Tracking Number:  147065

Title:  "US Seeks Successful Outcome at NPT Talks in Geneva." Portions of State Department official Richard Clarke's testimony before a House Foreign Affairs subcommittee. (900712)

Date:  19900712


07/12/90 1Ac Tx U.S. SEEKS SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME AT NPT TALKS IN GENEVA (Excerpts: Clarke Senate testimony) (2950)

Washington -- The United States will make a "major effort to ensure a successful outcome" at the review conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty next month in Geneva, says Richard Clarke, assistant secretary of state for politico-military affairs.

Meanwhile the United States is working hard to deter the spread of missiles, chemical and biological weapons and nuclear weapons, said Clarke in outlining those efforts July 11 in testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Security and Science.

"The growing number of countries working to acquire" these weapons "has become an increasingly serious threat over the past few years," he warned, adding the Bush administration "has devoted a considerable amount of time, energy and resources" to combatting their spread.

"We are especially pleased that over the past two years three states in the critical Middle East region -- Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait -- have joined the treaty," he added.

Following are excerpts from Clarke's statement to the subcommittee as prepared for delivery:

(begin excerpts)

The growing number of countries working to acquire or develop nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, and missile capabilities, has become an increasingly serious threat over the past few years. This administration has devoted a considerable amount of time, energy, and resources to combatting proliferation, and I welcome the chance to share with you my thoughts on how our efforts are progressing.

Today, some 14 countries possess a ballistic missile capability, including three with indigenously produced systems, and this number is growing. About 20 countries are pursuing offensive chemical weapons programs. About 10 countries have biological weapons programs. In addition to the declared nuclear weapon states, there are a few non-NPT parties that have the capacity to rapidly deploy nuclear weapons.

GE 2 POL406

Missile Proliferation

First, I wish to discuss specific countries of concern. Iraq's inflammatory remarks about its willingness to use chemical weapons against Israel have been underlined by its continued development of missile delivery systems. Iraq showed its readiness to use missiles against civilian populations during the Iran-Iraq war. On December 5, 1989, the Iraqi test launch of a large space launch vehicle (SLV) showed that it is making progress in developing missiles much larger than any we have seen there previously. Although we do not expect Iraq to have a large number of highly capable rockets any time soon, Iraq's rocket development program remains a concern to us. In addition, Iraq has begun to deploy variants of the Scud missile at sites which enable it to reach Israel. Therefore, it is clear that missiles figure prominently in Iraqi military strategy.

We have also noted an intensive Iraqi effort to procure missiles and missile equipment and technology. The most well-known example is the Condor II. We have had some success in hindering the Condor's development in the other countries involved, Argentina and Egypt, but the Iraqis continue to pursue it. In addition, the Iraqis continue to pursue an indigenous capability based on the less sophisticated, but proven, Soviet-designed Scud missile. We believe the Soviets are now acting more responsibly regarding Scud exports. Therefore, the Iraqis are looking to other suppliers to help them develop an indigenous capability for Scuds and Scud-derived missiles, such as the Al-Abbas and the Al-Husayn.

Although the Iraqis have taken center stage with their missile efforts, almost every country in the Middle East has some missile capability. Many of them are seeking to buy new missiles or to obtain foreign help in developing their own. One of the most disturbing reports was that China was preparing to sell M-9 missiles to Syria. As you know, the Chinese have publicly stated that they have no plans to do so. We were pleased with the Chinese statement, but we continue to press China for more specific assurances on other countries, other missiles, and missile technology.

In Asia, a disturbing development has been the emergence of North Korea as a missile supplier. The North Koreans appear willing to sell Scud-based missiles to anyone who can pay for them.

In South Asia, the efforts of both India and Pakistan to develop missiles remain disturbing. The Indian program is more advanced, having test fired the medium range Agni missile once and the short range Prithvi twice. We have had extensive discussions to discourage both sides from

GE 3 POL406 continuing to develop missiles -- a potentially destabilizing weapons systems -- in the region.

In other parts of the world, missile developments are less immediately threatening. In Latin America, for example, our main concern is that missiles developed there might be sold to the Middle East. I earlier mentioned Iraq's interest in the Condor II missile, about which we have had many discussions with Argentina. The Brazilian press has reported the possible involvement of Brazilian nationals in the Iraqi missile program, and the Brazilian government has indicated that it is investigating the situation.

The administration views these developments with serious concern and has taken positive steps to slow missile proliferation. The United States has strengthened its internal procedures to review export cases involving missile technology.

We have worked closely with the Intelligence Community to identify missile procurement efforts in other supplier countries. So far this year, we have made about ten demarches to other countries regarding missile procurement activities. These demarches have gone not only to our MTCR partners, but to other nations sympathetic to our missile nonproliferation efforts. This information has been useful in thwarting procurement efforts, and we have often received additional information in return.

Prime Minister Deputy Assistant Secretary for nonproliferation affairs, Elizabeth Verville, recently completed a trip through Eastern Europe to bring the nonproliferation issue to the attention of the new governments there. In Hungary, Yugoslavia, Romania, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, she met with a uniformly favorable reception. All of the governments stated that they shared our concerns about proliferation, and all indicated a desire to control it. Of course there are differences among the countries in the level of their knowledge of the subject and in the state of their export control systems. But we are encouraged by the constructive attitude towards non-proliferation taken by these governments, and plan to continue a dialogue with them to ensure that they do not contribute to proliferation.

At the top of our agenda for the future are:

-- assuring that envisaged changes in COCOM regulations do not weaken U.S. and MTCR partners' export controls on missile technology items;

-- bringing all of the EC countries and other nations seriously interested in missile non-proliferation into the MTCR;

GE 4 POL406 -- formalizing and improving Soviet and other countries' observance of MTCR guidelines, and,

-- strengthening our own and our MTCR partners' controls and enforcement efforts on missile technology exports.


Multilateral Ban

The best long-term solution to the production, stockpiling, and use of CW is the conclusion of an effective global ban. We are working hard at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva under our experienced and able Ambassador, Stephen Ledogar, to create a treaty text that will address the complex issues involved in a total ban of CW. The hardest issue of all is to establish an effective verification system. It will involve unusually intrusive inspection measures -- the dual-use nature of toxic chemicals, which are easily concealable, requires such measures. President Bush has given us marching orders. We will do everything possible to achieve a Chemical Weapons Convention.

But concluding a Convention is just the first step. We must get all the essential states, those that either have CW programs or might develop them in the future, to sign onto and live up to the Convention. In order to assure this result we are urging that all states follow the lead of the United States and the Soviet Union in declaring now that they intend to be original parties to the Convention. All of the NATO states made a similar declaration at the June 8 meeting of the North Atlantic Council. Another inducement to global adherence to the Convention is the U.S. and Soviet proposal that in the eighth year after the Convention goes into effect we will hold a meeting of states party to decide whether all essential states have joined.

Bilateral Efforts

We intend to continue our bilateral cooperation with the Soviet Union both in supporting the Geneva negotiations and in the nonproliferation area. Expert-level talks with the Soviets are planned for August and October.

Multilateral Efforts

In addition to the major multilateral task of achieving a treaty at Geneva, our primary mechanism for stemming the

GE 5 POL406 proliferation of chemical weapons is the Australia Group, an informal organization of twenty industrialized countries (EC countries plus the United States, Norway, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Austria, and Switzerland). At last month's meeting in Paris we secured agreement to control additional chemicals, expand the group's activities into biological weapons non-proliferation, pursue further standardization, and create an export data base. Under the energetic chairmanship of Australia, the group has played a large role in getting member states to stop shipments of CW precursors to Libya, Syria, Iraq and Iran.

Unilateral Efforts

The United States currently controls nine chemical precursors on a worldwide basis, and an additional 41 are controlled to Syria, Libya, Iraq and Iran. Of course actual chemical weapons themselves are strictly controlled under the Arms Export Control Act. We do not export CW.

Currently we are reviewing our export controls to determine how to expand their effectiveness. There is something I wish to particularly stress here. All of our efforts in combatting CW proliferation have been greatly helped by the enthusiastic cooperation of the U.S. chemical industry. Both in promoting a treaty and in devising effective export controls, the industry is on our side. We continually consult with them. Just last week representatives of the U.S. Chemical Manufacturers Association met with their counterparts from around the world in Geneva to discuss the latest text of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Despite the fact that the treaty will impose certain onerous burdens on them, the U.S. chemical manufacturers are in the very front rank in supporting a strong and verifiable treaty.

Biological Weapons (BW)

Biological weapons differ from CW in that there is already a treaty in existence which outlaws them. The United States destroyed its BW a long time ago. However, the unfortunate fact is that a number of countries are in violation of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) of 1972. We have detailed these countries in classified hearings.

One way to stop illegal and dangerous BW programs is to build confidence in the 1972 Convention, and encourage more states to become parties. We have been holding consultations with key allies in anticipation of next year's review conference of the BWC. We have also discussed the matter with the Soviets, but we have insisted

GE 6 POL406 that the Soviets satisfy our serious concern about their own compliance with the BWC before we proceed to discuss strengthening the convention.

While we look at the BWC, we are doing everything we can to stem BW proliferation. At last month's meeting of the Australia Group we secured agreement by all countries to send out advisories to all their companies which could export biological substances and equipment capable of helping make BW agents. We advised them to be particularly alert if orders appear to come from Iraq, Iran, Libya or Syria. In addition to the warning advisory, we are examining the feasibility of instituting additional export controls on BW-related items.

(The) United States has also passed implementing legislation giving effect to the BWC in domestic law. It would impose criminal penalties on those who knowingly contribute to BW proliferation. We would urge other states who have not done so to follow suit.


Our concern about preventing nuclear proliferation can be seen today in a highly developed international system of nuclear non-proliferation instruments, institutions and controls.

Foremost among the legal instruments that underpin this system is the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) with 140 parties, and for which we continue to seek universal participation. Supplementing and complementing it is the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), which provides the basis for a nuclear weapons free zone in the region.

The international nuclear non-proliferation regime stands as an example not only of the challenges that must be faced in assuring against the misuse for weapons purposes of an advanced technology, but also of the success that is possible. This is not to suggest that there is any room for complacency in the nuclear area. Certainly there are countries and regions that continue to cause us serious concern. The continuing risk of a South Asian nuclear arms race is extremely troubling, and the recent tensions over Kashmir have once again highlighted both the volatility of the region and the exceptional dangers that nuclear arms would introduce into the existing situation. North Korea's continuing refusal to fulfill its NPT obligation to conclude the requisite safeguards agreement with the IAEA is disturbing. Actions by certain Middle Eastern countries which have recently called into question their solemn NPT commitments, and the refusal of other countries to sign the NPT, are likewise profoundly disturbing. These are all

GE 7 POL406 problems that require serious attention, and we have been and will continue to be very active in seeking ways to deal with them.

We are convinced that one key to ensuring the continued vitality of the nuclear-nonproliferation regime is to maintain the highest possible level of cooperation with other countries on this issue. We think it important to have close and regular bilateral consultations on matters of non-proliferation concern, and, in support of our non- proliferation goals, to solidify the U.S. reputation as a consistent, predictable, reliable partner in legitimate peaceful nuclear cooperation under appropriate safeguards.

To give practical meaning to this approach, in addition to our frequent working-level contacts with many governments, we have held formal nuclear non-proliferation bilateral discussions with over a dozen different countries in the first half of this year alone. Some of these countries -- Belgium, Canada, France, the FRG, Italy, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the USSR -- have long played established roles in the regime. Others, like China, Spain, Argentina and Brazil, are just now emerging as potential nuclear suppliers. We are encouraging the latter two nations to give formal solemn expression to their professed peaceful nuclear intentions by adhering to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and, as new suppliers, to follow internationally-accepted norms of responsible nuclear export behavior. Still others -- Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland -- have long been firmly committed to nuclear non-proliferation goals and are parties to the NPT, but are only now beginning to speak with authentically independent voices on this as on other international matters. To help draw them further into the mainstream of nuclear non-proliferation activities, as well as to create a necessary legal framework for significant peaceful nuclear commerce with the United States, we have offered to negotiate individual agreements for peaceful nuclear cooperation with them consistent with the Atomic Energy Act. Their initial responses have been positive and we hope to have agreements in place in the coming months.

Secondly, we believe that perhaps the most important near- term step for strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime would be for nuclear supplier states to adopt a common policy of requiring full-scope IAEA safeguards as a condition for significant new peaceful nuclear supply to non-nuclear-weapon states. Full-scope safeguards are safeguards on all nuclear activities in a country, not just on the particular nuclear item being exported, a requirement already applied routinely by virtually all nuclear suppliers. The United States, by law and policy, already imposes a full-scope safeguards export requirement, as do Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Sweden. We were extremely pleased when Japan, a major supplier, declared last fall that it too would take this approach. We have long urged all suppliers to take this

GE 8 POL406 step, and we plan to continue our efforts at persuading those that have not yet done so.

Another important concern is the future vitality of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Next month the parties to the Treaty will gather in Geneva at a conference -- the fourth of its kind since 1975 -- to review the Treaty. We will be making a major effort to ensure a successful outcome to the Review Conference. We will, of course, continue to urge all states that are not yet party to the Treaty to join it. We are especially pleased that over the past two years three states in the critical Middle East region -- Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Kuwait -- have joined the treaty. Recently we have concentrated particular efforts on South Africa, whose adherence to the Treaty would greatly strengthen the non-proliferation regime.

A final area of emphasis in the nuclear field is strengthening the existing system of nuclear non- proliferation export controls, on both the national and multilateral level. For some years we have been engaged in a major effort to upgrade multilateral controls for the so- called sensitive technologies that can provide direct access to fissionable material. These efforts have taken place in the NPT Exporters Committee (also known as the Zangger Committee). We have also conducted many rounds of consultations with other governments on the problem of "dual use" exports, those items that can be used both for industrial purposes or for nuclear explosives development. We shall continue to work with other concerned nations to assure that technological progress does not translate into a greater risk of nuclear weapons spread.

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