EA - Mar 3, 1995
THIS IS A DELETED/SANITIZED VERSION OF THIS DOCUMENT
CONFIRMED TO BE UNCLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY: DOE/SA-20
BY D.P. CANNON, DATE: 3/6/95
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT FOR THE PROPOSED INTERIM STORAGE AT THE Y-12
PLANT OAK RIDGE, TENNESSEE OF HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM ACQUIRED FROM
KAZAKHSTAN BY THE UNITED STATES
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1.0 INTRODUCTION
1.1 DOE Decision Process on Related Actions
2.0 PURPOSE AND NEED FOR AGENCY ACTION
3.0 DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPOSED ACTION
3.1 HEU to be Acquired
3.2 Packaging
3.3 Air Transport by U.S. Air Force
3.3.1 Aerial Port of Entry Requirements
3.3.2 Flight from Kazakhstan to Dover AFB
3.3.3 C-5 Aircraft
3.3.4 Air Refueling
3.3.5 Cargo Restraint Transporter
3.4 Transfer at Dover Air Force Base
3.5 SST Transport from Dover Air Force Base to Y-12
3.6 Interim Storage at the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant
3.7 Inventory Accountability
3.8 Safeguards and Security
3.9 Environmental, Safety, and Health Protection
3.10 On-Site Transportation at the Y-12 Plant
4.0 ALTERNATE TO THE PROPOSED ACTION
4.1 No Action Alternative
4.2 Alternate Ports of Entry
4.2.1 Fort Campbell, Kentucky as Aerial Port
4.2.2 Air National Guard Base at McGhee Tyson Airport as Aerial Port
4.3 Alternatives Dismissed from Further Consideration
4.3.1 Other Ports of Entry
4.3.2 Other DOE Facilities
4.4 Commercial Facility
5.0 DESCRIPTION OF THE AFFECTED ENVIRONMENT
5.1 Y-12 Plant, Oak Ridge, Tennessee
5.2 Dover Air Force Base, Delaware
5.3 Fort Campbell, Kentucky
5.4 Air National Guard Base, McGhee Tyson Airport, Knoxville,
Tennessee
5.5 Global Commons
6.0 POTENTIAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS
6.1 Y-12 Plant
6.1.1 Environmental Effects
6.1.1.1 Land Use and Archaeological and Cultural Resources
6.1.1.2 Air Quality
6.1.1.3 Hydrology and Water Quality
6.1.1.4 Ecological Resources
6.1.2 Incident-Free Radiological Exposure
6.13 Exposure under Accident Conditions
6.14 Environmental Justice
6.1.5 Cumulative Effects
6.1.6 No Action Alternative Effects on the Y-12 Plant
6.1.7 Fort Campbell Alternative Effects on Y-12 Plant
6.1.8 McGhee Tyson Alternative Effects on Y-12 Plant
6.2 Transportation
6.2.1 Air Transport by U.S. Air Force
6.2.1.1 Incident-free Air Transport From Air Transport of HEU
6.2.1.2 Postulated Air Transport Accident Conditions
6.2.1.2.1 Air Transport Accident Probabilities
6.2.1.2.2 Air Transport Accident Consequences
6.2.2 Transfer of HEU from Aircraft to SST
6.2.2.1 Incident-Free Radiological Exposure from HEU Transfer
Activities
6.2.2.2 Postulated HEU Transfer Accidents
6.2.3 SST Transport of HEU to Y-12 Plant
6.2.3.1 Incident-free SST Transport
6.2.3.1.1 Proposed Action: SST Transport of from Dover AFB to Y-12
6.2.3.1.2 No Action
6.2.3.1.3 SST Transport of HEU from Fort Campbell to Y-12
6.2.3.1.4 SST Transport of HEU from McGhee Tyson Airport to Y-12
6.2.3.2 Postulated SST Transport Accident Conditions
6.2.3.2.1 Proposed Action: Postulated SST Transport Accident
6.2.3.2.2 No Action
6.2.3.2.3 Postulated Accident During SST Transport from Fort Campbell
6.2.3.2.4 Postulated Accident During SST Transport from McGhee Tyson
6.2.4 On-Site Transportation Impacts
6.2.5 Non-Radiological Impact
6.2.5.1 Proposed Action
6.2.5.2 Shipment from Fort Campbell
6.2.5.3 Shipment from McGhee Tyson
6.2.6 Cumulative Transportation Impacts
6.2.6.1 Cumulative Radiological Impacts
6.2.6.2 Cumulative Non-Radiological Impacts
7.0 AGENCIES AND PERSONS CONSULTED
8.0 REFERENCES
LIST OF APPENDICES
Appendix A. Affected Environment of Dover Air Force Base, Proposed
Aerial Port of Entry/HEU Transfer Site
Appendix B. Affected Environment of Fort Campbell, Kentucky;
Alternate Aerial Port of Entry/HEU Transfer Site
Appendix D. Affected Environment of McGhee Tyson and the Tennessee Air
National Guard Air Force Base Alternate Aerial Port of Entry/HEU Transfer
Site
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 3.0-1 Flight Paths for the Proposed Action
Figure 3.2-1 Physical Packing with Metal Cans
Figure 3.3-1 United States Air Force C-5 Aircraft
Figure 3.3.3-1 Cargo Restraint Transporter Loaded
Figure 3.3.5-2 Cargo Restraint Transport Unit Loaded and Secured
Figure 3.6-1 Location of the Oak Ridge Reservation
Figure 3.6-2 Location of the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant
Figure 3.6-3 Location of the Building 9720-5 Warehouse
Figure 3.6-4 HEU Storage Birdcage
Figure 3.6-5 Y-12 Building 9720-5 Warehouse Tube Vault
Figure 3.6-6 Y-12 HEU Modular Storage Vault Configuration
Figure 5.0.1-1 Location of Proposed Action and Alternatives
Figure 5.2-1 Location of Dover Air Force Base
Figure 5.2-2 Location of Dover Air Force Base Airstrip
Figure 5.3-1 Location of Fort Campbell, Kentucky
Figure 5.4-1 Location of McGhee Tyson Airport, Tennessee
Figure 5.42 Layout of McGhee Tyson Airstrip
Figure 6.1.2.1-1 Average External Dose to Workers in the Building
9720-5 Warehouse
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
AFB Air Force Base
ALAR As Low As Reasonably Achievable
ANSI American National Standards Institute
Be Beryllium
CEDE Committed Effective Dose Equivalent
CEQ Council on Environmental Quality
CERCLA Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation, and Liability
Act
CFC Chlorofluorocarbons
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
CSA Criticality Safety Analysis
DCG Derived Concentration Guide
DOD United States Department of Defense
DOE United States Department of Energy
DOT United States Department of Transportation
DU Depleted Uranium
EA Environmental Assessment
EDE Effective Dose Equivalent
EIS Environmental Impact Statement
Energy Systems Martin Marietta Energy Systems
EPA United States Environmental Protection Agency
ERAD Explosive Release Atmospheric Dispersal
FAA Federal Aviation Administration
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
FFCA Federal Facilities Compliance Agreement
FHA Federal Highway Administration
FONSI Finding of No Significant Impact
FRA Federal Railroad Administration
HEPA High Efficiency Particulate Air
HEU Highly Enriched Uranium
HF Hydrogen Fluoride
HMTA Hazardous Materials Transportation Act
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
ICC Interstate Commerce Commission
ICRP International Commission on Radiological Protection
IDLH Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health
IHD Industrial Hygiene Department
INEL Idaho National Engineering Laboratory
LCF Latent Cancer Fatality
LEU Low Enriched Uranium
LTT Lymphocyte Transformation Test
MACCS MELCOR Accident Consequence Code System
MTU Metric Tons Uranium
NAAQS National Ambient Air Quality Standards
NEPA National Environmental Policy Act of 1-969
NESHA National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants
NIOSH National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
NMCs Nuclear Material Couriers
NOI Notice of Intent
NOV Notice of Violation
NPDES National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
NPL National Priorities List
NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ORR Oak Ridge Reservation
OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration
PEL Permissible Exposure Limit
PCB Polychlorinated Biphenyl
PEIS Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement
RCRA Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
SAR Safety Analysis Report
SARA Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act
SARUP Safety Analysis Report Upgrade Program
SNM Special Nuclear Material
SST Safe Secure Transport
STEL Short-Term Exposure Limit
SWEIS Sitewide Environmental Impact Statement
TDEC Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation
TEDE Total Effective Dose Equivalent
TEMA Tennessee Emergency Management Agency
THP Tennessee Highway Patrol
TI Transport Index
TIC Time-Integrated Concentration
TID Tamper-Indicating Device
AFTCOM United States Air Force Transportation Command
TSD Transportation Safeguards Division
TSR Technical Safety Requirements
UN United Nations
USEC United States Enrichment Corporation
USQD Unreviewed Safety Question Determination
Y-12 Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant
On September 27, 1993, President Clinton outlined a major principle of
U.S. nonproliferation policy: "Our national security requires us to accord
higher priority to nonproliferation, and to make it an integral element of
our relations with other countries. The President has established the
objective of implementing United States nonproliferation policy by
selectively acquiring fissionable material from foreign sources in order
to reduce the likelihood of nuclear weapons proliferation. In furtherance
of this policy, the United States and Kazakhstan are pursuing an agreement
to relocate highly enriched uranium (HEU) acquired from Kazakhstan in
exchange for monetary aid. The prime objective of this bilateral effort
is to promote the nuclear nonproliferation policies supported by both
governments while providing monetary and humanitarian aid to the
government of Kazakhstan. The HEU in question constitutes sufficient
material for persons with low technical skills to make 20 or more nuclear
weapons.
1.1 DOE DECISION PROCESS ON RELATED ACTIONS
As part of the decision-making process for the storage and disposition of
fissile material, the Department is preparing the Programmatic
Environmental Impact Statement for Long-Term Storage and Disposition of
Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials (Disposition PEIS). Recent nuclear arms
reduction agreements and pledges, along with Presidential decisions
concerning what stocks of plutonium, HEU, and other nuclear materials
are to be reserved for national defense, will largely determine how much
and when material will be declared surplus and become available for
disposition. As stated in the June 21, 1994 Notice of Intent (NOI) to
prepare the Disposition PEIS (59 FR 31935), the disposition PEIS will
evaluate alternatives for long-term storage of all weapons-usable fissile
materials and for disposition of weapons-usable fissile materials declared
surplus to national defense needs by the President The Disposition PEIS
would be followed by project specific NEPA documents to the extent
necessary to implement any decisions.
Although the decision-making process for the long-term storage and
disposition of all weapons usable fissile materials has been initiated,
final decisions and implementation may require several years. Until these
decisions are made and implemented interim storage is needed for fissile
nuclear-materials, including HEU.
Prior to final approval, the Department released the Environmental
Assessment (EA) for the Proposed Interim Storage of Enriched Uranium
Above the Maximum Historical Storage Level at the Y-12 Plant, Oak Ridge,
Tennessee (DOE/EA 0929) to the public and the State of Tennessee in
September 1994. The EA is a revised version of a predecisional EA released
for review and comment to the State and public. in March 1994. Additional
predecisional opportunities for State and public involvement regarding the
predecisional EA are planned for the near future.
2.0 PURPOSE AND NEED FOR AGENCY ACTION
The United States Government has determined that action is needed
immediately to minimize the nuclear proliferation risk associated with
highly enriched uranium (HEU) in Kazakhstan. This HEU constitutes
sufficient material for persons with low technical skills to make 20 or
more nuclear weapons. The present risk of diversion must be addressed
expeditiously. In addition, weather conditions complicate the ability to
transport the HEU material over the next several months. Action is
necessary before the winter season in order to assure that departure of
the aircraft transporting the HEU from Kazakhstan is not affected by snow
or ice storms. De-icing and snow removal capabilities at the Kazakhstan
airport, which is located in the city of Ust Kamenogorst, are extremely
limited. The next opportunity to transfer this material would not occur
until the spring of 1995.
The potential need to acquire and store HEU from foreign sources was
addressed in the preapproval Environmental Assessment for the Proposed
Interim Storage of Enriched Uranium Above the Maximum Historical Storage
level at the Y-12 Plant, Oak Ridge, Tennessee (DOE/EA-0929). That EA
includes analysis of interim storage of approximately five metric tons of
HEU from foreign sources, which would be no more than one percent of the
HEU proposed to be received for interim storage at Y-12 over the next ten
years. Approximately 566 kg (0.566 metric tons) of HEU would be acquired
from Kazakhstan, which represents approximately 11 percent (0.566) of the
five metric tons from foreign sources addressed in the Y-12 Interim
Storage EA. Interim storage of the HEU from Kazakhstan would be needed
until decisions on its disposition can be made and implemented.
The Governments of the United States and Kazakhstan have agreed that the
HEU would be stored under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.
The United States Department of Energy (DOE) is taking the necessary steps
to implement this agreement.
3.0 DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPOSED ACTION
The proposed action is transport of HEU to be acquired by the United States
from Kazakhstan to the Y-12 Plant Oak Ridge, Tennessee for interim storage.
The HEU would be transported by the U.S. Air Force on two C-5 aircraft from
Kazakhstan to Dover Air Force Base (AFB), Kent County, Delaware. At Dover AFB,
the HEU would loaded on DOE Safe Secure Transport (SST) Trailers for highway
transport to the Y-12 Plant.
In accordance with Executive Order 12114, Environmental Effects Abroad of
Major Federal Actions, the activities in Kazakhstan are not addressed in this
EA because they will be implemented with the full cooperation and involvement
of the government of Kazakhstan. These activities, which will be conducted by
U.S. personnel include repackaging the HEU into IAEA authorized containers and
loading the containers into the two C-5 aircraft. All U.S. repackaging team
members would be fully trained in the handling of fissile radioactive
materials. This team would consist of 31 persons:
* 25 repackaging team members including three nuclear criticality safety
engineers, three health physicists, two nondestructive assay experts, one
nuclear material control and accountability experts, and one industrial
hygienist;
* one DOE safety officer;
* one DOD doctor/medic;
* three DOD interpreters; and
* one satellite communicator.
The aircrews would consist of 24-30 personnel for three U.S. Air Force C-5
aircraft: two C-5 aircraft would transport HEU and the third would carry only
personnel and equipment.
The proposed action includes the following activities: air transport by U.S.
Air Force C-5 aircraft to the proposed U.S. aerial port of entry, Dover Air
Force Base; transfer of HEU from the C-5 aircraft via ten U.S. Department of
Energy Safe Secure Transport (SST) vehicles: SST transport of the HEU via
highways to the Y-12 Plant in Oak Ridge, Tennessee; and interim storage
(without processing) at the Y-12 Plant. The proposed flight plan is an
approved international route; hence no specific agreements are required.
3.1 HEU TO BE ACQUIRED
The HEU to be acquired and relocated to the United States includes
approximately 566 kg (0.566 MT) of HEU (nominally 90 percent U-235, 9 percent
U-238, and 1 percent U-234). The HEU is contained in about 2,200 kg (2.2 MT)
of alloy, metal, and oxide. The HEU includes four material types: uranium
oxide; uranium metal; uranium beryllium machined stock as broken alloy rods,
turnings, and powders; and uranium beryllium alloy rods which were intended to
be used as fuel for a naval reactor project, but never were actually used.
All of these materials are unirradiated (i.e., not used in a reactor). The
material forms and quantities are shown in Table 3.1-1. (The preapproval EA
for Interim Storage at Y-12 (DOE/EA-0929) contains information on uranium in
Appendix D, Uranium: Occurrence, Uses and Health Effects.)
Laboratory analysis of samples indicates that some of the HEU contains trace
but measurable concentrations of U-232, U-236, plutonium, and other
transuranics. Less than one half kilogram of thorium uranium compound is
included in the material.
The bulk of the HEU is alloyed with beryllium (Be), of which about half is
machine turnings and oxide. It is estimated that approximately 1500 kg (1.5
MT) of beryllium in the 2,200 kg (2.2 MT) of material to be acquired.
Beryllium in weapons components as been staged or stored in Building 9720-5
previously. The 1500 kg (l.5 MT) of beryllium to be stored in Building 9720-5
under the proposed action is about equal to the quantity of beryllium in
weapon components previously staged or stored in Building 9720-5. Beryllium is
a metal used in industrial applications because of its light weight. While
beryllium is a toxic metal, the alloy form reduces the toxicity of the
material.
3.2 PACKAGING
The HEU would be packaged in containers meeting DOT regulatory requirements
and IAEA standards. The DOT Type B packaging with the specification 6M
(49 CFR 178.354) would be used. This packaging consists of an exterior
container, a standard 55-gallon drum, in which an inner container (DOT
specification 2R) is suspended by plywood and fiberboard insulation disks. A
total of 456 6M-2R containers would be transported to Kazakhstan to repackage
the HEU.
** Table 3.1-1 HEU Material Forms and Quantities
Material Form Total Weight U-235 Content Description
(kg) (kg)
Uranium Oxide >26 26/0.26 Powder Form. About 7
containers
Uranium Metal >187/0 187 About 0.4-0.6 in diameter
x 0.8 - 1.0 in long slugs.
27 containers.
Uranium Beryllium About 1,000 167 Finished U/Be rods, about
alloy (9-28% by 0.5 in diameter x 4.7 in
weight is U) long. About 500 containers.
Uranium Beryllium About 1,000 186 Machined turnings, broken
machined turnings (10-60% by rods, and powder. About
and powder weight is U) 500 containers.
Totals >2220 >566 1,025 storage containers
and about 6,000 sample
bottles containing no
more than 3 grams each of
oxides representative of
materials listed above. **
Type B packaging meets containment and shielding requirements for normal
transport, and in addition, is designed and tested to withstand the effects of
severe accidents. Evaluation for hypothetical accident conditions is based on
the application of free drop, puncture, thermal, and immersion tests. The
hypothetical accident condition tests are severe in nature (for example, the
thermal test exposes the package to 8000C [1.472 F] heat for no less than 30
minutes and are conducted sequentially to determine the cumulative effect on
the package. Except for a limited number of specification Type B packaging
described in the regulations (49 CFR 173A16), all Type B packaging designs
require prior approval of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission or DOE.
Packaging design requirements are found in 49 CFR 173 and 10 CFR 71.
Packaging would meet all requirements of the NRC regulations for fissile
material packages in Part 71 of 10 CFR (Packaging and Transportation of
Radioactive Materials). These requirements establish mandatory design and
construction criteria and contents limits to assure that subcriticality is
maintained by each package.
Type B packaging is designed to retain the integrity of containment and
shielding required by DOT regulations under normal conditions of transport. In
addition, Type B packaging must be designed under both normal and hypothetical
accident conditions (10 CFR 71.55), including forklift accidents involving the
puncture of a container.
Specific standards for each Fissile Class are also prescribed in the NRC
regulations (10 CFR 7l.57 through 10 CFR 71.61). These standards identify the
shipper requirements for determining the allowable number of packages of a
given design and fissile material loading which can be safely transported
together in a vehicle. As was the case for individual package design,
conveyance loading limits are established for both incident-free and
hypothetical accident conditions. In other words, the regulations assure that:
(1) individual package design and contents limits preclude nuclear criticality
in any single package, and: (2) when packages are stacked together for
shipment, their numbers are limited to ensure subcriticality. Packaging must
also undergo rigid tests to demonstrate containment capabilities during normal
conditions of transport and hypothetical accident conditions. While the
possibility of a nuclear criticality accident can never be considered zero
when sufficient quantities of fissile material are present, it is remote with
regard to transportation.
The packaging to be used would be the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT)
approved 6M-2R container (DOT, 1994). The intended use of the DOT
Specification 6M packaging is for shipments of enriched uranium. The 2R inner
container provides the primary containment boundary to prevent release of the
contents to the environment and enhances the shielding capability of the
packaging. The inner container also prevents moisture from reaching the
contents. The inner container (Figure 3.2-1) holds three or four steel cans
(4.75 inch diameter) for uranium compounds such as uranium oxide and broken
uranium or uranium alloy metal. The 6M-2R container meets the requirements of
Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations, and is in accordance with the
International Atomic Energy Agency Regulations (IAEA 1985, as amended 1990).
3.3 AIR TRANSPORT BY U.S. AIR FORCE
The HEU would be transported by the U.S. Air Force in two C-5 aircraft from
Kazakhtstan to Dover Air Force Base (AFB).
** Figure 3.2-1 is a technical drawing of the physical packing with metal cans.**
3.3.1 Aerial Port of Entry Requirements
To select the proposed aerial port of entry, the following set of requirements
were used:
* The aerial port should be on a military base with an airstrip where C-5
aircraft can land with minimal risk.
* The aerial port runway should have sufficient capacity to accommodate two
U.S. Air Force C-5 aircraft and the ten DOE Safe Secure Transport Trailers
which would be used for highway transport of the HEU.
* The aerial port should have a secure area for the transfer of HEU from the
C-5 aircraft to the SSTs.
* There should be a relatively low to moderate population in the vicinity of
the aerial port of entry, i.e., a suburban or rural area with a population
density of less than 500 person/ km2.
In addition to these requirements, other factors considered in selecting an
aerial port of entry are as follows:
* The air flight distance over U.S. territory should be minimized.
* Air refueling over U.S. territory should be avoided.
* The highway transport distance from the aerial port to the Y-12 Plant
should be minimized.
Dover AFB meets the aerial port requirements and considerations. Dover AFB
routinely handles the C-5 aircraft Dover AFB has more than enough capacity to
handle the C-5 aircraft and the SSTs. The equipment and personnel needed to
support C-5 flights of this nature are permanently established at Dover AFB.
Dover AFB is in an area with a moderate population; Dover AFB is located in a
suburban area within Kent County, which has a population of 110,000. The
population density within approximately 10 km of Dover AFB is 475.4
persons/km2. Based on the characteristics of the airstrip and support
facilities, and the moderate population density surrounding Dover relative to
other bases near urban areas, Dover AFB meets the aerial port requirements.
When considering the other factors, Dover AFB is distinguished among other
possible aerial ports. The air night distance over U.S. territory is very low
because Dover AFB is close to the Atlantic coast, and therefore, air refueling
over U.S. territory would be avoided. The highway transport distance from
Dover AFB to Y-12 Plant is greater than the two alternative aerial ports
analyzed in this EA, but is still relatively low, and considerably lower than
most other possible aerial ports in the U.S. which are not analyzed in the EA.
3.3.2 Flight from Kazakhstan to Dover AFB
The United States Air Force Transportation Command would utilize three C-5
aircraft to transport the HEU personnel, and equipment from Kazakhstan to the
United States. Two of the three planes would be used to transport HEU. The
total nonstop flight time is approximately 21 hours over a distance of
approximately 8,000 miles. The two aircraft with HEU cargo would proceed
directly to Dover Air Force Base without any intermediate stop in a foreign
country. The third aircraft with the majority of the repackaging team and its
support equipment (and no HEU cargo) would make refueling stops in Europe and
proceed to McGhee Tyson, Tennessee Air National Guard Base, co-located at the
Municipal Airport of Knoxville, Tennessee. McGhee-Tyson is the site from which
the team and its equipment would depart from the U.S. to Kazakhstan.
3.3.3 C-5 Aircraft
The C-5 is a long-range, high-speed sept-wing aircraft which is designed for
use as a heavy logistics transport (USTRANSCOM. 1994). The aircraft is powered
by four General Electric engines mounted in individual pods beneath the wing.
The C-5 is capable of airlifting in excess of 250,000 pounds of cargo and 75
troops at a speed of 360 knots or 0.875 Mach. With its in-night refueling
capability, the range is unlimited. The normal crew consists of six, with
seating provisions for seven relief crew members. The C-5 aircraft landing
gear is of the fully retractable, modified tricycle type, with four wheels on
the steerable nose landing gear and six bogie-mounted wheels on each of the
four main landing gear assemblies. The weight of the aircraft is thus
distributed among 28 wheels, which allows the aircraft to land or takeoff on
unimproved runways.
The maximum gross weight of the aircraft is 769,000 pounds with a fuel load of
51,000 gallons weighing approximately 332,500 pounds.
The C-5 aircraft has many unique features including:
* a forward and aft cargo door system, enabling straight-through loading and
unloading;
* a landing gear kneeling system which enables the cargo deck to be tilted
nose-down or tail-down; or lowered in the level position;
* two auxiliary power units, one located in each main landing gear pod to
provide electrical, pneumatic, and hydraulic power for engine starting and for
ground operations and maintenance requirements.
3.3.4 Air Refueling
Each C-5 air refueling event would be accomplished with two KC-135 tanker
aircraft for each C-5. There would be a total of four tanker aircraft
utilized to refuel both C-5s at the same time. The tankers would take off
from their respective bases to rendezvous with the C-5s along the flight
route. As the rendezvous approaches, the tankers and the C-5 would be in
visual contact separated by 1000 feet in altitude with the C-5 one mile behind
the tankers. The C-5 would then maneuver to a position directly behind and
below the tanker. The tanker boom operator would directly monitor the C-5
closure on the tanker. Once the C-5 is in position, the boom operator would
position the flying boom into the refueling receptacle at the top of the C-5.
The fuel would then pass through the boom into the C-5. The transaction would
take approximately 20 minutes. After refueling from the first tanker, the C-5
would then maneuver to the second tanker to refuel again. After the second
refueling is complete, the tankers would climb and turn away from the C-5 to
return to their launch bases. The C-5 would descend 1,000 feet until the
tankers have left, then return to the appropriate altitude. The Air force
routinely trains personnel on C-5 aircraft refueling and refueling with this
tanker is a routine operation.
** Figure 3.3.3-1 is a photograph of an Air Force C-5 Aircraft. **
3.5.5 Cargo Restraint Transporter
Cargo Restraint Transporters are used to load material onto the aircraft and
hold the containers in place during transport in a manner that maximizes cargo
space and safety (Sandia, 1988). A Cargo Restraint Transporter unit loaded
with drums is shown in Figures 3.3-1 and 3.3.5-2.
The unit is loaded as follows:
* Four drums are placed on the base section;
* The center section is placed on top of the four drums;
* Four additional drums are loaded on top of the center section;
* The top section is placed on top of the four additional drums;
* The array is secured with tiedowns through the tiedown rings
to the base section.
The containers would be placed in cargo restraint transporters as illustrated
in Figure 3.3.5-2. It is estimated that approximately 57 CRTs would be loaded
with containers. The CRTs would be tied down on pallets or directly onto the
cargo bay floor inside the C-5 aircraft.
** Figure 3.3.5-1 is an illustration of a loaded cargo restraint transporter. **
** Figure 3.3.5-2 is an illustration of a loaded and secured cargo restraint
transporter. **
3.4 TRANSFER AT DOVER AIR FORCE BASE
SSTs would be parked in a secure area at Dover AFB to await the arrival of the
two C-5 aircraft. The unloading of the containers from the C-5 aircraft would
be done by Dover AFB personnel, and loading of the containers into the SSTs
would be done by DOE personnel. The loading process could utilize a forklift
and/or a K-loader, which is a adjustable-height platform that would be moved
up to aircraft and then moved to the SST. The Cargo Restraint Transporter
would be loaded onto the SST guided by floor and ceiling tracks. Once in the
appropriate position, the Cargo Restraint Transporters are secure to the SST
via lug nuts, locking pins, chains, straps, and nets. A Cargo Restraint Net is
placed over the array to further secure the material. The net is a multi-strap
adjustable net that is designed to secure a varying size of arrays of
containers within the SSTs. Detailed instructions and procedures are
described in the Document Y/OA-3493, "Cargo Restraint Nets Handling
Instructions" (Energy System 1986) and the technical manual, "Cargo Restraint
Transporter Handling Instructions (Sandia, 1988).
3.5 SST TRANSPORT FROM DOVER AIR FORCE BASE TO Y-12
The HEU would be transported by Safe Secure Transport (SST) from Dover Air
Force Base to the Y-12 plant. Transportation would be conducted by the DOE
Transportation Safeguards Division (TSD) in accordance with the requirements
of DOE Orders and U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations (title
49 of the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations [CFR ]). Since its establishment
in 1975, TSD has accumulated more than 119 million km (74 million miles) of
over-the-road experience in transporting DOE-owned cargo, without any
accidents resulting in a release of radioactive material.
The SST vehicles which would be used to transport the HEU are specially
designed semi-trailers pulled by armored tractors, which use penetration
resistance and delay mechanisms to prevent unauthorized cargo removal. This
design has the added benefit of protecting the cargo from damage or release in
the event of a severe accident. A robust tiedown and restraining system to
secure the cargo within the SST trailer provides additional protection.
Secure Safe Transport vehicles are accompanied by escort vehicles equipped
with armored couriers, communications and electronics systems, radiological
monitoring equipment and other equipment to enhance safety and security.
Redundant communications systems assure that intra-convoy communications and
communications between each vehicle and the Security Communications System in
Albuquerque, New Mexico, are maintained. The SST vehicles observe special
operating procedures designed to promote safety and security.
DOE Order 5632.2A, Physical Protection of Special Nuclear Materials with Vital
Equipment, establishes baseline protection requirements for special nuclear
materials in transit, providing for an appropriately graded level of
protection for each shipment. DOE Order 5610, Transportation-Safeguards
System Program Operations, ensures that Transportation Safeguards System
operations are accomplished in a manner commensurate with established
practices and procedures for cargo safeguards, program continuity, and the
protection of national security, personnel, the public, and the environment.
Nuclear Material Couriers (NMCs), the Federal Officers of the DOE who drive
and escort all shipments of HEU made within the Transportation Safeguards
System, are trained to provide an immediate response to any incident.
Depending on the incident, the NMCs will assess the integrity of the SST and
define an initial response. An emergency notification system for reporting
and processing operations information is maintained to ensure that effective
and appropriate action is taken during emergency situations. The response may
include notifying local authorities and establishing a joint command post,
initiating traffic control measures, providing first aid, performing basic
radiological surveys, and taking other actions deemed necessary to protect the
public and or the public domain.
Anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons are included in the types of armament
against which DOE facilities must provide strategies and/or systems of
protection. The Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),
has the responsibility for quantifying threats within the continental United
States. According to the FBI, the terrorist threat to DOE nuclear facilities
is low. For hardened targets (facilities with design features which would
mitigate or eliminate the effects of an attack), such as the Transportation
Safeguard System and Y-12 Plant, the threat is even lower.
DOE Albuquerque assesses threat to near and long-term operations in
coordination with the DOE HQ Office of Nonproliferation and National Security
and the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Military Application and Stockpile
Support. There is a DOE counterintelligence program designed to provide
timely foreign intelligence information to assist in protecting weapons
shipments in transit. There has never been an overt attempt to take material
from an SST, nor has there ever been a loss of HEU during shipment by the
Transportation Safeguards Division program.
The Transportation Safeguards Divisions liaison program assures that the
States which will be traversed are generally aware of TSD operations and
coordinates communication channels between the DOE Albuquerque Office and the
State authorities. The States are involved in briefing and training efforts,
which include sharing information on the frequency and general routing for TSD
shipments and identifying the types of assistance TSD would require in an
emergency.
The DOE Accident Response Group would respond to any incident involving the
SST transport. The mission of the Accident Response Group is to efficiently
manage the resolution of accidents involving nuclear materials in DOE custody
at the time of the incident. The Accident Response Group handles a broad range
of incidents, including an burning of a nuclear component and radioactive
contamination, in accordance with the DOE Accident Response Group Procedures
Material which is the analog to the Department of Defense Nuclear Accident
Procedures.
3.6 INTERIM STORAGE AT THE OAK RIDGE Y-12 PLAN
The HEU would be received for interim storage at the Y-12 Plant, Oak Ridge
Tennessee, and stored up to ten years. The Y-12 facility is currently in
operational standdown to address safety concerns raised by the Defense Nuclear
Facilities Safety Board. The Department of Energy anticipates that the safety
concerns raised by the Board will be addressed sufficiently to allow receipt
and storage of the HEU at the Y-12 Plant in November 1994. The HEU material
would be stored in the Building 9720-5 Warehouse, which is in the southwestern
portion of the Y-12 Plant. Building 9720-5 is a single-story warehouse that
includes approximately 3,716 m2 (40,000 ft2) of storage space. The Oak Ridge
Reservation and the Y-12 Plant are shown in Figures 3.6-1 and 3.6-2. The
location of Building 9720-5 within the Y-12 Plant is shown Figure 3.6-3.
** Figure 3.6-1 is a map of the location of the Oak Ridge Reservation. **
** Figure 3.6-2 is a map of the location of the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant. **
The SSTs would off-load the HEU material at the Building 9720-5 warehouse.
The material would undergo a transfer check consisting of a weight and a
tamper-indicating device verification and possibly a non-destructive assay
check. Some of the material may be loaded in Y-12 Plant transport vehicles
(known as the Blue Goose) for in-plant transport to the Y-12 Plant Laboratory
(Building 9995) for confirmatory non-destructive assay measurements as
required for nuclear material control and accountability purposes. The
material confirmatory measurements may be also be conducted in Buildings 9720
5 or 9212. Following these accountability checks, the HEU material would be
transported back to the Building 9720-5 warehouse.
The HEU would be placed directly into a vault-type room in building 9720-5 for
interim storage, without any processing to convert its existing form. The
Kazakhstan HEU material would be in the same forms and type as the special
nuclear material already stored in building 9720-5 (e.g. broken metal oxide,
solid metal, Beryllium alloys). The materials would be packaged the same as
the existing materials and would be subject to the same physical and
administrative controls. The bulk of the material is alloyed with beryllium
and the Y-12 plant safety documentation does not currently cover the
processing of such material. This would be a new type of processing for the
Y-12 Plant to which further environmental, safety, and health documentation
would be requested. Therefore, the HEU would be placed in storage in its
existing form without any pre-storage processing.
The authorization basis for interim storage in building 9720-5 is documented
in the Unreviewed Safety Question Determination, Interim Storage of Material
NMSSS Warehouse, Building 972O-5 (U), September 15, 1994. The determination
that there are no unreviewed safety questions is based on the following
documents:
(l) Final Safety Analysis Reports for the Assembly, Disassembly and Warehouse
Project (U), Y/TS-816, September 1984 (Energy Systems. 1984): (2)Phase I
Hazard Screening Analysis or the Nuclear Material Safeguarded Shipping and
Storage (NMSSS) Facility Building 9720-5 (U). FINAL HS/7/f/2, December 20,1990
(Energy Systems, 1990): (3) Letter from E.D. Brewer to A.K. Zava, Change in
Preliminary Hazard Rating 9720-5, December 3, 1991 (Energy Systems,1991); and
(4)Operations Safety Requirements for the Enriched Uranium Assembly;
Disassembly and Warehouse Operation (U), Y/TS-53, Rev. l, March 7, 1991
(Energy Systems, 1991).
Note: The terminology Unreviewed Safety Question Determination refers to the
process of determining whether or not there are any safety questions which
have not been addressed in other safety documentation. A determination that
an action does not constitute an unreviewed safety question means that no new
administrative or physical controls will be required to ensure safety.
The HEU would be stored within a Material Access Areas in Building 9720-5,
which is in the Y-12 Plant Perimeter intrusion Detection and Alarm System
protected area. A Material Access Area is a controlled security area that
segregates enriched uranium use or storage from other operations areas by
physical barriers and specific access controls. All storage configurations
would meet criticality safety, environmental, and security requirements.
Storage arrays located in vault-type rooms would rest on the floor of existing
process locations within Material Access Areas. A vault-type room is a
structure having a combination locked door and protected by an intrusion alarm
system that is activated by any penetration of walls, floors, ceilings, or
openings, or by motion within the room. Fabricated structures commonly
referred to as birdcages (Figure 3.64) could be used, to ensure criticality
safety while material is stage or laboratory analysis.
Upon approval of additional safety documentation, the material may be unloaded
from 6M2R containers and stored in tube vaults, modular storage vaults, or
transferred to in-plant containers in a vault or vault-type room. A vault is
a windowless enclosure with a built-in combination locked steel door and with
walls, floor, and ceiling substantially constructed of materials that afford
penetration resistance at least equal to that of 3-inch thick reinforced
concrete. Any openings in the vault, greater than 96 square inches in area
and over 6 inches in the smallest dimension are protected by imbedded steel
bars at least 5/8 inches in diameter on 6-inch centers. Metals would be
stored in locked steel boxes in fixed, safe trays within reinforced concrete
vaults, commonly referred to as tube vaults.
Tube vaults (Figure 3.6-5) have concrete floors, ceilings, and walls. Matrices
of steel tubes are constructed in two opposing walls in these vaults, and the
spaces between the steel tubes are filled with concrete. Trays with fixed
spacers are used in the tubes, to hold canned materials in fixed positions on
the tray. The trays are pulled out horizontally from the tube vault and
loaded with containers, in accordance with Y-12 Plant procedures (Energy
Systems, 1994f). A typical tube vault can safely accommodate as much as 40
MTU of HEU, and its design life is estimated to be nearly 100 years (U.S.
Congress 1993).
The HEU could also be stored in modular storage vaults, (see Figure 3.6) which
are structurally equivalent to the tube vaults. A modular storage vault is
loaded at the ground level in accordance with Y-12 procedures (Energy Systems,
1994g). Each container would be hand loaded into the storage cavity within
the vault, as described in the EA for Interim Storage at Y-12 (DOE/EA-0929).
The safety analysis documentation for the modular storage vaults allows for
the stacking of eight modular storage vaults.
** Figure 3.6-3 is a map of the location of the Y-12 plant building 9720-5
warehouse. **
The interim storage of the uranium material would not generate any radioactive
or hazardous waste. The EA for the Proposed Interim Storage of Enriched
Uranium at the Y-12 Plant (DOE/EA-0929) describes processing operations that
generate waste and that are not involved in this proposed action.
3.7 INVENTORY ACCOUNTABILITY
Upon receipt of the enriched uranium at the Y-12 Plant, a transfer check would
be made as the shipping containers were unloaded from transport vehicles. The
transfer check would confirm container item count and identity, verify the
integrity tamper-indicating devices (including identification numbers), and
compare this information with shipping documentation to ensure that the
shipment was received intact. Confirmatory measurements in the receipt
facility would include a non-destructive analysis to verify the presence of
HEU in the container and a gross weight determination on the containers.
Following the confirmatory measurements, the HEU would enter the nuclear
materials accounting system at the Y-12 Plant.
The Y-12 Plant maintains a database for tracking enriched uranium, documenting
nuclear material transactions, and issuing periodic reports. The accounting
system supporting the data base, follows generally accepted accounting
principles, as promulgated by the American Institute for Certified Public
Accountants, and meets the requirements of DOE Order 5633.3A, Control and
Accountability of Nuclear Materials, which requires a physical inventory of
materials to determine the quantities of nuclear materials on hand.
Statistical random sampling of enriched uranium inventories is required to
verify and confirm the contents. Materials sealed with tamper-indication
devices (TIDS) would be visually inspected one at a time to assure that the
seals are undisturbed and the integrity of the container has not been
jeopardized.
** Figures 3.6-4 - 3.6-6 are illustrations of HEU storage facilities. **
3.8 SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY
In terms of safeguards and security, special nuclear materials (SNM) are
categorized according to their attractiveness to theft or diversion and
according to their quantity (DOE Order 5633.3A, Control and Accountability of
Nuclear Materials). The Y-12 Plant uses a graded safeguards system designed
to provide varying degrees of physical protection, accountability, and
material control to different types, quantities, physical forms, and chemical
or isotropic compositions of nuclear materials, consistent with the risks
associated with threat scenarios.
Safeguarding and securing HEU at the Y-12 Plant is accomplished through a
combination of four approaches: access control, material surveillance,
material containment, and detection and assessment of unauthorized removal.
Each approach may vary in extent depending on the quantity and form of HEU.
Access control refers to physically restricting access to enriched uranium to
properly authorized personnel. Most of the Y-12 plant is a high-security
facility with restrictions, fencing, and other physical barriers that exclude
trespassers. This physical barrier to unauthorized entry, combined with Y
12's highly trained security force and drills and exercises in various
security breach scenarios, limits the possibility of accidental or intentional
incidents resulting from uncontrolled access.
Material surveillance refers to the monitoring of HEU to detect unauthorized
activities. Protective force personnel and process operators are present in
most areas of the plant around the clock. These personnel are further
supported by full-time security and emergency staffs who can provide immediate
aid in the event of any security breach or environmental incident.
Material containment involves assuring that HEU is kept only in Material
Access Areas. Materials transferred in or out of these areas are rigorously
accounted for. A physical inventory of all HEU in interim storage is taken on
a DOE-approved, fixed schedule. All areas that contain HEU establish separate
material control codes for accounting purposes. Transfer between storage and
processing areas is documented, and individual items are identified with a
batch card system. The inventory schedule is adhered to by all storage and
processing areas.
Detection and assessment of unauthorized removal of HEU is accomplished
through such means as tamper-indicating devices (TIDs) and physical or
electronic searches of vehicles, personnel, packages, and other containers at
enriched uranium storage and process areas.
3.9 ENVIRONMENTAL, SAFETY, AND HEALTH PROTECTION
As described in the EA for the Proposed Interim Storage of Enriched Uranium at
the Y-12 Plant (DOE/EA-0929), the Y-12 Plant has extensive programs and
procedures for environmental, safety, and health protection. It is the policy
of the Y-12 Plant site management to conduct operations in a safe and
environmentally sound manner, and in compliance with all applicable federal,
state, and local laws and regulations and with all applicable DOE Orders. The
air, groundwater, and surface water in and around the Y-12 Plant are monitored
routinely to identify and minimize the impacts to the environment from its
operations. Worker safety is addressed throughout the receipt, prestorage
processing, intra-plant transport, and storage operations by the Y-12 Plant's
implementation of Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
requirements through applicable DOE Orders. A detailed report on monitoring
results, estimates of the current environmental impacts, and regulatory
compliance at Y-12 appears annually in the Oak Ridge Reservation Annual Site
Environmental Report, which has been published since 1971 and is available to
the public.
3.10 ON-SITE TRANSPORTATION AT THE Y-12 PLANT
Transportation between Y-12 Plant buildings would be accomplished by means of
vehicles specifically designed for on-site use. These vehicles are commonly
referred to as Blue Goose vehicles because of the color of the cargo body and
cab. Each vehicle can transport cargo weighing up to 1.814 kg (4000 lb.).
Numerous security and safety systems have been installed on the Blue Goose and
there is no access to the cargo body from the cab. On-Site Transportation
Safety (Energy Systems 1991) establishes safety requirements and guidelines
for handling and moving materials at the Y-12 Plant which ensure protection
equivalent to that provided by the DOT regulations (49 CFR). These guidelines
include packaging, marketing, labeling, placarding, and emergency response
requirements.
Blue Goose vehicles operate in the Protected Area of the Y-12 Plant to
transport material to and from the Material Access Areas, which are the
controlled security areas containing special nuclear materials.
4.0 ALTERNATIVES TO THE PROPOSED ACTION
The alternatives to the proposed action considered in this EA include
the no action alternative and two alternate aerial ports of entry for
the C-5 aircraft landing in the United States: Fort Campbell, a U.S. Army
base which is located in southwestern Kentucky and the Air National Guard
base (hereafter called McGhee Tyson) which is collocated with McGhee
Tyson Airport, the commercial airport in Knoxville, Tennessee. Fort
Campbell and McGhee Tyson Airport were selected as representative aerial
ports of entry which meet the criteria established in Section 3.3.1,
Aerial Port of Entry Requirements. The impacts of using either Fort
Campbell or McGhee Tyson as the aerial port of entry are analyzed in
Section 6.
4.1 NO ACTION ALTERNATIVE
Under the no action alternative, the United States would not acquire the
HEU from Kazakhstan. This would not meet the U.S. objectives for
nonproliferation and would not reduce the global nuclear danger. As
discussed in Section 2, the HEU in Kazakhstan constitutes sufficient
material for persons with low technical skills to make 20 or more nuclear
weapons.
4.2 ALTERNATE PORTS OF ENTRY
4.2.1 FORT CAMPBELL, KENTUCKY, AS AERIAL PORT
Under this alternative, Fort Campbell, located in southwestern Kentucky,
would be the aerial port of entry for the C-5 flight into the United
States. Fort Campbell meets the port of entry requirements. Fort
Campbell is a U.S. Army base with an airstrip that can accommodate the
C-5 aircraft and the SSTs. The equipment and personnel needed for C-5
operations would be transported to Fort Campbell. However, Fort Campbell
would not have the added measure of safety offered by Dover AFB which has
more experience with C-5 aircraft. Fort Campbell has sufficient capacity
in a secure area to accommodate the two C-5 aircraft and 10 SSTs. Fort
Campbell is within a three-hour drive to the Y-12 Plant, which is
considerably closer to the Y-12 Plant than Dover AFB. Fort Campbell is
located in a rural area within four counties which have a population of
approximately 189,000. The population density within 10 km of Fort
Campbell is 3.7 person/km2. Based on these characteristics of the
airstrip and support facilities, and the low population in the surrounding
area, Fort Campbell meets the aerial port requirements.
In considering the "other factors," as described in Section 3.3.1, Fort
Campbell would not be as desirable as an aerial port as Dover AFB in most
respects. The air flight distance from the East Coast of the U.S. to
Fort Campbell is approximately 600 miles while Dover is essentially on the
East Coast. No additional refueling would be required for the Fort
Campbell alternative. The factors which are more favorable under this
alternative than Dover are the facts that Fort Campbell has a lower
population density, and this alternative would require less highway
transport distance to Y-12 than the Dover alternative.
4.2.2 AIR NATIONAL GUARD BASE AT MCGHEE TYSON AIRPORT AS AERIAL PORT
Under this alternative, the Air National Guard Base at the McGhee Tyson
Airport in Knoxville, Tennessee would be the aerial port of entry for the
C-5 flight into the U.S. McGhee Tyson meets the port of entry
requirements. The Air National Guard Base is a military aerial port
collocated with a commercial airport. McGhee Tyson has sufficient
capacity in a secure area to accommodate the C-5 aircraft and the SSTs.
The equipment and personnel need for C-5 operations would be transported
to McGhee Tyson. However, McGhee Tyson would not have the added measure
of safety offered by Dover AFB because of Dover's greater experience with
C-5 aircraft. Also, McGhee Tyson does not have as much ramp space as
Dover AFB does for parking the C-5 aircraft and SSTs. McGhee Tyson is
much closer to the Y-12 Plant than either Dover AFB or Fort Campbell.
McGhee Tyson is located in Blount County, which has a population of
approximately 86,000. The center of the City of Knoxville, which is a
relatively large urban area is 10 miles from the McGhee Tyson airport.
The population density within 10 km of McGhee Tyson is 17.8 person/km2,
which is lower than Dover AFB population density of 475.4 persons/km2.
Based on these characteristics of the airstrip and support facilities and
the low population in the area within 10 km of the airport, McGhee Tyson
meets the aerial port requirements.
In considering the other factors described in Section 3.3.1, McGhee Tyson
would not be as desirable an aerial port as Dover AFB in most respects.
The air flight distance from the East Coast to McGhee Tyson is
approximately 400 miles, while Dover is essentially on the East Coast. No
additional refueling would be required for the McGhee Tyson alternative.
The factors which are more favorable under this alternative than Dove AFB
or Fort Campbell alternatives are the facts that the McGhee Tyson
alternative has a lower population density and would require much less
highway transport distance to Y-12 than the Dover alternative.
4.3 ALTERNATIVES DISMISSED FROM FURTHER CONSIDERATION
4.3.1 Other Ports of Entry
The three ports of entry analyzed in this EA provide a range of reasonable
alternatives which meet the port requirements established in Section
3.3.1. Additional ports of entry farther west than Fort Campbell,
Kentucky, were determined not to be reasonable because they would require
additional air refueling, but would not provide any substantial benefit
when compared to the three ports of entry analyzed.
4.3.2 Other DOE Facilities
The Department is proposing to consolidate storage of HEU from the DOE
weapons complex at the Y-12 Plant in order to minimize the cost of storage
and maximize the security of the material, as discussed in the preapproval
EA for Proposed Interim Storage of Enriched Uranium Above the Maximum
Historical Storage Level (DOE/EA-0929). It would not be reasonable to
create a separate DOE secure storage facility solely for the limited
amount of material of foreign origin which may be stored for
nonproliferation purposes.
4.4 COMMERCIAL FACILITY
Because the eventual United States policy goal is to dispose of surplus
HEU (see Section 1.1), it could be beneficial to transport the Kazakhstan
HEU directly to a commercial nuclear processing facility for storage
rather than to the Y-12 facility, if an acceptable arrangement can be
concluded in the time available. The Babcock and Wilcox Company has
expressed tentative interest in obtaining the HEU in order to process and
blend it to a low enriched from at their Lynchburg, Virginia facility for
use as fuel in power reactors. The Department of Energy has been advised
by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), that the Lynchburg facility
could store the material pending a decision on its disposition. This
approach could eventually provide a method to dispose of the material
more expeditiously and also avoid the need to re-transfer the material
from Y-12 at some later date. Minimizing the period of storage could
also reduce the attendant costs.
Initially, any agreement with Babcox and Wilcox would be for storage only
until the legal, regulatory, environmental, and policy issues associated
with commercial disposition of the material could be resolved. An
analysis of transporting the material to the Lynchburg facility is in
preparation and the results will be available before a final decision is
made regarding the destination of the Kazakhstan HEU.
5.0 DESCRIPTION OF AFFECTED ENVIRONMENT
The locations of the Y-12 Plant and Dover Air Force Base are shown in
Figure 5.0-1, as well as the alternative aerial ports.
5.1 Y-12 PLANT, OAK RIDGE, TENNESSEE
The Y-12 Plant is located on the DOE-owned Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR)
which is within the corporate boundaries of the city of Oak Ridge,
Tennessee. The Y-12 Plant, which is situated at the eastern boundary of
the Oak Ridge Reservation, has surrounding buffer zone of about 1,133
hectares (2,800 acres) and is about 4.8 km (3 miles) from the population
center of the city of Oak Ridge.
The estimated residential population within an 80-km (50 mile) radius of
the Oak Ridge Reservation is approximately 880,000. A major urban center,
Knoxville (the approximate population of which is 165,000), is located
about 32 km (20 miles) to the east. The City of Oak Ridge has a
population of about 27,000. Except for Knoxville and the city of Oak
Ridge, the land within 80 km (50 miles) of the Oak Ridge Reservation is
predominantly rural and is used primarily for residential, commercial,
recreational, and agricultural purposes. The preapproval EA for Proposed
Interim Storage of Enriched Uranium at the Y-12 Plant, Oak Ridge
Tennessee, released to the State of Tennessee and the public in September
1994, provides the full description of the Oak Ridge Reservation affected
environment (DOE/EA 0929).
5.2 DOVER AIR FORCE BASE, DELAWARE
Dover AFB is located in Kent County, Delaware, approximately 50 miles
southeast of Wilmington, Delaware and 80 miles southeast of Philadelphia.
The region where Dover AFB is shown in Figure 5.2-1 and the airstrip is
shown in Figure 5.2-2.
Dover AFB is the home of the 436th Airlift Wing and since 1973, has been
the only all C-5 base in the Air Mobility Command. Dover AFB houses the
largest aerial port facility on the East Coast, and is the focal point
for cargo and passenger movement to Europe and the Middle East aboard
both the 436th Airlift Wing C-5s. The mission of the 436 Airlift Wing is
to provide strategic global military airlift capability for worldwide
support of contingency and emergency war plans. Additional information
on Dover AFB is provided in Appendix A.
** Figure 5.0-1 is a U.S. map with the locations of proposed actions and
alternatives. **
**Figure 5.2-1 is a map of a portion of Delaware with the Dover Air Force
Base highlighted. **
** Figure 5.2-2 is a layout of the Dover Air Force Base Airstrip. **
5.3 FORT CAMPBELL, KENTUCKY
Fort Campbell is located in southwestern Kentucky and north-central
Tennessee in portions of four counties: Montgomery and Stewart counties
in Tennessee, and Christian and Trigg Counties in Kentucky. The
installation is approximately eight miles north of Clarksville, Tennessee,
and seventeen miles south of Hopkinsville, Kentucky (see Figure 5.3-1).
Of the 105,303 total acres of land occupied by the Forces Command
installation, approximately two-thirds are in Tennessee and the remainder
in Kentucky. The primary mission of Fort Campbell is to support, train,
and prepare the 101st Airborne Division for combat readiness. Additional
information on Fort Campbell is in Appendix B.
5.4 AIR NATIONAL GUARD BASE, MCGHEE TYSON AIRPORT, KNOXVILLE, TENNESSEE
McGhee Tyson Airport is one of five major air carrier airports in the
state of Tennessee. McGhee Tyson Airport is located approximately 30
miles from Oak Ridge, Tennessee. The airport is located adjacent to the
corporate limits of Alcoa, Tennessee, approximately 10 miles southwest of
the Knoxville Central Business district. The region where McGhee Tyson
airport presently shares its airfield facilities with the 134th Air
Refueling Group of the Tennessee Air National Guard and the Army Aircraft
Support Facility. The Tennessee Air National Guard occupies 323 acres on
the west side of the airport. The 134th's primary mission is to provide
refueling support for military aircraft and it has assigned eleven KC-135E
tankers. McGhee Tyson Airport is categorized in the National Plan of
Integrated Airport systems as a medium-haul commercial service airport.
This category does not restrict or prevent its use by general aviation or
military aircraft. The runways are adequate for landings and takeoffs by
the largest Air Force cargo aircraft, including the C-5A. Fuel storage
and fueling services for general aviation, air cargo, and the airlines is
handled on-site by the fixed base operators. Additional information on
McGhee Tyson is provided in Appendix C. The high natural radionuclide
levels make the ocean ecosystems the highest background-radiation domains
in the biosphere (IAEA, 1976).
Radionuclides have been discharges into the oceans since 1944. However,
in 1981, it was estimated that the total input of radionuclides,
essentially from waste disposal and nuclear weapons testing, approached
0.7 percent of the natural radioactivity present in the oceans (Needler,
1981). The total inventory of natural radioactivity in the oceans is
approximately 5.0 x 10E11 Ci(IAEA, 1976).
The relationship between environmental concentrations of radionuclides
and the concentration found in organisms is important in the study of food
web (as occurs with organic pesticides in terrestrial environments) is
observed in marine food webs. In the marine environment, uranium has not
been found to bioaccumulate in fish and only slightly bioaccumulates in
crustaceans and mollusks (IAEA, 1976). The readiness with which other
constitutes of spent nuclear fuel may enter the food web is variable, but
generally low (DOE, 1980).
The deep sea bottom dwellers, or benthos, are highly diverse, with many
taxonomic groups being represented there by more species than most
shallow-water communities (Hessler, 1976). However, the number of
individual organisms in a given volume does decrease in the deep seas
and this dramatic reduction in standing stock or biomass on the deep
ocean floor. In round figures, the total weight of bottom-living
organisms in and on each square meter seabed decreases from 10-100 grams
on the continental shelf, to 1-10 grams on the continental slope, and to
only 0.1-1.0 gram on the abyssal plain. (Rice, 1978).
The continental shelf, averaging 65 km (40.3 miles) wide and less than
200 m (0.124 miles) deep, has the greatest biomass concentration in the
ocean and is where most fisheries are located. The deep ocean is an
average of 4 km (2.48 miles) deeper than the continental shelf (Pickard,
1979).
Specific flow estimates for the North Atlantic are up to 5.0 x 10E6 m3/s
for the total volume of water crossing the Iceland-Scotland ridge (Steel,
1962). From the Greenland Sea, the flow through the Denmark Strait has
been estimated to be 5.0 x 10E6 m3/s (Swallow, 1960). Water from the
Arctic that enters the Atlantic leaves mainly to the south toward
midlatitudes (NEA, 1988).
** Figure 5.3-1 is a map of the location of Fort Campbell, Kentucky. **
** Figure 5.4-1 is map of the location of McGhee Tyson Airport,
Tennessee. **
5.5 Global Commons
Because the proposed action would involve air transport over the oceans,
the potential impacts on the global commons are analyzed in this EA, in
accordance with Executive Order 12114, Environmental Effects Abroad of
Major Federal Actions.
Seawater is a complex solution containing the majority of the known
elements. The average salinity of ocean water is about 35 parts per
thousand. A significant feature of sea water is that while the total
concentration of dissolved salt varies from place to place, the ratios of
the more abundant components remain almost constant. This may be taken
as evidence that over geologic time, the oceans have become well mixed.
(Pickard, 1979).
** Table 5.1 Oceanic Concentrations of naturally occurring Uranium Isotopes
U-234 1.04 - 1.30 pCi/l
U-235 0.04 - 0.07 pCi/l
U-238 0.9 - 1.30 pCi/l
Note: one picocurie (pCi) = 1.0 x 10E12 Ci **
Naturally occurring radionuclides such as uranium-234, uranium-235, and
uranium 238 are present in seawater and in marine organisms at
concentrations generally greater than their concentrations in terrestrial
ecosystems. The ocean water concentrations of uranium isotopes are shown
in Table 5.1.
6.0 POTENTIAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS
This section examines the potential impacts of the proposed action and
alternatives under incident-free and accident conditions on: the global
commons; the aerial ports of entry and their surrounding areas; the Y-12
Plant and the surrounding area, and the areas along the highway routes on
which the HEU would be transported.
6.1 Y-12 PLANT
The preapproval EA for Proposed Interim Storage of Enriched Uranium at
the Y-12 Plant, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, released to the State of Tennessee
and the public on September 23, 1994, provides and analysis of the impacts
of prestorage processing and interim storage of up to 500 metric tons of
HEU, including 5 metric tons of HEU which could be acquired from foreign
sources, and 7,105.9 metric tons of LEU for up to 10 years (DOE/EA 0929).
This EA references applicable sections of the Y-12 Interim Storage EA
(DOE/EA 0929).
6.1.1 Environmental Effects
6.1.1.1 Land Use and Archaeological and Cultural Resources
Because there will be no new buildings constructed or demolished for the
proposed action, there will be no effects on land use or archaeological
and cultural resources. (DOE/EA 0929).
6.1.1.2 Air Quality
The proposed action is to provide interim storage of the HEU without any
prestorage processing, which is the greater source of air emissions,
relative to storage activities. There would be no additional releases of
airborne contaminants beyond the effects analyzed in the Y-12 Interim
Storage EA (DOE/EA-0929) because no processing would be required.
Atmospheric discharges from Y-12 Plant production operations are minimized
through the extensive use of air pollution control equipment.
High-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters are used to essentially
eliminate particulate emissions (including uranium) from numerous
production facilities. HEPA filters remove more than 99% of the
particulates from the exhaust gases.
Radioactive and nonradioactive airborne discharges would continue to be
emitted from the Y-12 Plant under the proposed action, with prestorage
processing being the primary source of emissions. An estimated 0.055
curies of uranium was released into the atmosphere in 1993 as a result
of Y-12 Plant operations, primarily from processing operations. There
has been a general downward trend in the total curie discharges of
uranium from the Y-12 Plant, with 0.15 curies released in 1989, 0.08
curies released in 1990, 0.06 curies in 1991 and 1992, and 0.055 curies
in 1993. The decreased uranium emissions reflect: the reduction since
1989 in other types of process activities that are still operating; and
improvements in contamination control throughout the Y-12 Plant.
6.1.1.3 Hydrology and Water Quality
The proposed action would involve only interim storage operations, and
therefore, does not involve the types of wastewater discharges resulting
from prestorage processing. The effects on hydrology and water quality
analyzed in the Y-12 Interim Storage EA (DOE/EA-0929) would continue
primarily as a result of other Y-12 Plant operations.
6.1.1.4 Ecological Resources
As there is little natural vegetation or fauna within the Y-12 Plant, and
there would be no new construction or demolition of buildings under the
proposed action, no effects on ecological resources would occur. The
effects on ecological resources analyzed in the Y-12 Interim Storage EA
(DOE/EA-0929) would continue primarily as a result of other Y-12 Plant
operations.
**Figure 6.1.2.1-1 Average External Dose to Workers in building 9720-5
Warehouse
1987 0.16 rem
1988 0.125 rem
1989 0.07 rem
1990 0.025 rem
1991 0.03 rem
1992 0.02 rem
1993 0.025 rem **
6.1.2 Incident-Free Radiological Exposure
This section discusses the potential radiological effects to workers and
the public from the proposed action under incident-free conditions.
Under incident-free conditions, radiological exposures to workers could
occur through direct exposure to the uranium material. Facility workers
who would be in close proximity to the HEU material are the only
population group at risk from direct exposure to this source because
HEU emits low penetrating radiation. These direct exposures may result
in an external dose to the workers.
The twelve workers involved in handling the HEU acquired from Kazakhstan
to place the containers in interim storage would receive a collective
dose of 0.1 person-rem. The individual dose would be 0.008 rem. Using
the worker dose-to-risk conversion factor of 4 x 10E-4 cancer fatalities
per person-rem (NRC, 1991), the collective dose of 0.1 person-rem would
be estimated to result in 4 x 10E-5 excess latent cancer fatalities among
those 12 workers. (0.1 person-rem x 0.0004 [risk factor] = .00004). This
means that there would be a probability of 4 x 10E-5 or approximately 4
chances in 100,000 that even one excess cancer fatality would occur
among the 12 workers as a result of the proposed action.
The worker exposure from ongoing operations in Building 9720-5, which
would continue regardless of whether the proposed action is undertaken,
is shown in Table 6.1. The estimated exposures are based on actual 1993
dosimetry data derived from dosimeters worn by Y-12 workers. The average
annual dose and the dose to the maximally exposed worker for each building
are shown. These annual doses are well below the Y-12 Plant annual limit
of 1 rem. The doses resulting from routine storage operations have
substantially decreased since 1987 due to new shielding and operational
procedures. The proposed action would be doses received over a short
duration and would not increase the annual doses received by workers in
Building 9720-5.
Under incident-free operations, there would be essentially no uranium
releases to the atmosphere and therefore, there would be no dose to the
public caused by the proposed action. The annual dose to the maximally
exposed individual from ongoing Y-12 Plant operations would continue to
be approximately 0.0013 rem (1.3 mrem), which is the 1993 dose,
regardless of whether the proposed action is implemented. EPA standards
for releases, such as the NESHAP regulations, limit the dose to an
individual member of the public from radionuclide releases to the
atmosphere to 10 mrem per year. The annual collective dose from ongoing
Y-12 operations to the public within 50 miles of Oak Ridge Reservation
would continue to be 12 person-rem, which is the 1993 collective dose,
regardless of whether the proposed action is implemented.
In the postulated fire in Building 9720-5, the uranium and beryllium could
potentially ignite and become airborne. The radiological effects of
credible bounding uranium fires are analyzed in the EA for Interim Storage
at Y-12 (DOE/EA-0929). A postulated fire that causes beryllium to become
airborne is one of toxic chemical release accident scenarios identified
in that EA (see Table 6.3). However, the consequences of that fire are
not analyzed because it is not the bounding chemical release accident at
Y-12 Plant: the anhydrous hydrogen fluoride leak is the bounding chemical
accident, and it is analyzed in depth in the EA.
The bounding uranium fire accident analyzed in the EA for Interim Storage
at Y-12 is postulated in Building 9212, rather than Building 9720-5; it
should be noted that Building 9212 contains processing operations,
whereas Building 9720-5 is only a warehouse and does not contain
processing operations. The consequences of the Building 9212 fire are a
dose of 0.03 rem to the involved worker, and a collective dose to the
worker population of 7,100 person-rem, which is the mean dose. The 95th
percentile collective dose is estimated to be 40,000 person rem. For the
public, the dose to the maximally exposed individual from this accident
would be 7.2 rem (30 rem - 95th percentile dose), and the collective dose
to the population within 50 miles would be 100 person rem (380 person-rem
- 95th percentile dose).
The health effects of the worker and public doses are presented in the EA
for Interim Storage at Y-12. As an example, the collective dose of 100
person-rem would result in 0.02 excess latent cancer fatalities, based on
the public dose-to-risk conversion factor of 5 x 10E-4 (NRC, 1991) (100
person-rem x 0.0005 [risk factor] = 0.05). This means that there would
be a probability of 0.05 or one chance in 20 that even one excess cancer
fatality would occur among the entire population within 50 miles of the
Oak Ridge Reservation; therefore, it is expected that not a single member
of the public would die from cancer as a result of exposure to radiation
from the bounding criticality accident.
The acute effects of airborne beryllium are respiratory distress such as:
pulmonary edema (fluid on the lungs) and chemical pneumonitis (chemical
toxicity of the pulmonary system). Beryllium-induced acute respiratory
effects range from a mild inflammation of the nasal mucous membranes, to
a severe chemical pneumonitis. Acute pneumonitis is encountered only
rarely due to improved control methods and prompt medical treatment of
beryllium exposures. Recovery can take up to six months for acute
pneumonitis. Severe cases may become fatal. In addition, beryllium is
potentially a strong skin sensitizer and can cause contact dermatitis,
which is characterized by itching and reddened, elevated, or fluid-
accumulated lesions. Following cessation of exposure and with simple
local treatment, the skin eruptions usually disappear within one to two
weeks.
Table 6.1 Radiation Doses for Y-12 Workers in Building 9720-5
Population Population Annual Dose 10-Year Dose Latent Cancer
Size to Worker (rem) Fatalities
Collective 37 0.024 8.9 person 3.6 x 10E-3
rem
Maximally 1 0.092 0.92 rem 3.7 x 10E-4
Exposed
Individual
6.1.3 Exposure under Accident Conditions
Building 9720-5 is a warehouse with no processing operations. Therefore,
the postulated bounding accident is a fire or a criticality, either of
which could be initiated by natural phenomena (earthquake, tornado,
lightning), an aircraft crash, or inadvertent ignition of combustible
materials. The probability of an aircraft crash is on the order of 1 x
10E-7 per year or less (approximately 1 chance in 10,000,000). The
probability of an earthquake of the magnitude to collapse the building
(peak ground acceleration of .18g) is 5 x 10E-4 or approximately 1 chance
in 2,000. The probability of a tornado of sufficient magnitude to
collapse the building is 2 x 10E-5, approximately 1 chance in 50,000.
(Kennedy, et al 1990)
Fire Accident Scenario The probability of ignition of combustible
materials in Building 9720-5 has not been calculated; as described in the
EA for Interim Storage at Y-12 (DOE/EA-0929), the Safety Analysis Reports
for Y-12 are in the process of being updated. The Final Safety Analysis
Report for the Assembly, Disassembly and Warehouse Project (Energy
Systems 1986) determined that the probability of a fire occurring is not
"credible," which is a safety analysis term for an accident with a
probability greater than 1 x 10E-6. Beryllium toxicity can be manifested
in adverse effects on the human immune system; epidemiological studies
have not determined the mechanism for these effects.
Some persons suffering acute beryllium exposure experience these
symptoms, whereas others may not. There are uncertainties concerning the
dose-response relationship. However, historic epidemiological data
indicate that approximately 4 percent of workers exposed to beryllium
have a positive response to the Lymphocyte Transformation Test (LTT),
which is a potential indicator of berylliosis or acute beryllium disease.
There is currently no standard for Immediately Dangerous to Life and
Health (IDLH) for beryllium issued by the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA). The National Institute for Occupational Safety
and Health (NIOSH) gives an IDLH value of 10mg/m3 for 30 minute exposure.
(NIOSH, 1990) The OSHA Permissible Exposure Limit (PEL) for an 8 hour
time weighted average is 2ug/m3, and the Short-Term Exposure Limit (STEL)
is 5 ug/m3 over a 30 minute time period. In a beryllium fire, the
workers could be exposed to concentrations greater than the NIOSH IDLH
standard or the OSHA PEL or the STEL. At high concentrations of
airborne beryllium, workers fatalities could potentially occur. It is
extremely unlikely that members of the public would experience acute
effects.
Criticality Accidents: Postulated criticality accidents are analyzed in
detail in EA for Interim Storage at Y-12 (DOE/EA-0929). The bounding
criticality accident analyzed in the EA for Interim Storage is a ground-
level release in Building 9212, which results in fatalities among the
involved workers and an average dose of 0.1 rem to the uninvolved worker
(0.8 rem - 95th percentile dose). For the total worker population, the
mean dose from the criticality accident is estimated to be 870 person-rem
(4,800 person-rem - 95th percentile dose). For the public, the dose to
the maximally exposed individual from this accident would be 1.3 rem
(3.2 rem - 95th percentile dose), and the collective dose to the
population within 50 miles would be 9 person-rem (40 person-rem - 95th
percentile dose).
The health effects of worker and public doses are presented in the EA for
Interim Storage at Y-12 (DOE/EA-0929). For example, the collective dose
of 40 person-rem would result in 0.02 excess latent cancer fatalities,
based on the public dose-to-risk conversion factor of 5 x 10E-4 (NRC
1991), (40 person-rem x 0.0005 [risk factor] = 0.02). This means that
there would be a probability of 0.02, or one chance in 50, that even one
excess cancer fatality would occur among the entire population within 50
miles of the Oak Ridge Reservation; therefore it is expected that not a
single member of the public would die from cancer as a result of exposure
to radiation from the bounding criticality accident.
Beyond-Design-Basis Building Collapse: The EA for Interim Storage at Y-12
(DOE/EA-0929) analyzes the bounding scenario of the beyond-design-basis
collapse for Building 9212 could result from an extreme natural hazard
(tornado or earthquake) or an airplane crash. This postulated accident
bounds the consequences of the collapse of Building 9720-5. Fatalities
to the involved workers would be expected as a result of the building
collapse and the criticality that is postulated in this scenario. In
addition, a fire and simultaneous release of HEU is postulated. The
estimated exposure to uninvolved workers is an average dose of 2 rem. The
average collective dose to all the workers on-site at Y-12 would be 14,000
person-rem. The average collective dose of 14,000 person-rem from the
collapse of Building 9212 is estimated to result in five excess cancer
fatalities (14,000 person-rem x 0.0004 [risk factor] = 5). For the
public, there would be a collective dose of 190 person-rem from the
beyond-design-basis accident, which is estimated to result in 0.1 excess
latent cancer fatalities (190 person-rem x 0.0005 [risk factor] = 0.1).
This means that there would be a probability of 0.1, or one chance in
ten, that even one excess cancer fatality would occur among the entire
population within 50 miles of the Oak Ridge Reservation; therefore it is
expected that not a single member of the public would die from cancer as
a result of exposure to radiation from the beyond-design-basis accident.
6.1.4 Environmental Justice
On February 11, 1994, President Clinton signed Executive Order 12898.
Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations
and Low-Income Populations (59 FR 7829). The order requires each Federal
agency to make environmental justice "part of its mission by identifying
and addressing, as appropriate, disproportionately high and adverse human
health or environmental effects of its programs, policies and activities
on minority populations and low-income populations..." By December 11,
1994, each agency must develop a proposed agency-wide environmental
justice strategy and the strategy must be finalized by February 11, 1995.
While the DOE strategy is not yet final, President Clinton directed all
agencies to take necessary steps to implement several specific directives
immediately. Each Federal agency must analyze the environmental effects,
including human health, economic and social effects, of Federal actions,
including effects on minority communities and low-income communities,
when such analysis is required by the National Environmental Policy Act
of 1969 (NEPA). Mitigation measures outlined or analyzed in an
environmental assessment, environmental impact statement, or record of
decision, whenever feasible, should address significant and adverse
environmental effects of proposed Federal actions on minority communities
and low-income communities. In addition, each Federal agency is required
to provide opportunities for community input in the NEPA process,
including identifying potential effects and mitigation measures in
consultation with affected communities and improving the accessibility
of meetings, crucial documents, and notices.
The EA for Y-12 Interim Storage (DOE/EA-0929) analyzes the effects of
interim storage of enriched uranium on two potential low income
populations and minority populations, which are located in census tracts
201 and 205. The EA does not identify disproportionate effects on these
two communities.
6.1.5 Cumulative Effects
The EA for Y-12 Interim Storage (DOE/EA-0929) analyzes the cumulative
effects of interim storage of enriched uranium. The Oak Ridge Reservation
includes the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), K-25 Site, and Y-12
Plant. All three sites contribute to radioactive air emissions, as
reported in the Oak Ridge Reservation Environmental Report (Energy
Systems 1994h). During 1993, approximately 2,232 curies of radionuclides
were released to the atmosphere from the DOE ORR facilities. Almost all
of the radioactivity released was from ORNL and primarily consisted of
tritium, radioiodine, and the inert radioactive gases argon, xenon and
krypton. At the K-25 site, the Toxic Substance Control Act (TSCA)
incinerator is the only major radionuclide source and is the primary
K-25 contributor to offsite dose. The total discharge of radionuclides
from the K-25 site to the atmosphere in 1993 was approximately 0.42
curies. Of the total discharges of radionuclides from the K-25 site,
less than 0.02 curies were uranium. The total discharge of radionuclides
to the atmosphere from the Y-12 Plant in 1993 was approximately 0.055
curies from Y-12 uranium processing (Energy Systems 1994h).
In addition to the ORR facilities, five non-DOE offsite sources of minor
radioactive air emissions are located in the vicinity. A NESHAP-permitted
waste processing facility located on Bear Creek Road adjacent to and west
of the ORR reported a maximum individual dose of 0.06 mrem due to
airborne emissions in 1993 (Energy Systems 1994h). A depleted uranium
processing facility and a decontamination facility on Illinois Avenue
and Flint Road, respectively, in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, also reported 1993
emissions (Energy Systems 1994h). The other two sources are the Kingston
and Bull Run coal-fired steam plants. Based on a study conducted to
determine the radiological impact of airborne effluents of coal-fired and
nuclear power plants, a hypothetical plant similar to the Kingston and
Bull Run plants was estimated to release approximately 0.02 curies of
uranium per year (McBride, et al. 1977).
Table 6.1-2 summarized 1993 airborne radionuclide emissions from both DOE
and non-DOE sources in the vicinity of the Oak Ridge Reservation. A
network of ambient air and effluent samplers provide data from individual
plant emissions, cumulative emissions from ORR sources, and offsite
locations. This network consists of three distinct categories: site
monitors, perimeter monitors, and remote monitors. Analysis of the
perimeter air sampling data shows that the operations at Oak Ridge
Reservation slightly increase the local airborne concentrations of
radionuclides. No major changes in the concentration of these
radionuclides were detected between 1992 and 1993 at the remote monitoring
samplers. A hypothetical maximally exposed individual could receive 1.4
mrem/yr from radionuclides release into the atmosphere from ORR (Energy
Systems 1994h). The collective EDE to the 879,546 persons residing
within 80 km (50 miles) of the ORR. Thus, based on the perimeter air
sampling data, the ongoing operations have a slight effect on local air
quality. The local impact is well within EPA's National Emissions
Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP) regulatory limit of 10
mrem/year to the maximally exposed individual of the public (40 CFR 61,
Subpart H).
Table 6.1-2 1993 Airborne Radionuclide Emissions in the Vicinity of the
Oak Ridge Reservation
Site Location Radionuclides Maximally Exposed Off-site
Released Off-site Individual collective
(curies) TEDE (mrem) EDE (person-rem)
DOE/ORR ORNL 2,231 0.1 6
K-25 Plant 0.42 0.1 8
Y-12 Plant 0.055 1.3 12
Non-DOE Water process- Not avail. 0.06 Not avail.
ing facility
on Bear Creek
Road
Depleted uran- 0.05 kg Not avail. Not avail.
ium processing (approx. (approx. less
facility on 2 x 10E-5 than 0.0006
Illinois Ave. curies) mrem)
Decontamination Not avail. 0.0001 Not Avail.
facility located
on Flint Road.
Kingston coal- 0.02 curies <0.0001 Not Avail. fired steam of uranium plant (estimate) Bull Run coal 0.02 curies Not avail. Not avail. fired steam of uranium plant (estimate) In addition to the extensive monitoring programs described in the annual Oak Ridge Reservation Environmental Report, a new soil monitoring program was implemented in 1992. The soil provides an integrating medium that can "record" contaminants released to the atmosphere, and soil sampling can be used to evaluate the long-term accumulation and estimated environmental radionuclide inventories. Soil plots were established at nine of the perimeter ambient air sampling stations. Initial soil plot samples collected in 1993 will form a baseline for comparison and trend analysis in future years for use in determining cumulative impacts. In recent years there has been a general decline in the level of air emissions and worker and public exposures, as a result of mission changes at Y-12 and improved administrative controls. The dose to the maximally exposed individual from all ORR sources is estimated to be approximately 14 mrem. Since implementation of the proposed action would not result in radioactive air emissions which are greater than those recently reported, the cumulative impacts from implementation of the proposed action are expected to remain at current levels. These doses are well below the 100 mrem annual regulatory limit for individuals off-site from all exposure pathways. 6.1.6 No Action Alternative Effects on Y-12 Plant Under the no action alternative, the Y-12 Plant would continue to provide interim storage for enriched uranium which is stored on site. Pending the outcome of the EA for Y-12 Interim Storage (DOE/EA-0929), the effects would either be the effects of the No Action Alternative analyzed in that EA or the effects of the proposed action of storage of enriched uranium above the maximum historical storage level. 6.1.7 For Campbell Alternative Effects on Y-12 Plant Under the alternative in which Fort Campbell would be the aerial port of entry, the HEU would be stored at Y-12 just as under the proposed action. Therefore, the effects at Y-12 Plant would be the same as the proposed action, as analyzed in Section 6.1.1 6.1.5. THIS IS A DELETED/SANITIZED VERSION OF THIS DOCUMENT CONFIRMED TO BE UNCLASSIFIED AUTHORITY: DOE/SA-20 BY D.P. CANNON, DATE: 3/6/95
6.2 Transportation
Direct radiological exposure resulting in an external dose may occur from
radiation emitted by packages aboard vehicles in transport and during
stops. In addition, accidents during air and highway transport could
result in external and internal radiological exposure from the release of
material. Nonradiological impacts of the generation of pollutants and
mechanical injuries during normal transport and physical trauma during
accidents are other potential impacts.
Impacts on the transportation crew and the public from the HEU shipping
campaign were calculated by means of a RADTRAN risk analysis (Sandia
1992). RADTRAN is a computer code that yields conservative estimates
(i.e. overstates the risk) of radiological exposure to the transportation
crew and potentially exposed public.
6.2.1 Air Transport by U.S. Air Force
Under the three alternatives, the HEU would be transported by the U.S. Air
Force.
6.2.1.1. Incident-free Air Transport From Air Transport of HEU
The transport of under incident-free conditions would result in
radiological exposure only to the personnel on the aircraft. There would
be no radiological exposure to the public caused by incident-free air
transport.
The radiological exposure received by persons on the C-5 aircraft would be
approximately the same whether the aerial port of entry is Dover AFB,
Fort Campbell, or McGhee Tyson. This is because of the minimal difference
in flying time to the three destinations, in terms of percentage of total
flying time. The maximum individual dose resulting from proximity to the
HEU is estimated to be 0.01 rem. This would be added to the background
individual dose of 0.015 rem resulting from the cosmic radiation on a
flight (round trip).
The maximum collective dose to the 34 (maximum) persons on board is
estimated to be 0.34 person-rem. Using the worker dose-to-risk conversion
factor of 4 x 10E-4 cancer fatalities per person-rem (NRC, 1991), the
collective dose of 0.34 person-rem would be estimated to result in 1.4 x
10E-4 latent cancer fatalities (0.34 person-rem x 0.0004 [risk factor] =
0.00014). This means that there would be a probability of 0.00014, or
about 1 chance in 7000 that any excess cancer fatalities would occur
among the crew.
Under incident-free conditions, there would be negligible effect on the
global commons from the C-5 aircraft flight from Dover, Fort Campbell,
and McGhee Tyson. Air emissions of criteria pollutants from C-5 and
tanker aircraft flights would consist of carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxides,
hydrocarbons, and particulate matter. Emissions at the altitudes the
aircraft will fly over the global commons would constitute a very
temporary and minor addition to those already emitted by other aircraft
and ships. Similarly, the additional C-5 operations would constitute a
very temporary 2.24 percent increase in daily operations and, therefore,
would result in very minor increases of airborne emissions. The
additional emissions from these aircraft operations and associated ground
vehicles would fall below EPA specified threshold levels, and, therefore,
an air conformity determination is not required.
Under the no action alternative, there would be no flight and therefore,
there would be no effects.
6.2.1.2 Postulated Air Transport Accident Conditions
6.2.1.2.1 Air Transport Accident Probabilities
The C-5 aircraft has an excellent performance history. The historical
data indicate that the probability of accidents is extremely low (No class
A accidents or 0 per 100,000 flying hour average for the last three
years). For the of this EA, the accident probabilities are conservatively
assumed to be comparable to very large cargo planes. Six categories of
accident severity derived from simple air-mode fault trees were used in
the RADTRAN risk analysis. These are:
* Category 1: no forces on packages exceed Type A standards
* Category 2: no forces on packages exceed Type B standards
* Category 3: impact forces exceed Type B standards; no fire; 15 percent
of packages fail
* Category 4: impact forces do not exceed Type B standards; engulfing fire
for more than 30 min.; 30 percent of all packages fail
* Category 5: impact forces exceed Type B standards; engulfing fire for
more than 30 min.; 50 percent of all packages fail
* Category 6: impact forces exceed Type B standards; engulfing fire for
more than 30 min.; 70 percent of all packages fail.
Two separate fault trees (based on smaller aircraft than the C-5) were
used for two sets of accident scenarios: one for landing/low altitude
stalls; and one for in-flight accidents. In the event of an accident,
the probability that one of the six accident categories would occur are
as follows:
Landing
/Stalls In-flight
Category 1: 0.208 0.230
Category 2: 0.540 0.130
Category 3: 0.050 0.3850
Category 4: 0.060 0.014
Category 5: 0.128 0.217
Category 6: 0.014 0.024
_____ _____
1.00 1.00
For Dover AFB, the accident scenario of most concern is the landing/stall
accident. For landing/stall accidents, there is a 75 percent probability
that an accident would not breach a container. For the alternate ports
of entry, (Fort Campbell and McGhee Tyson) , the probability of occurrence
of a landing/stall accident is the same as for Dover AFB, but the
probabilities of an in-flight accident are greater because the routes
traverse greater distances over U.S. territory. (The air flight distance
to Dover = 600 nautical miles; the distance to Fort Campbell = 1190
nautical miles; and the distance to McGhee Tyson = 105 nautical miles).
In-flight accidents have higher probabilities causing the breach of some
of the containers. For example, the probability that an accident would
not breach a container drops to 36 percent.
If there were an accident during overflight of U.S. territory, the
probability that it would occur in a rural population zone was estimated
to be 80 percent. The probability that any accident that might occur
would be in a suburban area, estimated to be 19 percent; and in an urban
area, 1 percent. These percentages represent the national average
occurrence of rural, suburban, and urban population densities.
In the global commons, only in-flight accident probabilities are
applicable because no landings would occur in the global commons.
Although air refueling would occur in the global commons, there are no
landings involved.
6.2.1.2.2 Air Transport Accident Consequences
Air Transport Accident Consequences Over U.S. Territory
The consequences of a bounding accident(Category 6) over U.S. territory
are given for in-flight and landing/stall accidents in Tables 6.2-1 and
6.2-2 respectively. For in-flight accidents, the consequences were
calculated for a generic high-population urban area; a conservative
generic population estimate is used because it is not possible to predict
the exact location of such an accident. The probability of occurrence of
such an accident varies with total distance of flight over U.S. territory
as shown in Table 6.2-1. For each port of entry, the collective dose
would be 15.6 person-rem distributed among the generic population of
5,210,000. This would result in 7.8 x E-4 latent cancer fatalities in
the exposed population. There is about a 1 in 1,300 chance of a single
latent cancer fatality occurring as a result of this dose among the
exposed population.
A maximum-consequence (Category 6) landing/stall accident has an equal
chance of occurring (2.0 x 10E-8) at any of the proposed ports of entry,
but the collective dose varies according to differences in the size of
the surrounding populations. Thus, the collective dose to persons
potentially under the plume (5,000) (see footnote "a" under Table 6.2-1)
for Fort Campbell, would be lowest at 0.03 person-rem. The collective
dose at McGhee Tyson to persons potentially under the plume (24,000)
would be 0.12 person-rem. The collective dose at Dover to persons
potentially under the plume (26,500) would be 0.13 person-rem. The
collective dose at Dover AFB would result in 6.5 x 10E-5 latent cancer
fatalities. This would be a probability of 0.000065, or about 7 chances
in 100,000 that any excess cancer fatalities would occur in the
surrounding population.
** Table 6.2-1 Air Transport In-Flight Accident Consequences For Bounding
Accident in Urban Area
No. of Persons Accident Collective Latent Cancer
Exposed Probability Dose Fatalities
(person-rem)
Proposed Action: 5,210,000 6.7 x 10E-10 15.6 7.8 x 10E-4
Flight to Dover
AFB
No Action 0 0 0 0
Alternative
Fort Campbell 5,210,000 2.0 x 10E-9 15.6 7.8 x 10E-4
Alternative
McGhee Tyson 5,210,000 1.3 x 10E-9 15.6 7.8 x 10E-4
Airport
Alternative **
** Table 6.2-2 Air Transport Landing/Stall Accident Consequences For
Bounding Accident in Urban Area
No. of Persons Accident Collective Latent Cancer
Exposed Probability Dose Fatalities
(person-rem)
Proposed Action: 26,500 2.0 x 10E-5 0.13 6.5 x 10E-5
Flight to Dover
AFB
No Action 0 0 0 0
Alternative
Fort Campbell 5,000 2.0 x 10E-5 0.03 1.5 x 10E-5
Alternative
McGhee Tyson 24,000 2.0 x 10E-5 0.12 6.0 x 10E-5
Airport
Alternative
Note: The number of persons exposed gives the number persons under the
plume based on the production density surrounding the airport; persons
located closest to the airport(within 1 to 2 kilometers) would receive
the majority of the dose. This result is generally unaffected by the
presence of a city or other population center a few miles away. **
Air Transport Accident Consequences in the Global Commons
Because the proposed action would involve air transport over the oceans,
this EA analyzes the potential environmental impacts of the proposed
action on the global commons in accordance with Executive Order 12114.
Under accident conditions, any containers which withstood the accident
and did not sink to an unrecoverable depth (200m) could possibly be
retrieved. Containers that sank deeper than 200 meters could possibly be
retrieved, but for the purposes of this analysis, it is conservatively
assumed that the containers of HEU in depths greater than 200 m would be
breached, and the HEU would be instantaneously released into the ocean.
It is more likely that the container would be eventually breached and
that there would be a slow release over time which would have less effect
on the marine environment.
The existing oceanic environment contains substantial quantities of
uranium and its daughter products from naturally occurring processes (see
Section 5). As a result, marine organisms are exposed to relatively high
levels of background radiation. Since uranium has not been found to
bioaccumulate in fish and only slightly bioaccumulates in other marine
organisms, an accidental release would result in only slight increases
in the exposure of marine organisms which tend to be more radiation
resistant than terrestrial mammals and which are already exposed to
similar concentrations of uranium. The beryllium in the material could
have a toxic effect on marine organisms, but as discussed in Section 6.1,
the effects are somewhat uncertain. Depending on the concentrations in
the sea water, either the uranium and beryllium could potentially result
in fatalities to marine organisms. As a result of the large volumes of
water, the mixing mechanisms within it, the background concentrations of
uranium, and the radiation resistance of aquatic organisms, the
radiological and toxic impact of this very low probability accident
releasing uranium and beryllium into the ocean would likely be localized
and of short duration.
6.2.2. Transfer of HEU From Aircraft to SST
The HEU would be immediately transferred from the C-5 aircraft to the
waiting SST vehicles at Dover AFB under the proposed action, or at Fort
Campbell, or McGhee Tyson Airport under the alternatives.
6.2.2.1 Incident-Free Radiological Exposure From HEU Transfer Activities
Incident-free radiological exposures to workers and the public from HEU
transfer activities are shown in Table 6.2.3. Package handling modeled
with RADTRAN identifies two exposed groups of workers: the handlers
themselves, who are in this case operators of the K-loader; and 30 other
workers/guards within a 50-m radius. The other workers/guards are not
subdivided into civilian and military personnel. Because unloading would
occur in a secured area at a distance from the public, the dose under
incident-free conditions would be negligible. Even at McGhee Tyson,
where the military installations are separated from the civilian airport
facilities by two parallel runways, one of which is used only by military,
the public is sufficiently distant to avoid being exposed.
** Table 6.2-3 Incident-free Radiological Exposure for HEU Transfer from
Aircraft to SST Under the Proposed Action and Alternatives
Population Transfer of HEU to SST
Population Dose LCF's
Size (person-rem)
K-loader Collective 2 0.088 3.6 x 10E-5
Operations Population
Maximum 1 0.044 1.8 x 10E-5
Individual Dose
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Other Collective 30 1.5 x 10E-2 6.0 x 10E-6
Loading Population
Workers
Average 1 0.50 mrem 2.0 x 10E-7
Individual Dose
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Public Collective none none none
within Population
500 m
Average none none none
Individual Dose
**
Handling is modeled as occurring in the same way at all three aerial ports
of entry. It was estimated to take 30 minutes per Cargo Restraint
Transporter (CRT), or 14.50 hours for complete transfer of all of the
CRTs on one C-5 aircraft to the SSTs if both planes are unloaded at the
same time. No interim storage was assumed to occur during this process.
The incident-free radiological exposure resulting from HEU transfer
activities would be the same at Dover AFB, Fort Campbell, and McGhee
Tyson. The maximum collective dose to two workers who unload all CRTs
is estimated to be 8.8 x 10E-2 person-rem. The maximum individual dose
is estimated to be 4.4 x 10E-2 rem. Using the worker dose-to-risk
conversion factor of 4 x 10E-4 cancer fatalities per person-rem (NRC,
1991), the collective dose of 8.8 x 10E-2 person-rem would be estimated
to result in 3.6 x 10E-5 latent cancer fatalities (0.088 person-rem x
0.004 [risk factor] = 0.000036). This means that there would be a
probability of 3.6 x 10E-5, or about 1 chance in 28,000 that any excess
cancer fatalities would occur among the workers as a result of exposure
incurred during HEU transfer activities.
The dose to other persons at the handling location is estimated to be
1.5 x 10E-2 person-rem for an average individual dose of less than 0.5
mrem.
Under the no action alternative, no flight would occur, and therefore
there would be no transfer of HEU.
6.2.2.2 Postulated HEU Transfer Accidents
The postulated HEU transfer accident is that the K-loader pierces a
package. It is conservatively assumed that the accident damages the
package so severely that the inner and outer containers fail and some
fraction of the contents of that package are dispersed as particulate
material. Persons nearby and downwind would receive a dose via
inhalation of particulates. The contents of the damaged packaged are
conservatively assumed to be oxide in powder form. The package is assumed
to release 50 percent of its contents as aerosols, five percent of which
are respirable.
The effects of an accident during HEU transfer would be the same at Dover
AFB, Fort Campbell, and McGhee Tyson. The maximum individual dose
received by a K-loader operator primarily by inhalation, is estimated to
be 0.088 rem. For other workers, the collective dose to the 2 operators
is estimated to be 0.176 person-rem. Workers are modeled as being able
to move from the immediate location to at least 100 m away. These
workers would receive an average dose of 0.021 rem. Using the worker
dose-to-risk conversion factor of 4x10E-4 cancer fatalities per person-rem
(NRC, 1991), the collective dose of 0.176 person-rem would be estimated to
result in 7 x 10E-5 latent cancer fatalities (0.176 person-rem x 0.0004
[risk factor] = 0.00007). This means that there would be a probability
of 0.00007, or about 1 chance in 14,000 that any excess cancer fatalities
would occur among workers during HEU transfer activities.
** Table 6.2-4 Radiological Exposure for Postulated HEU Transfer Accidents
Population Transfer of HEU to SST
Population Dose LCF's
Size (person-rem)
Other Collective 30 0.6300 3.6 x 10E-5
Workers Population
Maximum 1 0.0210 1.8 x 10E-5
Individual Dose
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Loading Collective 2 0.1760 7.0 x 10E-5
Workers Population
Average 1 0.0880 3.5 x 10E-6
Individual Dose
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Public Collective 8,100 0.0400 2.0 x 10E-5
(Beyond Population
500 m)
Average 1 0.0019 1.0 x 10E-6
Individual Dose
**
The 50-year collective dose to the public from an accident during transfer
activities is estimated to be 4 x 10E-2 person-rem per year. This
collective dose is conservatively assumed to be distributed among an
estimated 8,100 persons. The population of 8,100 persons represents a
conservative estimate of the maximum number of persons within the plume
which would rise from the accident site and descend at approximately 500
meters away. This does not represent the entire population within the
500 meter radius of the accident location, because only those people in
the area where the plume descends would be affected. Any differences
among aerial ports, in terms of population or meteorological conditions,
are bounded by the conservatism in the assumption of 8,100 persons as the
affected population. The maximally exposed member of the public, who is
assumed to be at a distance of 500 m downwind from the accident would
receive a dose of about 2 mrem. Using the general population dose-to-risk
conversion factor of 5 x 10E-4 cancer fatalities per person-rem (NRC,
1991), the collective dose to the public of 4 x 10E-2 person-rem would be
estimated to result in 2.0 x 10E-5 latent cancer fatalities (0.04 person-
rem x 0.0005 [risk factor] = 0.00002). This means that there would be a
probability of 0.00002 or about 1 chance in 50,000 that any excess cancer
fatalities would occur among the affected population of approximately
8,100.
Based on these doses and the estimated latent cancer fatalities, it is
expected that not a single worker or member of the public would die from
cancer as a result of an accident during transfer of HEU. Under the no
action alternative, no flight would occur, and therefore, there would be
no transfer of HEU.
THIS IS A DELETED/SANITIZED VERSION OF THIS DOCUMENT
CONFIRMED TO BE UNCLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY: DOE/SA-20
BY D.P. CANNON, DATE: 3/6/95
6.2.3 SST Transport of HEU to Y-12 Plant
Transportation impacts were analyzed for SST highway transport from Dover
Air Force Base to the Y-12 Plant. Representative SST routes maximizing
the use of interstate highways were developed with the HIGHWAY routing
code. No credit was taken for shielding provided by the SST walls, which
would, in fact, decrease actual exposures. Routes typical of those used
for SST transport were selected and are documented in the transportation
analysis (Sandia, 1994). Route data for rural, urban, and suburban
population densities were used to define the properties and
characteristics of the transportation routes for the RADTRAN analysis of
HEU shipments by SST.
Table 6.2-5 summarizes the annual radiological exposure from incident-free
transport to three populations under the proposed action and alternatives:
(1) the transportation crew; (2) the workers (e.g., escorts, security
personnel) who may be exposed when a SST makes a rest stop; and (3) the
public, including persons sharing the transportation route at the time of
shipment, persons near the transportation route, and persons at stops.
SST stops would occur only under the proposed action and the Fort Campbell
alternative; McGhee Tyson Airport is close enough to the Y-12 Plant that
stops would not be necessary. Under the proposed action the SSTs would
make stops only in low-population-density areas and park only in areas
which are located well away from other trucks at the stop.
6.2.3.1 Incident-free SST Transport
6.2.3.1.1 Proposed Action: SST Transport of HEU from Dover AFB to Y-12
The collective dose to the public for incident-free SST transport would
be 2.9 x 10E-4 person-rem per year. This collective dose would be shared
by the estimated 320,000 persons within 800 meters (0.5 miles) of the
center line of the highway routes that lie between Dover AFB and the Y-12
Plant and by the persons at SST stops. The maximum in-transit dose to an
individual member of the public would be 3.6 x 10E-5 mrem. Using the
general population dose-to-risk conversion factor of 5 x 10E-4 cancer
fatalities per person-rem (NRC, 1991), the collective dose to the public
of 2.9 x 10E-4 person-rem would be estimated to result in 1.4 x 10E-7
latent cancer fatalities (.00029 person-rem x 0.0005 [risk factor] =
.00000014). This means that there would be a probability of .00000014,
or 1 chance in 7 million, that any excess cancer fatalities would occur
among the affected population of approximately 320,000 people.
Based on these doses and the estimated latent cancer fatalities, it is
expected that not a single worker or member of the public would die from
cancer as a result of exposure to radiation from the proposed
transportation of HEU by SST from Dover AFB to Y-12.
6.2.3.1.2 No Action
Under the no action alternative, no flight would occur, and therefore,
there would be no SST transport of HEU.
6.2.3.1.3 SST Transport of HEU from Fort Campbell to Y-12
Under this alternative, the average individual dose to a SST
transportation crew member from transport of HEU from Fort Campbell to
the Y-12 Plant is estimated to be 4.6 x 10-4 rem. The collective dose to
the public for incident-free SST transport from Fort Campbell to Y-12
would be 7.2 x 10E-5 person-rem per year. This collective dose would be
shared by the estimated 74,000 persons within 800 meters (0.5 miles) of
the highway routes that lie between Fort Campbell and the Y-12 Plant.
The maximum in-transit dose to an individual member of the public would
be 3.6 x 10E-8 rem. Using the general population dose-to-risk conversion
factor 5 x 10E-4 cancer fatalities per person-rem (NRC, 1991), the
collective dose to the public of 7.2 x 10E-5 person-rem would be
estimated to result in 3.6 x 10E-8 latent cancer fatalities (.000072
person-rem x 0.0005 [risk factor] = .000000036). This means that there
would be a probability of .000000036, or 1 chance in 28 million, that any
excess cancer fatalities would occur among the affected population of
approximately 74,000.
Based on these doses and the estimated latent fatalities, it is expected
that not a single worker or member of the public would die from cancer as
a result of exposure to radiation from the proposed transportation of HEU
by SST from Fort Campbell to Y-12.
6.2.3.1.4 SST Transport of HEU from McGhee-Tyson Airport to Y-12
Under this alternative, the maximum individual dose to a SST
transportation crew member from transport of HEU from McGhee Tyson Airport
to the Y-12 Plant is estimated to be 9.25 x 10E-5 rem.
The collective dose would be shared by the estimated 24,000 persons within
800 meters (0.5 miles) of the center line of the highway routes that lie
between McGhee Tyson and the Y-12 Plant. The maximum in-transit dose to
an individual member of the public would be 3.6 x 10E-8 rem. Using the
general population dose-to-risk conversion factor of 5 x 10E-5 cancer
fatalities per person-rem (NRC, 1991), the collective dose to the public
of 4.4 x 10E-5 person-rem would be estimated to result in 222 x 10E-8
latent cancer fatalities (.000044 person-rem x 0.0005 [risk factor] =
22 x 10E-8). This means that there would be a probability of 22 x 10E-8,
or 1 chance in 500 million, that any excess cancer fatalities would occur
among the affected population of approximately 24,000.
Based on these doses and the estimated latent cancer fatalities, it is
expected that not a single worker or member of the public would die from
cancer as a result of exposure to radiation from the proposed
transportation of HEU by SST from Fort Campbell to Y-12.
** Table 6.2-5 Incident-free Radiological Exposure for Transport Under
the Proposed Action and Alternatives
Information has been deleted from table because it contains classified
information **
6.2.3.2 Postulated SST Transport Accident Conditions
Under postulated SST accident conditions, radiological consequences would
result primarily from release of respirable radioactive particulates and
subsequent inhalation by persons downwind of the accident, either directly
or after resuspention. Other exposure methods would include direct
radiation from the cloud of airborne material and from contamination on
the ground.
SST Threat Assessment
The safeguards and security systems for SST transportation are designed
to protect against sabotage and other adversarial actions. The approved
DOE design basis threat addresses acts of terrorism. Since the RADTRAN
model does not address terrorist attack scenarios, the Explosive Release
Atmospheric Dispersal (ERAD) computer model has been used by the
Transportation Safeguards Division to analyze consequences due to
attack.
The most immediate and severe threat to workers and members of the public
from a terrorist attack by military-equipped forces is death or injury
from weapons-fire. It is quite likely that one or more of the DOE
transportation workers (couriers), who are trained and responsible for
protecting the shipments would suffer fatalities during the attack.
Depending on the proximity of the members of the public to the shipment
at the time the attack occurs, civilian casualties may also be expected
from the weapons fire.
While the radiological hazard associated with weapons fire is
substantially less than the physical hazard, it is possible for an
accurately aimed, energetic projectile fired at an SST to cause a
dispersal of HEU into the atmosphere. The effects of such a dispersal
can be bounded. Based on tests done for the Nuclear Emergency Search
Team program, the fraction of material aerosolized would be less than 5
percent for this type of event. The bounding conditions for the
postulated accident were as follows: the accident occurs in an urban
area; there is maximum loading of the SST (equivalent to 1000 kilograms
[454.5 pounds] of 93 percent enriched uranium); and quiet, night-time
meteorological conditions prevail, resulting in low dispersion of
contaminants. Under these conditions, the contaminated area would be 3
square kilometers (1.16 square miles), and the maximum individual dose
would not exceed 30 mrem. The upper bound for the collective dose would
be approximately 4,000 person-rem resulting in 2 excess latent cancer
fatalities. The anticipated impacts due to weapons fire would be lower
than the bounding case, resulting in the containment area of 1.5 square
kilometers(0.58 square miles), a maximum individual does of 5 mrem, and
either 0 or 1 excess latent cancer fatalities in the collective
population. The anticipated impacts are based on yearly average
meteorological data. The threat analysis for SST shipments is discussed
in more detail in the "EA for the Proposed Interim Storage of Enriched
Uranium Above The Maximum Historical Storage level at the Y-12 Plant"
(DOE/EA-0929).
RADTRAN Accident Analysis
RADTRAN is a computer model which calculates the collective dose from a
postulated accident to a single exposed population (workers and the public
are not differentiated). The transportation accident model in RADTRAN
assigns accident probabilities to a set of accident categories. For the
truck analysis, the eight accident severity categories defined in NUREG-
0170 (The Transportation of Radioactive Material by Air and Other Nodes
[NRC 1977]) were used. The least severe accident category (Category 1)
represents low magnitudes of crush force, accident impact velocities, fire
duration, or puncture impact speed. The most sever category (Category 8)
represents a large crush force, high impact velocities, long fire
durations, and high puncture-impact speed (an 88-km/h [55mph] collision
into the side of the vehicle and 982C [1800F] fire lasting 1.5 hours to
produce a release of the HEU). The bounding accident is the highest
category accident used in the analysis and is associated with a
probability of occurrence for each populations density area.
The Department of Energy had conducted more that 119 million km (74
million miles) of SST operations without accidents that resulted in any
release of radioactive materials. However, to provide a conservative
estimate of the probability of postulated accidents, accident rates from
Department of Transportation data for the entire commercial shipping
industry (i.e., accidents on interstate highways involving at least one
commercial tractor-trailer regardless of contents) were used, and are
documented in the transportation risk assessment report (Sandia 1994).
The probability of an SST accident resulting in a release of radioactive
material would actually be lower that the probability of a commercial
accident.
In order to determine the risk of truck transportation accident, the
response of a package to accident conditions must be predicted.
NUREG-0170 (NRC) was also used to determine the amount of material which
would be released from Type B packaging for the eight accident severity
categories. Using NUREG-0170 release fractions, the bounding accident for
SST shipment would be a Category 8 accident, since the consequences are
maximized at these severity levels.
Table 6.2-6 summarizes the potential action and alternatives. The
population size shown in Table 6.2-6 represents the maximum populations
which could be affected in the urban area along the route for this
alternative. The maximum potentially affected urban population along the
route from Dover would be 3,000,000 persons, while for the Fort Campbell
and McGhee Tyson alternatives, the maximum urban population would be
2,850,000 and 2,380,000 respectively.
6.2.3.2.1 Proposed Action: Postulated SST Transport Accident
Under the proposed action, the dose due to the bounding SST accident (that
is, the accident with the gre