S. Hrg. 105-183 CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION ======================================================================= HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION __________ Appendix Conditions to the Chemical Weapons Convention.................... 261
A P P E N D I X ---------- Conditions to the Chemical Weapons Convention (1) Effect of Article XXII Summary: The Senate reserves the right to add reservations to the resolution of ratification, despite the ban (in Article XXII of the Convention) on reservations to the Convention. This condition asserts the Senate's right under the U.S. Constitution, but does not exercise it. Text: (1) Effect of Article XXII. Upon the deposit of the United States instrument of ratification. The President shall certify to the Congress that the United States has informed all other States Parties to the Convention that the Senate reserves the right, pursuant to the Constitution, to offer advice and consent to ratification of the Convention subject to reservations, notwithstanding Article XXII of the Convention. (2) Financial Contributions (Helms #3) Summary: Requires statutory authorization and appropriation for payments or assistance to the Organization. Text: (2) Financial Contributions. (A) Notwithstanding any provision of the Convention, no funds may be drawn from the Treasury of the United States for payments or assistance (including the transfer of in-kind items) under paragraph 16 of Article IV, paragraph 19 of Article V, paragraph 7 of Article VIII, paragraph 23 of Article IX, Article X, or any other provision of the Convention, without statutory authorization and appropriation. (3) Establishment of an Internal Oversight Office (Helms #4) Summary: Requires the equivalent of an independent OPCW Inspector General's Office by late December 1997; withholds 50 percent of regular U.S. contributions to the OPCW, beginning April 29, 1998, if the required independent oversight office has not been established. Text: (3) Establishment of an Internal Oversight Office. (A) No later than 240 days after the deposit of the instrument of ratification of the United States to the Convention (in this resolution referred to as the ``United States instrument of ratification''), the President shall certify to the Congress that the current internal audit office of the Preparatory Commission has been expanded into an independent internal oversight office whose functions will be transferred to the Organization upon its establishment. The independent internal oversight office shall be obligated to protect confidential information pursuant to the obligations of the Confidentiality Annex. The independent internal oversight office shall-- (i) make investigations and reports relating to all programs of the Organization; (ii) undertake both management and financial audits, including-- (I) an annual assessment verifying that classified and confidential information is stored and handled securely pursuant to the general obligations set forth in Article VIII and in accordance with all provisions of the Annex on the Protection of Confidential Information; and (II) an annual assessment of laboratories established pursuant to Paragraph 55 of Part II of the Verification Annex to ensure the Director General is carrying out his functions pursuant to Paragraph 56 of Part II of the Verification Annex; (iii) undertake performance evaluations annually to ensure the Organization has complied to the extent practicable with the recommendations of the independent internal oversight office; (iv) have access to all records relating to the programs and operations of the Organization; (v) have direct and prompt access to any official of the Organization; and (vi) be required to protect the identity of, and prevent reprisals against, all complainants. (B) The Organization shall ensure, to the extent practicable, compliance with recommendations of the independent internal oversight office, and shall ensure that annual and other relevant reports by the independent internal oversight office are made available to all member states pursuant to the requirements established in the Confidentiality Annex. (C) Until a certification is made under subsection (A), 50 percent of the amount for United States contributions to the regular budget of the Organization assessed pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article VIII shall be withheld, in addition to any other amounts required to withheld by any other provision of law. (D) Notwithstanding the requirements of this paragraph, for the first year of the Organization's operation, ending on April 29, 1998, the United States shall make its full contribution to the regular budget of the Organization assessed pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article VIII. (E) For purposes of this paragraph, the term ``internal oversight office'' means the head of an independent office (or other independent entity) established by the Organization to conduct and supervise objective audits, inspections, and investigations relating to the programs and operations of the Organization. (4) Cost-Sharing Arrangements (Helms #5) Summary: Requires cost-sharing for ``any new research or development expenditures for the primary purpose of refining or improving the Organization's regime for verification of compliance under the Convention, including the training of inspectors and the provision of detection equipment and on-site analysis sampling and analysis techniques.'' Permits programs to improve U.S. monitoring without cost- sharing. We would not want the United States to do all the expensive research and development needed to maximize verification of compliance with the CWC, and not be reimbursed by other countries for such efforts. It will still be possible for U.S. agencies to pursue R&D programs so as to improve U.S. monitoring of chemical weapons, however, and cost-sharing arrangements need not be in place unless and until the United States wants to share the results with the OPCW. Text: (4) Cost-Sharing Arrangements. (A) Prior to the deposit of the United States instrument of ratification, and annually thereafter, the President shall submit a report to Congress identifying all cost-sharing arrangements with the Organization. (B) The United States shall not undertake any new research or development expenditures for the primary purpose of refining or improving the Organization's regime for verification of compliance under the Convention, including the training of inspectors and the provision of detection equipment and on-site analysis sampling and analysis techniques, or share the articles, items, or services resulting from any research and development undertaken previously, without first having concluded and submitted to the Congress a cost- sharing arrangement with the Organization. (C) Nothing in this paragraph may be construed as limiting or constricting in any way the ability of the United States to pursue unilaterally any project undertaken solely to increase the capability of United States means for monitoring compliance with the Convention. (5) Intelligence Sharing and Safeguards (Helms #6) Summary: Requires interagency Intelligence Community approval and sanitization of intelligence information before release to the OPCW, such that there would be only minimal damage from unauthorized disclosure. The Director of Central Intelligence may waive these requirements on a case-by-case basis, with notice to appropriate com- mittees of Congress. Any unauthorized disclosure by the OPCW must be reported to Congress within 15 days of after the executive branch learns of it. Text: (5) Intelligence Sharing and Safeguards.-- (A) Provision of Intelligence Information to the Organization.-- (i) In General.--No United States intelligence information may be provided to the Organization or any organization affiliated with the Organization, or to any officials or employees thereof, unless the President certifies to the appropriate committees of Congress that the Director of Central Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, has established and implemented procedures, and has worked with the Organization to ensure implementation of procedures, for protecting from unauthorized disclosure United States intelligence sources and methods connected to such information. These procedures shall include, but not be limited to-- (I) offering and provision of advice and assistance to the Organization in establishing and maintaining the necessary measures to ensure that inspectors and other staff members of the Technical Secretariat meet the highest standards of efficiency, competence, and integrity, pursuant to subparagraph l(b) of the Confidentiality Annex, and in establishing and maintaining a stringent regime governing the handling of confidential information by the Technical Secretariat, pursuant to paragraph 2 of the Confidentiality Annex; (II) explicit recognition, in each case in which intelligence information is to be provided to the Organization or any organization affiliated with the Organization, or to any officials or employees thereof, of the risks of unauthorized disclosure of the U.S. information to be provided to the Organization, and determination that such disclosure would result in no more than minimal damage to national security; (III) sanitization of intelligence information that is to be provided to the Organization or any organization affiliated with the Organization, or to any officials or employees thereof, to remove all information that could betray intelligence sources and methods; and (IV) interagency United States Intelligence Community approval for any release of intelligence information to the Organization or any organization affiliated with the Organization, or to any officials or employees thereof, no matter how thoroughly it has been sanitized. (ii) Waiver Authority.-- (I) In General.--The Director of Central Intelligence may waive the application of clause (i) if the Director of Central Intelligence certifies in writing to the appropriate committees of Congress that providing such information to the Organization or an organization affiliated with the Organization, or to any official or employee thereof, is in the vital national security interests of the United States and that all possible measures to protect such information have been taken, except that such waiver must be made for each instance such information is provided, or for each such document provided. In the event that multiple waivers are issued within a single week, a single certification to the appropriate committees of Congress may be submitted, specifying each waiver issued during that week. (II) Delegation of Duties.--The Director of Central Intelligence may not delegate any duty of the Director of Central Intelligence under this subsection. (B) Periodic and Special Reports.-- (i) Periodic Reports.-- (I) In General.--The President shall report periodically, but not less frequently than semiannually, to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives on the types and volume of intelligence information provided to the Organization or any organization affiliated with the Organization, or to any officials or employees thereof, and the purposes for which it was provided during the period covered by the report. (II) Exemption.--For purposes of subclause (i), intelligence information provided to the Organization or any organization affiliated with the Organization, or to any officials or employees thereof, does not cover information that is provided only to, and only for the use of, appropriately cleared United States Government personnel serving with the Organization or any organization affiliated with the Organization. (ii) Special Reports.-- (I) Report on Procedures.--Accompanying the certification provided pursuant to subparagraph (A)(i), the President shall provide a detailed report to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives identifying the procedures established for protecting intelligence sources and methods when sanitized intelligence information is provided pursuant to this section. (II) Reports on Unauthorized Disclosures.--The President shall report to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives, within 15 days after it has become known to the U.S. Government, regarding any unauthorized disclosure of intelligence information provided by the United States to the Organization. (C) Delegation of Duties.--The President may not delegate or assign the duties of the President under this section. (D) Relationship to Existing Law.--Nothing in this paragraph may he construed to-- (i) impair or otherwise affect the authority of the Director of Central Intelligence to protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure pursuant to section 103(c)(5) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403- 3(c)(5)); or (ii) supersede or otherwise affect the provisions of title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.). (E) Definitions.--In this section: (i) Appropriate Committees of Congress.--The term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Committee on International Relations and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. (ii) Organization.--The term ``Organization'' means the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons established under the Convention and includes any organ of that Organization and any board or working group, such as the Scientific Advisory Board, that may be established by it. (iii) Organization Affiliated with the Organization.--The term ``organization affiliated with the Organization'' includes, but is not limited to, the Provisional Technical Secretariat under the Convention and any laboratory certified by the Director- General of the Organization as designated to perform analytical or other functions. (6) Amendments to the Convention (Helms #7) Summary: Requires the United States to vote on all proposed amendments and requires the executive branch to submit all amendments to the Senate for its advice and consent. Text: (6) Amendments to the Convention. (A) A United States representative will be present at all Amendment Conferences and will cast a vote, either affirmative or negative, on all proposed amendments made at such conferences. (B) The President shall submit to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification under Article 11, Section 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution of the United States any amendment to the Convention adopted by an Amendment Conference. (7) Continuing Vitality of the Australia Group and National Export Controls (Helms #11) Summary: Requires the President to certify, before depositing instruments of ratification, that the CWC will in no way weaken the Australia Group, and that each member of the Group agrees there is no CWC requirement to weaken their export controls. Requires annual certification that Australia Group controls have not been weakened and remain effective or, if this cannot be certified, consultation with the Senate on a resolution of continued adherence to the CWC. Requires the President to block any attempt within the Australia Group to change the Group's view of its obligations under the CWC. Text: (7) Continuing Vitality of the Australia Group and National Export Controls. (A) The Senate declares that the collapse of the informal forum of states known as the ``Australia Group,'' either though changes in membership or lack of compliance with common export controls, or the substantial weakening of common Aus- tralia Group export controls and non-proliferation measures in force on the date of United States ratification of the Convention, would constitute a fundamental change in circumstances to United States ratification of the Convention. (B) Prior to the deposit of the United States instrument of ratification, the President shall certify to Congress that-- (i) nothing in the Convention obligates the United States to accept any modification, change in scope, or weakening of its national export controls. The United States understands that the maintenance of national restrictions on trade in chemicals and chemical production technology is fully compatible with the provisions of the Convention, including Article XI(2), and solely within the sovereign jurisdiction of the United States; (ii) the Convention preserves the right of State Parties, unilaterally or collectively, to maintain or impose export controls on chemicals and related chemical production technology for foreign policy or national security reasons, notwithstanding Article XI(2); and (iii) each Member-State of the Australia Group, at the highest diplomatic levels, has officially communicated to the U.S. Government its understanding and agreement that export control and nonproliferation measures which the Australia Group has undertaken are fully compatible with the provisions of the Convention, including Article XI(2), and its commitment to maintain in the future such export controls and nonproliferation measures against non-Australia Group members. (C) (i) The President shall certify to Congress on an annual basis that-- (a) Australia Group members continue to maintain an equally effective or more comprehensive control over the export of toxic chemicals and their precursors, dual-use processing equipment, human, animal and plant pathogens and toxins with potential biological weapons application, and dual-use biological equipment, as that afforded by the Australia Group as of the date of ratification of this Convention by the United States; and (b) the Australia group remains a viable mechanism for limiting the spread of chemical and biological weapons-related materials and technology, and that the effectiveness of the Australia Group has not been undermined by changes in membership, lack of compliance with common export controls and nonproliferation measures, or weakening of common controls and nonproliferation measures in force as of the date of ratification of this Convention by the United States. (ii) In the event that the President is, at any time, unable to make the certifications described in subparagraph (C)(i), the President shall consult with the Senate for the purposes of obtaining a resolution of continued adherence to the Convention, notwithstanding the fundamental change in circumstance. (D) The President shall consult periodically, but not less frequently than twice a year, with the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives, on Australia Group export control and nonproliferation measures. If any Australia Group member adopts a position at variance with the certifications and understandings provided under subparagraph (B), or should seek to gain Australia Group acquiescence or approval for an interpretation that various provisions of the Convention require it to remove chemical-weapons related export controls against any State Party to the Convention, the President shall block any effort by that Australia Group member to secure Australia Group approval of such a position or interpretation. (E) For the purposes of this paragraph-- (i) ``Australia Group'' means the informal forum of states, chaired by Australia, whose goal is to discourage and impede chemical and biological weapons proliferation by harmonizing national export controls, chemical weapons precursor chemicals, biological weapons pathogens, and dual-use production equipment, and through other measures: and (ii) ``Highest diplomatic levels'' means at the level of a senior official with the power to authoritatively represent their government, and does not mean a diplomatic representative of that government to the United States. (8) Negative Security Assurances (Helms #12) Summary: Requires a classified Presidential report regarding the impact of CWC on U.S. options for responding to chemical or biological attacks, and on the assurances we offer to other countries that foreswear the use of nuclear weapons. Some Members are concerned because ratification of the CWC will leave the United States unable to threaten retaliatory use of chemical weapons against a state that used chemical weapons on U.S. or allied forces. The United States has no in- tention of using chemical weapons, however, even in response to a foreign chemical weapon attack. Even before the CWC was negotiated, the United States committed itself to the destruction of nearly all U.S. chemical weapons. This condition requires the President to submit a classified report on the impact of CWC upon U.S. ``negative security assurances'' to other countries. Such assurances are the ``umbrella'' that we offer to countries that agree to forego weapons of mass destruction. Text: (8) Negative Security Assurances. (A) In forswearing the possession of chemical weapons retaliatory capability under the Convention, the Senate understands that deterrence of attack by chemical weapons requires a reevaluation of the negative security assurances extended to non-nuclear-weapon states. (B) Accordingly, 180 days after the deposit of the United States instrument of ratification, the President shall submit to the Congress a classified report setting forth the findings of a detailed review of United States policy on negative security assurances, including a determination of the appropriate responses to the use of chemical or biological weapons against the United States military, United States citizens, allies, and third parties. (9) Protection of Advanced Biotechnology (Helms #13) Summary: Requires the President to certify, prior to the deposit of the United States instrument of ratification and annually thereafter, that the legitimate commercial activities and interests of U.S. chemical, biotechnology, and pharmaceutical firms are not being significantly harmed by the Convention. The Administration is prepared to certify, both now and annually, that the CWC's limits on the production and use of the most toxic chemical weapons and their precursors are not significantly harming the legitimate commercial activities and interests of U.S. chemical, biotechnology, and pharmaceutical firms. Most of those firms played a major role in the negotiation of this Convention, of course, so they have long since signed up to any sacrifices that U.S. firms may have to make in order to limit the ability of rogue states to obtain and use chemical weapons. And the Reagan, Bush and Clinton Administrations have all taken extraordinary measures to limit the impact of the CWC upon U.S. businesses. Text: (9) Protection of Advanced Biotechnology. Prior to the deposit of the United States instrument of ratification, and on January 1 of every year thereafter, the President shall certify to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Speaker of the House of Representatives that the legitimate commercial activities and interests of the chemical, biotechnology, and pharmaceutical firms in the United States are not being significantly harmed by the limitations of the Convention on access to, and production of, those chemicals and toxins listed in Schedule 1 contained in the Annex on Chemicals of the Convention. (10) Monitoring and Verification of Compliance (Helms #14) Summary: Requires detailed annual country-by-country reports on chemical weapons developments and U.S. intelligence coverage, as well as at least quarterly briefings on U.S. actions to pursue CWC compliance issues. We all know that monitoring and verification of some aspects of CWC compliance will be difficult. This fact of life has prompted understandable concern on the part of some Members, and the administration is prepared to accept a condition that requires both periodic reports and prompt notice regarding world chemical weapons programs and the status of CWC compliance. The executive branch would also offer briefings on current compliance issues, including issues to be raised in OPCW meetings and the results of those meetings. Text: (10) Monitoring and Verification of Compliance. (A) The Senate declares that-- (i) the Convention is in the interests of the United States only if all parties to the Convention are in strict compliance with the terms of the Convention as submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification, such compli- ance being measured by performance and not by efforts, intentions, or commitments to comply; and (ii) the Senate expects all parties to the Convention to be in strict compliance with their obligations under the terms of the Convention, as submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification; (B) Given its concern about the intelligence community's low level of confidence in its ability to monitor compliance with the Convention, the Senate expects the executive branch of Government to offer regular briefings, not less than four times a year, to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives on compliance issues related to the Convention. Such briefings shall include a description of all United States efforts in bilateral and multilateral diplomatic channels and forums to resolve compliance issues and shall include a complete description of-- (i) any compliance issues the United States plans to raise at meetings of the Organization, in advance of such meetings; (ii) any compliance issues raised at meetings of the Organization, within 30 days of each such meeting; (iii) any determination by the President that a party is in noncompliance with or is otherwise acting in a manner inconsistent with the object or purpose of the Convention, within 30 days of such a determination. (C) The President shall submit annually on January 1 to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives a full and complete classified and unclassified report setting forth-- (i) a certification of those priority countries included in the Intelligence Community's Monitoring Strategy, as defined by the Director of Central Intelligence's Arms Control Intelligence Staff and the National Intelligence Council, deter-mined to be in compliance with the Convention, on a country-by-country basis; (ii) for those countries not certified pursuant to clause (i), an identification and assessment of all compliance issues arising with regard to the adherence of the country to its obligations under the Convention; (iii) the steps the United States has taken, either unilaterally or in conjunction with another State Party-- (I) to initiate challenge inspections of the noncompliant party with the objective of demonstrating to the international community the act of noncompliance; (II) to call attention publicly to the activity in question; and (III) to seek on an urgent basis a meeting at the highest diplomatic level with the noncompliant party with the objective of bringing the noncompliant party into compliance. (iv) a determination of the military significance and broader security risks arising from any compliance issue identified pursuant to clause (ii); and (v) a detailed assessment of the responses of the noncompliant party in question to actions undertaken by the United States described in the report submitted pursuant to clause (iii). (D) On January 1, 1998, and annually thereafter, the Director of Central Intelligence shall submit to the Committees on Foreign Relations, Armed Services, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and to the Committees on International Relations, National Security, and Permanent Select Committee of the House of Representatives, a full and complete classified and unclassified report regarding-- (i) the status of chemical weapons development, production, stockpiling, and use, within the meanings of the Convention, on a country-by-country basis; (ii) any information made available to the U.S. Government concerning the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, use, or direct or indirect transfer of novel agents, including any unitary or binary chemical weapon comprised of chemical components not identified on the schedules of the Annex on Chemicals, by any country; (iii) the extent of trade in chemicals potentially relevant to chemical weapons programs, including all Australia Group chemicals and chemicals identified on the schedules of the Annex on Chemicals, on a country-by-country basis; (iv) the monitoring responsibilities, practices, and strategies of the intelligence community and a determination of the level of confidence of the intelligence community (as defined in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947) with respect to each specific monitoring task undertaken, including an assessment by the intelligence community of the national aggregate data provided by parties to the Organization, on a country-by- country basis; (v) an identification of how U.S. national intelligence means, including national technical means and human intelligence, is being marshaled together with the Convention's verification provisions to monitor compliance with the Convention; and (vi) the identification of chemical weapons development, production, stockpiling, or use, within the meanings of the Convention, by subnational groups, including terrorist and paramilitary organizations. (E) The report required under subparagraph (D) shall include a full and complete classified annex submitted solely to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and to the Permanent Select Committee of the House of Representatives regarding-- (i) a detailed and specific identification of all United States resources devoted to monitoring the Convention, including information on all expenditures associated with the monitoring of the Convention; and (ii) an identification of the priorities of the executive branch of Government for the development of new resources relating to detection and monitoring capabilities with respect to chemical and biological weapons, including a description of the steps being taken and resources being devoted to strengthening U.S. monitoring capabilities. (11) Enhancements to Robust Chemical and Biological Defenses (Helms #15) Summary: Requires the Secretary of Defense to ensure that U.S. forces are capable of carrying out required military missions in U.S. regional contingency plans, regardless of any foreign threat or use of chemical weapons, and that the U.S. Army Chemical School remains under the supervision of an Army general. Former Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger and others have asserted that ratifying CWC could lead to complacency regarding the need for chemical weapons defenses. This concern is frankly a bit mystifying. The fear of complacency persists, however, so the administration has agreed to a condition requiring the Secretary of Defense to ensure that U.S. forces are capable of carrying out required military missions in U.S. regional contingency plans, regardless of any foreign threat or use of chemical weapons. This means not only improving the defensive capabilities of U.S. forces, but also initiating discussions on chemical weapons defense with likely coalition partners and countries whose civilian personnel would support U.S. forces in a conflict. The Administration has also agreed to assure that the U.S. Army Chemical School remains under the supervision of an Army general. Text: (11) Enhancements to Robust Chemical and Biological Defenses. (A) It is the sense of the Senate that-- (1) chemical and biological threats to deployed U.S. Armed Forces will continue to grow in regions of concern around the world, and pose serious threats to U.S. power projection and forward deployment strategies; (2) chemical weapons or biological weapons use is a potential condition of future conflicts in regions of concern; (3) it is essential for the United States and key regional allies to preserve and further develop robust chemical and biological defenses; (4) the United States Armed Forces are inadequately equipped, organized, trained and exercised for chemical and biological defense against current and expected threats, and that too much reliance is placed on non-active duty forces, which receive less training and less modern equipment, for critical chemical and biological defense capabilities; (5) the lack of readiness stems from a de-emphasis of chemical and biological defenses within the executive branch of Government and the United States Armed Forces; (6) the armed forces of key regional allies and likely coalition partners, as well as civilians necessary to support U.S. military operations, are inadequately prepared and equipped to carry out essential missions in chemically and biologically contaminated environments; (7) congressional direction contained in the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 should lead to enhanced domestic preparedness to protect against chemical and biological weapons threats; and (8) the U.S. Armed Forces should place increased emphasis on potential threats to deployed U.S. Armed Forces and, in particular, make countering chemical and biological weapons use an organizing principle for U.S. defense strategy and development of force structure, doctrine, planning, training, and exercising policies of the U.S. Armed Forces. (B) The Secretary of Defense shall take those actions necessary to ensure that U.S. Armed Forces are capable of carrying out required military missions in U.S. regional contingency plans, despite the threat or use of chemical or biological weapons. In particular, the Secretary of Defense shall ensure that U.S. Armed Forces are effectively equipped, organized, trained and exercised (including at the large unit and theater level) to conduct operations in a chemically or biologically contaminated environment that are critical to the success of U.S. military plans in regional conflicts, including-- (1) deployment, logistics and reinforcement operations at key ports and airfields; (2) sustained combat aircraft sortie generation at critical regional airbases; and (3) ground force maneuvers of large units and divisions. (C) The Secretaries of Defense and State shall, as a priority matter, initiate discussions with key regional allies and likely regional coalition partners, including those countries where the U.S. currently deploys forces, where U.S. forces would likely operate during regional conflicts, or which would provide civilians necessary to support U.S. military operations, to determine what steps are necessary to ensure that Allied and coalition forces and other critical civilians are adequately equipped and prepared to operate in chemically- and biologically-contaminated environments. No later than one year after deposit of the United States instrument of ratification, the Secretaries of Defense and State shall provide a report to the Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House on the results of these discussions, plans for future discussions, measures agreed to improve the preparedness of foreign forces and civilians, and proposals for increased military assistance, including through the Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Financing and the International Military Education and Training programs pursuant to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. (D) The Secretary of Defense shall take those actions necessary to ensure that the United States Army Chemical School remains under the oversight of a general officer of the United States Army. (E) Given its concerns about the present state of chemical and biological defense readiness and training, it is the sense of the Senate that-- (1) the transfer, consolidation, and reorganization of the United States Army Chemical School, the Army should not disrupt or diminish the training and readiness of the United States Armed Forces to fight in a chemical-biological warfare environment; (2) the Army should continue to operate the Chemical Defense Training Facility at Fort McClellan until such time as the replacement training facility at Fort Leonard Wood is functional. (F) On January 1, 1998, and annually thereafter, the President shall submit a report to the Committees on Foreign Relations, Appropriations, and Armed Services and the Committees on International Relations, National Security, Appropriations, and Speaker of the House on previous, current, and planned chemical and biological weapons defense activities. The report shall include the following information for the previous fiscal year and for the next three fiscal years-- (1) Proposed solutions to each of the deficiencies in chemical and biological warfare defenses identified in the March 1996 General Accounting Office Report, titled ``Chemical and Biological Defense: Emphasis Remains Insufficient to Resolve Continuing Problems,'' and steps being taken pursuant to paragraph (B) of this section to ensure that the U.S. Armed Forces are capable of conducting required military operations to ensure the success of U.S. regional contingency plans despite the threat or use of chemical or biological weapons; (2) An identification of priorities of the executive branch of Government in the development of both active and passive chemical and biological defenses; (3) A detailed summary of all budget activities associated with the research, development, testing, and evaluation of chemical and biological defense programs; (4) A detailed summary of expenditures on research, development, testing, and evaluation, and procurement of chemical and biological defenses by fiscal years defense programs, department, and agency; (5) A detailed assessment of current and projected vaccine production capabilities and vaccine stocks, including progress in researching and developing a multivalent vaccine; (6) A detailed assessment of procedures and capabilities necessary to protect and decontaminate infrastructure to reinforce United States power-projection forces, including progress in developing a nonaqueous chemical decontamination capability; (7) The progress made in procuring light-weight personal protective gear and steps being taken to ensure that programmed procurement quantities are suffi- cient to replace expiring battle-dress overgarments and chemical protective overgarments to maintain required wartime inventory levels; (8) The progress in developing long-range standoff detection and identification capabilities and other battlefield surveillance capabilities for biological and chemical weapons, including progress on developing a multi-chemical agent detector, unmanned aerial vehicles, and unmanned ground sensors; (9) Progress in developing and deploying layered theater missile defenses for deployed U.S. Armed Forces which will provide greater geographic coverage against current and expected ballistic missile threats and will help mitigate chemical and biological contamination through higher altitude intercepts and boost-phase intercepts; (10) An assessment of the training and readiness of the United States Armed Forces to operate in a chemically or biologically contaminated environment and actions taken to sustain training and readiness, including at national combat training centers; (11) The progress in incorporating chemical and biological considerations into service and Joint exercises as well as simulations, models, and wargames and the conclusions drawn from these efforts about the U.S. capability to carry out required missions, including with coalition partners, in military contingencies; (12) The progress in developing and implementing service and joint doctrine for combat and non-combat operations involving adversaries armed with chemical or biological weapons, including efforts to update the range of service and joint doctrine to better address the wide range of military activities, including deployment, reinforcement and logistics operations in support of combat operations, and for the conduct of such operations in concert with coalition forces; and (13) The progress in resolving issues relating to the protection of United States population centers from chemical and biological attack, including plans for inoculation of populations, consequence management, and progress made in developing and deploying effective cruise missile defenses and a national ballistic missile defense. (12) Noncompliance (Helms #16) Summary: In the event of noncompliance by a State Party, requires the President to inform and consult with the Senate and to take a series of actions designed to expose noncompliance and to force compliance. These actions include making effective use of CWC provisions for challenge inspections, high-level diplomacy and U.N. sanctions. The President must also implement any sanctions required by U.S. law. If the noncompliance should persist for a year, the President must consult with the Senate regarding continued adherence to the Convention. Text: (12) Noncompliance. (A) If the President determines that persuasive information exists that a party to the Convention is maintaining a chemical weapons production or production mobilization capability, is developing new chemical agents, or is in violation of the Convention in any other manner so as to threaten the national security interests of the United States. Then the President shall-- (1) consult with, and promptly submit to, the Senate a report detailing the effect of such actions, (2) seek on an urgent basis a challenge inspection of the facilities of the relevant party in accordance with the provisions of the Convention with the objective of demonstrating to the international community the act of noncompliance; (3) seek, or encourage, on an urgent basis a meeting at the highest diplomatic level with the relevant party with the objective of bringing the noncompliant party into compliance, (4) implement prohibitions and sanctions against the relevant party as required by law; (5) if noncompliance has been determined, seek on an urgent basis within the Security Council of the United Nations a multilateral imposition of sanctions against the noncompliant party for the purposes of bringing the noncompliant party into compliance; and (6) in the event that noncompliance persists for a period of longer than 1 year after the date of determination made pursuant to subparagraph (A), promptly consult with the Senate for the purposes of obtaining a resolution of support of continued adherence to the Convention, notwithstanding the changed circumstances affecting the object and purpose of the Convention. (B) Nothing in this section may be construed to impair or otherwise affect the authority of the Director of Central Intelligence to protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure pursuant to section 103(c)(5) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(5)). (C) If the President determines that an action otherwise required under paragraph (A) would impair or otherwise affect the authority of the Director of Central Intelligence to protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure, he shall report that determination, together with a detailed written explanation of the basis for that determination, to the Chairmen of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence no later than 15 days after making such determination. (13) Primacy of the United States Constitution (Helms #17) Summary: Makes clear that the CWC does not contradict the U.S. Constitution. Some CWC opponents have said that on-site inspections would be conducted in violation of the U.S. Constitution. This is simply not the case. No administration would agree to a treaty that violated the Constitution, no treaty ever takes precedence over the Constitution, and only the United States interprets our Constitution. This condition states those facts. Text: (13) Primacy of the United States Constitution. Nothing in the Convention requires or authorizes legislation, or other action, by the United States prohibited by the Constitution of the United States, as interpreted by the United States. (14) Financing Russian Implementation (Helms #18) Summary: Requires the United States not to accept any effort by Russia to make Russia's CWC ratification contingent upon U.S. financial guarantees to cover Russian destruction costs. None of us would want the United States to be stuck with the bill for Russian destruction of their vast chemical weapons stockpile. So there is agreement on a condition that the United States shall not accept any Russian effort to condition its ratification of CWC upon the United States providing guarantees to pay for Russian implementation of CWC or of the 1990 Bilateral Destruction Agreement. Text: (14) Financing Russian Implementation. The United States understands that in order to be assured of the Russian commitment to a reduction in chemical weapons stockpiles, Russia must maintain a substantial stake in financing the implementation of both the 1990 Bilateral Destruction Agreement, and the Convention. The United States shall not accept any effort by Russia to make deposit of Russia's instrument of ratification contingent upon the United States providing financial guarantees to pay for implementation of commitments by Russia under the 1990 Bilateral Destruction Agreement or the Convention. (15) Assistance Under Article X (Helms #19) Summary: Requires the United States not to contribute to the voluntary fund for chemical weapons defense assistance to other States Parties, and limits U.S. assistance to certain states to medical antidotes and treatments. Opponents of CWC assert that Article X would require the United States to provide assistance and equipment to countries like Cuba to improve their chemical weapons defense capabilities. This is a misconception of paragraph 7 of Article X, which says: ``Each State Party undertakes to provide assistance through the Organization.'' Assistance may include ``detection equipment and alarm systems, protective equipment; decontamination equipment and decontaminants; medical antidotes and treatments; and advice on any of these protective measures.'' The rest of paragraph 7 of Article X makes clear that a State Party may simply declare what assistance it might provide in response to an appeal by the OPCW. CWC does not compel the United States to give any country, let alone an enemy like Cuba, anything more than medical assistance or advice. Text: (15) Assistance Under Article X. (A) Prior to the deposit of the United States instrument of ratification, the President shall certify to the Congress that the United States shall not provide assistance under paragraph 7(a) of Article X. (B) Prior to the deposit of the United States instrument of ratification, the President shall certify to the Congress that for any States Party the government of which is not eligible for assistance under chapter 2 of Part II or chapter 4 of Part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961-- (i) no assistance under paragraph 7(b) of Article X will be provided to the States Party; and (ii) no assistance under paragraph 7(c) of Article X other than medical antidotes and treatment will be provided to the States Party. (16) Constitutional Prerogatives (Helms #22) Summary: Sense of the Senate that U.S. negotiators should not agree to treaties that bar reservations and that the Senate should not consent to ratification of any such future treaties. (See also #1.) Article XXII of the CWC states: ``The Articles of this Convention shall not be subject to reservations. The Annexes of this Convention shall not be subject to reservations incompatible with its object and purpose.'' Senator Helms rightly notes that although the United States has ratified other treaties with similar provisions, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has maintained that ``the President's agreement to such a prohibition can not constrain the Senate's constitutional right and obligation to give its advice and consent to a treaty subject to any reservation it might determine is required by the national interest.'' The U.S. Constitution vests in the Senate the power to give its advice and consent subject to reservations. So I am happy to support this condition that reminds the executive branch of the Senate's role. Text: (16) Constitutional Prerogatives. (A) The Senate makes the following findings: (1) The Constitution states that the President ``shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur.'' (2) At the turn of the century, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge took the position that the giving of advice and consent to treaties constitutes a stage in negotiation on the treaties and that Senate amendments or reservations to a treaty are propositions ``offered at a later stage of the negotiation by the other part of the American treatymaking power in the only manner in which they could then be offered.'' (3) The executive branch has begun a practice of negotiating and submitting to the Senate treaties which include a provision which has the purported effect of inhibiting the Senate from attaching reservations which the Senate considers necessary in the national interest or of preventing the Senate from exercising its constitutional duty to give its advice and consent to treaty commitments before ratification. (4) During the 85th Congress, and again during the 102d Congress, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate made its position on this issue clear when stating that ``the President's agreement to such a prohibition can not constrain the Senate's constitutional right and obligation to give its advice and consent to a treaty subject to any reservation it might determine is required by the national interest.'' (B) Sense of the Senate. It is the sense of the Senate that-- (1) the past ratification by the Senate of treaties containing provisions which prohibit amendments or reservations should not be construed as a precedent for such clauses in future agreements with other nations which require the advice and consent of the Senate; (2) United States negotiators to a treaty should not agree to any provision which has the effect of inhibiting the Senate from attaching reservations or offering amendments to the treaty; and (3) the Senate should not consent in the future to any treaty article or provision which would prohibit the Senate from giving its advice and consent to the treaty subject to amendment or reservation. (17) Additions to the Annex on Chemicals (Replaces Helms #25) Summary: There may well be occasions where it is in our national security interest to add new chemicals to the list of restricted and prohibited chemicals when it becomes clear that they have chemical weapon uses. However, some have expressed a concern that the addition of certain chemicals to the annex on chemicals might introduce new burdens on U.S. industry. This condition requires that the executive branch inform Congress when a chemical is proposed for addition to the Schedules. Consultation with Congress at that stage would enable the United States to object to routine adoption of a change that might have serious impact upon U.S. companies. Such an objection would force the OPCW to seek a two-thirds vote in the Conference of States Parties. Text: (17) Additions to the Annex on Chemicals. (A) Presidential Notification.--Not later than ten days after the Director-General communicates information to all States Parties, pursuant to Article XV(5)(a) of the Convention, of a proposal for the addition of a chemical or biological substance to a schedule of the Annex on Chemicals, the President shall notify the Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate of the proposed addition. (B) Presidential Report.--Not later than 60 days after the Director-General communicates information of such a proposal pursuant to Article XV(5)(a) or not later than 30 days after a positive recommendation by the Executive Council pursuant to Article XV(5)(c) of the Convention, whichever is sooner, the President shall transmit to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate a report, in classified and unclassified form, detailing the likely impact of the proposed addition to the Annex on Chemicals. Such report shall include, but not be limited to-- (i) an assessment of the likely impact on U.S. industry of the proposed addition of the chemical or biological substance to the Annex on Chemicals; (ii) a description of the likely costs and benefits, if any, to U.S. national security of the proposed addition of such chemical or biological substance to the Annex on Chemicals; and (iii) a detailed assessment of the effect of the proposed addition on U.S. obligations under the Verification Annex; (C) Presidential Consultation.--The President shall, after the submission of the notification required under subparagraph (A) and prior to any action on the proposal by the Executive Council under Article XV(5)(c), consult promptly with the Senate as to whether the United States should object to the proposed addition of a chemical or biological substance pursuant to Article XV(5)(c). (18) Effect on Terrorism (Helms #27) Summary: Senator Helms and you have agreed to a condition by which the Senate will find that the CWC would not have stopped the Aum Shinrikyo group in Japan and that future terrorist groups will likely seek chemical weapons. Both of these statements are probably quite accurate, and no harm is done by attaching them to the resolution of ratification. Text: (18) Effect on Terrorism. The Senate finds that-- (A) Irrespective of whether the Convention enters into force, terrorists will likely look upon chemical weapons as a means to gain greater publicity and instill widespread fear; and (B) the March 1995 Tokyo subway attack by the Aum Shinrikyo would not have been prevented by the Convention. (19) Constitutional Separation of Powers (Helms #30) Summary: This condition recognizes the Constitutional responsibility of the Congress to pay the debts of the United States. It also declares the Senate's view that the appropriation of funds for financial contributions to the OPCW are beyond the control of the executive branch, and that the United States should not be denied its vote in the OPCW for failing to pay in full its assessed financial contribution. Text: (19) Constitutional Separation of Powers. Article VIII, paragraph 8 of the Convention allows States Parties to vote in the Organization if that member is in arrears in the payment of financial contributions provided that the Organization is satisfied that such non-payment is due to conditions beyond the control of that member. Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution vests in Congress the exclusive authority to ``pay the Debts'' of the United States. Financial contributions to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons may be appropriated only by the Congress and thus the Senate declares that they are, for the purposes of Article VIII, paragraph 8, beyond the control of the executive branch of the U.S. Government. Therefore, the United States vote in the Organization should not be denied in the event the Congress does not appropriate fully funds for its assessed financial contribution. (20) The On-Site Inspection Agency Summary: In 1994, the Select Committee on Intelligence recommended that Congress authorize the DoD On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA) to assist private facilities in the escorting of CWC inspectors. OSIA has done a fine job over the years in escorting arms control inspectors at U.S. Government and defense contractor facilities, making sure that treaty obligations are met with minimal risk to sensitive information. OSIA's charter restricts it to DoD and contractor sites, so new legislation will be needed--probably in the CWC implementing legislation. (Note: The Armed Services Committee will support this so long as the assistance is provided on a reimbursable basis, but may object if DoD funds are to be used to help U.S. industry.) Text: (20) The On-Site Inspection Agency. It is the sense of the Senate that-- In advance of any inspection, the On-Site Inspection Agency of the Department of Defense should be authorized to provide assistance to United States facilities subject to routine inspections under the Convention or to any facility which is the object of a challenge inspection initiated pursuant to Article IX, provided that the consent of the owner or operator of such facility has first been obtained. (21) Further Arms Reduction Obligations Summary: This declaration builds upon Section 33(b) of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act of 1961, which was originally intended to ensure that the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency would be prohibited from taking any actions in furtherance of arms control objectives that affect the armed forces of the United States without the approval of either a two-thirds vote of the Senate or a majority of both Houses. This provision, which has been attached to major arms control treaties in recent years, sets forth the Senate position that any international agreement that would obligate the United States to limit its forces in a militarily significant way will only be considered by the Senate pursuant to Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution. Text: (21) Further Arms Reduction Obligations. The Senate declares its intention to consider for approval international agreements that would obligate the United States to reduce or limit the Armed Forces or armaments of the United States in a militarily significant manner only pursuant to the treaty power as set forth in Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution. (22) Treaty Interpretation Summary: This provision, commonly referred to as the ``Biden Condition,'' has been attached to all major treaties since the INF Treaty. It states the Constitutionally based principle that the shared understanding that exists between the Executive branch and the Senate at the time the Senate gives advice and consent to ratification can only be altered subject to the Senate's advice and consent to a subsequent treaty or protocol, or the enactment of a statute. Text: (22) Treaty Interpretation. The Senate affirms the applicability to all treaties of the Constitutionally based principles of treaty interpretation set forth in Condition (1) of the resolution of ratification with respect to the INF Treaty. For purposes of this declaration, the term ``INF Treaty,'' refers to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate- Range and Shorter Range Missiles, together with the related memorandum of understanding and protocols, approved by the Senate on May 27, 1988. (23) Chemical Weapons Destruction Summary: This condition requires the President to explore alternative technologies for the destruction of the U.S. chemical weapons stockpile. It recognizes that the deadline set in the Convention for the completion of stockpile destruction, 2007, supersedes the 2004 date established in an earlier law. It also reassures us that the requirement under the Convention to submit a plan on the method of destruction does not preclude the later use of alternative technologies. Finally, should a safer and more environmentally friendly alternative technology be discovered, but its employment circumscribed by the 2007 deadline, the President would need to consult with the Congress to determine whether the United States should exercise its rights under the Convention and request a brief extension of the destruction deadline. Text: (23) Chemical Weapons Destruction. Prior to the deposit of the United States instrument of ratification of the Convention, the President shall certify to the Congress that all of the following conditions are satisfied: (A) Exploration of Alternative Technologies.--The President has agreed to explore alternative technologies for the destruction of the United States stockpile of chemical weapons in order to ensure that the United States has the safest, most effective and environmentally sound plans and programs for meeting its obligations under the Convention for the destruction of chemical weapons. (B) Convention Extends Destruction Deadline.--The requirement in Section 1412 of Public Law 99-145 (50 U.S.C. 1521) for completion of the destruction of the United States stockpile of chemical weapons by December 31, 2004 will be superseded upon the date the Convention enters into force with respect to the United States by the deadline required by the Convention of April 29, 2007. (C) Authority to Employ a Different Destruction Technology.--The requirement under Article III(l)(a)(v) of the Convention for a declaration by each state party to the Convention, not later than 30 days after the date the Convention enters into force with respect to that party, on general plans of the State Party for destruction of its chemical weapons does not preclude the United States from deciding in the future to employ a technology for the destruction of chemical weapons different than that declared under that Article. (D) Procedures for Extension of Deadline.--The President will consult with Congress on whether to submit a request to the Executive Council of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons for an extension of the deadline for the destruction of chemical weapons under the Convention, as provided under Part IV(A) of the Annex on Implementation and Verification to the Convention if, as a result of the program of alternative technologies for the destruction of chemical weapons carried out under Section 8065 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1997 (as contained in Public Law 104-208), the President determines that alternatives to the incineration of chemical weapons are available that are safer and more environmentally sound but whose use would preclude the United States from meeting the deadlines of the Convention.