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25 March 1957
The Treaty formally establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) is signed in Rome.29 July 1957
The Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), opened for signature on 26 October 1956, comes into force. The Agency is established to facilitate the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, while ensuring that the assistance the Agency provides will not be used for military purposes.
20 November 1959
On the initiative of Ireland, the UN General Assembly adopts resolution 1380 (XIV), by which it suggests that the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee consider the feasibility of an international agreement by which the nuclear-weapon Powers would not hand over control of those weapons to other Powers, and non-nuclear-weapon States would not manufacture such weapons.1 December 1959
The Antarctic Treaty is signed in Washington, stipulating that Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only. It prohibits any measures of a military nature, including the testing of any type of weapons.
20 December 1960
On the initiative of Ireland, the General Assembly adopts resolution 1576 (XV), by which it calls upon both nuclear- and non-nuclear-weapon States, pending agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons, to refrain, as a temporary and voluntary measure, from acts that would lead to further proliferation.
The IAEA establishes its first safeguards system.
4 December 1961
On the initiative of Sweden, the General Assembly adopts resolution 1664 (XVI), by which it requests the Secretary-General to inquire under what conditions States not possessing nuclear weapons would be willing to undertake not to acquire them. Upon the initiative of Ireland, the General Assembly adopts, without a vote, resolution 1665 (XVI), by which it calls upon the nuclear-weapon States in particular to endeavour to conclude an international agreement on non-dissemination of nuclear weapons and upon all States to cooperate for this purpose.
5 August 1963
The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water (the Partial Test-Ban Treaty) is signed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America. On 8 August, it is opened for signature in Moscow, London and Washington.
17 August 1965 — DRAFT NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY
The United States submits a draft nuclear non-proliferation treaty to the United Nations Disarmament Committee. The draft would ban the transfer of nuclear weapons by any nuclear weapon state (NWS) to any non-nuclear-weapon state (NNWS). The NNWS would agree to apply International Atomic Energy Agency or equivalent safeguards to their peaceful nuclear activities.
24 September 1965
The USSR submits to the General Assembly a draft treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.
19 November 1965
On the initiative of eight non-aligned States, the General Assembly adopts resolution 2028 (XX), which contains five principles on which negotiation of a non-prolifer-ation treaty is to be based.
The General Assembly adopts two resolutions on non-proliferation: resolution 2149 (XXI), by which it appeals to all States, pending conclusion of a nuclear non-proliferation treaty, to renounce actions that might hamper agreement on such a treaty, and resolution 2153 A (XXI), in which it calls upon the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to give priority to the question of non-proliferation and also to consider the question of assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States.
27 January 1967
The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (the Outer Space Treaty) is opened for signature (A/RES/2222 (XI), annex). The Treaty prohibits the placing of nuclear weapons or any other weapons of mass destruction in outer space, stipulating that that environment shall be used exclusively for peaceful purposes.
14 February 1967 — TREATY OF TLATELOLCO
The Treaty of Tlatelolco is signed prohibiting nuclear weapons in Latin America. The United States signs Protocol I of the treaty -- which applies denuclearization to U.S. territories in the zone -- in 1977 and ratifies it in 1981. The United States signs Protocol II of the treaty -- to respect the denuclearized status of the zone and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the parties to the treaty -- in 1968 and ratifies it in 1971.
24 AUGUST 1967 — U.S. AND SOVIET DRAFT TREATIES
The United States and the Soviet Union submit separate but identical texts of a draft treaty on nuclear non- proliferation for extensive debate in the United Nations.
19 December 1967
The General Assembly adopts resolution 2346 A (XXII), in which it requests the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to present it with a full report on the negotiations on a non-proliferation treaty on or before 15 March 1968.
1 JANUARY 1968 — JOINT U.S.-SOVIET DRAFT TREATY
The United States and the Soviet Union submit a joint draft treaty on nuclear non-proliferation to the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference (ENDC).
1 January 1968
The Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) enters into force.
January — March 1968
The Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament examines further revisions of the draft treaty texts submitted by the USSR and the United States, which incorporate some of the suggestions of the non-nuclear-weapon States, and submits another revision to the General Assembly at its resumed twenty-second session.
1 APRIL 1968 — TREATY OF TLATELOLCO: U.S. SIGNS PROTOCOL II
The United States signs Protocol II to the 1967 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco). Under Protocol II the United States agrees to respect the provisions of the treaty which establish a Latin American nuclear weapon free zone.
12 June 1968
After further revision -- concerning mainly the preamble and articles IV and V -- the General Assembly commends the draft text of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which is annexed to Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII).
19 June 1968
The UN Security Council adopts resolution 255 (1968) on security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States.
1 JULY 1968 — NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT)
The United States, United Kingdom, Soviet Union and 59 other countries sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Treaty has three primary goals: preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons; facilitating international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards; and encouraging negotiations on nuclear arms control.
On July 9, President Lyndon Johnson submits the Treaty to the U.S. Senate for its advice and consent for ratification. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia slows ratification of the Treaty until President Richard Nixon asks for Senate agreement in February 1969. The President ratifies the Treaty in November 1969.
16 September 1968
The IAEA revises its safeguards system with further additional provisions for safeguarded nuclear material in conversion plants and fabrication plants.
5 MARCH 1970 — NPT BROUGHT INTO FORCE
The United States and the Soviet Union deposit their instruments of ratification, bringing the NPT into force.
11 February 1971
The Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof (the Sea-Bed Treaty) is opened for signature.
26 May 1972
The United States and the USSR sign two agreements to halt the growth in their strategic arms: the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty) and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. These agreements are referred to as SALT I.
3 July 1974
The United States and the USSR sign the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests (the Threshold Test-Ban Treaty).
3 September 1974 — ZANGGER COMMITTEE
From 1971 to 1974, a group of 15 states, including the United States, holds a series of informal meetings in Vienna chaired by Professor Claude Zangger of Switzerland. The group, which comes to be known as the Zangger Committee, represents the first major international effort to develop export controls on nuclear materials. On August 14, 1974, the committee publishes two separate memorandums that establish export guidelines, including a "trigger list" of controlled items -- so called because their export triggers safeguards. These items consist of material, equipment, and facilities that, if diverted from peaceful uses, could contribute to a nuclear program. Each member of the committee then writes identical letters to the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, indicating each state's intention to abide by the export controls and asking the agency to make the decisions public. The IAEA accordingly publishes the memorandums and letters as IAEA document INFCIRC/209 dated September 3, 1974.
6 MAY 1975 — PRESIDENT FORD'S MESSAGE TO NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE
In a message to the NPT Review Conference, President Gerald Ford says he hopes the conference will:
-- Convey the importance of non-proliferation to the security of all nations;
-- Promote international cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy while insuring that it not be misused as a means of mass destruction;
-- Encourage the further development and wider application of effective safeguards and physical security measures for nuclear materials and facilities; and
-- Review the considerable progress that has been made in arms control and disarmament since the treaty was signed and promote efforts to build on what has been achieved.
5—30 MAY 1975 — FIRST NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE
The First NPT Review Conference, as called for by the Treaty, is held in Geneva. By the time of the First Review Conference the NPT had 91 parties. From the outset, different views were expressed on the objectives of the Conference, the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty and the ways and means of strengthening it.
The three NWS that were parties to the NPT at the time (Soviet Union, United States, United Kingdom) and most other Eastern and Western bloc countries felt that the principal purpose of the Conference was to strengthen the Treaty through universality and strengthened safeguards. While most non-aligned and neutral countries acknowledged the vital importance of a greater number of adherents, they held that the main objective of the Conference was to conduct a critical examination of the Treaty’s operation, determine whether all its provisions were being realized, and adopt measures to remedy its shortcomings. In this context, many NNWS voiced their dissatisfaction with what they regarded as the one-sided implementation of the Treaty. They contended that emphasis had been placed heavily on their obligations, while scant attention had been paid to their rights or to the obligations of the NWS. This opinion was reflected in the discussions on nuclear disarmament, security assurances to NNWS, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
Particularly controversial was the question of whether the NWS had sufficiently met their obligations under article VI to negotiate in good faith effective measures to halt the nuclear-arms race and achieve nuclear disarmament. Both the Soviet Union and the United States maintained that the two agreements to limit offensive and defensive strategic weapons, reached in the first stage of the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT I), represented considerable progress towards the implementation of article VI.
In the debate on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, several NNWS asserted that the safeguards provided for in article III placed them at a disadvantage in comparison with States that were not parties, as the latter could import nuclear materials and equipment without having to submit all their peaceful activities to IAEA safeguards.
However, despite the controversial issues, the parties to the Treaty were able to agree on a Final Declaration. The Declaration reaffirmed the strong support of the parties for the Treaty and reflected their agreement that the provisions relating to the fundamental objective of averting the further spread of nuclear weapons had been faithfully observed by all parties. With regard to article VI, the Conference, while welcoming the various arms limitation agreements concluded since 1970, expressed its serious concern that the arms race, in particular the nuclear-arms race, had continued unabated. It therefore urged resolute efforts by each party, in particular the NWS, to achieve an early and effective implementation of article VI. While welcoming the increase in the number of parties, the Conference noted with concern that the Treaty had not yet achieved universal adherence.
28 May 1976
The United States and the USSR sign the Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes (the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty).
28 OCTOBER 1976 — PRESIDENT FORD ANNOUNCES MAJOR NEW CONTROL INITIATIVES
President Ford announces new initiatives to strengthen international controls. The actions and proposals are aimed at:
-- Strengthening the commitment of nations of the world to the goal of non-proliferation and building an effective system of international controls to prevent proliferation;
-- Changing and strengthening U.S. domestic nuclear policies and programs to support U.S. non-proliferation goals, and;
-- Establishing, by these actions, a sound foundation for the continued and increased use of nuclear energy in the United States and in the world in a safe and economic manner.
27 APRIL 1977 — PRESIDENT CARTER PROPOSES NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION ACT (NNPA)
President Jimmy Carter submits to Congress a proposed Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA). The NNPA defines a number of specific conditions for U.S. nuclear export, in particular, that the importing country have all of its nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards (called full-scope or comprehensive safeguards).
26 MAY 1977 — TREATY OF TLATELOLCO: U.S. SIGNS PROTOCOL I
The United States signs Protocol I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which prohibits nuclear weapons in Latin America and strengthens the principle of nuclear non- proliferation. Under its provisions, the U.S. pledges not to test, use, produce or deploy nuclear weapons anywhere within the zone of the Latin American treaty.
21 September 1977
Fifteen nuclear supplier countries, known as the Nuclear Suppliers Group or the London Club, reach agreement in London on a set of principles and guidelines to govern the transfer of nuclear materials, equipment and technology. The suppliers’ policies are based on a “trigger list” of nuclear and other materials for which certain conditions would have to be met before they would be exported.
11 January 1978 — NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUPSProposed by the United States after the 1974 Indian nuclear test, the founding members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, France, West Germany, Canada, and Japan -- begin meeting April 23, 1975, to consider further restrictions on sensitive nuclear exports. In September 1977, the NSG adopts the Zangger list and expands it to include other nuclear-related technologies. The agreement takes the form of a document entitled "Guidelines on Nuclear Transfers." The NSG formally transmits the document to the IAEA Director-General on January 11, 1978, and the IAEA publishes it as INFCIRC/254 in February 1978.
10 MARCH 1978 — PRESIDENT CARTER SIGNS NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION ACT
President Carter signs the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA) into law. The NNPA sets forth conditions for nuclear export which provide assurance that material will not be diverted to the production of nuclear weapons.
23 May — 30 June 1978
The General Assembly holds its tenth special session—the first special session devoted to disarmament—in New York. The session ends with the adoption by consensus of a Final Document. At the special session and later in the year, the five nuclear-weapon States make unilateral security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States.
18 June 1979
The United States and the USSR sign the Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (referred to as SALT II).
3 March 1980
The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material is opened for signature in Vienna and New York; the Convention applies to nuclear material used for peaceful purposes while in international nuclear transport (INFCIRC/274/Rev.1
5 MARCH 1980 — WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT ON 10TH ANNIVERSARY OF NPT ENTRY INTO FORCE
President Carter says the Treaty "has admirably served the causes of international peace and technical progress in the nuclear field and has become the cornerstone of U.S. non- proliferation policy." He adds that it has "enhanced international security" by:
-- Diminishing regional tensions;
-- Preempting regional nuclear arms races; and
-- Diminishing the role of nuclear weapons as symbols of national prestige.
12 AUGUST 1980 — PRESIDENT CARTER'S MESSAGE TO SECOND NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE
President Carter says the Treaty "remains indispensable...to achieve a safer, saner, and more secure world." The acquisition of nuclear explosives by additional states, he says, would:
-- Decrease the security of the states acquiring them; -- Decrease the stability of the regions in which they are located;
-- Increase the risk of nuclear conflict.
11 AUGUST — 7 SEPTEMBER — SECOND NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE
The Second NPT Review Conference is held in Geneva. By the time of the Conference, membership in the Treaty had increased to 112 parties. Much of the debate revolved around the same matters that had been discussed at the First Review Conference. Unlike the 1975 Review Conference, however, the participants in the Second Review Conference were unable to adopt a final declaration, primarily in view of fundamental differences over the implementation of article VI.
Virtually all speakers noted with satisfaction that the number of States parties to the Treaty had increased considerably since 1975. At the same time, several parties maintained that the lack of universal adherence to the Treaty had a negative impact on its implementation and pointed out that a number of non-parties operated significant nuclear facilities.
In contrast to the First Review Conference, differences of view concerning the obligation of the parties under articles I and II of the Treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons were pronounced. Drawing attention to the assistance and cooperation in the nuclear field provided by NNWS that were exporters of nuclear material, equipment and technology, a number of non-aligned States parties stated that such collaboration, particularly with some non-parties to the Treaty, could have a result contrary to the aim of non-proliferation.
The most intense debate was again on the implementation of article VI. Most participants held that the NWS had not adequately fulfilled their obligations to negotiate effective measures to halt the nuclear-arms race and achieve nuclear disarmament. It was widely felt that the Conference should urge the major nuclear Powers to intensify their efforts in that direction. Many NNWS called for the early conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban and for the ratification of the 1979 United States-Soviet SALT II agreement on strategic offensive arms.
Many States acknowledged that, since the First Review Conference, there had been some progress on the issue of security assurances. At the 1978 first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the five NWS had made individual declarations with regard to “negative” security assurances to NNWS.
NNWS, particularly those that were members of the non-aligned group, felt that since they themselves had refrained from acquiring nuclear weapons, they should be entitled to a more adequate system of guarantees of their security. In the debate on this question, several approaches were advocated, varying from a solemn endorsement by the General Assembly or the Security Council of the declarations made by the NWS in 1978 to the conclusion of a legally binding international instrument to assure NNWS against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.
With regard to article III, the parties generally expressed satisfaction with the IAEA safeguards procedures. At the same time, it was emphasized that those procedures would need continued improvement to deal with increasing amounts of nuclear material and increasingly complex nuclear fuel cycle facilities. Many participants also stressed that NNWS that were not parties to the Treaty should submit all their nuclear activities to IAEA safeguards, but there were fundamental differences over whether suppliers were under an obligation to require such comprehensive safeguards of their customers.
As for the implementation of article IV, a number of developing States expressed dissatisfaction with what they considered restrictive export policies applied to them by suppliers of nuclear equipment and technology for peaceful purposes. Regret was also expressed by some participants that nuclear suppliers that were parties to the Treaty had continued to engage in nuclear trade and cooperation with non-parties, often permitting less stringent safeguards than those applied to parties in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty. In addressing the question of development and promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, a number of parties emphasized that the primary purpose of the Treaty had always been, and remained, the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons.
16 JULY 1981 — PRESIDENT REAGAN ON U.S. NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY
President Ronald Reagan lists the following basic guidelines for U.S. nuclear non-proliferation policy:
-- The U.S. will seek to prevent the spread of nuclear explosives to additional countries as a fundamental national security and foreign policy objective.
-- The U.S. will strive to reduce the motivation for acquiring nuclear explosives by working to improve regional and global stability and to promote understanding of the legitimate security concerns of other states.
-- The U.S. will continue to support adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) by countries that have not accepted those treaties.
-- The U.S. will view a material violation of these treaties or an international safeguards agreement as having profound consequences for international order and U.S. bilateral relations, and also view any nuclear explosion by a non-nuclear-weapon state with grave concern.
-- The U.S. will strongly support and continue to work with other nations to strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to provide for an improved international safeguards regime.
-- The U.S. will seek to work more effectively with other countries to forge agreement on measures for combatting the risks of proliferation.
-- The U.S. will continue to inhibit the transfer of sensitive nuclear material, equipment and technology, particularly where the danger of proliferation demands, and to seek agreement on requiring IAEA safeguards on all nuclear activities in a non-nuclear-weapon state as a condition for any significant new nuclear supply commitment.
7 June —10 July 1982
The General Assembly holds its second special session devoted to disarmament in New York. At the special session, China, France and the USSR make declarations regarding unilateral security assurances.
31 MARCH 1981 — PRESIDENT REAGAN URGES NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS
President Reagan calls upon U.S. allies to join the United States in following a common policy of requiring comprehensive safeguards from all non-nuclear-weapon states before giving new commitments to supply them with significant amounts of nuclear materials.
1 JULY 1983 — PRESIDENT REAGAN ON 15TH ANNIVERSARY OF SIGNING OF NPT
President Reagan says the Treaty, "now with 119 parties, has the widest adherence of any arms control treaty in history." He says the United States is committed to:
-- Continuing to provide technical assistance and other cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy under adequate safeguards;
-- Pursuing negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament.
April, 1984 — U.S.-SINO NUCLEAR TRADE PACT
The United States signs a nuclear trade pact with China after Peking agrees to join the IAEA and accept IAEA inspection of any exported nuclear equipment and material. The agreement comes into force December 16, 1985.
1 NOVEMBER 1984 — SHULTZ OUTLINES U.S. APPROACH TO NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION
In an address to the United Nations Association of the United States, Secretary of State George Shultz outlines the U.S. approach to nuclear non-proliferation: -- The U.S. remains firmly committed to strengthening international safeguards against the spread of nuclear weapons;
-- The U.S. has improved export controls on nuclear material, equipment and technology; -- The U.S. supports peaceful uses of nuclear energy for economic development and energy security, and will not ignore the legitimate needs of the developing world; -- The U.S. makes "rational distinctions between close friends and allies who pose no great proliferation risk, and those areas of the world where we have real concerns about the spread of nuclear weapons";
-- The U.S. recognizes a clear need to "restrict sensitive nuclear activities in regions of instability and proliferation concern" such as the Middle East and South Asia;
-- The U.S. strives to reduce the motivation of some states to acquire nuclear explosives by working with them to improve regional and global stability;
-- The U.S. seeks consultation and cooperation with other nations to advance its non-proliferation policy, and to give its closest nuclear trading partners a "firmer and more predictable basis on which to plan their vital energy programs";
-- The U.S. believes nuclear cooperation with China will advance global non-proliferation objectives;
-- The U.S. and the Soviet Union have "broad common interests" in non-proliferation, and hold bilateral discussions on the subject;
-- The U.S. seeks to expand the non-proliferation dialogue, and has resumed talks with rapidly industrializing countries such as Brazil, Argentina and South Africa.
6 August 1985 — SOUTH PACIFIC NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE/RAROTONGA TREATY
Eight members of the South Pacific Forum, including Australia and New Zealand, establish a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific (SPNFZ) that comes into force on December 12, 1986. Three protocols are attached to the treaty that allow the nuclear powers to participate in the SPNFZ regime (see March 25, 1996).
28 AUGUST 1985 — PRESIDENT REAGAN'S MESSAGE TO NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE
In a message to the Third Review Conference of the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons meeting in Geneva, President Reagan says: "The United States remains firmly committed to the objectives embodied in this Treaty, and to its vision of a more stable and secure world for all nations."
27 AUGUST—21 SEPTEMBER 1985 — THIRD NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE
The Third NPT Review Conference takes place in Geneva. By the time of the Third Review Conference the total number of parties to the Treaty had increased to 131. Developed States, in particular, felt that the Treaty had been successful in meeting the fundamental objective of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. Some African and Middle Eastern countries, however, expressed doubts that the Treaty had effectively prevented horizontal proliferation. In this connection, they referred specifically to the unsafeguarded nuclear facilities of Israel and South Africa. On the matter of safeguards, many participants advocated full-scope safeguards on all nuclear facilities in all NNWS. Some parties felt that acceptance of such safeguards should be a condition for the supply of nuclear materials. While the IAEA safeguards system was praised in general, States parties advocated that it be strengthened further through the allocation of the additional resources required to keep pace with advancing technologies and an increasing number of safeguarded facilities and activities. A number of States also referred to the confidence engendered by IAEA safeguards and made clear that the acceptance of safeguards had not hindered their nuclear industry.
On the question of technical assistance in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, somewhat divergent views were heard. Developed nuclear supplier countries generally emphasized their contributions in the area, while some recipient States felt that assistance had been inadequate and pointed to the relatively small number of nuclear installations in developing countries. However, there was agreement that efforts to improve international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be continued and intensified.
As at the first two Review Conferences, the overwhelming majority of parties expressed their regret and concern that there had been no concrete progress towards the objective of promoting nuclear disarmament. The debate on the implementation of article VI of the Treaty focused largely on the issue of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. In that context, many speakers were disappointed that the trilateral negotiations on such a treaty, which had begun in 1977 between the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States, had not continued after 1980. It was also noted that the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating body, had not yet initiated negotiations on the subject, despite repeated calls to that end by the General Assembly of the United Nations.
The question of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, under article V of the Treaty, received relatively little attention, as the potential benefits of such explosions had not been demonstrated and no requests for services related to the peaceful applications of nuclear explosions had been received by the IAEA since the Second Review Conference. This led some parties to maintain that any test ban must embrace all nuclear explosions, including those for peaceful purposes.
In the context of article VII, many participants expressed support for the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones. A number of speakers welcomed the adoption in 1985 of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga) by the members of the South Pacific Forum.
On the related issue of security assurances to NNWS, the NNWS reiterated that they expected unconditional “negative” assurances as part of the bargain for having given up the nuclear-weapon option.
Another issue not provided for in the Treaty but discussed at the Conference was that of armed attacks against nuclear facilities, which derived from the 1981 Israeli attack on a nuclear installation in Iraq and allegations of attacks by Iraq on Iran’s unfinished nuclear power plant.
Towards the end of the Conference, a few but very important matters were still unresolved, including some aspects of the question of nuclear disarmament under article VI and the formulation of a paragraph on the protection of safeguarded nuclear facilities against attack. All participants realized that voting on the outstanding issues would make agreement by consensus on a substantive final declaration impossible. During intensive negotiations in the final phase of the Conference, the parties were able to reach compromises, thereby avoiding the need to resort to voting. This cleared the way for the adoption by consensus of a substantive Final Declaration.
As part of the compromises reached, it was agreed to deal with certain contentious issues not in the Final Declaration itself, but in the part of the Final Document that immediately follows the text of the Final Declaration. Accordingly, with regard to the outstanding aspects of article VI, the group of non-aligned and neutral States agreed not to put to the vote two draft resolutions—calling for a nuclear test-ban moratorium and a nuclear-arms freeze respectively—but to have them reproduced, together with an accompanying statement, in the Final Document. A similar compromise solution was found for the issue of attacks against peaceful nuclear facilities. The relevant statements by the representatives of Iran and Iraq were attached to the Final Document.
On the whole, the Final Declaration was strongly supportive of the Treaty, although it was critical of its implementation in some areas, particularly those relating to the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament. It offered purposeful recommendations aimed at further strengthening the NPT. But above all, in the Final Declaration, the parties solemnly declared “their continued support for the objectives of the Treaty” and “their conviction that the Treaty is essential to international peace and security”.
12 December 1985 — NORTH KOREA JOINS NPT
North Korea (DPRK) formally accedes to the NPT and agrees to open a new 30- megawatt research reactor facility to IAEA inspections and safeguards.
23 March — 10 April 1987
The UN Conference for the Promotion of International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy is held in Geneva, but is unable to reach agreement on principles for international cooperation that would promote the objectives of the full utilization of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
16 April 1987
The Missile Technology Control Regime, established by seven industrialized countries, establishes guidelines for sensitive missile-relevant transfers.
30 November 1987
The General Assembly, by its resolution 42/38 C in conjunction with resolution 41/59 N, establishes a system for an annual register of data on nuclear explosions to be submitted to it by the Secretary-General following notification of such tests by Member States.
8 December 1987
The United States and the USSR sign the Treaty on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (the INF Treaty).
13 JUNE 1988 — U.S. ON CHALLENGES OF PROLIFERATION
In a speech before the Third Special Session of the U.N. on Disarmament, Secretary of State George Shultz says the spread of nuclear and chemical weapons capabilities, of ballistic missile technology and biotechnology is a global problem.
Shultz also says:
-- There is no good reason why every nation should not make a binding commitment to the NPT;
-- Nuclear proliferation is one of the most direct and serious threats to regional and global stability;
-- The danger today is most acute in South Asia, and the U.S. is "prepared to work with countries inside and outside the region to find a lasting solution to the danger of proliferation that satisfies all parties."
1 JULY 1988 — PRESIDENT REAGAN ON 20TH ANNIVERSARY OF OPENING FOR SIGNATURE OF NPT
President Reagan calls on all nations that have not yet adhered to the NPT to "do so to demonstrate their commitment to preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and to strengthening the foundations of peace." He adds, "If we are to succeed in halting the spread of nuclear weapons, the nations of the world must continue to work together."
13 August 1988 — SOUTH AFRICAN NUCLEAR CAPABILITY
South African Foreign Minister R.F. Botha publicly acknowledges that his nation has the ability to produce a nuclear weapon.
20 APRIL 1989 — PRESIDENT BUSH ON IMPORTANCE OF TLATELOLCO TREATY
President George Bush says the Treaty of Tlatelolco: "Continues to stand as an important barrier to the spread of weapons of mass destruction in the Western Hemisphere; its contributions to regional and hemispheric security are substantial. The treaty strengthens international legal restrictions on the proliferation of nuclear weapons, protecting the peace and the security interests of every nation. Increasing concern about the spread of nuclear arms around the world is a compelling reminder that we must continue to pursue the goals set by the authors of the Tlatelolco Treaty."
25 SEPTEMBER 1989 — PRESIDENT BUSH ON ROLE OF IAEA
Recognizing the International Atomic Energy Agency's "vital role in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, and in promoting cooperation in peaceful nuclear technologies among states," President Bush reaffirms the U.S. commitment to strengthen the Agency.
7—9 FEBRUARY 1990 — MOSCOW MINISTERIAL: NON-PROLIFERATION
In a joint statement, Secretary James Baker and Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze agree to "prepare a document for consideration by their leaders covering both principles and concrete steps of cooperation in all areas of non- proliferation -- chemical, missile and nuclear."
5 MARCH 1990 — PRESIDENT BUSH ON 20TH ANNIVERSARY OF NPT
In a statement on the 20th anniversary of the entry into force of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, President Bush says:
"One hundred and forty states have joined the treaty, making it the most widely accepted arms control instrument in history. The NPT represents the primary legal barrier to nuclear proliferation and thus constitutes a principal foundation of international security....
"The NPT has been not only a significant arms control instrument, it has also facilitated international cooperation in a wide variety of peaceful uses of atomic energy under international safeguards applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency....
"It is essential in these times of great change and great promise, and of major progress in arms control, that the community of nations works together even more diligently to prevent nuclear proliferation, which poses one of the greatest risks to the survival of mankind. I urge all states that are not party to the NPT to join and thereby demonstrate their support for the goal of preventing nuclear proliferation, and I call upon all states party to the Treaty to join our efforts to secure the integrity of the NPT, which benefits all countries."
1 June 1990
The United States and the USSR sign verification Protocols to the 1974 Threshold Test-Ban Treaty and the 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty.
4 JUNE 1990 — WASHINGTON SUMMIT: JOINT U.S.-SOVIET STATEMENT
The United States and the Soviet Union issue a Joint Statement on Non-Proliferation following a Washington summit meeting between US President George Bush and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev.
In the area of nuclear non-proliferation the statement stresses that:
-- The U.S. and USSR strongly support efforts to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons, while encouraging the peaceful uses of atomic energy;
-- Both countries will encourage further adherence to the NPT;
-- Both will urge signatories to the NPT to implement scrupulously their IAEA safeguards, and support stringent export controls on nuclear-related material, equipment and technology;
-- The U.S. and USSR support the concept of regional non- proliferation efforts, particularly in areas of tension such as the Middle East, South Asia and Southern Africa.
13 JULY 1990 — PRESIDENTIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS
In his annual report to Congress on U.S. efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation, President Bush says the U.S. has sought to "inhibit states from obtaining nuclear explosives by a variety of political, economic and security means."
The report points out that the U.S.:
-- "Resorted to control, and, where appropriate, denial of nuclear material, equipment and technology, and urged similar prudence and restraint on the part of other nuclear supplier governments";
-- Continues to seek universal adherence to the NPT as an indispensable instrument for peace and international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
2 August 1990 — IRAQI INVASION OF KUWAIT
Iraq invades Kuwait in a pre-dawn attack.
AUGUST 20 — SEPTEMBER 14 FOURTH NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE IN GENEVA
By the time of the Fourth Review Conference 140 States were parties to the Treaty. Many States expressed their satisfaction that additional States had adhered to the Treaty since 1985, but at the same time voiced concern over the number of States that had not done so and that had developed nuclear activities. The increase in the number of observers at the Conference, in particular China and France, was interpreted as evidence of increased interest in the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.
States parties differed in their interpretation of the Treaty’s main objectives and in their assessment of the degree to which they had been implemented. The questions that dominated the debate related to the implementation of the Treaty, in particular the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban, safeguards agreements, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and security assurances to NNWS. Many States referred to concerns over the implement-ation of articles I and II, stating that while there had not been any open violation of these articles, there was a danger of horizontal proliferation due to the spread of technical knowledge.
As in previous review conferences, the question of implementation of article VI was crucial in the assessment of the operation of the Treaty. Many States, particularly Western countries and some other European States, considered that significant progress had been made towards ending the arms race and implementing effective measures for nuclear disarmament during the period under review. Other States, in particular the non-aligned and neutral countries, recognized the significance of recent agreements and ongoing negotiations in the nuclear disarmament field, but expressed regret that the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons by NWS was continuing with new weapons under development and nuclear doctrines maintained. The most controversial issue concerning the implementation of article VI and the corresponding preambular paragraphs was the question of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Although there was agreement that the ultimate goal of all efforts should be a comprehensive and global prohibition of all tests for all time, differences emerged as to how and when to reach that goal.
Many States stressed that IAEA safeguards played a key role in preventing nuclear proliferation and that the international safeguards regime needed to be further strengthened. A number of speakers pointed out that the IAEA safeguards system had effectively served the goal of preventing horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, and most expressed their satisfaction with the way in which the Agency had been implementing the system. Several States welcomed the fact that all NWS had concluded voluntary-offer agreements with the IAEA to apply Agency control over some of their civilian nuclear facilities.
Although during the period 1985–1990 some progress had been made in regard to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, somewhat divergent views were expressed. The nuclear supplier States stressed that large-scale international cooperation in the nuclear field had continued during the past five years and that technical assistance had been provided with attention to the maximum safety of nuclear facilities. On the other hand, the recipient countries felt that, despite some progress, the assistance had not been adequate. The non-aligned and other States regretted that commitments to peaceful nuclear cooperation had not been fulfilled satisfactorily, pointing to what they considered unjustified restrictions imposed on developing NNWS parties. They proposed that the role of IAEA be enhanced and that more assistance be provided to developing countries through the Agency and through favourable financing by international institutions.
The question of security assurances played a far more prominent part at the Conference than it had on previous occasions. Although there was no consensus on convening a separate conference to negotiate legally binding assurances, all five NWS reaffirmed their earlier unilateral assurances. Many participants expressed support for the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones in general, and in specific regions, as a contribution to the non-proliferation regime.
Once more the differences in assessment of the implementation of article VI, especially in regard to progress in reaching a comprehensive test-ban treaty, could not be resolved and therefore no final declaration emerged from the Conference. However, in spite of the lack of a final declaration, the Conference proved useful in providing an opportunity to assess the operation of the Treaty and to confirm the readiness of virtually all States to continue to support the non-proliferation regime, of which the Treaty is the central element.
1990 -- December 13 ENHANCED PROLIFERATION CONTROL INITIATIVE The United States announces the Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI) to tighten the licensing regulations for the export of products useful for the development of missiles, and for chemical and biological weapons. In addition, domestic regulations are promulgated criminalizing activities that promote the spread of missile technology and chemical weapons.
7—18 January 1991
The Amendment Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water meets in New York.
16 January 1991 — U.S.-LED COALITION FORCE AT WAR WITH IRAQ
U.S. President George Bush and the allied coalition establish the destruction of Iraq's nuclear, chemical, and biological research, development, and production facilities as a key war aim.
3 April 1991 — RESOLUTION 687 ON IRAQ
The United Nations Security Council passes Resolution 687 requiring the destruction of Iraq's nuclear capability, as well as its chemical and biological weapons, and of missiles with a range over 150 kilometers. The UNSC assigns the IAEA responsibility for implementing the decision.
28 May 1991 — MIDDLE EAST ARMS CONTROL
President Bush announces an arms control initiative to stem the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. He also calls on the five leading conventional arms suppliers (the United States, China, France, Britain, and the Soviet Union) to restrain destabilizing conventional arms transfers to the region.
10 July 1991 — SOUTH AFRICA JOINS NPT
South Africa formally joins the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state. Two years later, on March 24, 1993, South African President F.W. de Klerk announces that South Africa had developed "a limited nuclear deterrent capability" (six fission devices) that were dismantled before South Africa joined the treaty.
18 July 1991
Argentina and Brazil establish the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials.
31 July 1991
The United States and the USSR sign the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (the START I Treaty), by which the two sides undertake to reduce their nuclear weapons from their current levels of between 10,000 and 11,000 weapons to between 8,000 and 9,000 weapons.
September — October 1991
The United States and the USSR make unilateral announcements of further reductions and other measures for their respective nuclear arsenals.
23 October 1991 — UNSC PLAN FOR IRAQ
The United Nations Security Council adopts an IAEA plan to prevent any future development of nuclear weapons in Iraq.
12 December 1991 — SOVIET NUCLEAR THREAT REDUCTION ACT (NUNN-LUGAR LEGISLATION)
President Bush signs the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act (the Nunn-Lugar legislation) approving $400 million in U.S. aid to help the CIS with the storage, transportation, dismantlement, and destruction of nuclear and chemical weapons, defense conversion, and military-to-military exchanges. Over four years, $1.5 billion will be budgeted for these non-proliferation activities, more than half of which goes to the non-Russian former Soviet republics.
20 January 1992 — NORTH-SOUTH KOREAN PACT
North and South Korea agree to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula. The accord bans both countries from testing, producing, acquiring, or deploying nuclear weapons and prohibits them from possessing facilities to produce weapon-grade fissionable material.
30 January 1992 — NORTH KOREAN SIGNING OF IAEA SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT
As required by the NPT, the DPRK signs a safeguards agreement with the IAEA (see December 12, 1985) and ratifies it on April 9. On May 4, the DPRK submits an "initial report" on its nuclear material and facilities to the IAEA, in which it admits that it was building a facility capable of reprocessing plutonium and that it had already separated a very small quantity of plutonium.
31 January 1992
At the meeting of the Security Council held at the level of Heads of State or Government, the Council emphasizes the threat that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction constitutes to international peace and security.
17 February 1992 — INTERNATIONAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY CENTER
The United States, Russia, and Germany agree to set up an institute to aid Russian and CIS nuclear scientists and engineers by giving them "opportunities to redirect their talents to non-military endeavors [and to] minimize any incentives to engage in activities that would result in proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, and missile delivery systems." The United States agrees to contribute $25 million (from the $400 million appropriated by Congress for threat reduction -- see December 12, 1991). A similar center is established in Kiev, Ukraine.
24—26 February 1992 — IAEA MONITORING CAPABILITY
Following the discovery of the advanced state of Iraq's nuclear program, the IAEA board of governors approves measures designed to improve the agency's ability to detect clandestine activities. These measures include a reassertion of the IAEA's right to conduct "suspect site" inspections of undeclared facilities.
9 March 1992 — CHINA JOINS NPT
China accedes to the NPT as the fourth nuclear weapon state.
21 March—3 April 1992 — NSG GUIDELINES
At a meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the group agrees to tighten export restrictions on thousands of items on the dual-use list and to require importers to accept full-scope safeguards prior to any significant new supply of equipment.
23 May 1992
The Lisbon Protocol to the START I Treaty is signed by Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation and Ukraine, as successor States of the former USSR in connection with the Treaty, and by the United States. By the Protocol, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine undertake to adhere to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States in the shortest possible time.
25 May—7 June 1992 — IAEA INSPECTION OF THE DPRK NUCLEAR PROGRAM
The IAEA conducts a series of inspections of the DPRK nuclear program in conjunction with the DPRK-IAEA safeguards agreement.
1 June 1992 — IAEA DESTRUCTION OF IRAQI NUCLEAR FACILITIES
The 12th IAEA inspection team, aided by the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM), completes the destruction of key facilities and equipment at Al-Atheer, Iraq's main nuclear weapon design and development installation.
2 July 1992 — REMOVAL OF U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM SOUTH KOREA
The U.S. Department of Defense announces withdrawal of all nuclear weapons from South Korea in connection with President Bush's unilateral initiative to remove all ground-based and sea-based tactical nuclear weapons (see section 5, September 27, 1991).
13 July 1992 — U.S. NON-PROLIFERATION INITIATIVE
President Bush announces that, as part of a general non-proliferation initiative, the United States will no longer produce plutonium or highly-enriched uranium (HEU) for nuclear explosive purposes.
3 August 1992 — FRANCE JOINS THE NPT
France, the last of the five acknowledged nuclear weapon states, joins the NPT.
3 January 1993
The United States and the Russian Federation sign the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (the START II Treaty), by which they undertake further significant reductions in their nuclear arsenals.
8 February 1993 — UNSCOM ON IRAQ
While warning that long-term monitoring will be required to ensure continued compliance, UNSCOM officials announce that Iraq's nuclear weapons program has been destroyed.
9 February 1993
Belarus accedes to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State.
18 February 1993 — U.S.-RUSSIAN AGREEMENT ON SALE OF HEU
During Safety, Security, and Dismantlement (SSD) talks, the United States and Russia sign an agreement committing the United States to purchase low-enriched uranium (LEU) blended down from 500 metric tons of highly-enriched uranium from Russia over the next 20 years. The HEU is to be removed from warheads that Russia is committed to destroy under its existing arms control treaty commitments.
10—12 March 1993 — NORTH KOREAN WITHDRAWAL FROM NPT
On March 10, the DPRK refuses to accept a special IAEA inspection team and, on March 12, it announces its decision to withdraw from the NPT.
26 March 1993 — COUNTER-PROLIFERATION
The U.S. Department of Defense requests $40 million in counter-proliferation funds to be used to "prevent, where possible, the acquisition of nuclear and biological and chemical weapons and the methods to deliver those weapons."
1 April 1993
The Nuclear Suppliers Group, meeting in Lucerne, Switzerland, revises the 1977 London Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers.
3—4 April 1993 — VANCOUVER SUMMIT U.S.
President Bill Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin meet in Vancouver. The presidents "re-affirm their determination to strengthen the NPT, make it universal, and give it an unlimited duration," and agree to work toward easing COCOM restrictions on trade with Russia.
11 May 1993 — UNSC RESOLUTION ON NORTH KOREA'S NPT WITHDRAWAL
The UNSC approves Resolution 825, which calls on the DPRK to reconsider its decision to withdraw from the NPT and to meet its treaty obligations.
1 June 1993 — UPDATED MILITARY CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES LIST
The United States releases an updated Military Critical Technologies List (MCTL) containing about 400 technologies that will require an export license.
2—11 June 1993 — U.S.-NORTH KOREA TALKS TO RESOLVE NUCLEAR CRISIS
The United States and the DPRK open talks at the U.S. mission to the United Nations in New York. On June 11, the countries release a joint statement in which they agree to the "principles of assurances against the threat and use of force, including nuclear weapons," and the DPRK announces suspension of its withdrawal from the NPT for as long "as it considers necessary."
19 July 1993 — IAEA-NORTH KOREA TALKS
The DPRK agrees to consult with the IAEA and to renew contacts with South Korea.
22 July 1993 — BELARUS ACCESSION TO NPT
Belarus formally accedes to the NPT and signs three agreements with the United States releasing Nunn-Lugar funding for denuclearization assistance.
10 August 1993
The Conference on Disarmament decides to give its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban a mandate to negotiate a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. A special meeting (informal) of the Amendment Conference of the Partial Test-Ban Treaty is held in New York.
17 August 1993
The Russian Federation declares its policy regarding security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States.
26 August —2 September 1993 — U.S.-RUSSIAN AGREEMENT ON NUCLEAR DISMANTLEMENT ASSISTANCE
The United States and Russia sign an "implementing" agreement to permit Nunn- Lugar assistance to go to Russia for dismantling strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. The United States also agrees to provide $75 million in assistance for construction and operation of a fissile material storage facility in Russia.
23 September 1993 — NEW U.S. NON-PROLIFERATION AND EXPORT POLICY
President Clinton establishes a framework for U.S. efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The plan proposes to:
o Negotiate a multilateral convention to prohibit the production of fissionable materials for nuclear weapons.
o Submit U.S. fissile material no longer needed for weapons to IAEA inspection.
o Pursue the purchase of HEU from the former Soviet Union.
o Explore long-term options for plutonium disposition.
o Streamline U.S. non-proliferation export controls.
o Promote the MTCR as a global missile non-proliferation norm.
o Seek ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).
7 December 1993 — NEW U.S. COUNTER-PROLIFERATION STRATEGY
In a speech to the National Academy of Sciences Committee on International Security and Arms Control, U.S. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin outlines the U.S. "Counter-Proliferation Initiative." He announces that, while the United States intends to maintain its emphasis on the prevention of proliferation, it will add "protection" against weapons of mass destruction as a major policy goal.
16 December 1993
The General Assembly adopts without a vote a resolution (48/70), sponsored by 157 States, on a comprehensive test-ban treaty, welcoming the decision of 10 August by the Conference on Disarmament.
14 January 1994 — MOSCOW SUMMIT/JOINT STATEMENT ON NON-PROLIFERATION
Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin issue a Joint Statement on Non-Proliferation that reaffirms support for:
Negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty begin in the Conference on Disarmament. Consultations begin in the Conference on Disarmament regarding a mandate to negotiate a treaty on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for weapons purposes.
14 February 1994 — KAZAKHSTAN ACCESSION TO NPT
Kazakhstan formally accedes to the NPT after a December 13, 1993, vote by the Kazakhstan Parliament approving accession to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state.
15 February 1994 — DPRK AND IAEA INSPECTIONS
Although the DPRK agrees to allow inspections at its seven declared nuclear sites, IAEA inspectors report significant interference during their March 1-15 inspections.
21 April 1994 — SHUTDOWN OF DPRK REACTOR
The Democratic People's Republic of Korea shuts down its reactor and prepares to remove fuel elements.
2 June 1994 — U.S. PURSUIT OF SANCTIONS AGAINST NORTH KOREA
The Clinton administration decides to pursue sanctions against the DPRK after it removes fuel rods from its reactor.
22 June 1994 — FREEZE ON DPRK NUCLEAR PROGRAM
After the DPRK confirms its willingness to accept a verified "freeze" of its nuclear weapons program -- an idea that had been discussed during a visit to Pyongyang by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter on June 15-18, the Clinton administration agrees to resume high-level political talks with the DPRK.
23 June 1994 — GORE-CHERNOMYRDIN REACTOR SHUTDOWN AGREEMENT
U.S. Vice President Al Gore, Jr., and Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin sign an agreement to shut down by the year 2000 the remaining plutonium production reactors operating in Russia. Russia also agrees not to use newly produced plutonium from the reactors in nuclear weapons.
20 September 1994
The International Convention on Nuclear Safety is opened for signature in Vienna (INFCIRC/449 and Add.1).
23 October 1994 — U.S.-NORTH KOREAN "AGREED FRAMEWORK"
In an "Agreed Framework" to "freeze" North Korea's nuclear program, the United States and the DPRK agree over the next 10 years to construct two new proliferation-resistant light water-moderated nuclear power reactors (LWRs) in the DPRK in exchange for the shutdown of all existing DPRK nuclear facilities.
The DPRK also agrees to allow 8,000 spent nuclear reactor fuel elements to be removed to a third country once components for the first reactor are delivered, to remain a party to the NPT, and to comply fully with its IAEA safeguards agreement, which includes "special inspections." The agreement explicitly includes a DPRK obligation to accept inspections at two suspected nuclear waste storage sites.
The United States agrees to normalize economic and diplomatic relations with Pyongyang and to provide formal assurances to the DPRK against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the United States.
27 October 1994 — FORMATION OF KEDO
The United States, South Korea, and Japan meet immediately after the signing of the U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework to plan the formation (on March 9, 1995) of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO). KEDO is to have up to 10 partner countries and will oversee the $4.5-billion costs of the nuclear deal.
23 November 1994 — U.S. REMOVAL OF HEU FROM KAZAKHSTAN
In a secret operation code-named Operation Sapphire, the United States removes nearly 600 kilograms of highly-enriched uranium from Kazakhstan. The HEU is brought to the U.S. Department of Energy facility at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, for safekeeping until it can be blended down for sale as fuel for commercial reactors.
29 November 1994 — HALTING OF DPRK NUCLEAR PROGRAM
The IAEA notes that an inspection team "visited the [DPRK] nuclear facilities...and confirmed that these facilities were not in operation and that construction work had stopped."
5 December 1994 — UKRAINE JOINS THE NPT
Ukraine accedes to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state.
1 March 1995 — U.S. REMOVAL OF FISSILE MATERIAL
President Clinton announces the permanent removal of 200 tons of fissile material from the U.S. nuclear stockpile.
23 March 1995 — FISSILE MATERIAL CUTOFF TALKS
Delegates to the UN Conference on Disarmament (CD) establish an ad hoc committee to negotiate a fissile material production cutoff agreement.
11 April 1995
The Security Council adopts resolution 984 (1995) on security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States that are parties to the NPT.
17 April — 12 May 1995
The Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the NPT convenes. The NPT is indefinitely extended and decisions on “Strengthening the review process for the Treaty”, “Principles and objectives on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament” and a “Resolution on the Middle East” are adopted without a vote.
The 1995 Review and Extension Conference had the responsibility of both reviewing the implementation of the Treaty and deciding, as required by article X, paragraph 2, “whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods”. At the time that it was held, 38 more States had become parties to the Treaty, increasing the membership to 178 States parties. It was the first conference of the States parties to be held since the dissolution of the Soviet Union and was also the first in which all five NWS participated as parties.
There was wide agreement that the full and effective implementation of the Treaty and the regime of non-proliferation in all its aspects had played a vital role in promoting international peace and security and that universal adherence to it was the best way to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. The Conference welcomed the accession to the Treaty by an additional 38 States, among them China and France, as well as South Africa, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, since the 1990 Review Conference. Almost without exception the States parties very strongly emphasized the need to achieve universality, and quite a few specifically referred to India, Israel and Pakistan.
Already during the preparatory stage of the 1995 Conference, it was clear that there were deep differences among States parties regarding the review of the operation of the Treaty and its extension and that these two aspects were closely intertwined. Although the question of reviewing the operation of the Treaty and its extension were legally and technically two separate issues, it was expected that the outcome of the former would very much influence the decision on the latter. An overwhelming majority expressed strong support for indefinite extension of the Treaty. However, several non-aligned States parties offered a variety of alternatives. South Africa proposed, early in the proceedings, a declaration on principles on nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament as a yardstick by which to measure the implementation of obligations under the Treaty, which would be extended indefinitely and would be subject to a strengthened review process.
As anticipated, implementation of the provisions on disarmament (article VI) and on safeguards and peaceful uses of nuclear energy (articles III and IV) was a focus of contention. As regards the implementation of article VI, there was a noticeable convergence of views between the developing and developed NNWS on the need for the NWS to proceed more speedily towards the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament. Steps such as the completion of negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty (CTBT) no later than 1996, the commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a fissile material treaty and a firm commitment by the NWS to go beyond reductions envisaged in the second, bilateral, Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II), were overwhelmingly endorsed. The NWS maintained that the arms race had ended, as demonstrated by the deep cuts in nuclear armaments being made by the United States and the Russian Federation following START. Significant reductions by France and the United Kingdom were another sign of this trend.
A number of States, while recognizing that some positive developments had taken place, considered that the nuclear arms race continued, particularly with respect to the qualitative improvement of existing nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. A majority of NNWS, especially non-aligned, called for an intensification of negotiations towards the elimination of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery by all NWS within a time-bound framework.
Once again, the issue of security assurances was given significant attention. Responding to past demands from NNWS, the NWS issued statements just prior to the Conference, in which they updated their unilateral declarations on both negative and positive security assurances to NNWS. In addition, on 11 April 1995, the Security Council adopted, by consensus, a resolution on the subject (resolution 984 (1995)). Although this resolution was seen as an important and encouraging measure, many NNWS parties held that the declaration did not address their main concerns. They maintained that early conclusion of a multilateral legally binding instrument on unconditional security assurances was still required to effectively ensure the security of NNWS parties to the Treaty.
With regard to articles III and IV, all parties expressed overwhelming support for strengthening the IAEA safeguards mechanism and further enhancing the Agency’s ability to carry out its functions. States parties agreed that the IAEA safeguards were an important, integral part of the international regime of non-proliferation and that they played an indispensable role in ensuring the implementation of the Treaty. Divergent views existed with respect to the implementation of treaty obligations in the case of two parties to the Treaty. While States agreed that the IAEA had played a positive role in carrying out Security Council resolutions 687 (1991) and 707 (1991), Iraq maintained that it had already been established that it had destroyed its nuclear programme completely. There were also differences of view with regard to the implementation of the safeguards agreement (INFCIRC/403) between the DPRK and the IAEA.
As at previous review conferences, there was broad agreement concerning questions related to peaceful uses of nuclear energy and on the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of the Treaty. The parties acknowledged the importance of the work of the IAEA as the principal agent for technology transfer and welcomed the successful operation of the Agency’s technical assistance and cooperation programmes. However, regrets were expressed that some non-parties had been able to benefit from cooperation with parties in a way that might have contributed to non-peaceful nuclear programmes. As in the past, a great number of parties considered that the benefits of peaceful nuclear explosions under article V had not materialized and pointed to the serious concerns about environmental consequences and proliferation risk of such activities.
There was wide agreement among the parties that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones (article VII) enhanced regional and global peace and security and contributed to the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons. Satisfaction was expressed that all countries in the region covered by the Treaty of Tlatelolco now adhered to it and that the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty was successful in reinforcing in that region the global norm against nuclear-weapon proliferation. Also, the progress being made towards the conclusion of treaties in Africa and Southeast Asia was welcomed. There was, however, no agreement on a proposal, put forward by Belarus, for creating a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Europe. Strong support was expressed for a Middle Eastern nuclear-weapon-free zone.
While at the previous review conferences there had been agreement concerning compliance with articles I and II, in 1995, for the first time, the non-aligned States, with some support from others, argued that some NWS might not have fully complied with the letter and the spirit of article I with reference to transfers among themselves of nuclear weapons, or of their control, and when acting in cooperation with groups of NNWS parties under regional arrangements. There was broad agreement that article II has been complied with, the only violation having been by Iraq. A strong concern was also expressed with regard to the implementation of the safeguards agreement between the IAEA and the DPRK. A number of States, particularly from the Middle East, expressed their misgivings regarding horizontal proliferation and referred specifically to the unsafeguarded nuclear facilities of Israel. This issue was ultimately reflected in the Conference’s adoption of the resolution on the Middle East.
By focusing almost exclusively on the issue of extension of the Treaty, it was impossible to devote sufficient time to finding agreement on a number of sensitive issues because positions diverged so sharply. Consequently, the Conference was unable to adopt a Final Declaration on the review aspects of the Treaty.
It was clear that though the majority of States parties were in favour of extending the Treaty indefinitely, there was no consensus on this question. Three draft texts dealing with the extension of the Treaty had been put forward by Mexico, by Canada, on behalf of 102 co-sponsors, and by a group of non-aligned States, respectively.
In the course of consultations, agreement took shape on a package of decisions containing the elements of review, principles and objectives, and extension. On 11 May, the Conference decided, without a vote, that, “as a majority exists among States party to the Treaty for its indefinite extension, in accordance with article X, paragraph 2, the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely”. Together with this decision, it adopted the decision on “Strengthening the review process for the Treaty” and on “Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament”. In parallel with those decisions, the Conference also adopted without a vote a resolution on the Middle East. This issue was of particular concern to the Arab States parties. The resolution, reaffirming the importance of universal adherence to the Treaty, inter alia, calls upon all States in the Middle East to accede to it as well as to take practical steps towards the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the region.
States that expressed misgivings with regard to the indefinite extension of the Treaty did so in terms of the lack of commitment on the part of the NWS to undertake specific measures leading to nuclear disarmament within a time-bound programme and of the lack of universal adherence to the Treaty. Israel’s non-membership in the Treaty and the fact that its nuclear facilities are not subject to IAEA safeguards roused strong reservations from a number of States parties from the region of the Middle East, which did not wish to see the Treaty extended as long as that situation continued. The decision on indefinite extension was seen in a very favourable light by a considerable number of parties, whose statements reflected a variety of priorities. Some parties emphasized that permanent status would facilitate the achievement of nuclear disarmament and the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons. The majority of the speakers, whether or not they had reservations, reaffirmed their commitment to the object-ives of the Treaty.
By agreeing to extend the duration of the Treaty indefinitely, the States parties have given permanence to the only existing international legal barrier against nuclear proliferation. The decision on indefinite extension was reinforced by the other two decisions in the package. The decision on a strengthened review process provides that, even at the preparatory stage, substantive issues and the question of universality will be considered, as well as procedural matters, and that the review conference itself will evaluate the results of the period under review and identify the areas in which, and the means through which, further progress should be sought, thus looking forward as well as back. The three decisions and the resolution on the Middle East had a far-reaching impact beyond the indefinite extension of the Treaty. The States parties ensured that the Treaty was not only maintained as the core of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, but its indefinite extension both reinforced and rendered permanent the international legal norm against the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
9 — 10 May 1995 — MOSCOW SUMMIT
Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin sign a joint statement on "The Transparency and Irreversibility of the Process of Reducing Nuclear Weapons," expanding their cooperative efforts to account for and remove nuclear weapons and fissile material from their nuclear weapons stockpiles.
19 September 1995 — NATIONAL SECURITY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY STRATEGY
The Clinton administration announces its decision to develop improved nuclear, chemical, and biological detection sensors and technology to track the attempted smuggling of nuclear material.
9 December 1995
The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies is agreed to by 33 States.
15 December 1995 — SOUTHEAST ASIAN NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONE
The seven-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) -- Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam -- joined by Cambodia, Laos, and Burma, approve the creation of the Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ). The treaty creating the zone prohibits the parties from acquiring, manufacturing, possessing, and stationing nuclear explosive devices.
26 January 1996
The US Senate ratifies START II with an overwhelming majority and without amendment.
29 January 1996
France declares a moratorium on nuclear testing.
25 March 1996 — PROTOCOLS TO THE SOUTH PACIFIC NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE TREATY
The United States signs the protocols to the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty obligating the United States not to manufacture, acquire, test, or station any nuclear explosive device in the South Pacific (see August 6, 1985).
11 April 1996 — PELINDABA TREATY
Forty-three African nations sign the Pelindaba Treaty establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa (AFNWFZ). The United States signs the two protocols to the AFNWFZ that ban the use or threatened use of nuclear weapons against any treaty party and that require signatories not to conduct, encourage, or assist any nuclear testing in the zone.
19 — 20 April 1996 — NUCLEAR SAFETY SUMMIT
A Nuclear Safety Summit among leaders of the G-7, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine takes place in Moscow. In a series of declarations made at the end of the summit, the leaders reaffirm their commitment to the conclusion and signing of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty and call for, among other things, the negotiation of a universally binding fissile material production ban; improved nuclear material protection, control, and accounting procedures; safe and effective management of weapons fissile material designated as no longer required for defense purposes; and an improved program for preventing and combatting illicit trafficking in nuclear material.
8 July 1996
The International Court of Justice issues an advisory opinion on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons. The Court agreed unanimously that the threat or use of force by means of nuclear weapons that was contrary to article 2, paragraph 4 (refraining from the threat or use of force) of the Charter and did not meet the requirements of article 51 (inherent right of individual or collective self-defence) was unlawful, and that such threat or use of force should be compatible with international law applicable in armed conflict. It decided unanimously that “there exists an obligation to…bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament”.
29 July 1996
China declares a moratorium on nuclear testing.
14 August 1996
The Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons issues its report.
10 September 1996
The General Assembly adopts the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) by a vote of 158 to 3, with 5 abstentions.
17 September 1996 — TRILATERAL AGREEMENT
The IAEA, the United States, and Russia sign a trilateral agreement calling for: (1) the creation of a trilateral working group to address issues regarding IAEA verification of weapons-origin fissile material, and (2) Russian/IAEA visits to U.S. Department of Energy sites (Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site, Hanford Site, and Argonne National Laboratory-West).
22 September 1996 — SHIPMENTS OF SPENT FUEL
The first shipments of spent nuclear fuel from foreign research reactors (Chile, Colombia, France, Sweden, and Switzerland) arrive at Charleston Naval Weapons Station in the state of South Carolina, marking the first such U.S. take-back of foreign spent nuclear fuel in seven years. This is part of the U.S. program to reduce the use of highly-enriched uranium internationally in civilian reactors [the U.S. Department of Energy's Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) promotes conversion of civilian reactors from HEU fuel to LEU. To get foreign reactor operators to convert to proliferation-resistant LEU fuel, the United States began to accept spent HEU fuel -- and in 1986, LEU fuel that had originally been enriched in the United States.]
24 September 1996
The CTBT is opened for signature in New York. Seventy-one States, including all five nuclear-weapon States, sign the Treaty on that day.
14 November 1996 — AMENDMENT TO HEU PURCHASE
The United States and Russia sign an amendment to the HEU Purchase Agreement in order to accelerate implementation of the 1993 agreement. The amendment to the contract establishes set prices, quantities, and terms for the Russian LEU shipments through the year 2001 (see February 18, 1993).
19 November 1996
The Preparatory Commission for the CTBT Organization is established with its seat in Vienna.
4 December 1996 — JOINT STATEMENT ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Retired General Lee Butler, former commander-in-chief of the U.S. Strategic Air Command, and retired General Andrew Goodpaster, former supreme allied commander in Europe, address the National Press Club in Washington, D.C., and release a joint statement stressing the "diminished role and utility of [nuclear weapons]" and calling on all nuclear states to work toward the "ultimate objective of...the complete elimination of nuclear weapons from all nations." On December 5, 1996, 61 retired generals and admirals from 17 countries issue a similar statement calling for eventual global nuclear disarmament.
7 — 18 April 1997
The first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2000 NPT Review Conference is held in New York.
16 May 1997In May 1997, the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) approved new strengthened measures to verify the compliance of States with their commitments under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and similar treaties not to produce nuclear weapons. By adopting the model Protocol Additional to their existing Safeguards Agreements approved by the Board, States will provide the IAEA with the legal authority to implement more extensive and intrusive measures to detect undeclared nuclear activities on their territory. The moves were prompted by the limitations of the present system revealed by the extent of Iraq’s clandestine nuclear program, the actions of North Korea and South Africa’s now dismantled nuclear weapons. The new measures, known collectively as the 93+2 program, include:
The sixth Review Conference of the States Parties to the NPT convened in New York. In the Final Document, the Conference agreed to the adoption of what is now known as the Thirteen Practical Steps Toward Nuclear Disarmament for the "systematic and progressive efforts" to implement Article VI of the Treaty:
1. Signing and ratifying the CTBT.
2. Observing a moratorium on nuclear testing until the CTBT enters into force.
3. Negotiation of a "non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable" FMCT in the Conference on Disarmament.
4. Establishing in the Conference on Disaramament a subsidiary body with a "mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament."
5. "The principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures."
6. An "unequivocal undertaking" by the nuclear weapons states to achieve total nuclear disarmament.
7. Arms Control: early entry into force and full implementation of START II; conclusion of START III as soon as possible; and preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty.
8. "The completion and implementation of the Trilateral Initiative between the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the International Atomic Energy Agency"
9. Steps for nuclear weapon states to take toward nuclear disarmament that will promote international stability and provide international security for all: further unilateral reductions in nuclear weapons; increased transparency regarding nuclear capabilities and the implementation of agreements to build confidence; further reductions in non-strategic nuclear weapons; concrete measures to reduce the operational status of weapons systems; diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies; and the engagement as soon as appropriate of all the nuclear weapon states in the process leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons.
10. Excess Fissile Material: arrangement as soon as possible to declare excess military fissile material and to place it under IAEA control to be used for peaceful purposes.
11. "Reaffirmation that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control."
12. Completion of regular reports by all states parties on the implementation of Article VI.
13. Further development of verification capabilities to ensure compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements.