The Missile Launch Transparency Regime as a Component of the GCS Concept (Outline of the report)
Esteemed Ladies and Gentlemen,
Esteemed Representative of the UN Secretary-General Mr. Reidel,
On behalf of the acting President of the Russian Federation Mr. V.V. Putin, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Mr. I.S. Ivanov, let me greet you here in Moscow as representatives of States, which expressed interest and desire to participate in the first International Meeting of Experts on the problem of creation of a Global Control System for the Non-Proliferation of Missiles and Missile Technology, an idea of which was put forward by the President of the Russian Federation in June 1999 and proposed to the international community at the 54th session of the General Assembly of the United Nations Organization. More than 80 experts and observers from over 40 States and international organizations participate in this meeting which marks the beginning of joint work on this idea.
I think I will express common opinion if I say that there are no States that are not concerned about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction on the planet, about potential danger of its use in international conflicts, about grave political, economic and social consequences of the continuing arms race. Owing to various reasons States are impelled to implement military programs and to spend huge amounts of money on the most sophisticated armaments. We are witnessing preservation of international tension and we have so far failed not put an end to a destabilizing proliferation of weapons and military technologies through concerted and simultaneous efforts. Even though the world has passed out of the cold war stage, unfortunately, it has not become just and secure for all yet. The world has not yet learnt to live without arms, without the use or threat of force. At the same time we do not abandon hope - more and more members of the international community realize the danger of further pursuing such course and are taking hard but necessary steps towards fuller implementation of the principles of the UN Charter, other fundamental rules of international law aimed at a peaceful settlement of conflicts, limitation of and reduction in weapons, creation and improvement of structures engaged in arms control.
In this sense today's meeting is one of the elements of our common aspiration for peace and security. It is a joint attempt to work out, without prejudice, new political and diplomatic, but not military-technical, approaches to the solution of the global problems of security, which we are faced with at the turn of the 21st century. This idea was proposed by a number of countries, in particular by Australia, England, France, Canada and others, as long ago as in the early nineties. We have only tried to develop and specify it, to give it a certain shape.
We propose the following working name for this new mechanism - Global Control System for the Non-Proliferation of Missiles and Missile Technology.
I would like to highlight a few issues before our discussion starts. We do not claim that we have found answers to all questions involving missile proliferation, we do not even claim that we are proposing you an optimal version of a way out from the complicated situation in this sphere. We only invite you to resolve the problem which has become pressing and poses a real threat to global, as well as real security and stability.
The proposals put forward by us were worked out as a combination of various measures contributing to the achievement of the set goal. In this respect the Global Control System neither opposes nor challenges other recognized international agreements and regimes in the sphere of non-proliferation. Our ideas are intended to supplement and balance the decisions already found to promote the realization of the goals embodied in them. The Global Control System is a system of control, but it is neither a restrictive nor a prohibitive system, it does not create new division lines between States. Our proposals are open to all and ensure transparency of actions of all the participants.
The Global Control System is not a discriminatory mechanism, it ensures equal rights of all those who decide to participate and cooperate in achieving its goals. This system is not based on coercive methods, on sanctions or any prerequisites. The methods it suggests are based on encouragement and guarantees, creation of incentives to voluntary cooperation. On the whole the substance of our proposal, as we see it, is to encourage but not force the States to work out the rules of conduct in the missiles sphere and to follow them voluntary and deliberately. The Global Control System in a broad political and legal sense is an instrument not only for taking decisions but for an ongoing dialogue enhancing confidence and contributing to finding a balance of national interests of all the participants in this structure, in other words, the equal and constructive dialogue which, as we hope, will be a focus of the forthcoming UN General Assembly - the millennium summit, - that will be held next autumn.
We, in our turn, as you know, have submitted for consideration by these important international fora some specific proposals aimed at relaxing tension and at creating a new just system of international relations which are consolidated in the Russian Peace Program for the 21st century. As you remember, one of the provisions in this Program is dedicated to specific disarmament and non-proliferation issues.
Our forum has been planned and held as an informal working meeting of experts. We are ready to share with you our considerations and to listen to yours concerning the expediency of establishing a Global Control System, its concept, the identification of ways to develop and promote this and, possibly, other ideas in this field. At the same time, we are far from predetermining the future of this idea, do not intend to propose you any formal decisions and statements on the outcome of this meeting.
At this meeting Russia pursues nothing but practical and disarmament-oriented goals which are related to our national security and general global stability. This meeting is not directed against any other proposals; its purpose is to freely discuss and work out recommendations which would suit all the participants. We would like all the participants to have an absolutely clear understanding on this point.
The main thing is that we all understand the urgent necessity of this informal business discussion. We understand that we are yet at the beginning of a long and difficult way towards a just world, global stability and disarmament. We hope that this meeting will let us make our modest but tangible contribution to the achievement of these noble goals.
I would like to thank you again for having come such a long way to Moscow to share with us your considerations.
As missile technology developed the international community has become increasingly aware of the dangers posed by missiles and their proliferation in the world. These dangers have various causes, are different in nature and impact on environment, human life and society ranging from ecological consequences of missile launches to the damage to a state, international relations, strategic stability and the entire world. Since 1972 there has been established a number of important international mechanisms operating on bilateral and multilateral basis and oriented towards preventing or minimizing the danger related to the use of missiles and opposing missile proliferation in the world.
Let us have a look at the essence of these mechanisms, their objectives and the benefit they bring to the international community.
Behind the first such mechanisms are joint efforts of the United States and the Soviet Union.
In September 1971 the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Agreement on measures to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war, which entered into force from the moment of its signature and has an unlimited duration. The Agreement inter alia provides for an obligation of both Parties to notify the other Party in advance of planned missile launches in case missiles are launched beyond its national territory in the direction of the other Party.
In May 1972 the governments of the United States and the Soviet Union concluded the Agreement on the prevention of incidents on and over the high seas. The Agreement entered into force upon signature and remains valid for every following period of three years unless one of the Parties expresses its intent to terminate it. In accordance with this Agreement the Parties should notify each other in advance through Notices to Airmen and Mariners of their activities on the high seas presenting danger to military ships navigation or military aircraft in flight. Planned ballistic missile launches related to the use of international waterways pose such a danger, which makes it necessary to provide appropriate notifications. Through such notifications certain areas of the high seas are declared closed for navigation and aircraft in flight, though it is not required to report the character of the danger in the area. Notifications shall be presented not later than three or five days before beginning of dangerous activities at sea.
The Treaty between the USSR and the USA on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT II), which was signed but didnít enter into force, contained an obligation for each Party to notify the other Party in advance of the conduct of multiple ICBM launches as well as single ICBM launches outside of its national territory in any direction. At the same time notifications of single ICBM launches were not provided for, if they were not planned to be conducted outside of national territory. Neither were envisaged notifications of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) launches.
It should be emphasized that not one of these earlier agreements provided for a comprehensive notification of all strategic ballistic missile launches- ICBM and SLBM.
In May 1988 the USSR and the USA concluded the Agreement on Notifications of Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles which entered into force on the day of its signing and has an unlimited duration. According to the Agreement each Party presents a notification of the launch date, launch area and reentry impact area no less than 24 hours in advance of the planned launch as applied to any launch of a strategic ballistic missile: intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) or submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLAM). This Agreement was a new important step reflecting the intention of the Parties to reduce the danger of an outbreak of a nuclear war, particularly as a result of misinterpretation, miscalculation or accident.
The START I Treaty which was signed in 1991 and entered into force in 1994, contains the obligation of the Parties to notify of any ICBM or SLBM flight tests, including their launches to place objects into the upper atmosphere or space. In addition to the information included into advance notifications under the 1988 Agreements, the START I Treaty also provides for reporting certain important additional parameters of missile launches, - telemetry broadcast frequencies and modulation types used during the launches, etc. The provision of such additional data on planned missile launches increases transparency of activities undertaken by each of the Parties in the missile fields, decreases the possibility of appearance of a surprise factor in the strategic relationship between them and, as a consequence, contributes to global stability.
The Agreement between the USSR and the USA on Establishing Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, signed in 1987, was an important step in establishing mechanisms of notifications of the ballistic missile launches. These centers have been used, and continue to be used, to transmit appropriate notifications the list of which changes as new agreements are reached. To the present time notifications or ballistic missile launches are transmitted through these Centers under the above-mentioned agreements and treaties in force.
In addition to the Russian-American agreements on notifications of launches of ballistic missiles there exist mechanisms based on the principle of good will according to which such States as Great Britain and Norway notify Russia in advance of planned launches of their missiles and at the same time Norway notifies of sounding rocket launches inasmuch as since they are conducted in the areas observed by the Russian early warning system and may increase the danger of misinterpretation of the situation. This is a positive example of States cooperation with regard to controlling mechanisms in the missile sphere. Without doubt such forms of cooperation contribute to enhancing confidence between States and strengthening regional and global stability.
It is also well known that since 1999 there is an agreement exists between India and Pakistan related to notifications of ballistic missiles launches.
The Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space which was opened for signing in 1975 and entered into force in 1976 provides a useful legal experience in the context of the problems we are discussing today. Any State may join the Convention at any time. This Convention established a registration mechanism of space objects that operates with the direct participation of the United Nations in the process. Information provided by the States to the UN for registration of space objects is fully accessible. Each State reports the following information on such objects:
name of the State providing information on the object for its registration;
designation of the object or its registration number in the national register;
date and territory or site of launch;
main parameters of the orbit of the object;
general purpose of the object.
States may, at their own discretion, provide the UN with additional information on registered space objects.
It should be noted that the registration of a space object takes place after its launch into space.
The Convention on Registration of Space Objects received a worldwide support and has already been in force for about 25 years.
At the same time, it should be admitted that there is still no regime or practice of advance notification of launches of space delivery vehicles.
Along with notification mechanisms related to missiles and space vehicles, it is necessary to draw attention to a number of major treaties and regimes which established mechanisms to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and means of their delivery. They include:
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1968 under which the non-nuclear States renounced the possession of nuclear weapons, while the nuclear powers undertook not to transfer such weapons to any one and not to assist in their development;
the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 prohibiting the placement into orbit of objects carrying nuclear weapons or other types of weapons of mass destruction;
the Treaty on the Limitation of Antiballistic Missile Systems of 1972 prohibiting the transfer of ABM systems or their components, including interceptor missiles and their launchers, to other countries;
the Missile Technology Control Regime establishing a multi-level export control mechanism in that area.
Summing up the above, it is necessary to stress that the international community has already acquired sufficient experience in creating and operating international mechanisms designed to prevent or reduce the danger of using missiles and to counteract their global proliferation. The major nuclear missile powers, recognizing the importance of the issue, have progressively broaden the range of relevant agreements. The existing mechanisms are, certainly, not comprehensive or universal, but nevertheless they provide a time-tested legal basis which, with the necessary adjustments, can be used to establish a Global Control System for the Non-proliferation of Missile and Missile Technology.
Ladies and Gentlemen, Colleagues,
The previous report of the Russian Side contained an overview of the existing international control mechanisms and legal norms in the missile and missile technology fields. In the last decade, the global society has witnessed the promotion by several States of important initiatives and specific proposals for establishing new international legal norms which could contribute to the prevention or reduction of the danger of using missiles and countering their global proliferation.
For various reasons, some of these proposals were not developed, while some are being examined. However, all of these initiatives are worthy of welcome, as they contain that rational seed which, planted in the fertile ground of international support, might yield positive, long-term results.
It appears to us that the time has come to realize in the fullest the potential of these initiatives, to grasp anew their essence and that benefit which the realization of the relevant ideas may bring.
Naturally, the idea of establishing a Global Control System was not born a in an empty space. At the 1992 General Assembly session in New York, France invited the global society to develop and accept the obligation to provide advance notification of launches of space objects and ballistic missiles. A more detailed proposal to that end was introduced by France in 1993, at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.
Today, this proposal is as relevant as ever and may be used as a foundation for the development of the main component element of the GCS - the transparency regime for launches of space delivery vehicles and ballistic missiles.
From contacts with other States, we know that similar ideas have been voiced, for instance, by our Australian colleagues. Our colleagues from Canada and Great Britain have also expressed several useful ideas related to missile non-proliferation.
All these proposals have one in common, - the recognition of the necessity to develop a global norm and international co-operation in the missile sphere. Naturally, they comprised the foundation of our conceptual approach.
In September 1998, Russia and the USA adopted a Joint Statement on the Exchange of Information on Missile Launches and Early Warning. This Statement, made on a bilateral basis, contains an important provision that Russia and the United States shall study the possibility of establishing a multilateral notification regime for planned launches of ballistic missiles and space delivery vehicles, open also for other States.
In 1999, at its 54th session, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted a resolution proposed by Iran in which it decided to consider the missile issue "in all of its aspects" at its 55th session. This resolution, in our opinion, makes it possible to raise in the UN General Assembly any issue of interest to the global society related to the issue of missiles, including the issue of establishing the GCS which we are discussing today.
Today's forum makes it possible for all interested States to jointly consider the possibility and advisability of establishing, within the Global Control System, a universal transparency regime for launches of ballistic missiles and space delivery vehicles, including, as a component, a multilateral advance notification regime for planned launches of such missiles, as suggested by several states on various occasions.
We would like stress once again that the idea of GCS did not arise in an empty space - it absorbed proposals of several countries, relies upon them and develops them, which allows us to say that the idea of a Global Control System for the Non-Proliferation of Missiles and Missile Technology has been, from the very beginning, a collective international idea. We should continue to stick to this approach in considering, elaborating and implementing this idea.
During the formulation of the idea of establishing a global control system (GCS) for the non-proliferation of missiles and missile technology, the Russian Federation proceeded from the following basic premises:
the process of global proliferation of missiles and missile technology continues and has a tendency to expand;
non-proliferation regimes for weapons of mass destruction and their delivery vehicles can only be effective if, in the aggregate, they constitute a comprehensive, well thought out structure, the components of which are directed toward the resolution of one or another group of tasks, subordinated to a common goal;
the goal of such a structure of non-proliferation regimes, as well as the tasks of its components, should be recognized by the world community and supported by it and it should be closely related to a most important world problem - the limitation, reduction and prohibition of various types of weapons of mass destruction.
The Global Control System seems to conform to such an approach in all ways. In essence, the GCS is directed toward achieving the same non-proliferation goals as the existing limiting regimes, but accomplishes its own group of tasks related to missiles and missile technology. In this regard, the GCS supplements the structure of non-proliferation regimes. The tasks of the GCS, as we can see from the reaction of a large number of states to the idea of its establishment, are recognized and supported by a significant portion of global society. Finally, the tasks of the GCS lie in the path of the common task - reduction of the missile nuclear arms in the world.
There is reason to believe that the Global Control System, as it is planned, will occupy its own, presently still unfilled, niche in resolving problems of non-proliferation.
As we can see from the surveys of existing international monitoring mechanisms and legal norms in the missile and missile technology fields, as well as the proposals regarding monitoring issues in the missile field, put forward by various states, the prevention or reduction of the danger of using missiles in peacetime, including the reduction of the risk of other states' misperception of conducted launches (misinterpretation of the situation), the establishment of "rules of conduct" in the missile field, and the voluntary and conscious renunciation of possession of missile delivery vehicles for WMD and associated technologies remain serious problems requiring resolution. The resolution of these problems is unavoidably linked to providing transparency of missile activity, in particular missile launches, factors motivating States to develop missile technologies and possess missile delivery vehicles for WMD, guaranteeing the security of a state given its voluntary renunciation of the possession of such missiles, and to providing incentives for a State not to engage in proliferation of missiles and missile technology. This is by no means a complete list of what will lie at the foundation of preventing or reducing the danger of using missiles, and establishing "rules of conduct" in the missile field but, it represents an important portion which, in many respects, determines the position of a state with a decision to make whether to possess or not to possess missile technology. It is well known that a number of states have voluntarily and consciously abandoned national missile programs and a number of states have continued their implementation.
The Global Control System is directed toward the resolution specifically of such tasks.
The concept of the GCS will be presented today in several reports of Russian experts, therefore we will now only give its general characteristics.
Conceptually, GCS, as we envision it, represents a system of international regimes and mechanisms, including:
a missile launch transparency regime;
a mechanism to guarantee the security of GCS participating States which have renounced the possession of missile delivery vehicles for WMD;
an incentive mechanism for States which have renounced the possession of missile delivery means for WMD;
an international consultations mechanism in the framework of GCS for improving the regimes and mechanisms of the Global Control System and resolving issues that arise.
The missile launch transparency regime provides for the voluntary provision of information (the timing, scope and format of which shall be agreed) on ballistic missile and space launch vehicle launches being prepared or already conducted, as well as the technical monitoring of missile launches with the help of detection and observation means. The implementation of the missile launch transparency regime could be assigned to a suitable international technical center. The establishment of the transparency regime and corresponding international technical center should, in our opinion, be based upon multilateral agreement.
The GCS participating States which renounce the possession of missile delivery vehicles for WMD should be protected from infringements on their security through the provision of the appropriate guarantees. The nature of such guarantees and the mechanism for their provision should, in our view, be determined on an international basis and set forth in an appropriate agreement.
With regard to states declining the possession of missile delivery vehicles for WMD, one should use stimulation and various types of encouragement, for instance, facilitating the development of national space programs and the participation of these states in the utilization of the results of space activity.
It seems to us that the international consultations mechanism in the framework of GCS is an important element of the system, a working instrument through which the regimes and mechanisms of the Global Control System may be improved and disputed issues and ambiguities may be' resolved. In a word, it is a mechanism for ensuring the effective operation of the Global Control System for the non-proliferation of missiles and missile technology.
Obviously, such a multifaceted, complicated system like the GCS should have in its structure an international body, operating under the aegis of the UN, coordinating the activity of the system, its regimes and mechanisms, examining the issues of its development and improvement, and managing its consultative processes. The organizational form of such a body could be defined through joint efforts and recorded in an international agreement.
We would like to draw attention to the legal aspect of the establishment and operation of the GCS. Undoubtedly, certain agreements must be reached, otherwise, it will be difficult to implement the GCS idea. But, it seems to us that the preparation in the future of such agreements should not become a deterring or frightening factor, inasmuch as key principles upon which, in the opinion of the Russian side, the GCS should be developed are difficult not to support. They are as follows:
the development of the GCS on a multilateral basis;
the equal rights of GCS participants;
the openness of the GCS for the participation of all interested states;
the voluntary nature of participation in the GCS;
the operation of the GCS under the aegis of the UN;
the phased development of the GCS.
The development of the GCS from the very first steps on a multilateral basis precludes giving the system the status of a "closed club" for the select. All participants shall enjoy equal rights during the development and operation of the system.
The principle of openness of the system provides no basis for possible suspicions concerning a conspiracy of a tight circle of countries, which possess missile technology, to act without consideration of the interests of other states.
The voluntary nature of participation in the GCS precludes the danger of being lured into a "trap" and presupposes a conscious agreement to follow the "norms of conduct" that will underlie the system.
The operation of the GCS under the aegis of the UN reflects the compliance of states participating in the system with the internationally recognized norms set forth in the Charter of the Organization. This should also be taken into account while developing a legal basis for this new multilateral mechanism which is unprecedented in international experience.
Evidently, it is advisable to create such a complex and multifaceted system as the GCS in stages.
Again, we would like to highlight a few important aspects:
the GCS is a control system, but is not limiting, not prohibitive. The GCS ensures the transparency of the participantsí activities;
the GCS is not a discriminatory mechanism, but one ensuring equal rights of all its participants;
the GCS is not based on coercive measures. It uses incentives and assurances;
the essence of the GCS is to motivate a state to reduce to a maximum extent the danger of using missiles in peace time, including reduction of the risk of misperception by other states of launches conducted, to work out "norms 'of conduct" in the missile field, to voluntarily and consciously follow those norms and to voluntarily and consciously renounce the possession of WMD missile delivery vehicles and related technologies.
The Russian Side today does not intend to present the GCS concept in all its details. First, it is unlikely that anyone has prepared answers to all the questions arising from the GCS idea. Secondly, and we've already mentioned this, the GCS idea, from the very beginning, is the result of collective efforts of many states. It is on a multilateral basis that it must be developed and detailed. We are convinced that drawing all interested states into the implementation of the GCS concept is a sound foundation for the successful resolution of this difficult task.
In further presentations of Russian experts, our preliminary vision of the essence of the basic components of the Global Control System for the non-proliferation of missiles and missile technology will be set forth.
In the framework of the Cologne Initiative of the Russian President on the establishment of the GCS, three main avenues of work are proposed for the purpose of voluntary participation of interested states in establishing the transparency regime of missile launches conducted by the regime's participating states for the prevention or reduction of the danger of using missiles in peace time, including the reduction of the risk of misperception by other states of missile launches conducted (misinterpretation of the situation) and, in the final analysis, the reduction of the likelihood of regional and global military conflicts.
The missile launch transparency regime is supposed to be established in stages. The basic stages shall be:
Stage 1 - Establishment of a multilateral pre-launch and post-launch notification regime.
Stage 2 - Establishment of an appropriate international center;
Stage 3 - Establishment of a regime for monitoring (observation and verification) the conduct of missile launches.
The time intervals for moving from the first to the subsequent stages shall be determined by mutual agreement of the Parties.
The missile launch notification exchange regime should be based on unconditional fulfillment of the following fundamental principles:
Non-damaging. The transmission of information should not cause damage to the interests of the participating states transmitting the information or to the security of any other (third) state. The information being transmitted for the purposes of the notification exchange regime cannot be provided to states not participating in the regime.
Consistency. Cooperation in this area should not conflict with existing bilateral and multilateral agreements on strategic stability and international security.
Openness. Any state sharing the goals of the regime and prepared to fulfill the obligations of a member of the regime may be invited to participate in the regime.
Non-interference. The regime shall not provide for any interference by other states with national missile launch control systems.
Technical Compatibility. The equipment and software developed and used for the exchange of notifications at the Data Exchange Center and at the national centers of the Parties should be compatible.
Stage 1. The multilateral notification regime for missile launches, specifically those of ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles presumes that a participating state will voluntarily provide other countries with information on missile launches being prepared or conducted. Information on launches being prepared will allow other countries to have confidence that missile launches being conducted are not offensive, accidental or unauthorized by the leadership of the state (that is, they do not represent an act of terrorism) .
Information may be exchanged on missiles with a range of more than 1500 Km or a maximum altitude at the apex of its flight trajectory greater than 1000 Km. These proposed numerical parameters are tentative and subject to agreement.
The Parties shall provide pre-launch and post-launch notifications.
Pre-launch notifications shall be provided no more than (30 days) and no less than (24 hours) prior to the proposed launch date. Pre-launch information to be exchanged shall include the following:
proposed date and time of the launch;
general class of missile (IRBM, ICBM, SLBM, SLV) ;
geographic coordinates of the missile launch area (longitude and latitude); name of the position, range or area of ocean from which the missile launch is to be conducted;
geographic coordinates of the re-entry impact area - only for launches of ballistic missiles (longitude and latitude) ;
launch indication: multiple or single.
Post-launch notification (confirmation) shall be provided no later than (48 hours) following the launch. It shall include the following:
date and time of the launch.
The regime shall be of an open character and any state may join it. A condition for other states to join the regime should be their obligation to provide information on its BM and SLV launches to the data bank and to bear an appropriate share of the financial expenses. All states participating in the regime will have equal rights of access to the information provided by the other countries.
Stage 2. The International Missile Launch Data Exchange Center shall be a consultative and technical body for accommodating the equipment necessary for the operation of the multilateral missile launch notification regime shall be located and holding operational consultations on routine issues which arise.
The primary tasks of the Data Exchange Center are:
to receive, process, and systematize data on planned and conducted launches of ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles;
to formulate and convey reports containing information on planned and conducted launches of ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles to regime participants;
to organize operational consultations of representatives of participating states on issues related to the conduct of launches of ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles;
The Data Exchange Center may be located in Moscow, Russia, or in another city as agreed by the parties. A computer database shall be located at the Center in which notifications sent to the Center by all participating states will be kept.
The center will accommodate a computerized database where the notifications sent to the center by the participating States will be stored.
Our experts have carefully studied the issue to show that the exchange of notifications may be carried out using the Internet network and electronic mail. In the computerized database of the center a separate partition will be established for each participating State with respective Internet pages. The format and contents of the page should be unform for all the States participating in the multilateral regime. Each participant in the regime will have its electronic identification code for confirming its authority. The receipt of the data will be acknowledged in a confirmation message (an electronic receipt) to be sent to the sender of the information. Encoding may be used to secure confidentiality of the information. In case of need for an additional exchange of data or receiving confirmations of the launches conducted the participants in the regime may use electronic mail. To ensure access to the network special communications lines with appropriate transmission rate will be established.
The center will come under the general supervision of the GCS co-ordination body. Direct supervision of the centerís daily activities may be exercised on a rotational basis by representatives of the States participating in the regime. The supervisors of the center will exercise routine management of the centerís activities and will bear responsibility for accomplishing the tasks assigned to the center. The GCS co-ordination body may set up a special commission for the oversight of the centerís activities.
The maintenance of the center's infrastructure may be conducted by personnel employed on contract to the UN. Each State participating in the regime, if it is so desires, may have a computerized workstation at the center for its representative. The duties and work procedures of the national representatives may be agreed upon later. The center will be connected through telecommunications lines with the relevant national bodies of the participating States for speedy resolution of issues related to missile launches.
Stage 3. The establishment (observation and verification) of a regime to monitor missile launches is the final step in implementing the missiles launches transparency regime and may serve as a supplemental verification measure to ensure correct and timely notifications of missile launches. Information on the detected missile launches on the global scale may be provided either by the national detection means, which several States have at their disposal, or by means specially created and placed at the disposal of the international community. These means may be both mobile and stationary. In each case the need for monitoring and its timeframes will be jointly decided by the representatives of the States participating in the regime.
The results of monitoring would be made available to all States participating in the regime in the form of special reports. No information on the missiles initial trajectory will be required.
The monitoring reports on missile launches may contain the following parameters:
nationality of the missile;
detection time of a missile launch;
general classification of a missile (MRBM, ICBM, SLBM, SLV);
geographic area of a missile launch;
geographic area of a missile impact (if any).
The launch and impact areas shall be designated by the geographic coordinates of the boundary points or the center of the circle with indication of the radius. The sizes of their designations should be agreed upon in advance by the Parties.
The monitoring reports are supposed to be displayed at the workstations at the data exchange center and transmitted to the relevant national centers in an agreed tabular form. This information will be then stored in a special database. In addition, the information received may be depicted graphically on the digital map of a missile launch area.
Thus, the step by step implementation of a comprehensive and universal missile launch transparency regime will allow to create a most wanted international mechanism for preventing or reducing the threat of using missiles in peacetime, including the risk of the strong reaction to launches by other States. At the same time, it is, in and of itself, a necessary component of the resolution of the problem of limiting the global proliferation of missiles and missile technologies.
The States participating in a Global Control System for the Non-Proliferation of Missiles and Missile Technology which do not possess or renounce the possession of missile delivery systems for WMD should be given assurances that if they fall victim to an act of aggression or become the object of the threat of aggression with the use of missile delivery systems for WDM the Security Council and, above all, the GCS participants possessing missile weapons will take immediate steps in accordance with the provisions of the UN Charter.
The character of such assurances and means of their provision should be internationally determined and embodied in a relevant arrangement, for example, in the form of a special resolution of the UN General Assembly or separate declarations or a joint statement of GCS participating States.
Such an arrangement should provide that in the event of aggression with the use of missile delivery systems for WMD or the threat of such aggression against a State participating in the Global Control System for Non-Proliferation of Missiles and Missile Technology, which do not possess or has renounced missile delivery systems for WMD, any GCS participating State may bring this issue to the attention of the Security Council in order it may take immediate measures to provide assistance, in accordance with the provisions of the UN Charter, to the State falling victim to an act of aggression or becoming the object of the threat of such aggression, while the Member States of the Security Council possessing missile weapons will urge the Security Council to take measures to provide assistance, in accordance with the provisions of the UN Charter, to the State falling victim to aggression.
The provision of assistance to such a GCS participating State which does not possess missile weapons may include an investigation of the situation and the required measures aimed at settling the dispute and restoring international peace and security.
In addition, in response to the request of a victim of aggression with the use of missile delivery systems for WMD, the GCS participating States may also take necessary measures to provide the victim with technical, medical, scientific or humanitarian assistance and recommend the Security Council the appropriate procedures with regard to the compensation, in accordance with international law, by the aggressor for losses, destruction or other damage caused by the aggression.
States possessing missile delivery systems for WMD may also provide the GCS participating States which do not possess or have renounced the possession of such missiles assurances that they will not use ballistic missiles against those States.
Naturally, States may assume the obligation to renounce the possession of missile delivery systems for WMD on a voluntary basis being aware of their responsibility for the maintenance and strengthening of international stability. The Russian Side proceeds from the assumption that high political discipline of those States should be not only welcomed by the international community but should be also encouraged and stimulated. States which have chosen to abandon military missile technologies should be genuinely interested in implementing this important decision.
In the practice of international relations certain experience has been accumulated in the use of so-called compensatory measures, which stimulate the responsibility of States on the international arena. Well-known, for example, is the approach, used in the legal sphere, of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and in the practice of its implementation. Article IV of this Treaty states that: " All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials, and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy." Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing alone or together with other states or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon states Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world." That provision of the NPT was intended to stimulate the joining of new participant from among those states trying to develop peaceful nuclear activities. The basic channel for providing assistance to NPT participating states in the area of application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is the Technical Assistance and Cooperation Program of the IAEA.
It appears to us that with appropriate adaptation this experience might be used in the establishment of the Global Control System for the Non-Proliferation of Missiles and Missile Technology. We believe that filling this incentive regime with a specific set of stimuli to give it the maximum effectiveness should be the subject of collective creative activity taking into account the proposals of separate countries or groups of countries. This would enable us to give such a system a flexible character and to build it, taking into account specific concerns. Russia is prepared to discuss this important aspect of the problem of GCS.
Now we would like to clarify one of the directions in which, in our view, we may go during the establishment of the incentive regime. The framework of this direction was highlighted in sufficient detail in documents at the UN Basic Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space - UNISPACE III (Vienna, 19-30 July, 1999). There, the directions of the incentive activities in the political, economic and humanitarian spheres were formulated.
For example, it would be possible to examine the possibility of providing assistance to states, especially developing nations, in using the results of space research for the purpose of facilitating stable development; in establishing or strengthening national mechanisms ensuring appropriate development of their own peaceful space activities; in widening possibilities in the area of training and preparation of personnel in sphere related to mastering space; and in improving the exchange of information on the results of space activities. The Vienna Declaration of UNISPACE III also spoke of the necessity of taking measures directed toward the search for new and non-traditional sources of financing on an international level for facilitating the implementation of the recommendations of that Conference.
In this manner, the GCS may
have in its structure a mechanism providing, in political language, a
"dual positive result:" on one hand, a justified renunciation of
military missile technology, on the other hand, stimulation of international
cooperation in peaceful space activities.