1995 Review and Extension Conference
of the Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

28 March 1995

New York, 17 April-12 May 1995


On behalf of His Excellency Mr. László Kovács, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Hungary, Chairman-in-Office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, I have the honour to transmit herewith an excerpt from the Budapest Summit Declaration adopted on 6 December 1994 by the Heads of State and Government of the States participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (annex I), as well as the full text of chapter VI of the document of the Budapest Summit, entitled "Principles Governing Non-Proliferation" (annex II).

It would be highly appreciated if you could arrange to have the present letter and its annexes issued as an official document of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

(Signed) István NÁTHON
Ambassador Permanent Representative

Annex I


Towards a Genuine Partnership in a New Era

1. We, the Heads of State or Government of the States participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, have met in Budapest to assess together the recent past, to consider the present and to look to the future. We do so as we approach the Fiftieth Anniversary of the end of World War II and the Twentieth Anniversary of the signing of the Helsinki Final Act, and as we commemorate the Fifth Anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall.

2. We believe in the central role of the CSCE in building a secure and stable CSCE community, whole and free. We reaffirm the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and subsequent CSCE documents. They reflect shared values which will guide our policies, individually and collectively, in all organizations and institutions to which we belong.

3. The CSCE is the security structure embracing States from Vancouver to Vladivostok. We are determined to give a new political impetus to the CSCE, thus enabling it to play a cardinal role in meeting the challenges of the twenty-first century. To reflect this determination, the CSCE will henceforth be known as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

4. The CSCE has been instrumental in overcoming barriers and in managing change throughout our region. Since we last met, there have been further encouraging developments. Most vestiges of the Cold War have disappeared. Free elections have been held and the roots of democracy have spread and struck deeper. Yet the path to stable democracy, efficient market economy and social justice is a hard one.

5. The spread of freedoms has been accompanied by new conflicts and the revival of old ones. Warfare in the CSCE region to achieve hegemony and territorial expansion continues to occur. Human rights and fundamental freedoms are still flouted, intolerance persists and discrimination against minorities is practised. The plagues of aggressive nationalism, racism, chauvinism, xenophobia, anti-semitism and ethnic tension are still widespread. Along with social and economic instability, they are among the main sources of crisis, loss of life and human misery. They reflect failure to apply the CSCE principles and commitments. This situation requires our resolute action. We must work together to ensure full respect for these principles and commitments as well as effective solidarity and cooperation to relieve suffering.


12. In view of the new threats posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, we have agreed on basic principles to guide our national policies in support of common non-proliferation objectives. We are strongly committed to the full implementation and indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. We welcome the recent statements by the four nuclear-weapon States in the CSCE region relating to nuclear testing as being consistent with negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty. We urge that all signatories to the Convention on the Prohibition of Development, Production, Stockpiling or Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction complete the ratification process in the shortest possible time. We also underline the importance of an early entry into force and implementation of the Treaty on Open Skies.

Annex II



The participating States recall that in Prague on 30 January 1992 they reiterated their commitment to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and to control the spread of missile technology. They also recall their declaration in the Helsinki Document of 10 July 1992 to take further steps to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and to intensify cooperation on a non-discriminatory and equitable basis in the field of effective export controls applicable to nuclear materials, and other sensitive goods and technologies as well as conventional arms.


The participating States strongly believe that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and missiles to deliver them, poses a threat to international peace, security and stability and hereby affirm their commitment:

- to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons;

- to prevent the acquisition, development, production, stockpiling, and use of chemical and biological weapons;

- to control the transfer of missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction and their components and technology.


In order to promote international peace, security and stability, the participating States undertake to enhance and strengthen existing norms against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. They seek to do so through the use of an entire range of measures available to address the proliferation issues, as well as through the broadest possible multilateral support. Therefore the participating States will:


- implement fully all their existing undertakings in the field of nuclear disarmament and arms control;

- endorse and encourage universal adherence to the NPT; in particular, the participating States that are still not parties to the NPT reiterate their pledge to accede to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States in the shortest time possible;

- agree that the NPT should be indefinitely and unconditionally extended;

- bring into force full-scope IAEA safeguards agreements as required by the NPT, including the right of the IAEA to conduct special inspections, thus strengthening the verification regime;

- support efforts to strengthen and streamline IAEA safeguards, in particular with a view to enhancing the Agency's capabilities to better detect clandestine nuclear weapons programmes;

- improve national nuclear export control policies by supporting and, where possible, strengthening the guidelines of the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, including the latter's controls on dual-use items;

- welcome the recent statements of France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States of America relating to nuclear testing and are convinced that these statements are consistent with the negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty and support negotiation in the Conference on Disarmament of a universal and effectively verifiable Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, as agreed by the Conference on Disarmament on 10 August 1993;

- support efforts for negotiating as soon as possible, in the Conference on Disarmament, a non-discriminatory, internationally and effectively verifiable multilateral treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.

Chemical and Biological

- adhere to the 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibiting the use in war of chemical and biological weapons (CBW);

- adhere to, and join efforts to strengthen, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), inter alia, by participating in the Ad Hoc Group established by the BTWC Special Conference 19-30 September 1994, to consider appropriate potential verification measures in order to develop a legally-binding regime to promote compliance with the Convention;

- pursue the achievement of universal adherence to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and participate in the work of the Preparatory Commission; in particular, the participating States that have not yet done so reiterate their pledge to sign and to seek early ratification of the Convention so that it may enter into force as soon as possible;

- review progress in this regard at the next Ministerial Council;

- support controls as agreed, in particular, in the Australia group, and introduce effective licensing and enforcement procedures covering the chemical weapons precursors lists within the existing control regimes, CW-related dual-use equipment, BW-relevant pathogens and BW-related dual-use equipment.

Missile Technology

- support the guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), undertake to control the export of missiles, technology and equipment in accordance with the guidelines and annex and encourage efforts with a view to interested participating States becoming adherents to the MTCR.


Furthermore each participating State will:

- take appropriate action to reflect the commitments in Section II in its legislation, regulations and procedures governing the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles capable of delivering them, relevant technology and expertise;

- promote international cooperative efforts to provide opportunities for weapons scientists and engineers to redirect their talents to peaceful endeavours, including through available institutional means;

- exchange information, inter alia, in the context of security dialogue within the Forum for Security Cooperation (including through seminars and working parties) about national laws, regulations and practical measures for ensuring application and implementation of non-proliferation regimes;

- take all appropriate action to prevent, within their constitutional and legislative means, their nationals from engaging in activities that do not conform to these principles concerning the non-proliferation of all types of weapons of mass destruction.