM and SLBM warhead ceilings apply only to downloading carried out pursuant to subparagraph (c), the warheads with which the Minuteman III and SS-N-18 are attributed are not relevant to these ceilings.

bbbbb1bb Paragraph 6 of Article III sets forth the initial accountability" provisions, which stipulate when newly constructed strategic offensive arms shall begin to be subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty. Note that Section VII of the Notification Protocol requires notification of strategic offensive arms of new types. The phrase subject to limitation" is used in paragraph 6 to mean that once a strategic offensive arm that is in process of being constructed reaches a certain step in this process, it will begin to be subject to numerical and other restrictions on that type of arm. Subparagraph (a) provides that an ICBM will be subject to limitation when it first leaves a production facility. Subparagraph (b) provides that a mobile launcher of ICBMs will be subject to limitation when it first leaves a production facility for mobile launchers of ICBMs. Subparagraph (c) provides that a silo launcher of ICBMs will be subject to limitation when both the excavation for that launcher and the pouring of concrete for the silo have been completed, or 12 months after the excavation begins, whichever occurs earlier. The Parties understand that the term excavation begins" means the time when ground is first broken.

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (d) of paragraph 6 provides that a silo launcher of ICBMs will be subject to limitation, for the purpose of limits on deployed ICBMs and their associated launchers, by being considered to contain a deployed ICBM when both excavation for that launcher and the pouring of concrete for the silo have been completed, or 12 months after the excavation begins, whichever occurs earlier. Subparagraph (d) also provides that a mobile launcher of ICBMs will be subject to limitation, for the purpose of limits on deployed ICBMs and their associated launchers, by being considered to contain a deployed ICBM when it arrives at a maintenance facility of an ICBM base, except for the non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs provided for in subparagraph 2(b) of Article IV of the Treaty, or when it leaves an ICBM loading facility. Subparagraph 2(b) of Article IV allows each Party to retain no more than two non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs at the maintenance facility of each ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs, for each type of ICBM specified for that ICBM base.

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (e) of paragraph 6 provides that an SLBM will be subject to limitation when it first leaves a production facility. Subparagraph (f) provides that an SLBM launcher will be subject to limitation when the submarine on which that launcher is installed is first launched. Subparagraph (g) provides that an SLBM launcher will be subject to limitations, for the purpose of limits on deployed SLBMs and their associated launchers, by being considered to contain a deployed SLBM when the submarine on which that launcher is installed is first launched.

bbbbbbb It is possible that a silo launcher or a ballistic missile submarine ultimately intended to hold a new type of ICBM or SLBM could become accountable before the ICBM or SLBM it is intended to hold has been flight-tested. The Treaty does not directly address accountability in such cases. Since the launcher is deployed, it must be considered to contain an ICBM or SLBM. It cannot be considered to contain the new, untested missile, however, since there are no provisions for attributing a number of warheads or for determining accountable ballistic missile throw-weight for a type of ICBM or SLBM that has never been flight-tested. Thus, unless the Parties were to agree otherwise, the only way to meet the requirements of the Treaty would be to declare the launcher to contain an existing type of ICBM or SLBM and subsequently to convert it (which requires only a notification) to a launcher of the new type.

bbbbbbb If a silo launcher or a ballistic missile submarine ultimately intended to hold a new type of ICBM or SLBM became accountable after the ICBM or SLBM it is intended to hold has been flight-tested, but before the eighth flight test (when accountable throw-weight is determined), the owning Party could elect to declare that the new missile was deployed. As provided for in the Thirty-second Agreed Statement, the Parties would agree within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission on the procedures for establishing throw-weight accountability in such a case. The warhead attribution in such a case would depend on the maximum number of reentry vehicles with which the new type of ICBM or SLBM had been flight-tested, subject to the 40 percent reentry vehicle counting rule; this number could not subsequently be altered. (If, however, a Party wished to declare that the new launcher was considered to contain an existing type of ICBM or SLBM and subsequently to convert it to a launcher of the new type, the Treaty would not prohibit such an approach.)

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (h) of paragraph 6 provides the initial accountability rules for heavy bombers and former heavy bombers. Former heavy bombers" are defined in the Definitions Annex as reconnaissance, tanker, or jamming airplanes that are not equipped for nuclear armaments, or non-nuclear air-to-surface armaments, and that have been converted in accordance with the procedures in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol or that meet the requirements for conversion in accordance with the Protocol. Such airplanes may be newly constructed on the basis of the airframe of an existing type of heavy bomber, or they may be converted from a heavy bomber.

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (h) provides that a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber becomes subject to limitations when its airframe is first brought out of the shop, plant, or building in which components of a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber are assembled to produce complete airframes; or when its airframe is first brought out of the shop, plant, or building in which existing bomber airframes are converted to heavy bomber or former heavy bomber airframes. This means that the accountability of a new heavy bomber is tied in all cases to the appearance of the completed airframe. Note that while there is an initial accountability rule for heavy bombers, there is no such rule for long-range nuclear ALCMs. This is because such ALCMs are not directly accountable under the Treaty. Rather, warheads are attributed to heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs under agreed attribution rules, once such heavy bombers become accountable under the Treaty.

bbbbbbbParagraph 7 of Article III first provides the general rule that ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers that have been converted to launch an ICBM or SLBM, respectively, of a different type shall not be capable of launching an ICBM or SLBM of the previous type. Apart from this general rule, paragraph 7 also provides the specific rules for accountability of converted launchers; that is, the rules for when launchers of ICBMs or SLBMs of one type, which are in the process of conversion to being launchers of ICBMs or SLBMs of a different type, shall begin to be considered as being launchers of ICBMs or SLBMs of the different type. Such changed accountability for a silo launcher of ICBMs that is in the process of conversion begins when an ICBM of a different type or a training model of a missile of a different type is first installed in that launcher, or when the silo door is reinstalled, whichever occurs first. Such changed accountability for a mobile launcher of ICBMs that is in the process of conversion begins at a point that would be agreed by the Parties, within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. Such accountability for an SLBM launcher that is in the process of conversion begins when all launchers on the submarine on which that launcher is installed have been converted to launch an SLBM of the different type and the submarine begins sea trials. Subparagraph (c) also clarifies that a submarine begins sea trials when that submarine first operates under its own power away from the harbor or port in which the conversion of launchers was performed.

bbbbbbbParagraph 8 of Article III sets forth the rules for accountability of converted heavy bombers; that is, the rules for when heavy bombers that have been converted into heavy bombers of a different category or into former heavy bombers shall be considered to be heavy bombers of that different category or former heavy bombers. Subparagraph (a) of paragraph 8 states that, for a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs that is converted into a heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, the converted bomber is counted as being so equipped when it is first brought out of the shop, plant, or building where it was equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs. Subparagraph (b) provides that, for a heavy bomber of one category that is converted into a heavy bomber of another category or into a former heavy bomber, the converted bomber is counted as being of the different category or being a former heavy bomber when the inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 13 of Section VI of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol is completed or, if such an inspection is not conducted, when the 20-day period provided for in paragraph 13 of Section VI of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol expires. Note that the rules for converting a heavy bomber of one category into a heavy bomber of another category are provided for in paragraphs 9-12 of Section VI of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol. There are no procedures for converting heavy bombers to heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs; when permitted, such conversion is accomplished by notification in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol. No procedures for such a conversion are required, because there is no cheating scenario in such a conversion.

bbbbbbbParagraph 9 of Article III contains the " type rules," which are rules that are necessary to associate an individual item with others of its "type," and to distinguish between types.

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (a) of paragraph 9 provides that a ballistic missile of a type developed and tested solely to intercept and counter objects not located on the surface of the Earth shall not be considered to be a ballistic missile to which the limitations provided for in this Treaty apply. Thus, missiles for defense against ballistic missile attack or for air defense are not subject to Treaty limitations provided that they are developed and tested solely for defensive purposes. This provision parallels paragraph 3 of Article VII of the INF Treaty.

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (b) of paragraph 9 provides the type rule for ballistic missiles as weapon-delivery vehicles. A weapon delivery vehicle" is defined in the Definitions Annex as meaning, for ballistic missiles and cruise missiles, a missile of a type, any one of which has been flight-tested or deployed to carry or be used as a weapon, that is, as any mechanism or device that, when directed against any target, is designed to damage or destroy it. Subparagraph (b) provides that if a ballistic missile has been flight-tested or deployed for weapon delivery, all ballistic missiles of that type shall be considered to be weapon-delivery vehicles. Subparagraph (c) provides the type rule for cruise missiles as weapon-delivery vehicles. It provides that if a cruise missile has been flight-tested or deployed for weapon delivery, all cruise missiles of that type shall be considered to be weapon-delivery vehicles.

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (d) of paragraph 9 contains a two-part type rule for launchers other than soft-site launchers. ( Soft-site launchers" are defined as fixed, land-based launchers of ICBMs or SLBMs other than silo launchers.) It provides first that, if a launcher, other than a soft-site launcher, has contained an ICBM or SLBM of a particular type, it shall be considered to be a launcher of ICBMs or SLBMs of that type. Note that this provision, as well as the rest of the Treaty, refers to an ICBM or SLBM of a type," but does not use the words a launcher of a type." This was done to avoid suggesting that two dissimilar launchers of the same type of missile would be treated as different types under the Treaty; it was agreed that the type" of a launcher is the type of the missile that is associated with that launcher. Note also that in the Sixteenth Agreed Statement, in the Agreed Statements Annex, the Parties agree that, with respect to this provision, each ICBM launcher or SLBM launcher existing as of the date of signature of the Treaty is capable of launching only an ICBM or SLBM of the type specified for that launcher in the Memorandum of Understanding.

bbbbbbb Second, subparagraph (d) of paragraph 9 provides that, if a launcher, other than a soft-site launcher, has been converted into a launcher of ICBMs or SLBMs of a different type, it shall be considered to be a launcher of ICBMs or SLBMs of the type for which it has been converted. Thus, launchers can be converted from being launchers of one type of missile into launchers for another type. Finally, this provision has the effect of exempting soft-site launchers from the general rule that launchers are associated with only one type of ICBM or SLBM. Thus, soft-site launchers, located only at test ranges or space launch facilities, are permitted by the Treaty to launch several different types of ICBMs or SLBMs.

bbbbbbb Subparagraph (e) of paragraph 9 contains the heavy bomber type rule. It provides that, if a heavy bomber is equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, all heavy bombers of that type shall be considered to be equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, except those that are not so equipped and are distinguishable from heavy bombers of the same type equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs. The term distinguishable" is defined in the Definitions Annex. In this context, it means that the heavy bombers not equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs must be different on the basis of the totality of functional and external differences that are observable by national technical means (NTM) of verification, or, when such observations may be inconclusive in the opinion of the inspecting Party, that are visible during inspection. This means, for example, that although some B-52 bombers of the United States are equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs and some are not, the ones that are not so equipped will not count as being equipped, so long as they are distinguishable." If they are not distinguishable, they will count as if they were equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs.

Subparagraph (e) also provides that if long-range nuclear ALCMs have not been flight-tested from any heavy bomber of a particular type, no heavy bomber of that type shall be considered to be equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs. This means, for example, that, so long as long-range nuclear ALCMs are not flight-tested from the B-2 heavy bomber of the United States, no B-2 bombers will be considered to be heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs for purposes of Treaty limitations. Subparagraph (e) also provides that, within the same type, a heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, a heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments, a training heavy bomber, and a former heavy bomber shall be distinguishable from one another. (See the discussion of the term "distinguishable" in the analysis of the Definitions Annex.)

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (f) of paragraph 9 contains the long-range nuclear ALCM type rule. It provides that any long-range ALCM of a type, any one of which has been initially flight-tested from a heavy bomber on or before December 31, 1988, shall be considered to be a long-range nuclear ALCM. This means that if a long-range ALCM, whether it is a non-nuclear or nuclear-armed ALCM, was first flight-tested from a heavy bomber on or before December 31, 1988, then it will be considered to be a long-range nuclear ALCM. Long-range ALCMs first flight-tested from a heavy bomber after this date are treated differently, however. The second sentence of subparagraph (f) provides that any long-range ALCM of a type, any one of which has been initially flight-tested from a heavy bomber after December 31, 1988, shall not be considered to be a long-range nuclear ALCM if it is a long-range non-nuclear ALCM and is distinguishable from long-range nuclear ALCMs. Long-range non-nuclear ALCMs not so distinguishable shall be considered to be long-range nuclear ALCMs. This means that the long-range non-nuclear Tacit Rainbow system of the United States (now cancelled, but which was first flight-tested from a heavy bomber after December 31, 1988), would not be considered to be a long-range nuclear ALCM, provided that it is distinguishable from long-range nuclear ALCMs, according to the distinguishing features that would be provided as part of the notification required by Section VII of the Notification Protocol.

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (g) of paragraph 9 sets forth the type rule for mobile launchers of new types of ICBMs. It provides that mobile launchers for each new type of ICBM shall be distinguishable from mobile launchers of ICBMs of existing types of ICBMs and from mobile launchers for other new types of ICBMs. Subparagraph (g) also provides that such new launchers, with their associated missiles installed, shall be distinguishable from mobile launchers of ICBMs of existing types of ICBMs with their associated missiles installed, and from mobile launchers of ICBMs of other new types of ICBMs with their associated missiles installed.

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (h) of paragraph 9 sets forth the type rule for mobile launchers of one type of ICBM that are converted to launch another type of ICBM. This provision parallels subparagraph (g). Subparagraph (h) provides that mobile launchers of one type of ICBM converted into launchers of another type of ICBM shall be distinguishable from mobile launchers of the previous type of ICBM. Not only must the converted launchers be distinguishable, they must be distinguishable while their associated missiles are installed. (See the discussion of the term "distinguishable" in the analysis of the Definitions Annex.)

bbbbbbbThe final provision of subparagraph (h) provides that any conversion of a mobile launcher must be carried out in accordance with procedures that would be agreed within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. Mobile ICBM launchers may not be converted prior to procedures being agreed in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. This provision amounts to a de facto veto right over the conversion of mobile ICBM launchers.

bbbbbbbParagraph 10 of Article III lists the existing and former types of ICBMs, SLBMs, heavy bombers, and long-range nuclear ALCMs as of the date of signature of the Treaty. Because a Party may sometimes designate a system of the other Party by a name other than that used by the other Party, the designations used by each Party for various systems are included to avoid any ambiguity. The Parties agree that the lists are complete as of the date of signature. Thus, systems such as the Titan II missile, which is not listed as either an existing or former type, are effectively exempted from all provisions of the START Treaty, provided that they are not subsequently deployed and that they do not subsequently meet the criteria to be considered a new type or a variant of an existing type of ICBM or SLBM. With regard to the Titan II, U.S. negotiators informed their Soviet counterparts on April 26, 1990, that the Titan II had been retired from service and that all launchers for the Titan II had been eliminated except for a single launcher located at Green Valley, Arizona. This single launcher is unable to launch missiles, and is being maintained as a museum display.

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (a) lists the Parties' existing types of ICBMs and SLBMs. The technical characteristics for each of these ICBMs and SLBMs are listed in Annex F to the Memorandum of Understanding. The list does not include the Soviet SLBM designated as RSM-45, known to the United States as the SS-N-17, even though technical characteristics for this SLBM are listed in Annex F. This is because the data in the Memorandum of Understanding are data effective as of September 1, 1990, and the SS-N-17 was removed from operational service between that date and the date of signature.

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (b) of paragraph 10 lists the Parties' existing types of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs. For the United States of America, this includes the Peacekeeper ICBM. Peacekeeper ICBMs are treated as mobile ICBMs under the Treaty, despite the fact that they have not been tested or deployed in a mobile mode. Peacekeeper ICBMs that are deployed in silos, however, do not count under the limit of 1100 warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs on mobile launchers of ICBMs. The U.S. Small ICBM is not listed in subparagraphs (a) or (b) since it is still a "prototype," as that term is defined in the Definitions Annex. If it becomes accountable, it will fall under those provisions of the Treaty regulating new types of ICBMs.

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (c) of paragraph 10 lists the Parties' former types of ICBMs and SLBMS. The purpose of listing former types of ICBMs and SLBMs is to allow them to be used in flight tests involving reentry vehicles, without being treated as new types or variants of existing types of ICBMs or SLBMs. The U.S. Minuteman I and Polaris A-3 are listed. The Soviet Union has no ballistic missiles listed as former types. Note that the Twenty-ninth Agreed Statement specifies that the STARS (Strategic Target System) booster is not the Polaris A-3 SLBM and is thus not subject to any of the provisions of the Treaty. Note also that the Definitions Annex describes retired types" as ICBMs or SLBMs deployed at the time the Treaty enters into force, but that subsequently become non-deployed due to conversion or elimination of all launchers for that type, except those launchers at test ranges and space launch facilities. In comparison, former types" are listed types that were once deployed, but none of which are deployed as of entry into force of the Treaty.

bbbbbbbThe Polaris A-3 is considered a former type of SLBM, rather than a deployed type, despite the fact that two ex-Polaris submarines, USS John Marshall and USS Sam Houston, each equipped with 16 Polaris A-3 SLBM launchers, were in service during the Treaty negotiation. However, U.S. negotiators informed their Soviet counterparts on April 26, 1990 that these submarines had been converted to special purpose submarines; that the launchers had not been removed for reasons of cost, but that equipment to support launch was removed; that these submarines were unable to launch missiles; and that both submarines would be retired during the seven-year period of reductions under START. The method of retirement was not specified and the United States is not obligated to use START procedures in retiring these submarines.

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (d) of paragraph 10 lists the Parties' existing types of heavy bombers. Heavy bombers are also classified by category (based on armament) and variant (based on distinguishable differences within a particular category/type combination). The terms category," variant," and distinguishable" are each defined in the Definitions Annex. For each type of heavy bomber, the Memorandum of Understanding includes data on the numbers of all categories of heavy bombers and the numbers of former heavy bombers. Note that the Twelfth Agreed Statement and the letters exchanged by Heads of Delegation concerning Bear D bombers exempt certain Bear airplanes that might otherwise count under Treaty limits.

bbbbbbbNote that two types of Soviet airplanes are not listed: Bison and Backfire. Although, years ago, there were many Soviet Bison (designated by the Soviet Union as M" or Myasishchev") airplanes that would have met the definition of heavy bombers, only limited numbers of Bison airplanes exist today. The Parties' agreement regarding the Bison is recorded in the Sixth Agreed Statement. It excludes from the Treaty three particular Bison airplanes converted to transport oversize cargo (e.g., the Soviet space shuttle), and it specifies that the remaining Bisons will be considered to be former heavy bombers, since these were converted to serve as tankers. The Soviet Tu-22M bomber, known to the United States as the Backfire, is not listed. On July 31, 1991, the Soviet Union provided a politically-binding declaration concerning the Backfire bomber, which provides the basis for the Parties not to limit Backfires as heavy bombers under START. (See discussion below in the "Declarations" section of this analysis.)

bbbbbbb Subparagraph (e) of paragraph 10 lists the Parties' existing types of long-range nuclear ALCMs.

bbbbbbb In regard to paragraph 10, it should be noted that no sea-launched cruise missiles are listed, nor are such missiles subject to any Treaty limitation. On July 31, 1991, the Parties exchanged politically-binding declarations concerning their long-range nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles. (See discussion below in the Declarations" section of this analysis.)

ARTICLE IV

bbbbbbb Article IV of the Treaty text provides a variety of limitations other than the central limitations found in Article II. These limitations include limits on non-deployed ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, ICBMs and SLBMs at test ranges, non-deployed mobile launchers, test launchers and training launchers, bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, former heavy bombers, training heavy bombers, test heavy bombers, space launch facilities, launchers at space launch facilities, and locational restrictions on non-deployed ICBMs.

bbbbbbbParagraph 1 of Article IV provides a variety of limits for ICBMs and SLBMs other than the central numerical limits of Article II. Such limitations complement the central limits of the Treaty. They are intended either to inhibit rapid reload of deployed launchers or to limit the Parties' ability to augment the deployed force with launchers and associated missiles not counted against the central limits. Thus, for example, since ICBMs at test ranges could be used to augment the deployed force, their numbers are limited to those appropriate for testing purposes.

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (a) of paragraph 1 limits the number of non-deployed ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs. It limits each Party to an aggregate of no more than 250 non-deployed ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, of which no more than 125 may be non-deployed ICBMs for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs. Subparagraph (a) of the Thirty-seventh Agreed Statement provides that the limitations of subparagraph 1(a) do not apply to retired mobile ICBMs attributed with only one warhead. (Such a "retired type," pursuant to the Definitions Annex, would be ICBMs of a type that is deployed when the Treaty enters into force, but all of which type are subsequently rendered non-deployed by virtue of the conversion or elimination of their launchers, other than test launchers, launchers at space launch facilities, or launchers on special purpose submarines.) Since the SS-25 is the only single- reentry vehicle mobile ICBM that was deployed at the time of signature of the Treaty, this provision applies, in effect, only to it. ICBMs of retired mobile types would be subject to all other Treaty restrictions on non-deployed missiles, such as locational restrictions. Retired mobile ICBMs of types which have ever been attributed with more than one warhead continue to count under the 250/125 limits. Note that the limit in this subparagraph is the only provision in the Treaty which actually requires destruction of any ballistic missile. ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs must be eliminated pursuant to procedures in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol if their retention would cause these limits to be exceeded. Since retired mobile ICBMs attributed with only one warhead are not subject to the 250/125 limits, the Thirty-seventh Agreed Statement also exempts them from the elimination procedures in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol.

bbbbbbbSubparagraphs (b) and (c) of paragraph 1 are designed to limit the potential for rapid reload of ICBM launchers. In the case of mobile ICBMs, the number of non-deployed ICBMs at an ICBM base is limited by subparagraph (b) to no more than two for each type of mobile ICBM deployed at that base. In the case of silo-based ICBMs, subparagraph (c) gives each Party a choice (which can be different for each base) of either two non-deployed ICBMs and six sets of emplacement (silo loading) equipment, or four non-deployed ICBMs and two sets of emplacement equipment. These options for silo-based ICBMS are included to accommodate existing Soviet practices. Current United States' practices are to have only two non-deployed ICBMs of a type at a base. Since rapid reload requires both spare ICBMs and equipment to load them, either option serves to limit the capability to conduct such reload. (See the analysis of paragraph 16 of Article V for a discussion of rapid reload.")

bbbbbbbIn addition to the numerical limits, subparagraph 1(b) requires separate storage for non-deployed mobile ICBMs and non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs located at that maintenance facility. This provision, along with the numerical limits on non-deployed ICBMs and the companion limit in subparagraph 2(b) of Article IV on the number of non-deployed mobile launchers at an ICBM base, forms a constraint against the rapid augmentation of the deployed force. The provision also ensures that the non-deployed mobile launchers permitted at ICBM bases are genuinely non-deployed.

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (d) of paragraph 1 limits ICBMs and SLBMs at test ranges. There is a parallel limit on the number of test launchers in subparagraph (d) of paragraph 2. The test launcher limit is decreased after seven years. The limit on ICBMs and SLBMs at test ranges is reduced in parallel. Note that subparagraph (b) of the Thirty-seventh Agreed Statement provides that the limitations of subparagraph 1(d) of Article IV shall not apply to ICBMs and SLBMs of retired and former types except for retired mobile ICBMs.

bbbbbbbParagraph 2 of Article IV provides a variety of limits for ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers. Like the limits on ICBMs and SLBMs in paragraph 1, these limits are designed to reduce the potential for non-deployed mobile launchers and other launchers to complement the force of deployed launchers.

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (a) of paragraph 2 limits each Party to an aggregate of no more than 110 non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs. Within this limit, no more than 18 can be non-deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs. Included within these aggregate limits are the categories of non-deployed mobile launchers mentioned in subparagraphs (b), (c), and (d) below.

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (b) of paragraph 2 limits the number of non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs located at maintenance facilities at ICBM bases for mobile launchers of ICBMs to no more than two for each type of ICBM at that ICBM base. As noted above (subparagraph 1(b)), these launchers must be stored separately from non-deployed mobile ICBMs.

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (c) of paragraph 2 limits non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs at training facilities to no more than 40. Subparagraph (c) also creates an operational restriction on such launchers by providing that each such launcher may contain only a training model of a missile, and by providing that such non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs that contain training models of missiles shall not be located outside the training facility. The Fifteenth Agreed Statement provides an additional numerical limit on such launchers at the Plesetsk ICBM training facility.

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (d) of paragraph 2 limits test launchers to 45 (25 fixed and 20 mobile), dropping to 40 (20 fixed and 20 mobile) after seven years. There is a parallel limit on the number of ICBMs and SLBMs at test ranges in subparagraph (d) of paragraph 1, which also decreases after seven years. Note thatsubparagraphs (h) and (i) of the Thirty-seventh Agreed Statement provide that launchers of ICBMs or SLBMs of a former or retired type at test ranges count against these limits, except for a single Minuteman I test launcher located at Vandenberg Air Force Base.

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (e) of paragraph 2 limits the combined number of silo training launchers and mobile training launchers to no more than 60. In the Thirteenth Agreed Statement, the Parties agree that no more than four engineering models of silos may be located at the repair facility for ICBMs at Hill Air Force Base, Utah, and that such engineering models of silos will count against the numerical limits of subparagraph (e).

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (e) also creates operational restrictions on training launchers by providing that ICBMs shall not be launched from training launchers, and that each such launcher may contain only a training model of a missile. Note that the ban is on silo training launchers containing or launching an actual ICBM, not on having the capability to launch; such launchers could have a launch capability, and we could not verify, even at a high level of intrusiveness, whether in fact an individual launcher has such capability. In contrast, mobile training launchers are prohibited from being capable of launching ICBMs. Such mobile training launchers must differ from mobile launchers of ICBMs and other road vehicles or railcars on the basis of differences that are observable by national technical means of verification.

bbbbbbbParagraph 3 of Article IV limits heavy bombers, other than those counted against the central limits, and former heavy bombers. As in the case of paragraphs 1 and 2, such bombers are limited in order to constrain their potential to undermine the effectiveness of the central Treaty limits. Subparagraph (a) limits each Party to an aggregate of no more than 75 heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, former heavy bombers, and training heavy bombers. (Certain bombers are exempted from this limit, including 3 Bison bombers exempted pursuant to the Sixth Agreed Statement, and certain Bear bombers exempted for maritime operations pursuant to theTwelfth Agreed Statement.) Subparagraph (b) limits each Party to no more than 20 test heavy bombers. The former are subject to restrictions on the weapons they can carry, while test heavy bombers may be capable of delivering nuclear arms.

bbbbbbbParagraph 4 of Article IV provides limits on ICBMs and SLBMs used for delivering objects into the upper atmosphere or space. The Parties recognized that such use of ICBMs and SLBMs is valid and economical, but they also recognized that such use must be limited because such missiles could also be used for their original purpose of weapons delivery. In order to limit the potential for breakout, paragraph 4 limits each Party to no more than five space launch facilities," which are defined as specified facilities from which objects are delivered into the upper atmosphere or space using ICBMs or SLBMs. Paragraph 4 also provides that these facilities may not overlap ICBM bases (subparagraph (a)); limits each Party to a total of no more than 20 ICBM or SLBM launchers at those facilities, of which no more than ten may be silo and mobile launchers, unless otherwise agreed (subparagraph (b)); and limits the number of ICBMs or SLBMs at a given space launch facility to no more than the number of launchers at that facility (subparagraph (c)). Space launch facilities are not subject to inspection.

bbbbbbbSince the Parties recognize that their future space launch requirements are difficult to predict, both subparagraphs (a) and (b) provide for increases or decreases if the Parties agree. Such changes would not require an amendment to the Treaty.

bbbbbbbFinally, note that, as is discussed above in the analysis of subparagraph 2(d) of Article IV, subparagraph (h) of the Thirty-seventh Agreed Statement provides that launchers of a former or retired type shall be subject to the numerical limits of subparagraph 4(b) of Article IV, except for the single Minuteman I launcher at Vandenberg Air Force Base. Notwithstanding this, subparagraph (b) of the Thirty-seventh Agreed Statement provides that subparagraph 4(c) of Article IV shall not apply to retired and former types of ICBMs and SLBMs, except for retired mobile ICBMs.

bbbbbbbParagraph 5 of Article IV limits the number of transporter-loaders for ICBMs for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs. Restricting transporter-loaders constrains a Party's ability to reload mobile launchers rapidly after they have been fired. For road-mobile ICBMs with a single warhead, the Treaty allows two transporter-loaders per type per deployment area or test range, and a total of six transporter loaders in other areas, provided that the total does not exceed thirty. Note that paragraph 7 of Article V of the Treaty bans transporter-loaders for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs with multiple warheads and for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs.

bbbbbbbParagraph 6 of Article IV limits each Party to no more than two ballistic missile submarines in dry dock within five kilometers of the boundary of each submarine base. Since ballistic missile submarines in dry dock are exempted from reentry vehicle inspections by subparagraph 13(g) of Section IX of the Inspection Protocol, this limit is designed to prohibit a Party from circumventing the inspection regime by keeping an excessive number of ballistic missile submarines in dry dock.

bbbbbbb Paragraph 7 of Article IV limits ICBMs, SLBMs, heavy bombers, and former heavy bombers that are placed on static display after signature of the Treaty, and the number of heavy and former heavy bombers that are converted to ground trainers after signature of the Treaty. Static displays are essentially museum pieces, while ground trainers are non-flyable aircraft used for training (for example, in weapons loading). Neither term is defined in the Treaty, although procedures for placing items on static display or converting airplanes to ground trainers are provided in Section VIII of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol. Static displays and ground trainers existing at Treaty signature are not included in the limits, but are listed in Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding, to avoid ambiguity with later conversions.

bbbbbbbParagraph 8 of Article IV limits each Party to an aggregate of no more than 50 storage facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs and repair facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs. The numerical limit on ballistic missile storage and repair facilities is to ensure the integrity of quota-based, on-site inspections. If the sides were free to declare an unlimited number of ballistic missile storage sites, there would be no hope that a quota-based inspection regime would provide confidence that non-deployed missile limits were being observed. As of September 1, 1990, neither Party had more than ten such facilities. Storage and repair facilities are listed in Annexes A and B to the Memorandum of Understanding.

bbbbbbbParagraph 9 of Article IV provides a large number of locational and related restrictions on strategic offensive arms. These restrictions are designed to enhance the overall Treaty verification regime by limiting the places where strategic offensive arms are permitted to be located.

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (a) of paragraph 9 first lists the only allowed locations for non-deployed ICBMs and non-deployed SLBMs and specifies that such non-deployed ICBMs and SLBMs may also be in transit. The transit rule allows the non-deployed ICBMs and SLBMs to move between the listed locations. The subparagraph includes three special provisions:

­ Prototype ICBMs and prototype SLBMs (i.e., those which have not yet become accountable) are banned from maintenance facilities of ICBM bases and from submarine bases. This avoids the suspicion that covert deployment has occurred.

­ Non-deployed ICBMs for silo launchers of ICBMs may be transferred within an ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs. This allows for the routine replacement of silo-based missiles (since otherwise there would be no legal way for the replacement missile to move from its authorized location at a maintenance facility to the silo without having to issue a transit notification).

­ Non-deployed SLBMs that are located on missile tenders and storage cranes are considered to be located at the submarine base at which such missile tenders and storage cranes are specified as based, regardless of their actual location. This is a bookkeeping convenience, since such tenders and cranes may be located outside of the base.

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (c) of the Thirty-seventh Agreed Statement provides that the locational restrictions of subparagraph 9(a) of Article IV shall not apply to ICBMs or SLBMs of former or retired types except for ICBMs of retired types of mobile ICBMs.

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (b) of paragraph 9 provides the locational restrictions for non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs. It also permits such launchers to be in transit, so that they can be moved between the permitted locations. As subparagraph (a) does for prototype ICBMs, subparagraph (b) bans mobile launchers of prototype ICBMs from maintenance facilities of ICBM bases for mobile launchers of ICBMs, once again to avoid any implication of unannounced or covert deployment.

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (c) of paragraph 9 provides the locational restriction for test launchers. The basic rule is that test launchers may only be located at test ranges. There is an exception allowing rail-mobile test launchers to conduct movements for the purpose of testing outside a test range. Such movements may be conducted, provided that four requirements are met: first, each such movement must be completed no later than 30 days after it begins; second, each such movement must begin and end at the same test range and must not involve movement to any other facility; third, movements of a total of no more than six rail-mobile launchers may be conducted in each calendar year; and fourth, no more than one train containing no more than three rail-mobile test launchers may be located outside test ranges at any one time. Movements count on a one-per-launcher basis; thus, a train moving three launchers counts as three movements.

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (d) of paragraph 9 provides a special rule for situations where a deployed mobile launcher of ICBMs and its associated missile relocates to a test range. Such a launcher and missile may, at the discretion of the testing Party, either continue to be counted toward the maximum aggregate limits provided for in Article II of this Treaty, or be counted as a mobile test launcher pursuant to paragraph 2(d) of Article IV. In the case where the launcher and missile continue to be counted toward the maximum aggregate limits, they can remain at the test range for an uninterrupted period not to exceed 45 days. Furthermore, a Party may not have more than three such deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles located at a test range at any one time, nor more than three such deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles located at a test range at any one time.

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (e) of paragraph 9 restricts the location of silo training launchers to ICBM bases for silo launchers of ICBMs and training facilities for ICBMs. Subparagraph (e) also limits the number of silo training launchers located at each ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs to one for each type of ICBM specified for that ICBM base.

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (f) of paragraph 9 restricts the basing of test heavy bombers to heavy bomber flight test centers and production facilities for heavy bombers. It also provides that training heavy bombers shall be based only at training facilities for heavy bombers. These restrictions cover permanent basing, and do not preclude visits to other facilities.

bbbbbbbParagraph 10 provides locational restrictions for solid rocket motors, with or without nozzles attached, for first stages of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs. These provisions are designed to aid in assuring that mobile ICBMs or first stages for such ICBMs are not being covertly assembled by limiting the locations where solid rocket motors, with or without nozzles attached, which are essential components of such ICBMs, can legally be located. (Note that paragraph 30 of Article V reaffirms the locational restrictions on solid rocket motors with nozzles attached, which are even closer to being assembled ICBMs, and outlines the limited cases where solid rocket motors with nozzles attached can be removed from the production facility.) The specific locations where solid rocket motors with or without nozzles shall be permitted are listed in paragraphs 5 and 6 of Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding. Solid rocket motors without nozzles attached also may be moved between these locations. None of these locations is subject to declared facility on-site inspection, although production facilities where ICBMs of mobile launchers of ICBMs are assembled are subject to continuous monitoring. Instead, inspections at other locations help to verify the absence of solid rocket motors with or without nozzles attached for first stages of mobile ICBMs at locations where they are not permitted. Detection of a single solid rocket motor with or without nozzles attached at such a location would constitute a violation of the Treaty.

bbbbbbb Paragraph 11 of Article IV sets forth locational restrictions on facilities. (The term facilities" is defined in the Definition Annex.) The bulk of these restrictions are intended to hinder rapid reload by separating non-deployed ICBMs from ICBM launchers.

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (a) requires that specified facilities at which ICBMs of a particular type are located be separated by no less than 100 kilometers from other facilities at which launchers for that particular type of ICBM could be present. For existing facilities, the prohibition is type specific; there is no bar, for example, for storage facilities for ICBM type A" being co-located with launchers for ICBM type B". The Fourteenth Agreed Statement grandfathers two existing Soviet storage facilities for ICBMs located at Khrizolitovyy and Surovatikha, thus allowing these existing facilities to be separated by less than 100 kilometers from deployment areas where ICBMs of the same type are deployed.

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (a) also requires that specified new facilities, including those at which non-deployed ICBMs for silo launchers of ICBMs of any type of ICBM may be located and storage facilities for ICBM emplacement equipment, be separated by no less than 100 kilometers from any ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs. This prohibition is not type specific. There is an exception to this rule, concerning existing storage facilities that had previously been used for intermediate-range missiles. (These missiles have now been eliminated pursuant to the INF Treaty.) Such facilities that are located less than 100 kilometers from an ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs or from a test range, may be converted into storage facilities for ICBMs not specified for that ICBM base or that test range.

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (b) of paragraph 11 stipulates additional locational restrictions that are applicable to specified facilities for mobile launchers of ICBMs. It requires that specified facilities, including production facilities, repair facilities, and storage facilities, for mobile launchers of ICBMs of each particular type, be separated by no less than 100 kilometers from any ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs of that type of ICBM and any test range from which ICBMs of that type are flight-tested.

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (c) of paragraph 11 requires that test ranges and space launch facilities be separated by no less than 100 kilometers from ICBM bases and deployment areas. This provision is intended to constrain rapid reload. It is needed since a significant number of ICBMs (i.e., potential reloads) can legally be present at test ranges or space launch facilities. By separating these test ranges and space launch facilities from ICBM bases, these potential reloads are separated from the launchers at the ICBM bases. Without this rule, the utility of numerical limits on non-deployed ICBMs at ICBM bases would be severely undercut.

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (d) of paragraph 11 requires that training facilities for ICBMs be separated by no less than 100 kilometers from any test range. This provision restricts the ability to use the 40 non-deployed mobile ICBM launchers allowed at training facilities to launch the ICBMs that are allowed at test ranges. (The 40-launcher limit is in subparagraph 2(c) of Article IV.) The Fifteenth Agreed Statement provides an exception to this locational restriction for the existing training facility for ICBMs at Plesetsk, in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, allowing it to be located less than 100 kilometers from an existing test range.

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (e) of paragraph 11 requires that storage areas for heavy bomber nuclear armaments and storage areas for long-range nuclear ALCMs be separated by no less than 100 kilometers from air bases of various categories. Neither storage areas for heavy bomber nuclear armaments nor storage areas for long-range nuclear ALCMs are listed in the Memorandum of Understanding. This provision has little practical effect and was included at Soviet insistence for parallelism with the restrictions on ICBMs. Note that the restrictions on storage areas for heavy bomber nuclear armaments" would not preclude nuclear weapons for other strategic or tactical systems from being stored within the 100 kilometers specified. There is no specific provision in the Treaty for verification of this restriction.

bbbbbbbThe final paragraph of Article IV, paragraph 12, sets a time limit of 30 days for transits between permitted locations. Transit" is a defined term in the Definitions Annex and refers to one-way movement of non-deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, launch canisters, or mobile launchers of ICBMs.

ARTICLE V

bbbbbbb Article V of the Treaty sets forth the activities and systems that are prohibited by the Treaty. By adhering to these prohibitions, the Parties will channel their future modernization and replacement of strategic offensive arms in more stabilizing and predictable directions.

bbbbbbbParagraph 1 of Article V provides the important general rule that, except as prohibited by the provisions of the Treaty, modernization and replacement of strategic offensive arms may be carried out. This rule is closely based on provisions in earlier arms control agreements. It reflects the standard principle that activities which are not specifically prohibited by the provisions of a treaty are allowed.

bbbbbbbParagraph 2 of Article V sets forth prohibitions in regard to heavy ICBMs or SLBMs. Such ICBMs or SLBMs are defined in the Definitions Annex as those with a launch weight exceeding 106,000 kilograms or a throw-weight exceeding 4350 kilograms; both values are based on the Soviet data for the SS-19 ICBM as listed in the Memorandum of Understanding. Subparagraphs (a) through (d) ban: new types of heavy ICBMs; increases in the launch weight or throw-weight of existing heavy ICBMs (i.e., of the Soviet SS-18, the only existing heavy ICBM); heavy SLBMs; mobile launchers of heavy ICBMs; or additional silo launchers of heavy ICBMs, except for certain permitted replacements.

bbbbbbbThe Fifth Agreed Statement further clarifies that the replacement of silo launchers pursuant to this subparagraph can only be done in the case that launchers are destroyed by accident or in the case of other extraordinary circumstances. In a December 6, 1990, letter from Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and Defense Minister Yazov, it was explained that such extraordinary circumstances could be in particular due to the internal political processes taking place in our country." The Soviet Foreign Minister subsequently communicated with the U.S. Secretary of State again on December 30, 1990, in a letter addressing a series of issues that had arisen out of the Houston Ministerial of December 1990. In that letter, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze reconfirmed the conditions of new heavy ICBM silo construction. Specifically, he reconfirmed that construction of new heavy ICBM silos could be undertaken only to replace heavy ICBM silo launchers destroyed in an accident or to relocate such launchers threatened by internal political emergencies. Consequently, the Soviet Foreign Minister concluded that the replacement of heavy ICBM silo launchers did not include the possibility of extensive new silo construction.

bbbbbbbAdditional prohibitions in subparagraphs (e)-(g) include a prohibition on converting launchers that are not launchers of heavy ICBMs into launchers of heavy ICBMs; a ban on launchers of heavy SLBMs; and a ban on reducing the ten warheads attributed to the SS-18 existing heavy ICBM. Note that the letter exchanged by the Heads of Delegation on the phased reduction of heavy ICBMs provides a related prohibition by banning the Soviet Union from reducing their heavy ICBMs and their associated launchers to the limits of 154 through conversion; rather, such reductions must be accomplished by means of launcher elimination procedures specified in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol. After the central limit on heavy ICBMs and their associated launchers is reached, any additional heavy ICBM launcher reductions may be by either elimination or conversion.

bbbbbbb Paragraph 3 of Article V bans deployment modes for ICBMs other than in silos, on road-mobile launchers or on rail-mobile launchers. It also bans the production, testing, or deployment of ICBM launchers other than silo launchers, road-mobile launchers or rail-mobile launchers. This means that movable" ICBM systems other than road-and rail-mobile systems are prohibited, such as systems involving moving an ICBM in a launch canister between a number of vertical emplacement holes. Soft-site launchers also are banned by paragraph 9 of Article V at locations other than test ranges and space launch facilities. The Nineteenth Agreed Statement provides that mobile space launchers and space launch boosters associated with such launchers would be allowed provided that a variety of conditions are met; such boosters would not be considered ICBMs and would not be prohibited by paragraph 3 regardless of their basing mode.

bbbbbbbParagraph 4 of Article V prohibits deploying an ICBM on a mobile launcher of ICBMs if the ICBM was not declared as a type of ICBM for mobile launchers in accordance with paragraph 2 of Section VII of the Notification Protocol. This provision is necessary since the notification cited triggers the right to establish perimeter and portal continuous monitoring, necessary to verify the limits on non-deployed mobile ICBMs given in paragraph 1 of Article IV. Consistent with the view that single-warhead systems represent a lesser threat, the paragraph provides an exception allowing rebasing of such single-warhead systems, but only if the Parties agree to do so within the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. Therefore, a Party has a veto right over such redeployment by the other Party if it cares to exercise it.

bbbbbbbParagraph 4 also provides that a new type of ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs may cease to be considered to be a type of ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs if no ICBM of that type has been contained on, or flight-tested from, a mobile launcher of ICBMs. This provision means, for example, that if the United States initially declares the new Small ICBM to be an ICBM for mobile launchers of a new type in order to protect our option to base it as a mobile ICBM, and if we subsequently decide not to base it as a mobile ICBM, then the United States would have the right to cease treating the Small ICBM as a mobile ICBM for Treaty purposes, provided that no ICBM of that type has been contained on, or flight-tested from, a mobile launcher. This provision applies only to new types; thus, it does not apply to the U.S. Peacekeeper ICBM, which is considered to be an existing type of mobile ICBM.

bbbbbbbParagraph 5 of Article V bans deployment of ICBM launchers of a new type of ICBM, and SLBM launchers of a new type of SLBM, if such launchers are capable of launching ICBMs or SLBMs, respectively, of other types. It also provides that ICBM launchers of existing types of ICBMs, and SLBM launchers of existing types of SLBMs, shall be incapable, without conversion, of launching ICBMs or SLBMs