News


THE NETHERLANDS

H.E. Mr. Jozias J.van Aartsen
Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade

Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force
of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.
 

11 November 2001

(check against delivery)


Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen

The terrible events of September 11th have made it clear that we will have to work very hard to make this world a safer place. We cannot exclude the possibility that terrorists, or states that support terrorists, will seek to acquire weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons. To prevent them from doing so, effective non-proliferation has acquired even greater urgency. And a well-functioning test ban treaty is a key element in stemming nuclear proliferation.
 

Mr. President,

Let me congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of this important conference. With you, my delegation will do everything in its power to promote the early entry into force of the CTBT.

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty constitutes a true milestone on our long and arduous road to put the nuclear genie back in the bottle. The longest sought, hardest fought prize in arms control. By constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons the Treaty will be an effective barrier to the spread of nuclear weapons and the further build-up of nuclear arsenals. The norm the Treaty is establishing against testing, will of course only be fully effective if it enters into force. That is why all states need to sign and ratify the CTBT, nuclear weapon states in particular. In this context, I call on China and the US to ratify the Treaty.
 

Mr. President,

The twentieth century was an age of unprecedented advancement. But it was also an age of conflict and threat on a scale never seen before. Building on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, tremendous progress has been made towards the elimination of the most destructive weapons that century has left us with. The existing nuclear arsenals of the two major nuclear powers have been substantially reduced. This process should continue, eventually involving all nuclear weapon states.

A web of interlocking treaties on nuclear restraint has gradually been created. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is an integral part of this web of nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament, agreed to by all NPT parties. The test ban brings closer a key notion of the NPT: the vision of a world ultimately free of nuclear weapons. Without it, the entire fabric of the global arms control and non-proliferation regime would unravel. It is therefore of the utmost importance that this Treaty enters into force.
 

Mr. President,

The Treaty strengthens the existing non-proliferation regime in a more direct way. Without testing, proliferators will be prevented from moving beyond the manufacture of an untested, crude nuclear bomb.

The CTBT is a high-tech treaty on global arms control, equipped with means to ensure effective verification. Already now, an International Monitoring System is being put in place. Once completed this system will in fact extend well beyond the detection capabilities thought possible by the negotiators of the treaty. It will also detect nuclear test explosions carried out by would-be proliferators who think they can escape the non?proliferation regime by staying outside the CTBT. Once it has entered into force, the international community will have a credible tool to act against proliferators. The Treaty is also equipped with clear enforcement rules: any violator can expect sanctions.
 

Mr. President,

All nuclear weapon states are now observing a moratorium on nuclear tests. But moratoria are not enough. We need a legally binding prohibition of testing. If we want to ensure that test sites fall silent forever and no new ones are created, this is the only way forward.
 

Mr. President,

In only five years, more than 160 countries have signed the Treaty. Two thirds of the countries on whose acceptation the treaty depends have already completed their ratification process. Among them are three of the five nuclear weapon states. But, Mr. President, the fact that this Conference takes place means that we are not here to celebrate. I regret that two years after the conclusion of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, India and Pakistan conducted a series of underground nuclear test explosions. Both countries declared their intention to adhere to the CTBT. Now is the time to do so. Mr. President,

I also call upon all other states that have not yet done so to sign and/or ratify the CTBT at an early date. The states whose ratification is necessary for the Treaty's entry into force bear a special responsibility. Now, more than ever, is the opportunity to show both leadership and a sense of global responsibility.

Let me conclude by underlining what is at stake: world security. Resumed testing would revive the urge to refine nuclear weapons. It would feed a new arms race. It would encourage would-be proliferators to pursue the nuclear option. And finally, it would increase the risk of nuclear weapons falling into the wrong hands. The CTBT is crucial to any regime designed to safeguard against this.
 

Thank you Mr. President.

Sources