<DOC>
[106 Senate Hearings]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access]
[DOCID: f:61364.wais]
S. Hrg. 106-262
FINAL REVIEW OF THE COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY (Treaty Doc.
105-28)
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 7, 1999
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
PAUL COVERDELL, Georgia PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming BARBARA BOXER, California
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
BILL FRIST, Tennessee
Stephen E. Biegun, Staff Director
Edwin K. Hall, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Morning Session
Page
Kirkpatrick, Hon. Jeane J., senior fellow, American Enterprise
Institute and former U.S. Permanent Representative to the
United Nations................................................. 7
Prepared statement of........................................ 12
Ledogar, Hon. Stephen J., former Chief Negotiator of the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.................................. 15
Prepared statement of........................................ 20
Weinberger, Hon. Caspar W., former Secretary of Defense.......... 14
Prominent Individuals and National Groups in support of the CTBT. 3
Former Laboratory Directors oppose the CTBT...................... 27
Letter from Physics Nobel Laureates in support of CTBT........... 34
Afternoon Session
Albright, Hon. Madeleine K., Secretary of State.................. 72
Prepared statement of........................................ 75
Garwin, Dr. Richard L., senior fellow for science and technology,
Council on Foreign Relations, New York, NY..................... 112
Prepared statement of........................................ 117
Nuclear Testing--Summary and Conclusion--JASON report.... 131
Kerrey, Hon. J. Robert, U.S. Senator from Nebraska, vice
chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence..................... 60
Lehman, Hon. Ronald F., former director, Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, Palto Alto, CA............................. 101
Prepared statement of........................................ 105
Levin, Hon. Carl, U.S. Senator from Minnesota, ranking minority
member, Committee on Armed Services............................ 58
Shelby, Hon. Richard C., U.S. Senator from Alabama, chairman,
Select Committee on Intelligence............................... 54
Prepared statement of........................................ 56
Wade, Troy E., chairman, Nevada Alliance for Defense, Energy and
Business, Las Vegas, NV........................................ 109
Prepared statement of........................................ 111
Warner, Hon. John W., U.S. Senator from Virginia, chairman,
Committee on Armed Services.................................... 52
Letters from six former Secretaries of Defense and Henry
Kissinger opposing CTBT................................ 63
Senate Consideration of Major Arms Control and Security
Treaties--1972-1999............................................ 81
Letters from former Ambassadors Wisner and Oakley in support of
CTBT........................................................... 82
Article from the Washington Post, Oct. 7, 1999, entitled ``The
Next President Will Pay the Price'' by George Perkovich........ 87
Response of Secretary Cohen to question asked before the Armed
Services Committee on October 6, 1999.......................... 134
(iii)
FINAL REVIEW OF THE COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY (Treaty Doc.
105-28)
----------
THURSDAY, OCTOBER 7, 1999
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
Morning Session
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:35 a.m. in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jesse Helms
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Helms, Hagel, Smith, Thomas, Grams,
Biden, Kerry, and Boxer.
The Chairman. The committee will come to order. This is the
final hearing of the Foreign Relations Committee on the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. We extend our sincere welcome to
our first panel, Hon. Caspar Weinberger, former Secretary of
Defense for President Reagan, Hon. Jeane Kirkpatrick, former
U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, and Hon. Stephen
Ledogar, former chief negotiator of the CTBT.
I have already welcomed Mr. Ledogar in person, and I
welcomed Cap Weinberger, and Jeane Kirkpatrick is on her way. I
am confident in any event following the testimony by these
distinguished witnesses this morning, the committee will
convene a second session this afternoon in which we will hear
from the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services
Committee, Senator Warner.
We agreed to go back and forth to try to make our case, and
also the ranking Democrat on the Armed Services Committee,
Senator Levin, as well as the chairman of the Intelligence
Committee, Senator Shelby, and the vice chairman of that
committee, Bob Kerrey, Senator Kerrey of Nebraska, and we will
hear from the distinguished Secretary of State, Madeleine
Albright, and finally from the third panel of arms control
experts, former acting director Ronald Lehman, chairman of the
Nevada Alliance for Defense, Energy and Business, Troy Wade,
and from Dr. Richard Garwin of the Council on Foreign
Relations.
So I suggest by the end of the day it will be difficult for
anyone to credibly contend that the CTBT has not been
thoroughly discussed and debated.
Now then, I have a feeling most people know where I stand
on the treaty, and so I am not going to engage in extended
oratory this morning except to say this. I sense a clear
consensus is emerging in the foreign policy community against
Senate ratification of the CTBT. Here is why.
Four former Directors of Central Intelligence have weighed
in against the CTBT, including two of President Clinton's CIA
Directors, Jim Woolsey and John Derish. Two former chairmen of
the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Tom Moore and Admiral John Vessey are
likewise strongly opposed, and yesterday the Senate received a
letter signed by six--count them, six--distinguished former
Secretaries of Defense, Cap Weinberger, who is with us today,
thank the Lord, Frank Carlucci, Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld,
Jim Schlesinger, and Mel Laird.
And it occurs to me that such unanimity among the former
Secretaries of Defense in opposition to an arms control treaty
is almost without precedent, and I might say that the present
distinguished Secretary of Defense, whom I admire greatly and
enjoyed greatly, served in the Senate with him, when he was a
Senator he strongly opposed this treaty.
In any case, perhaps we should be reminded that it's not
the Republicans who asked for this vote. It was forced upon us
by the President and all 45 Senators on the other side of the
aisle. They wrote me a letter. I have never had a letter from
so many distinguished Americans in my life, 45 Senators on the
other side of the aisle, but the fact remains, if this treaty
is brought up to a vote next Tuesday, I believe it will be
defeated.
Now, there is only one way that the President can call off
that vote next Tuesday. He must formally request in writing
that (a) the treaty be withdrawn, and (b) that the CTBT not be
considered for the duration of his Presidency.
Now, if the President does that, then the CTBT will be
effectively dead, just as SALT II was effectively dead after
President Carter made a similar written request of the Senate,
and if Mr. Clinton does not submit a written request, we will
proceed with the vote, and I am confident that the CTBT will be
defeated, so the President has the choice to make.
Perhaps your testimony today, Secretary Weinberger, and
Ambassador Kirkpatrick, will serve to convince the President
that the time has come to make such a request and a commitment.
If not, I know your testimony will certainly be informative to
many Senators as we proceed with the vote next Tuesday.
Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, let me begin by saying I love
you, but I find your characterizations interesting. This is the
final hearing that is true. I would argue it is the first
hearing as well as the final hearing, but that is not worth
getting into right now.
And as it relates to a clear consensus of the foreign
policy community, I would ask, rather than take the time now,
to enter in the record a list of prominent individuals
including the present and five former chairmen of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, as well as 32 Nobel laureates, et cetera, and
so if we can duel on who supports what, I am confident that
there are more prominent Americans, particularly scientists,
who support this than oppose it, but at any rate, I would ask
unanimous consent that they be put in the record.
The Chairman. Of course. Without objection.
[The information referred to follows:]
Prominent Individuals and National Groups in Support of the CTBT
(September 20, 1999)
current chairman and former chairmen of the joint chiefs of staff
General Hugh Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
General John Shalikashvili, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff
General Colin Powell, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
General David Jones, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Admiral William Crowe, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
former members of congress
Senator John C. Danforth
Senator J. James Exon
Senator Nancy Kassebaum Baker
Senator Mark O. Hatfield
Senator John Glenn
Representative Bill Green
Representative Thomas J. Downey
Representative Michael J. Kopetski
Representative Anthony C. Bellenson
Representative Lee H. Hamilton
directors of the three national laboratories
Dr. John Browne, Director of Los Alamos National Laboratory
Dr. Paul Robinson, Director of Sandia National Laboratory
Dr. Bruce Tarter, Director of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
other prominent national security officials
Ambassador Paul H. Nitze--arms control negotiator, Reagan
Administration
Admiral Stansfield Turner--former Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency
Charles Curtis--former Deputy Secretary of Energy
other prominent military officers
General Eugene Habiger--former Commander-in-Chief of Strategic Command
General John R. Galvin--Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Admiral Noel Gayler--former Commander, Pacific
General Charles A. Horner--Commander, Coalition Air Forces, Desert
Storm, former Commander, U.S. Space Command
General Andrew O'Meara--former Commander U.S. Army Europe
General Bernard W. Rogers--former Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; former
NATO Supreme Allied Commander
General William Y. Smith--former Deputy Commander, U.S. Command, Europe
Lt. General Julius Becton
Lt. General John H. Cushman--former Commander, I Corps (ROK/US) Group
(Korea)
Lt. General Robert E. Pursley
Vice Admiral William L. Read--former Commander, U.S. Navy Surface
Force, Atlantic Command
Vice Admiral John J. Shanahan--former Director, Center for Defense
Information
Lt. General George M. Seignious, II--fomer Director Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency
Vice Admiral James B. Wilson--former Polaris Submarine Captain
Maj. General William F. Burns--JCS Representative, INF Negotiations,
Special Envoy to Russia for Nuclear Dismantlement
Rear Admiral Eugene J. Carroll, Jr.--Deputy Director, Center for
Defense Information
Rear Admiral Robert G. James
other scientific experts
Dr. Hans Bethe--Nobel Laureate; Emeritus Professor of Physics, Cornell
University; Head of the Manhattan Project's theoretical
division
Dr. Freeman Dyson--Emeritus Professor of Physics, Institute for
Advanced Study, Princeton University
Dr. Richard Garwin--Senior Fellow for Science and Technology, Council
on Foreign Relations; consultant to Sandia National Laboratory,
former consultant to Los Alamos National Laboratory
Dr. Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky--Director Emeritus, Stanford Linear
Accelerator Center, Stanford University
Dr. Jeremiah D. Sullivan--Professor of Physics, University of Illinois
at Urbana-Champaign
Dr. Herbert York--Emeritus Professor of Physics, University of
California, San Diego; founding director of Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory; former Director of Defense Research and
Engineering, Department of Defense
Dr. Sidney D. Drell--Stanford Linear Accelerator Center, Stanford
University
national groups
Medical and Scientific Organizations
American Association for the Advancement of Science
American Medical Students Association/Foundation
American Physical Society
American Public Health Association
American Medical Association
Public Interest Groups
20/20 Vision National Project
Alliance for Nuclear Accountability
Alliance for Survival
Americans for Democratic Action
Arms Control Association
British American Security Information Council
Business Executives for National Security
Campaign for America's Future
Campaign for U.N. Reform
Center for Defense Information
Center for War/Peace Studies (New York, NY)
Council for a Livable World
Council for a Livable World Education Fund
Council on Economic Priorities
Defenders of Wildlife
Demilitarization for Democracy
Economists Allied for Arms Reduction (ECAAR)
Environmental Defense Fund
Environmental Working Group
Federation of American Scientists
Fourth Freedom Forum
Friends of the Earth
Fund for New Priorities in America
Fund for Peace
Global Greens, USA
Global Resource Action Center for the Environment
Greenpeace, USA
The Henry L. Stimson Center
Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies (Saugus, MA)
Institute for Science and International Security
International Association of Educators for World Peace (Huntsville, AL)
International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War
International Center
Izaak Walton League of America
Lawyers Alliance for World Security
League of Women Voters of the United States
Manhattan Project II
Maryknoll Justice and Peace Office
National Environmental Coalition of Native Americans (NECONA)
National Environmental Trust
National Commission for Economic Conversion and Disarmament
Natural Resources Defense Council
Nuclear Age Peace Foundation
Nuclear Control Institute
Nuclear Information & Resource Service
OMB Watch
Parliamentarians for Global Action
Peace Action
Peace Action Education Fund
Peace Links
PeacePAC
Physicians for Social Responsibility
Plutonium Challenge
Population Action Institute
Population Action International
Psychologists for Social Responsibility
Public Citizen
Public Education Center
Saferworld
Sierra Club
Union of Concerned Scientists
United States Servas, Inc.
Veterans for Peace
Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation
Volunteers for Peace, Inc.
War and Peace Foundation
War Resistors League
Women Strike for Peace
Women's Action for New Directions
Women's Legislators' Lobby of WAND
Women's International League for Peace and Freedom
World Federalist Association
Zero Population Growth
religious groups
African Methodist Episcopal Church
American Baptist Churches, USA
American Baptist Churches, USA, National Ministries
American Friends Service Committee
American Jewish Congress
American Muslim Council
Associate General Secretary for Public Policy, National Council of
Churches
Catholic Conference of Major Superiors of Men's Institutes
Church Women United
Coalition for Peace and Justice
Columbian Fathers' Justice and Peace Office
Commission for Women, Evangelical Lutheran Church in America
Covenant of Unitarian Universalist Pagans
Christian Church (Disciples of Christ) in the United States and Canada
Christian Methodist Episcopal Church
Church of the Brethren, General Board
Division for Church in Society, Evangelical Lutheran Church in America
Division for Congregational Ministries, Evangelical Lutheran Church in
America
Eastern Archdiocese, Syrian Orthodox Church of Antioch
The Episcopal Church
Episcopal Peace Fellowship, National Executive Council
Evangelicals for Social Action
Evangelical Lutheran Church in America
Fellowship of Reconciliation
Friends Committee on National Legislation
Friends United Meeting
General Board Members, Church of the Brethren
General Board of Church and Society, United Methodist Church
General Conference, Mennonite Church
General Conference of the Seventh Day Adventist Church
Jewish Peace Fellowship
Lutheran Office for Governmental Affairs, Evangelical Lutheran Church
in America
Mennonite Central Committee
Mennonite Central Committee, U.S.
Mennonite Church
Methodists United for Peace with Justice
Missionaries of Africa
Mission Investment Fund of the ELCA, Evangelical Lutheran Church in
America
Moravian Church, Northern Province
National Council of Churches
National Council of Churches of Christ in the USA
National Council of Catholic Women
National Missionary Baptist Convention of America
NETWORK: A National Catholic Social Justice Lobby
New Call to Peacemaking
Office for Church in Society, United Church of Christ
Orthodox Church in America
Pax Christi
Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.)
Presbyterian Peace Fellowship
Progressive National Baptist Convention, Inc.
Religious Action Center of Reform Judaism
The Shalom Center
Sojourners
Union of American Hebrew Congregations
United Church of Christ
United Methodist Church
United Methodist Council of Bishops
Unitarian Universalist Association
Washington Office, Mennonite Central Committee
Women of the ELCA, Evangelical Lutheran Church in America
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, I welcome the opportunity to
discuss the test ban treaty. This afternoon, when the Secretary
of State appears before us, I have a slightly longer statement
as to why I support the treaty and believe the Senate should
give its ratification to the treaty.
This morning I would like to briefly set the stage for the
debate that is about to commence. Thirty-six years ago last
month, less than a year after the United States and the Soviet
Union came to the brink of nuclear war, the U.S. Senate gave
its advice and consent to the Limited Test Ban Treaty, a pact
banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere. Only a handful of our
Senate colleagues were here at that time, long-serving legends
like Strom Thurmond, and Robert C. Byrd, and Dan Inouye, and
possibly one or two others.
But although the geopolitical circumstances have changed,
as have the names and the faces of the United States Senators,
in some ways the debate today is very familiar. Then, as now,
there were questions about our ability to maintain a strong
nuclear deterrent under the treaty. Then, as now, there were
questions about whether a country whose capital is Moscow would
cheat.
Then, as now, there were concerns about the ability of the
United States to effectively verify the treaty. Then, as now,
there were concerns about American leadership if we failed to
ratify the treaty. Then, as now, the Joint Chiefs and the
administration of the day devised safeguards to assure that the
United States would adhere to the treaty and maintain a strong
nuclear deterrent force.
The story since 1963 is one in which those whom I would
call the realistic optimists were in my view proved right, and
those who I call the visceral pessimists did not see their
fears realized.
Our deterrent posture did not suffer, even though we gave
up a test that surely gave us more confidence in our weapons
systems than we could gain through underground tests alone. We
gained worldwide respect for reining in the nuclear arms race
which 5 years later translated into the U.S. diplomatic success
in negotiating a Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the treaty
banning nuclear weapons in Latin America, treaties that have
succeeded in constraining our nuclear proliferation, and we
gave our own people hope that the cold war would not lead to
the white heat of nuclear holocaust.
Eight years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, there
is great disagreement in this country about our foreign policy
objectives and our role in the world, but surely there should
be no disagreement that we should still pursue a strategy of
containment, this time directed not against an ideological foe,
but against the spread of dangerous weapons and technology.
The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which prohibits any
nuclear test explosion, is a key component to that strategy.
Thirty-six years ago, Senate Republican Leader Everett Dirksen,
for whom this building is named, reached across the aisle and
supported a treaty negotiated by President Kennedy.
In his speech on the Senate floor, Dirksen quoted a famous
Republican from his home State of Illinois, and I quote, it is
the true--quoting Abraham Lincoln--``The true role in
determining to embrace or reject anything is not whether it
have any evil in it, but whether it have more evil than good.
There are few things wholly evil or wholly good. Almost
everything, especially of Government policy, is an inseparable
compound of the two, so that our best judgment of the
preponderance between them is continuously demanded.''
Lincoln's words commend themselves to us now. This treaty
is a good treaty. It is not a perfect treaty. No treaty
produced by over 100 nations will ever be, but it has a lot of
good in it. The benefits which I will discuss this afternoon
and will debate today I believe clearly outweigh the risks, and
I hope my colleagues will study it closely and come to the same
conclusion.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and look forward to hearing from
our witnesses.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Biden. On the theory that
ladies go first, Ms. Kirkpatrick, if you will present your
case. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF HON. JEANE J. KIRKPATRICK, SENIOR FELLOW, AMERICAN
ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE AND FORMER U.S. PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
TO THE UNITED NATIONS
Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman,
for inviting me to testify before this distinguished committee
on this vitally important subject.
I accepted your invitation, Mr. Chairman, because I believe
it is essential that this Nation's defenses be adequate to cope
with the growing dangers we face from hostile powers possessing
weapons of mass destruction and effective means of delivery.
Mr. Chairman, I have had a good deal of intensive exposure
to this subject first, a consequence of having served on
President Reagan's Blue Ribbon Presidential Task Force on
Nuclear Products in 1985, on the President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board from 1985 to 1990, on the Defense
Policy Review Board from 1985 to 1992, and then, after having
been appointed by Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney in 1991 and
1992, I chaired the Failsafe and Risk Reduction Committee,
generally referred to by its acronym as the FARR committee,
which was charged with reviewing the United States nuclear
command and control system.
This experience made a strong impression on me concerning
the dangers of proliferating nuclear and missile technology. As
everyone who is interested in these matters knows, a number of
countries are capable of producing and delivering nuclear
weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. The number has
increased, and is increasing as we speak, and it includes
several of the world's most aggressive, repressive,
destructive, and dangerous countries, North Korea, Iran, Iraq,
as well as a Russia less stable than we would prefer, and a
China less benign.
We know, moreover, that other regimes with little regard
for the rule of law or human rights work to acquire weapons of
mass destruction, and that against these weapons the United
States can rely only on its nuclear deterrent. We have no other
defenses against weapons of mass destruction.
The current dangers have been documented and described in
the past year with great clarity by the Rumsfeld and the Cox
Commissions. The Rumsfeld Commission, which had unprecedented--
and I quote now--``unprecedented access to the most sensitive
and highly classified information,'' concluded that, ``The
threat to the United States posed by these emerging
capabilities is broader, more mature, and evolving more rapidly
than has been reported and that several countries, including
Iraq, will be able to inflict major damage on the United States
within about 5 years,'' and that was written in 1998, that is,
they started counting in 1998.
The Cox Commission describes the shocking success of China
in buying and stealing the most advanced U.S. thermonuclear
missile and space technology, which was quickly made available
to other governments, enabling China to ``pose a direct threat
to the United States, our friends and allies, or our forces.''
We know from the work of the Rumsfeld and the Cox
Commissions that at least two countries which already have
nuclear weapons, North Korea and China, have recently engaged
in intensive successful efforts to upgrade the weapons and the
missiles which carry them.
It is disturbing to me, Mr. Chairman, that President
Clinton has not been mobilized to make the defense of the
American people against these proliferating threats a top
priority. Instead, confronted with these dangers, President
Clinton and his administration have placed one obstacle after
another in the path of the development of an effective missile
defense. They have imposed disabling requirements and
unnecessary delays on the development and deployment of
effective national and theater missile defenses.
The President has urged that we give priority to preserving
an extended, outmoded ABM Treaty interpreted to be maximally
constraining on us. Now he urges on us the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty, which would commit the U.S. Government to carrying
out no nuclear tests--ever.
The United States has already lived through the longest
ever moratorium on tests. Now, with the CTBT, he proposes to
extend that moratorium forever. There are several reasons why
it would be imprudent for the United States to make this
commitment never to conduct another explosive nuclear test. I
will summarize briefly those which seem to me most compelling.
First is the fact that our Government takes its commitments
seriously. If we were to sign this treaty, we would feel bound
by its terms. We would not feel free to violate it, as many
governments will. We would not conduct explosive tests if we
signed this treaty.
Second, as everyone knows, the treaty cannot be verified.
The CIA has recently publicly acknowledged that it cannot
detect low-yield tests. It bothers me that we will not know
when and if they are cheating, and some will surely cheat us.
Third, I learned from my service on the Blue Ribbon and
FARR committees, Mr. Chairman, that the safety and reliability
of our nuclear stockpiles cannot be taken for granted, but must
be monitored. Testing is a vital part of ascertaining and
maintaining the reliability and safety of our nuclear weapons.
It is also a necessary step in modernizing our nuclear weapons.
Testing is vital to maintaining the reliability and
credibility of our nuclear deterrent and our confidence in it.
The authors of this treaty understand how important testing is
to maintaining the viability of nuclear weapons. The preamble
to the treaty, which I think everyone should read, states, and
I quote, ``Recognizing that the cessation of all nuclear weapon
test explosions and all other nuclear explosions by
constraining the development and qualitative improvement of
nuclear weapons and ending the development of advanced new
types of nuclear weapons constitutes an effective measure of
nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation in all its aspects.''
That is pretty clear, and a second item in the preamble
asserts, and I quote, ``Further recognizing that an end to all
such nuclear explosions will thus constitute a meaningful step
in the realization of a systematic process to achieve nuclear
disarmament.'' That preamble makes interesting reading, and I
recommend to the Senators who will vote on this treaty that
they should read the treaty and they should read the
expectations of its authors.
The fourth reason that I oppose the ratification of the
treaty, is that our deterrent--that nuclear deterrent which
will be so weakened by the ratification of the CTBT--is more
important to the security of Americans today, with rogue States
developing the capacity to attack our cities and our
populations, than it ever has been, because Americans and their
allies are more vulnerable today than we ever have been.
Mr. Chairman, the threat to Americans, its cities and
populations, is here and now. It has expanded dramatically, not
only because of systematic Chinese theft of America's most
important military secrets, and because of the inadequate
policies governing the safekeeping and transfer of technology
of this administration, but also because several countries who
are signatories to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT]
have violated their commitments under the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty.
They signed the nonproliferation treaty, served in IAEA
governing boards, and violated their commitments. They made a
commitment in signing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and
I quote now, they have already made a commitment quote, ``not
to transfer or in any way assist, encourage, or induce any
nonnuclear weapons State to acquire nuclear weapons,'' close
quote, and also, ``not to receive the transfer of nuclear
weapons or other explosive devices, not to manufacture or
otherwise acquire, not to receive assistance in the manufacture
of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.''
The system resembles an honor system at a university. You
promise neither to cheat nor to assist anyone else in cheating,
and to report anyone who does that comes to your attention.
China is not a signatory of the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty. Russia is, so are Iran, Iraq, and Libya. These are all
States that have been seeking and alas, acquiring, nuclear
capacities. India, North Korea and Pakistan are not
signatories, but Iran, Iraq, and Libya are. China is not,
Russia is. All are engaged in proliferation--either by offering
nuclear technology and weapons, or by seeking it and accepting
it.
Obviously, whether or not a government has signed the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty has little impact on their
behavior with regard to proliferation. Some who signed it,
violate it. Some who have not signed it are also engaged in the
same activities.
That is, I think, the critical point concerning what I
think of as the arms control approach to national security. You
just cannot count on it. We cannot rely on this treaty to
prevent countries that are actually or potentially hostile to
us from acquiring and testing and sharing nuclear arsenals and
ballistic missiles. The evidence is clear. I think it is clear,
anyway.
Why, then, does President Clinton, whose decisions have
diminished, delayed, and denied us development and deployment
of effective missile defenses, now urge on us a treaty which
would endanger the reliability of the nuclear deterrent, which
is our only defense, against a nuclear attack.
Mr. Chairman, the President and some of the supporters of
the treaties argue that the action of the Senate in ratifying
or rejecting this treaty will determine whether the world ends
nuclear tests and proliferation forever, and I have heard
several Senators say that in the last 48 hours, and you
probably have, too. But that is not true, Mr. Chairman.
China, North Korea, Iran, Iraq, just to name those
countries at random almost, do not follow our lead. They are
not waiting urgently to see what we are going to do so that
they can do likewise. I wish they were. The world would be
safer if they did.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to call the committee's
attention to the governance of the organization which will
administer this treaty. This I might say is of particular
concern to me. I note that all State parties are members, will
be members of the organization, not simply nuclear powers, but
all, basically all those countries which signed the treaty,
which is about 194--I think that is the right figure. That is
approximately right--will be members. No State party can be
excluded--under the organizing rules.
This organization will operate as the United Nations
General Assembly does on the basis of one country, one vote,
with an executive council which is based on geographical
representation. Now, think about this. On that executive
council, which will be the most important central governing
body, Africa is allotted 10 seats. I do not think there is yet
a nuclear power in Africa. I hope there is not.
But they are allotted 10 seats, Eastern Europe, where there
have been two or three nuclear powers, are allotted 7 seats.
Latin America is allotted 9, the Middle East and South Asia, 7
each, Western Europe and North America, 10, Asia, 8.
I would like to note that no one is guaranteed a seat on
this executive council. The United States has the same chance
of being chosen to sit on the executive council as, shall we
say, Jamaica.
Not only will this organization make policies for this
vitally important issue about whose importance we have heard a
great deal in the last few days, but the countries making
policy will not necessarily be world powers, as powers with
nuclear weapons, or with any experience with nuclear weapons.
They will simply be member States who have signed on the CTBT.
Not only that, there will be a technical support group, but
that technical support group will be chosen by the same
executive council which I have just described, which is chosen
by people the overwhelming majority of whom do not themselves
have any experience or competence with nuclear questions, much
less nuclear weapons.
``Each State party shall have the right to participate in
the international exchange of data, and to have access to all
data made available to the International Data Center.'' This is
a very interesting provision, and it parallels a provision in
the resolutions establishing the International Atomic Energy
Agency.
The International Atomic Energy Agency was itself,
conceived and founded for the purpose of preventing
proliferation of nuclear weapons, and it has been, through the
years, staffed by a good many men of great professional skill
and of genuine expertise and dedication, but not only has the
IAEA not been able to stop proliferation, it has more than once
served itself as a source of proliferation. This is the irony
of the harm that good men do, and the harm that good
organizations conceived with the best of intentions do.
The IAEA has more than once served as a source of
proliferation, as member States take from it technical
information and reactors ``for peaceful uses,'' it is always
said. The fact is, we know that several rogue States have
managed to take from the IAEA and their membership on the IAEA,
under the rules of the IAEA, the reactors and the technology
with which they have launched their own projects for creating
atoms not for peace, but for weapons.
I believe that the CTBT organization will also serve as a
source of technical expertise--in much the same way that the
IAEA has served as a source of technical expertise, and that
those who today claim the treaty will end nuclear testing once
and for all will be greatly shocked, but it should not surprise
the rest of us.
I just might remind you, Mr. Chairman, that at the time
that Iraq was sitting on the governing board of the IAEA--at
the very same time that it was engaged in massive efforts to
build its own nuclear capacity and to make war on all of its
neighbors.
Mr. Chairman, President Clinton and his administration are
once again urging Americans to take what amounts to a long step
toward unilateral nuclear disarmament at a time of
unprecedented vulnerability for the United States. I believe it
is enormously important that the Senate reject this treaty.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Kirkpatrick follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Jeane K. Kirkpatrick
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for inviting me to testify before this
distinguished Committee on this vitally important subject.
I accepted your invitation, Mr. Chairman, because I believe it is
essential that this nation's defenses be adequate to cope with the
growing dangers we face from hostile powers possessing weapons of mass
destruction and effective means of delivery.
Mr. Chairman, I encountered this subject and became concerned about
this issue, as a consequence of having served on President Reagan's
``Blue Ribbon Presidential Task Force on Nuclear Products'' in 1985; on
the ``President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB)'' from
1985 to 1990; on the Defense Policy Review Board from 1985 to 1992.
Then, after being appointed by Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney in
1991-1992, I chaired the ``Fail Safe and Risk Reduction'' Committee
(generally referred to by its acronym as the FARR Committee) charged
with reviewing the United States Nuclear Command and Control System.
This experience made a strong impression on me concerning the
dangers of proliferating nuclear and missile technology. As everyone
who is interested in these matters now knows, the number of countries
capable of producing and delivering nuclear weapons and other weapons
of mass destruction, has increased and is increasing as we speak, and
includes several of the world's most aggressive, repressive,
destructive countries--North Korea, Iran, Iraq--as well as a Russia
less stable than we would prefer and a China less benign.
We know, moreover, that other regimes with little regard for the
rule of law or human rights work to acquire weapons of mass
destruction, and that against these weapons the United States can rely
only on its nuclear deterrent. We have no other defense.
The current dangers have been documented and described in the past
year by the Rumsfeld and Cox Commissions. The Rumsfeld Commission,
which had ``unprecedented access to the most sensitive and highly
classified information'' concluded:
<bullet> That, ``the threat to the United States posed by these
emerging capabilities is broader, more mature, and evolving
more rapidly than has been reported.''
<bullet> That, ``several countries, including Iraq, will be able to
inflict major damage on the United States within about five
years.''
The Cox Commission describes the shocking success of China in
buying and stealing the most advanced U.S. thermonuclear missile and
space technology (which they quickly made available to other
governments) enabling China to: ``Pose a direct threat to the United
States, our friends, and allies or our forces.''
We know from the work of the Rumsfeld Commission and the Cox
Commission that at least two countries which already have nuclear
weapons--North Korea and China--have recently been engaged in
intensive, successful efforts to upgrade the weapons, and the missiles
which carry them.
It is disturbing to me, Mr. Chairman, that President Clinton has
not been mobilized to make the defense of the American people against
these proliferating threats a top priority.
Instead, confronted with these dangers, President Clinton and his
Administration have placed one obstacle after another in the path of
development of an effective missile defense. They have imposed
disabling requirements and unnecessary delays on the development and
deployment of effective national and theater missile defenses.
The President has urged that we give priority to preserving an
extended, outmoded ABM Treaty interpreted to be maximally constraining.
Now, he urges on us the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty which would
commit the U.S. government to carrying out no nuclear tests--ever.
The United States has already lived through the longest-ever
moratorium on nuclear tests. Now with the CTBT he proposes to extend
the moratorium forever.
There are several reasons that it would be imprudent for the United
States to make this commitment never to conduct another explosive
nuclear test. I will summarize briefly those which seem to me most
compelling.
First is the fact that our government takes its commitments
seriously. If we were to sign this treaty, we would feel bound by its
terms. We would not feel free to violate it at will as many governments
will. We would not conduct explosive tests.
Second, as everyone knows, this treaty cannot be verified. The CIA
has recently publicly acknowledged that it cannot detect low-yield
tests. It bothers me that we will not know when they are cheating and
some will cheat.
Third, I learned from my service on the Blue Ribbon and FARR
Committees that the safety and reliability of our nuclear stockpiles
cannot be taken for granted, but must be monitored. Testing (banned
forever by this proposed treaty) is a vital part of ascertaining and
maintaining the reliability and safety of our nuclear weapons. It is
also a necessary step in modernizing our nuclear weapons.
Testing is vital to maintaining the reliability and credibility of
our nuclear deterrent.
The authors of this treaty understand how important testing is to
maintaining the viability of nuclear weapons. The Preamble to the
Treaty states, and I quote:
Recognizing that the cessation of all nuclear weapon test
explosions and all other nuclear explosions, by constraining
the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons
and ending the development of advanced new types of nuclear
weapons, constitutes an effective measure of nuclear
disarmament and nonproliferation in all its aspects,
Further recognizing that an end to all such nuclear
explosions will thus constitute a meaningful step in the
realization of a systematic process to achieve nuclear
disarmament.
Fourth, that deterrent has never been as important to the security
of Americans as it is today with rogue states developing the capacity
to attack our cities and our population. Americans and their allies are
more vulnerable than we have ever been.
Mr. Chairman, the threat to Americans, its cities, and populations,
is here and now. It has expanded dramatically, not only because of
systematic Chinese theft of America's most important military secrets
and because of the inadequate U.S. policies governing the safekeeping
and transfer of technology, but also because several countries who are
signatories of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty have violated their
commitments under the Treaty. Specifically, they have violated
commitments:
``not to transfer . . . or in any way assist, encourage, or
induce any non-nuclear weapon State to acquire nuclear weapons
. . .''[Article I]
``not to receive the transfer . . . of nuclear weapons or
other nuclear explosive devices . . ., not to manufacture or
otherwise acquire . . . not to receive assistance in the
manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices . . .''[Article II]
China is not a signatory of the NPT. Russia is. So are Iran, Iraq
and Libya. North Korea, India, and Pakistan are not signatories.
Obviously, whether or not a government has signed the NPT has little
impact on their behavior with regard to proliferation.
That is the critical point concerning the arms control approach to
national security. We cannot rely on this treaty to prevent the
countries that are actually or potentially hostile to us from acquiring
and testing nuclear arsenals and ballistic missiles. The evidence is
clear.
Why then does President Clinton, whose decisions have diminished,
delayed, and denied us development and deployment of effective missile
defenses, now urge on us a treaty which would endanger the reliability
of the nuclear deterrent--which is our only ``defense'' against a
nuclear attack?
Mr. Chairman, the President and some other supporters of the
Treaties argue that the action of the Senate in ratifying or rejecting
the treaty will determine whether we end nuclear tests and
proliferation forever. But that is not true. China, North Korea, Iraq,
Iran do not follow our lead.
Finally, I should like to call the Committee's attention to the
governance of the organization which will administer it. I note: ``All
State Parties are members. No State Party can be excluded.'' It will
operate on the principle of one state, one vote, with an executive
council that based on geographical representation, comprising, Africa
is allotted ten seats; Eastern Europe seven, Latin America nine, the
Middle East and South Asia seven; Western Europe and North America ten;
Asia eight.
``Each State Party shall have the right to participate in the
international exchange of data and to have access to all data
made available to the International Data Centre.''
Mr. Chairman, the International Atomic Energy Agency, conceived to
prevent proliferation, and staffed with a good many first class
professionals has not only been unable to stop proliferation, it has
more than once served as a source of proliferation as member states
take from it technical information and reactors--for peaceful uses it
is always said.
The CTBT organization will also serve as a source of technical
expertise. Those who today claim the Treaty will end nuclear testing
once and for all will be greatly shocked. But it should not be a
surprise to the rest of us.
Mr. Chairman, President Clinton and his Administration are once
again urging Americans to take what amounts to a long step toward
unilateral nuclear disarmament--at a time of unprecedented
vulnerability. It is enormously important that the Senate reject this
Treaty.
The Chairman. A very fine statement, Ambassador
Kirkpatrick. I appreciate your coming so much.
Mr. Secretary Weinberger, we are delighted to have you here
this morning.
STATEMENT OF HON. CASPAR W. WEINBERGER, FORMER SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE
Mr. Weinberger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the
committee. It is always a privilege for me to testify before a
committee of such distinction. I am honored to be here. I have
a very short statement, and would be glad to try to take any
questions after that.
Mr. Chairman, the essence of this question seems to me to
come down to, if we need nuclear weapons, we have to know that
they work. That is the essence of their deterrence. If there is
uncertainty about that, the deterrent capability is weakened.
The only assurance that you have that they will work is to
test them, and the only way to test them is the most effective
way to test them, and all of the discussion in other
committees, and a great deal of the discussion in the public,
has been an attempt to show that the stockpile stewardship
program will be an effective way of testing them all, although
everyone agrees that it is not as effective as testing them in
the way that we have done in the past with underground
explosions, with all the precautions to prevent any of the
escape of the material into the atmosphere.
You will have all kinds of statements made that the
stewardship stockpile program will be tested by a computer
model. We have had some less than reassuring statements that
the computers that can do this best will be available in 2005,
or 2008, which is a tacit admission that in the meantime the
stockpile stewardship program as it is presently constituted is
not an effective way of testing, and the only way to be sure
that these weapons will work, and will be able to do their
unique task, is test them, and test them in the most effective
way possible.
The only way to test them is to do it by the means that we
have used before that we have now eschewed for the time being,
so basically the question comes down, as Ms. Kirkpatrick said,
whether we are going to abstain from testing in perpetuity.
All of this discussion is about lesser means of testing,
and it is not a question of stopping testing. The treaty does
not purport to do that, and even when it purports to do that,
as Ms. Kirkpatrick points out, and I agree fully with her, we
are not going to be able to rely on many of the rogue countries
that will do whatever is necessary to acquire this capability.
Nothing will encourage proliferation more than to tell
these countries that the big stockpiles in the United States
have not been tested, or that stockpiles of other countries
have not been tested effectively, and if they think that is the
case, they will be encouraged to believe that the deterrent is
not as effective as it should be, and that they will be
encouraged to try to acquire the kinds of weapons which,
through the testing that they can do, whether they promise to
or not, will make them effective.
There is an extraordinarily naive editorial, which I have
to call your attention to, in the New York Times. It says, the
treaty's main effect would be to halt programs in other
countries. It adds, that since no new nuclear weapons can be
reliably developed without testing, ratification of the treaty
by enough countries would freeze the nuclear weapons race
worldwide. That to my mind is a degree of naivete that is
extremely dangerous and is also, incidentally, not very true.
You have countries that have tested. You have two countries
in the last year that have tested and demonstrated that they
had nuclear capability in India and Pakistan. We have a number
of weapons in our stockpile that have essentially been rebuilt,
essentially been inspected from time to time, and deterioration
has been found.
As is inevitable, the aging process affects weapons also,
Mr. Chairman, unfortunately, and when a new component is put in
to replace an old component, you do not know if it is going to
work. You do not know if they are going to mesh together.
There is something--I do not know how many, but close to, I
think it is safe to say, thousands of moving parts in these
terrible weapons, and you have no way of knowing that all of
these things are going to mesh by consulting a computer,
particularly not if you have to wait till 2008 to get the kind
of computer that will be reasonably reliable. So the question
really comes down to is the kind of testing that is being done.
Other countries will test, other countries may be sure, or
they may not be sure that theirs will work. If they are sure we
have not received the absolute assurance that ours will work,
we will not have any idea of being able to stop the
proliferation of those countries trying. Any uncertainty about
the effectiveness of our deterrent weakens that deterrent.
The whole point of a deterrent is the ability to be able to
let hostile nations know, and let the world know that should an
attack come, we have the capability of responding. Not a
pleasant concept, not a good idea, but we do not make the world
in which we live. We have to rely on the kinds of weapons we
have to keep the peace.
And so I think the important thing to bear in mind here,
Mr. Chairman, is really what the treaty means, and in the
essence, the treaty means we would be committing ourselves in
perpetuity, forever, not to use the most effective means of
being able to assure us and the world that our stockpile works,
and for that reason I would very much oppose the treaty, and I
would hope the Senate would, too.
Thank you, sir.
The Chairman. Thank you, sir. Mr. Ambassador, we would be
glad to hear from you.
STATEMENT OF HON. STEPHEN J. LEDOGAR, FORMER CHIEF NEGOTIATOR
OF THE COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY
Ambassador Ledogar. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of
the committee. Thank you for this opportunity to speak to you
about the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty which is before the
committee for consideration.
First, a few things about my background, which I would
mention only because I think they are relevant to what I'll say
about the treaty. After 4 years as an active duty Naval aviator
and 5 years in private industry as a lawyer, I joined the
Foreign Service and served for 38 years before retiring 2 years
ago.
Most of my career I worked in political-military affairs
and arms control, including stints as deputy chief of mission
to NATO, press spokesman and member of the delegation to the
Vietnam Paris peace talks.
And I'd like to point out that I'm a strong believer in
nuclear deterrence and I know how central nuclear deterrence is
to NATO. During my last 10 years of full time service, I was
privileged to be an ambassador under Presidents Reagan, Bush
and Clinton, serving in turn as head of several U.S.
delegations in Vienna and Geneva. I was chief U.S. negotiator
from start to finish of the CTBT. Currently, I'm a part-time
consultant to the Department of State on national security
matters.
As I understand your invitation, Mr. Chairman, I'm not here
to give this committee the authoritative administration pitch
on CTBT. Secretary Albright and others will do that. Rather,
I'm here primarily as a resource to help recall and detail key
elements of the treaty as they were fought out in the
negotiating trenches between 1993 and signature in September
1996.
I should say, however, that not surprisingly, I fully
support the treaty, believing that it is very much in the
security interests of the United States. It was carefully
negotiated by me and my multi-agency delegation throughout,
always acting on fully cleared front channel instructions. And
I'm prepared to try to explain and defend all of it's key
provisions and, if my memory serves, to try to give you any
background you might be interested in having.
In the short time I have in this opening statement, I'll
limit my discussion to just three issues that I believe are
sources of some confusion. Over the course of the last few
days, I have heard opinions expressed on the question of the
CTBT's scope, it's verification provisions, and it's entry into
force provisions. Some of the debate suggests to me that
aspects of the negotiations have not yet been fully understood.
I hope that I may help to shed some light on these issues.
Last, I would like to address the likely international
repercussions should the Senate fail to give its consent to
ratification.
First of all on the scope. Let me address that issue as it
develops in the negotiation. As the name suggests, the treaty
imposes a comprehensive ban on all nuclear explosions, of any
size, in any place. I have heard some critics of the treaty
seek to cast doubt on whether Russia, in the negotiating and
signing of the treaty, committed itself under treaty law to a
truly comprehensive prohibition of any nuclear explosion,
including an explosion or experiment or event of even the
slightest nuclear yield. In other words, did Russia agree that
hydronuclear experiments which do produce a nuclear yield,
although usually very, very slight, would be banned and that
hydrodynamic explosions, which have no yield because they do
not reach criticality, would not be banned.
The answer is a categoric ``yes.'' The Russians as well as
the rest of the P-5 did commit themselves. That answer is
substantiated by the record of the negotiations at almost any
level of technicality and national security classification that
is desired and permitted. More importantly, for the current
debate, it is also substantiated by the public record of
statements by high level Russian officials as their position on
the question of thresholds evolved and fell into line with the
consensus that emerged.
It is important to recall that each of the five nuclear
weapons states began the CTBT negotiations desirous of a quiet
understanding among themselves that some low level of nuclear
explosions or experiments that did produce nuclear yield would
be acceptable, at least among themselves, despite the broad
treaty prohibition of ``any nuclear weapon test explosion or
any other nuclear explosion.'' Until August 1995, the beginning
of the final year of negotiations, the U.S. pushed for
agreement on a very low threshold of nuclear yield.
Our position was not popular among the P-5. Because of our
greater test experience and technical capabilities, we could
conceivably gain useful data from events of almost
insignificant yield. The other four argued that they needed a
higher threshold in order to gain any useful data. In some
cases, the thresholds they pushed for were politically
impossible to square with the notion of a comprehensive test
ban. Russia, for example, insisted that if there was going to
be any threshold among the five, it would have to allow for so-
called experiments with nuclear yields of up to 10 tons of TNT
equivalent.
The dispute among the five threatened to halt the
negotiations, as it became increasingly known to others that
the five were squabbling with each other about how much wiggle
room would be left to them when they signed onto a text that
said simply that nuclear explosions would be banned.
And as the arcane and jargon filled complexities of the
nuclear testing communities in Novaya Zemyla, Lop Nor, Mururoa
and Nevada became more widely understood, the non-nuclear
states and broad public opinion increasingly insisted that the
five should be allowed no tolerance, not even for the smallest
possible nuclear yields. A ban should be a ban. The answer to
this dilemma should be no threshold for anybody. In other
words, zero should mean zero.
On August 11, 1995 President Clinton announced that the
United States was revising its prior position on the threshold
question and would henceforth argue to the other four nuclear
weapons states that no tests that produced a nuclear yield
should be allowed to anyone under the treaty. The Russians, who
were miffed at being taken by surprise, climbed down from their
original positions slowly and painfully. It took until April
1996 before they signed onto the sweeping categoric prohibition
that is found in the final text. They never did like the word
``zero'' which was bandied about in public and actually once
used by Boris Yeltsin.
Instead, they announced that they embraced a treaty with no
thresholds whatsoever. In the confidential negotiations among
the five nuclear weapons states that went on the entire time
the broader CTBT negotiations continued, it was clearly
understood that the boundary line, that is, the zero line,
between what would be prohibited to all under the treaty and
what would not be prohibited, would be precisely defined by the
question of nuclear yield or criticality. If what you did
produced any nuclear yield whatsoever, it would not be allowed.
If it didn't, it was allowed.
Another issue I would like to address is how the treaty's
verification regime developed and how it benefits the United
States. I will leave it to others more expert than I to provide
more precise assessments of U.S. monitoring capabilities. The
point I would like to stress here is that the U.S. succeeded in
the negotiations in getting virtually every thing the
intelligence community and other parts of the government wanted
from the treaty, wanted and were prepared to pay for, to
strengthen our ability to detect and deter cheating and to seek
appropriate redress if cheating did occur.
At the same time, we succeeded in getting virtually
everything the Defense Department and others wanted to insure
the protection of sensitive national security information. Let
me give you several examples.
Concerning the use of national technical means, the United
States fought like mad to win acceptance of a state's rights to
use evidence acquired through national technical means as it
saw fit when requesting an onsite inspection. But we did not
want to be forced to reveal any information we believed would
be better kept private. Now, this was a ``red line'' issue for
the United States. Many of our negotiating partners were
adamantly opposed to giving the U.S. what they considered was a
clear advantage and a license to spy.
Yes, it is true that the U.S. has satellite surveillance
and intercept capabilities that surpass anything others have,
but is it logical to penalize and ignore the evidence of the
tall person with good eyesight who can see the crime committed
across the room? Eventually the U.S. position prevailed and is
incorporated in the treaty.
This treaty provides for onsite inspections on request by
any treaty party with the approval of the executive council. No
state can refuse an inspection. The U.S. position from the
start was that onsite inspections were critical to provide us
with added confidence that we could detect violations. And, if
inspections were to be effective, they had to be conducted
absolutely as quickly as possible after a suspicion arose,
using a range of techniques with as few restrictions as
possible.
However, the U.S. also had to be concerned with its
defensive posture as well as an offensive one. It was necessary
to insure that sensitive national security information would be
protected in the event of an inspection on U.S. territory. The
U.S. crafted a complicated, highly detailed proposal that
balanced our offensive and defensive needs. There was
resistance from some of our negotiating partners. However, by
the time we were through, the treaty read pretty much like the
original U.S. position paper that had been put together jointly
by the Departments of Defense, Energy and State, the
intelligence community and the then existing Arms Control
Agency.
I would like to touch on the composition of the
International Monitoring System, four networks of different
types of remote sensors encompassing 321 stations. I believe I
have heard questions about its value added. The intelligence
community, working through the larger interagency community,
had a list of requirements. They wanted certain technologies
and they wanted certain stations that would fill gaps and
complement existing national monitoring capabilities.
The U.S. delegation delivered nearly everything requested.
You have only to look at the coverage that would be established
if the treaty enters into force, the coverage in Russia, China
and the Middle East, to see the augmentation of U.S.
capabilities and the range of technologies to appreciate the
potential value added of an International Monitoring System.
Some people have criticized the treaty because it does not
provide for sanctions against the state, it has violated it.
This criticism strikes me as ill-informed. Consistent with
traditional U.S. policy, I was under strict instructions to
object to the inclusion of sanctions. The U.S. view, which I
believe this committee strongly endorses, is that we will not
agree to appoint an international organization to be not just
the investigator and special prosecutor, but also the judge,
jury and jailer. The U.S. reserves for itself the authority to
make judgments about compliance. And, we reserve for a body
higher than the one established by this treaty, namely, the
United Nations Security Council, in which we have a veto, the
authority to levy sanctions or other measures. This is U.S.
policy and this policy is reflected in the treaty.
Now a word on the treaty's entry into force requirements.
These have been the topic of much discussion and have even been
offered as a reason for why the U.S. should postpone its
ratification. As you know, the treaty does not enter into force
until 44 named states have deposited their instruments of
ratification. The named states are those that have nuclear
research or power reactors and were at the same time members of
the Conference on Disarmament.
It is true that this requirement erects a high barrier. It
also, in my opinion, reflects a core reality from which there
is no escape. The treaty would not work without the
participation of all five nuclear weapons states and the three
so-called threshold states, India, Pakistan and Israel, who are
not yet bound by the nonproliferation treaty.
The U.S. would not foreswear all future testing if China
and Russia were not similarly bound, and vice versa. China ties
its adherence to India, India to Pakistan, and so forth. It's
an interlocking reality--a political reality among the eight.
Israeli adherence is demanded by all. In my opinion, it did not
much matter what exact formulation was used. The reality was
that all eight were required.
It does not follow that the U.S. can afford to wait until
the other 43 have ratified the treaty. I have always believed
that if you want something, you must get out in front. That is
the American way. We must lead, not follow meekly behind. It is
our burden and our advantage that other states will follow our
lead. The day the United States submitted its ratification of
the Chemical Weapons Convention, China and four other countries
followed, the same day. Cuba, Iran, Pakistan and Russia
followed shortly thereafter.
What if the U.S. chooses not to ratify this treaty? I
believe my experience in the CTBT negotiations and many years
of representing the United States in multilateral diplomacy
render me competent to speculate on the international reaction
to such a possibility. I am not given to hyperbole, but I
believe it is not an exaggeration to say that there will be
jubilation among our foes and despair among our allies and
friends.
Iran, Iraq, North Korea and other states that harbor
nuclear aspirations surely will feel the constraints loosening.
Our allies and other friends will feel deserted and betrayed.
The global nuclear nonproliferation regime will be endangered.
Some isolationists may not believe this regime is worth
protecting and that the U.S. can take care of the problem
itself. But we need cooperation in my judgment from states like
Russia and our European allies, if only to help control exports
if we are to prevent states from acquiring nuclear weapons.
France, for example, which has already ratified the CTBT, will
be even less responsive to U.S. pleas to contain Iraq and Iran
if the U.S. walks away from this treaty, whose successful
negotiation the United States led.
I am not an expert on South Asian policy, but I believe
that if the U.S. fails to ratify the CTBT, we should brace
ourselves for more Indian tests. Pakistan, of course, would
match India test for test.
The Chairman. Mr. Ambassador, would you forgive me please?
We have a vote on and I suggest that Senators go cast their
votes and I will stay here, then it may save time.
Senator Boxer. Mr. Chairman, I just wondered, when we come
back, we will have an opportunity to question, is that correct?
The Chairman. Sure.
Ambassador Ledogar. I only have about two more sentences.
China will not ratify the test ban if the U.S. does not. We
can expect China to put itself in a position to resume testing,
especially if India tests, and the chain reaction may not end
there. Japan could face pressure to reconsider its nuclear
abstinence if China and India buildup their nuclear forces. And
Russia, of course, remains a wild card.
I trust you will have questions and I am prepared to
respond.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Ledogar follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Stephen J. Ledogar
Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for
this opportunity to speak to you about the Comprehensive Nuclear Test
Ban Treaty, which is before your committee for consideration.
First, a few things about my background which I mention only
because I think they are relevant to what I will say about the Treaty.
After four years of active duty as a Naval Aviator and five years in
Private Industry as a lawyer, I joined the Foreign Service and served
for 38 years before retiring two years ago. Most of my career, I worked
in Political-Military Affairs and Arms Control including stints as
Deputy Chief of Mission to NATO, and press spokesman and member of the
delegation to the Vietnam Peace Talks in Paris. I am a strong believer
in nuclear deterrence and I know how central it is to NATO. During my
last ten years of full time service, I was privileged to be an
Ambassador under Presidents Reagan, Bush and Clinton, serving in turn
as head of several U.S. delegations in Vienna and Geneva. I was chief
U.S. negotiator from start to finish of the CTBT. Currently, I'm a
part-time consultant to the Department of State on national security
matters.
As I understand your invitation, Mr. Chairman, I'm not here to give
this committee the authoritative administration pitch on the CTBT.
Secretary Albright and others will do that. Rather, I'm here primarily
as a resource to help recall and detail key elements of the Treaty as
they were fought out in the negotiating trenches between 1993 and
signature in September 1996. I should say, however, that, not
surprisingly, I fully support the Treaty believing that it is very much
in the security interests of the United States. It was carefully
negotiated by me and my multiagency delegation throughout, always
acting on fully cleared front channel instructions. I'm prepared to try
to explain and defend all its key provisions, and if memory serves to
try to give you any background you might be interested in having.
In the short time I have in this opening statement, I will limit my
discussion to just three issues that I believe are sources of some
confusion. Over the course of the last few days, I have heard opinions
expressed on the question of the CTBT's scope, its verification
provisions, and its entry into force provisions. Some of the debate
suggests to me that aspects of the negotiations have not yet been fully
understood. I hope that I may help to shed some light on these issues.
Lastly, I would like to address the likely international repercussions
should the Senate fail to give its consent to ratification.
scope of the ctbt
First, let me address the scope of the CTBT. As the name suggests,
the Treaty imposes a comprehensive ban on all nuclear explosions, of
any size, in any place.
I have heard some critics of the Treaty seek to cast doubt on
whether Russia, in the negotiation and signing of the Treaty, committed
itself under treaty law to a truly comprehensive prohibition of any
nuclear explosion, including an explosion/experiment/event of even the
slightest nuclear yield. In other words, did Russia agree that
hydronuclear experiments (which do produce a nuclear yield, although
very, very slight) would be banned, and that hydrodynamic explosions
(which have no yield because they do not reach criticality) would not
be banned?
The answer is a categoric ``yes.'' The Russians, as well as the
other weapon states, did commit themselves. That answer is
substantiated by the record of the negotiations at almost any level of
technicality (and national security classification) that is desired and
permitted. More importantly for the current debate, it is also
substantiated by the public record of statements by high level Russian
officials as their position on the question of thresholds evolved and
fell into line with the consensus that emerged.
It is important to recall that each of the five nuclear weapon
states began the CTBT negotiations desirous of a quiet understanding
among themselves that some low level nuclear explosions/experiments
that did produce nuclear yield would be acceptable at least among
themselves despite the broad treaty prohibition of ``any nuclear weapon
test explosion or any other nuclear explosion.'' Until August of 1995,
the beginning of the final year of negotiations, the U.S. pushed for
agreement on a very low threshold of nuclear yield. Our position was
not popular among the P-5. Because of our greater test experience and
technical capabilities, we could conceivably gain useful data from
events of almost insignificant yield. The other four argued that they
needed a higher threshold in order to gain any useful data. In some
cases the thresholds they pushed for were politically impossible to
square with the notion of a comprehensive test ban. Russia for example
insisted that if there was going to be any threshold among the five it
would have to allow for so-called experiments with nuclear yields of up
to ten tons of TNT equivalent.
The dispute among the five threatened to halt the negotiations as
it became increasingly known to others that the five were squabbling
with each other about how much wiggle room would be left to them when
they signed onto a text that said simply that nuclear explosions would
be banned. As the arcane and jargon filled complexities of the nuclear
testing communities in Novaya Zemyla, Lop Nor, Mururoa, and Nevada
became more widely understood, the nonnuclear states and broad public
opinion increasingly insisted that the five should be allowed no
tolerance--not even for the smallest possible nuclear yields. A ban
should be a ban. The answer to this dilemma should be no threshold for
anybody; i.e., zero means zero.
On August 11, 1995, President Clinton announced that the United
States was revising its prior position on the threshold question and
would henceforth argue to the other four nuclear weapon states that no
tests that produced a nuclear yield should be allowed to anyone under
the treaty. The Russians, who were miffed at being taken by surprise,
climbed down from their original position slowly and painfully. It took
until April of 1996 before they signed onto the sweeping, categoric
prohibition that is found in the final text. They never did like the
``zero'' word which was bandied around in public (and actually used
once by Boris Yeltsin). Instead, they announced that they embraced a
treaty with no threshold whatsoever. In the confidential negotiations
among the five nuclear weapon states that went on the entire time the
broader CTBT negotiations continued, it was clearly understood and that
the boundary line--the ``zero line'' between what would be prohibited
to all under the treaty and what would not be prohibited--was precisely
defined by the question of nuclear yield or criticality. If what you
did produced any yield whatsoever, it was not allowed. If it didn't, it
was allowed.
ctbt verification regime
Another issue I would like to address is how the Treaty's
verification regime developed and how it benefits the U.S. I will leave
it to others more expert than I to provide precise assessments of U.S.
monitoring capabilities. The point I would like to stress here is that
the U.S. succeeded in the negotiations in getting virtually everything
the intelligence community and other parts of the government wanted
from the Treaty to strengthen our ability to detect and deter cheating
and to seek appropriate redress if cheating did occur. At the same
time, we succeeded in getting virtually everything the Defense
Department and others wanted to ensure the protection of sensitive
national security information. Let me give you several examples.
Concerning the use of National Technical Means, the U.S. fought
like mad to win acceptance of a state's right to use evidence acquired
through NTM, as it saw fit, when requesting an on-site inspection. But
we did not want to be forced to reveal any information we believed
would be better kept private. This was a ``red line'' position for the
U.S. Many of our negotiating partners were adamantly opposed to giving
the U.S. what they considered was a clear advantage and a license to
spy. Yes, it is true that the U.S. has satellite surveillance and
intercept capabilities that surpass others', but is it logical to
penalize and ignore the evidence of the tall person with good eyesight
who can see the crime committed across the room? The U.S. position
prevailed.
This Treaty provides for on-site inspections on request by any
Treaty party and with the approval of the Executive Council. No state
can refuse an inspection. The U.S. position from the start was that on-
site inspections were critical to provide us with added confidence that
we could detect violations. And, if inspections were to be effective,
they had to be conducted absolutely as quickly as possible after a
suspicion arose, using a range of techniques with as few restrictions
as possible. However, the U.S. also had to be concerned with its
defensive posture, as well as an offensive one. It was necessary to
ensure that sensitive national security information would be protected
in the event of an inspection on U.S. territory. The U.S. crafted a
complicated, highly detailed, proposal that balanced our offensive and
defensive needs. There was resistance from some of our negotiating
partners. However, by the time we were through, the Treaty read pretty
much like the original U.S. paper put together jointly by the
Departments of Defense, Energy and State, the Intelligence Community,
and the then-existing Arms Control Agency.
I would like to touch on the composition of the International
Monitoring System--four networks of different types of remote sensors
encompassing 321 stations--because I have heard questions about its
value added. The intelligence community, working through the larger
interagency community, had a list of requirements. They wanted certain
technologies and they wanted certain stations that would fill gaps and
complement existing national monitoring capabilities. The U.S.
delegation delivered nearly everything requested. You have only to look
at the coverage in Russia, China and the Middle East, and the range of
technologies, to appreciate the potential value added of the IMS.
Some people have criticized the Treaty because it does not provide
for sanctions against a state that has violated it. This criticism
strikes me as ill informed. Consistent with traditional U.S. policy, I
was under strict instructions to object to the inclusion of sanctions.
The U.S. view, which I believe this Committee strongly endorses, is
that we will not agree to appoint an international organization to be
not just the investigator and special prosecutor, but also the judge,
jury, and jailer. The U.S. reserves for itself the authority to make
judgements about compliance. And we reserve for a higher body, the
United Nations Security Council in which we have a veto, the authority
to levy sanctions or other measures. This is U.S. policy. This is the
Treaty's policy.
entry into force requirements
The Treaty's entry into force requirements have been the topic of
much discussion and even offered as a reason for why the U.S. should
postpone its ratification. As you know, the Treaty does not enter into
force until 44 named states have deposited their instruments of
ratification. The named states are those that have nuclear research or
reactor reactors and were members of the Conference on Disarmament.
It is true that this requirement erects a high barrier. It also, in
my opinion, reflects a core reality from which there was no escape. The
Treaty would not work without the participation of the five nuclear
weapon states and the three so-called threshold states, India, Pakistan
and Israel, who are not yet bound by the NPT. The U.S. would not
foreswear all future testing if China and Russia were not similarly
bound. China ties its adherence to India. India to Pakistan. And
Israeli adherence was demanded by all. In my opinion, it did not much
matter what the exact formulation was. The reality stood that all eight
were required.
It does not follow that the U.S. can afford to wait until the other
43 have ratified the Treaty. I have always believed that if you want
something, you must get out in front. This is the American way. We must
lead, not follow meekly behind. It is our burden and our advantage that
other states will follow our lead. The day the United States submitted
its ratification to the Chemical Weapons Convention, China and four
other countries followed. Cuba, Iran, Pakistan, and Russia followed
shortly thereafter.
What if the United States chooses not to ratify this treaty? I
believe that my experience in the CTBT negotiations and many years of
representing the U.S. in multilateral diplomacy, render me competent to
speculate on the international reaction to such a possibility.
I am not given to hyperbole, but I believe it is not an
exaggeration to say that there will be jubilation among our foes and
despair among our friends. Iran, Iraq, North Korea and other states
that harbor nuclear aspirations surely will feel the constraints
loosening. Our allies and friends will feel deserted and betrayed. The
global nuclear nonproliferation regime will be endangered. Some
isolationists may not believe this regime is worth protecting: that the
U.S. can take care of the problem itself. But we need cooperation from
states like Russia and our European allies in controlling exports if we
are to prevent states from acquiring nuclear weapons. France, for
example, which has already ratified the CTBT, will be even less
inclined to heed U.S. pleas to contain Iraq and Iran if the U.S. walks
away from the Treaty, whose successful negotiations the U.S. led.
I am not an expert in South Asia policy, but I believe that if the
U.S. fails to ratify the CTBT we should brace ourselves for more Indian
tests. Pakistan, of course, would match India test for test. China will
not ratify the test ban if the U.S. does not. We can expect China to
ready itself to resume testing, especially if India tests. And the
chain reaction may not end there. Japan will face pressure to
reconsider its nuclear abstinence if China and India are developing
nuclear forces. And Russia, of course, remains a wild card.
I trust you have questions about the negotiating history or certain
Treaty elements. I would be pleased to provide whatever information I
can.
The Chairman. All right. We are going to hopscotch on this.
The Senator from Minnesota will take his 5 minutes and then I
will go and Chuck Hagel has already gone and will come back. We
have to play a tag game here.
Senator Grams. Thank you very much. I will not be able to
come back, so I am going to stay and keep the hearing going
until some of the others come back so I have the opportunity to
ask some questions and again, I appreciate your being here and
your testimony.
You know the original official negotiating position of the
Clinton administration in Geneva was to have a treaty which,
one, had a definite duration, 10 years; two, permitted low
yield tests, 4 pounds, and was also verifiable. Those were some
of the conditions they set out with.
If the administration had negotiated a treaty along those
lines, I think it would have had a better chance of being
ratified today. Instead, I think we have ended up with a treaty
of unlimited duration, zero yield, which is clearly
unverifiable. So my question is, and I'll start with Ms.
Kirkpatrick, do you think it was wise for the Clinton
administration to move so far from what was our original
position?
Ambassador Kirkpatrick. No, Senator Grams, I do not. I
think the original position was a reasonable one, which
provided--first of all, it provided for verification and
verifiability, but it also provided for entering the treaty
regime with the provision that it would not last forever. We
could see how it worked. We could see how other nations behaved
in that regime and if it didn't work in 10 years, it would
self-destruct.
I think that was reasonable and workable, and I think this
one is not. It is too sweeping, it is too universal, it is
binding for too long, and it is unverifiable, as I said in my
testimony.
Senator Grams. Mr. Ledogar, maybe I would ask you to answer
the same question. Where the administration began with and
where we ended up with seems like a huge shift, and I know you
were a part of the negotiating. Maybe you could answer that
question as well.
Ambassador Ledogar. Yes, I would be glad to. I agree with
Ambassador Kirkpatrick that it was a reasonable position. One
problem was that it was totally non-negotiable. We had no
support, not a single country, not our best friends would
support the so-called ``10 year easy-out'' proposal which was
originally put on the table by us. And that attitude sprang
from a number of events, but I would say that the then ongoing
Nonproliferation Review and Extension Conference was very
important in setting up a contrast that was thrown back at the
United States delegation. Critics said that you are asking for
the unlimited extension of the nonproliferation treaty and yet
you will commit yourself only to 10 years' duration of the test
ban. And having charged up that hill many times and taken quite
a few hits, I was among those that asked Washington to
reconsider. It was a tough decision but the interagency finally
decided that they could reconsider, with a set of safeguards,
and resort to the supreme national interest clause, which is
very important to the presentation, including to this
committee, of the whole package before it.
Mr. Weinberger. I think it was a very unwise thing. It is a
part of the whole process that an agreement is far more
important than the content, that all you want is the agreement,
and you'll do anything to get the agreement, and this means
that you have to change a well-considered position because
somebody else won't agree to it.
If we had adopted that philosophy and that practice during
President Reagan's term, we would not have a treaty that bans
all intermediate range nuclear arms today, and longer range
weapons, the intermediate range. That was the--when we went in
with the zero option originally in October, I think it was, of
1981, we were pretty well laughed off the international stage
because we were proposing something that everybody knew the
Soviets would never agree to, so it was clearly just a ploy by
Mr. Reagan and on and on and on and all the editorials poured
out about what a terrible thing it was to do. Seven years
later, they agreed to it, word for word, practically speaking.
We held firm. We felt the content was far more important than
getting an agreement.
And here is exactly the opposite philosophy prevails. If
you want an agreement, you have to do what everybody else
wants, regardless of how the content affects the United States
or doesn't affect the United States. So I think it was a very
unwise thing to do and I think the results are before us.
Senator Grams. It seems I hear the same about the Kyoto
treaty. The agreement was worth more than the contents. Let me
quote what John Holliman--I think you know John Holliman,
senior Clinton arms controller, who criticized this. And some
of the things he had to say, and I quote, ``the United States
views on verification are well known. We would have preferred
stronger measures, especially in the decisionmaking process,
for onsite inspections and in numerous specific provisions
affecting the practical implementation of the inspection
regime.
``I feel no need to defend this view. The mission of the
Conference on Disarmament is not to erect political symbols,
but to negotiate enforceable agreements. That requires
effective verification, not as the preference of any party, but
as the sine qua non of this body's work.
``On verification overall, the treaty tilts toward the
defense in a way that has forced the United States to conclude
reluctantly that it can accept barely the balance that
Ambassador Romaker has crafted.'' And I apologize, I don't have
my glasses on so it is hard for me to see all this.
So there are some concerns there. Also, we have been
discovering defects within our own stockpiles right up until
1992 and I think, Ms. Kirkpatrick, you have mentioned that we
have been under a ban for testing for many, many years now, so
we are already far behind in some of these areas. But finding
defects up until 1992 in the test ban.
So one might wonder why since 1992 not a single warhead has
been relined, in other words, removed from the inventory
because of concerns over performance and safety. Is it because
somehow by magic our stockpile self-perfected in 1992, or is it
that we cannot discover defects without nuclear testing itself.
Ms. Kirkpatrick?
Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Senator Grams, I think it is
uncertain, at best, how effective the various kinds of
simulations are or will be. The efforts that we make without
testing, without explosive testing, to verify the reliability
and condition of our stockpiles yield uncertain results and I
think we cannot have confidence in them at the level that we
could previously have confidence.
Senator Grams. Again, without being able to verify all the
testing, Mr. Weinberger, can we count on having a reliable
stockpile without testing?
Mr. Weinberger. No, we cannot, and even if we wait until
2007 or 2008 when these new computers come online, as the
Secretary of Defense testified yesterday and today, you will
still not have the kind of reliability that you get from
explosive testing. It is a substitute for it. It is something
less good. And that is what the treaty does, it forces
everybody to use, if they all complied with it, to use
something that is less effective than the most effective method
of testing for reliability so it doesn't ban testing, it
doesn't ban proliferation, it doesn't ban anything except the
most effective means of testing.
Senator Grams. But that is only for some of the most
sophisticated. When you have some less sophisticated nuclear
weapons you wouldn't need this type of testing, would you, so
it still puts us at a disadvantage.
Mr. Weinberger. Well, yes, and it is the old story about an
inaccurate nuclear weapon can still do an enormous amount of
damage and that is why you want to have them tested, to make
sure that they will do the job for which they are intended. It
is a horrible job, but our deterrence, our safety depends on
it.
Senator Grams. Mr. Ledogar, I read an article earlier this
week that Mr. Adamov, who heads up the nuclear programs in
Russia, and when Mr. Weinberger mentioned about the new
computers coming online, the most sophisticated computers, the
report basically stated that somehow the administration had
given him the impression that the United States, if they would
sign this treaty, would provide them with these type of
computers in order for them to do similar type of tests on
computers. Now, these are things, computers we do not want to
sell.
We have had many arguments on the floor of the Senate
about, worried about having this kind of technology stolen from
us at the labs, but yet are we willing to give this information
to the Russians in order for them to do computerized testing
without doing actual testing? Was that part of the plan at all,
or is this report in error?
Ambassador Ledogar. The report is not in error insofar as
it reflects what the Russian general said. It is in error
insofar as it suggests that the United States would even
consider giving those sophisticated computers to the Russians.
Now, I have had that on the authority of very senior officials
at the Department of Energy. I was not on the trip, and I only
have personal knowledge of the news stories.
Senator Grams. So you are saying this administration would
not commit and has not, behind closed doors, indicated to the
Russians that we would share this type of computer information
with them. We have not done that.
Ambassador Ledogar. That is correct. However, Senator, I
must say that I am not technically an administration spokesman.
I am a contractor now.
Senator Grams. Maybe we can ask Madeleine Albright this
afternoon.
Ambassador Ledogar. This afternoon you have the
opportunity. If I may say so, with all due respect, if I
believed, as Secretary Weinberger does, that the stockpile is
already or will quickly in the future become unreliable, I
certainly would not support the treaty, but I believe the
opposite, and I think that the bulk of the evidence--provided
that the science-based stockpile stewardship program continues
to be funded, and that the annual certifications with the
cooperation of the Congress continue to take place--gives the
assurance that, should there be any problem in the future, it
will be discovered, and that if it is discovered, the
appropriate steps will be taken, and it is on that basis that
this administration and the bulk of supporters of ratification
believe that it is safe for us to go forward without explosive
testing.
The amount of other testing that goes on is stupendous, and
very expensive. This afternoon you will have Dr. Garwin, and I
would hope that you could put to a highly qualified nuclear
physicist like him the questions and get the assurances that
are the basis for my beliefs.
Senator Grams. Thank you. We have many experts on both
sides. That is what makes this debate so much harder to
understand. I have to turn the gavel over to Senator Hagel, and
also I would like to ask to place statements by the current
laboratory directors in support of testing into the record, if
I could, at the same time.
[The statements referred to follow:]
Former Laboratory Directors Oppose the CTBT
``I urge you to oppose the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). No
previous Administration, either Democrat or Republican, ever supported
the unverifiable, zero yield, indefinite duration CTBT now before the
Senate. The reason for this is simple. Under a long-duration test ban,
confidence in the nuclear stockpile will erode for a variety of
reasons.''
Roger Batzel, Director Emeritus, response to
a request for views by Chairman Helms, October
5, 1999.
``Without nuclear testing, confidence in the stockpile will
decline. The U.S. capability to develop weapons will be degraded by the
eventual loss of all nuclear test experienced weapons experts who
developed the stockpile.''
``. . . For the U.S., the CTBT would be a `catch-22': without
nuclear testing, there is a growing uncertainty in our estimates of
stockpile reliability; without nuclear testing, experts cannot quantify
this uncertainty.''
John Nuckolls, Director Emeritus, response to
a request for views from Chairman Helms,
September 29, 1999.
``I have seen and studied a copy of your letter you wrote to
President Clinton on January 21. I was impressed by your statements,
and I am happy you made them.''
``. . . The point I must make is that, in the long run, knowledge
and ability to produce nuclear weapons will be widely available. To
believe that, in the long run, proliferation of nuclear weapons is
avoidable is wishful thinking and dangerous. It is the more dangerous
because it is a point of view that the public is eager to accept. Thus
politicians are tempted to gain popularity by supporting false hopes.''
Edward Teller, Director Emeritus, letter to
Chairman Helms, February 4, 1998.
``Of course, if nuclear testing were allowed, we would gain greater
confidence in the new tools. We could validate these tools more
readily, as well as validate some of the new remanufacturing
techniques. One to two tests per year would serve such a function quite
well. Yields of 10 kt would be sufficient in most cases. Yields of 1 kt
would be of substantial help.''
S.S. Hecker, Director of Los Alamos National
Laboratory, response to Senator Kyl, September
24, 1997.
``From a purely technical standpoint, some level of nuclear testing
would be a useful addition to the SSMP to address the effects of aging-
related changes on weapon safety and reliability, and to validate the
capabilities of the next generation of weapon scientists and their
experimental and computational facilities, particularly in addressing
hydrodynamic phenomena related to boosted primaries.''
C. Bruce Tarter, Director of Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory, response to
Senator Kyl, September 29, 1997.
``A strong Stockpile Stewardship and Maintenance Program is
necessary to underwrite confidence. A program of 500-ton experiments
would significantly reduce the technical risks.''
Joint statement by Laboratory Directors,
1995.
Senator Hagel. Senator, thank you. Let me add my welcome to
our three highly admired and distinguished witnesses. I would
like to ask each of you a question. Ambassador Kirkpatrick and
Secretary Weinberger, you obviously have laid out a rather
compelling sense of why this treaty should be defeated, and
with that compelling testimony I would ask each of you what,
then, should we do? What is the answer? Rewrite a treaty, start
anew, do not pay attention to it?
You lay out the threats of this new borderless world we
live in rather directly, and in a compelling way. I think what
we need to do now is, as we deal with the immediacy of this
issue, move forward. We must take this out of the political
swamp that it has found itself in and deal with the relevant
issues, and that is, how do we build a better world a safer
world for mankind? I would be most interested in your thoughts,
Madam Ambassador.
Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Senator Hagel, thank you very much.
Do you mean not simply with regard to nuclear weapons, but a
better world, period?
Senator Hagel. Well, any advice you can proffer, but I
would like you to stay focused on this, because we hear great
debate about how this is a bad treaty and we should defeat it
and drive a stake through its heart, but what, then, should we
do?
Ambassador Kirkpatrick. I think there is a kind of dynamic
that takes over in negotiations when they are underway, but
whether that dynamic is more helpful or more hurtful varies in
different circumstances. I think that it would be useful,
frankly, to go back to the beginning. I think the negotiating
positions which have been described, the original positions of
this administration, were sound negotiating principles. They
were sounder.
I have spent a good deal of time negotiating in the U.N.
context, in situations where you are seeking agreement of 185
countries, or 195 countries. What happens is that one gives
more and more--if one is not very alert, very determined, and
frankly, ready to end without an agreement, It is absolutely
essential to be aware of this in negotiations on a subject as
important as this.
I think one must be prepared to end such a negotiation with
no agreement--on the CTBT, for example, and I think had the
administration done that, had they entered the negotiation with
that determination, and clarity about their bottom-line
principles--the three principles we heard described, we might
not have gotten the treaty, or we might have gotten a better
one. I do not think it matters much whether there is a CTBT in
which 190 countries have signed on, because most of those
countries are not ever going to be players in the world of
nuclear weapons and nuclear war. Most of those countries really
have no stake in the subject, except the stake of fallout and
the pollution of the globe, that everyone has.
But they constitute a major influence in the negotiations
themselves because all of the countries, or virtually all of
the countries who are member States of the U.N. are also state
partners in the treaty. The structure of the U.N. becomes
important too, and so do the various blocs, the nonaligned
bloc, for example, the G-77 take bloc positions, even though
most of their members have no direct involvement in these
issues of these questions, but they exercise significant
influence in the negotiating process.
Senator Hagel. Are you saying we should go back and
renegotiate?
Ambassador Kirkpatrick. I would go back and renegotiate. I
would go back and renegotiate on the basis of some different
principles, and one of those principles would be an
understanding with both parties that any treaty which we
brought from the negotiation might not have all the members as
signatories.
What would be essential would be that the nuclear powers be
signatories, and maybe a few others. I am not saying only
nuclear powers should be able to participate, but they should
be the principal participants in any negotiation. All the
countries in the U.N. really do not need to participate in such
negotiations, I think you have a better chance of getting a
better product if you undertake the negotiations on that basis,
and in that spirit.
Senator Hagel. Thank you. Secretary Weinberger.
Mr. Weinberger. Well, sir, if your goal is simply to get an
agreement, then probably you would have to do what we did here,
which was to give up a soundly considered, carefully crafted
position, give it up easily, give every essential element of
it, just so we can get an agreement. This is the syndrome that
bothers me, because the agreement then becomes far more
important than the context, and I think that we did have a
well-considered position we went in with. If we could not get
anybody to agree with it, well then, so be it, we would not get
an agreement, but you would have a lot better than a bad
agreement which prevents us from doing the necessary things we
have to do to give the greatest assurance we possibly can that
this nuclear deterrent works. Your margin for error here, Mr.
Chairman, is extraordinarily small. You are not allowed to be
very wrong about a guess as to whether this works or not, and
that would lead me to conclude that we should have the most
effective means of testing available to us.
We are not preventing other countries from testing. We are
simply preventing ourselves, and if they comply themselves with
having a less effective method of testing, if you really want
to see, I think the most fundamental way to deal with this
problem, then I think what we should do is what we should have
done and what we started to do in 1983, and that is to develop
an effective defense against these weapons. The knowledge that
there is absolutely no defense, and that we remain committed to
a treaty that forbids any effective defense, the ABM Treaty--
which incidentally the Soviets started to violate within 2
weeks of the time they signed it--then you have the greatest
encouragement to other countries, rogue countries,
particularly, to feel that if they get this weapon and there is
not going to be any defense against them, they will then be in
a position to overcome their smallness, or their
insignificance, otherwise in order to have the kind of military
capability that will enable them to engage in nuclear
blackmail.
So the best method of all to deal with this problem is to
concentrate everything we have got on getting an effective
defense against it, not some half-hearted attempts to satisfy a
few polls or something of that kind, but a genuinely effective
method of defending against these weapons.
It can be done. We finally had a test that demonstrates one
method of doing it. We lost 10 years between 1993 and the
present time, which we could have been working on all of these
things and which we have not done. We started in 1983, we got a
program in 1983, and we remained fully committed to an ABM
Treaty which absolutely forbids any kind of effective defense.
Defense is the answer to this kind of thing.
Senator Hagel. My friend and colleague is up, and so if it
is OK, Mr. Ambassador, I will hold my questions.
Senator Biden. That is OK. Go ahead.
Senator Hagel. Senator Biden, thank you very much. Just a
quick question to both Ambassador Kirkpatrick and Secretary
Weinberger. The consequences of the United States defeating
this treaty, as Ambassador Ledogar referenced, as we have heard
an awful lot about, which I think there is some relevancy
attached to that, the consequences around the world, would you
give me a succinct answer? Is it real? Is it not real? Is it
important if we defeat this? If we go ahead on Tuesday, what
consequences will there be for the United States in the future
of efforts to deal with proliferation?
Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Senator Hagel, I truly believe that
the consequences would be very much less than almost all of the
extravagant statements that I have heard in the last 48 hours
about what would happen if the U.S. did not ratify it.
Most countries are simply not that concerned about our
policies. That is just a fact. We do not have the kind of
influence over the policies and behavior of other countries
that the comments are predicting, these dire consequences for
U.S.-nonratification suggest.
I just think they are mistaken. They should go to the U.N.
and try influencing a few countries to support votes and
policies on highly worthy subjects, and you will find out very
quickly how really impotent we often are in securing a large
number of other countries' support, and following our example.
Senator Hagel. Thank you. Mr. Secretary.
Mr. Weinberger. Well, Senator, I agree with Ambassador
Kirkpatrick completely. I think that the consequences will be a
certain amount of editorial hand-wringing, but nothing that is
in any sense substantive. Does anybody believe, as it was said
this morning, that all these constraints that now bind people
will be gone? What constraints does Kim Song-il feel under,
what constraints does Saddam Hussein feel under? If they can
get nuclear weapons they are going to get them.
They have some. They have some of the components. They are
not going to let anything like this stand in their way. The
United States reaction I think would be basically, if we
defeated the treaty on the grounds that have all been put forth
over the course of the debate, I think the basic reaction among
people who are realistic about such things would be that the
United States has declined to bind itself to having an
ineffective deterrent.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Thank you. Time is short. Maybe we will get
a second round here, but I thought one of the purposes, and it
may not meet, from your perspective, I say to you, Mr.
Secretary, and you, Ambassador Kirkpatrick, was to not merely
deal with the North Koreas, but to make sure that--or not make
sure, impact on the ability of China, for example, to move to a
MIRV system to be able to effectively, as you worried about,
deal with what stolen data they have.
You referenced the Cox committee, Ms. Kirkpatrick, which I
think is perfectly legitimate, and you indicated that one of
the reasons you were opposed to this treaty, among many--you
named many--was that what will happen here is that, look at
what the Chinese did, and you cited the Cox report.
Well, the Cox report says, and this is a quote, found that,
quote, ``the PRC does not likely need additional physical tests
for its older thermonuclear warhead designs, but since signing
the CTBT in 1996, the PRC has faced a new challenge in
maintaining its modern thermonuclear warheads without
physically testing,'' and they go on to state that ``given the
limited number of nuclear tests the PRC has conducted, the PRC
likely needs additional empirical information about the
advanced thermonuclear weapons performance.''
And it goes on to point out that unless they can test well
beyond 1 kiloton, which we are confident we can pick up, they
cannot effectively use the stuff they stole, so it seems to me
you are arguing against your own interest here, if you are
worried about the Chinese being able to use this technology,
and every one in our intelligence community suggests we are
able to detect the kind of yield they would have to engage in
to be able to use it.
Then one of two things happens. Either we observe, and they
go ahead and they sign--by the way, the treaty does not come
into force unless they sign, so unless they sign, and among
others, it does not come into force no matter what we do, but
if they sign, and if the only way the experts with whom I have
spoken--and I, like you, I have spent hundreds of hours on
this.
I have spoken to the lab directors. I have spoken to all
the folks who know a lot more than all four of us, or all 15 of
us, or all of us in this room about the detail of this process.
They all acknowledge in order to be able to use it, they have
got to be able to test it. The way they would have to test it,
we can figure it out, so that leaves them in the position of
either signing and then violating, in which case article 7
allows us, or safeguard 7 allows us to withdraw from the
treaty, period, boom, withdraw from the treaty. We do not have
to do anything else. We do not have to ask anybody, do
anything.
And then on the issue of--and I am doing this because we
only have 6 minutes, and I will get to specific questions in
the second round if we have one.
On the issue you both raise of the inability to modernize,
you point out that this would limit our ability to modernize.
Well, we are--does anyone doubt that our sophistication is
exponentially greater than any other country in the world in
terms of our ability to make quantum leaps in modernization in
the sophisticated field of strategic weapons? I know of no one
who ever has made that assertion, including the three of you.
Therefore, if we are constrained from modernizing, it is
overwhelmingly the case every other nation is even more
constrained from modernizing.
Now, the one thing you have both educated me about in your
testimony over the years is the degree to which a missile
defense technology will function is in direct proportion to how
sophisticated the array of offensive weapons coming in is.
There is no one I have ever, ever, ever spoken to, including
all the scientists out of your administration, and continuing
in this administration, who has said that we are not better
prepared if we do not have multiple warhead reentry vehicles
aimed at us to counter them with a missile defense.
That is one of the reasons why you did a brilliant job in
START in moving along and setting in process the idea that we
would no longer have multiple warheads on tops of missiles.
Now, you all are saying here, if we do not have this treaty
we acknowledge the ability of the sophisticated nations to MIRV
their systems increases, add a minimum increases, I would argue
increases gigantically, but increases, and yet you are now
saying what you should be relying on is a missile defense.
It seems to me if you want a missile defense, and a missile
defense that is likely to work in the relatively near term, the
fewer nations that are able to MIRV, the better off we all are.
And so my question is this. Do any of the three of you
think that the ability for the nuclear States to move to
MIRV'ed capacity they do not possess is harder or easier, under
this treaty? Just that one question, MIRV'ed capability.
Do you think it is harder or easier, because we all know,
as you know, most people do not know, to MIRV you have got to
take these big old ugly things, make them lighter, make them
smaller, make them more compact, make the yield of the
plutonium package able to be boosted in a way as a consequence
of the ignition package, as most people in here would know it,
and that is a very sophisticated process that not a single
scientist I have ever spoken to says can be done without
nuclear testing, and nuclear testing in yields that are
detectable.
And so explain to me how it makes sense, if you want a
missile defense system, to be against this treaty.
Mr. Weinberger. Senator, that is a perfectly good argument,
but it overlooks one point and that is the sophisticated
knowledge which you speak of so correctly has been stolen.
Senator Biden. But it cannot be used if it cannot be
tested.
Mr. Weinberger. Yes, it can be used. The new light warhead
we spent years and millions of dollars has now been given to
China one way or another, and they are able to use it perfectly
well, so for this treaty to have any effect of banning, to have
any effect on a country that wants to develop this kind of
capability, the question is, it is irrelevant.
Senator Biden. For the record, if you could submit the name
of one scientist----
The Chairman. Let us go ahead, and you take 6 more minutes.
Senator Biden. I just want to--if I could just followup
with 10 seconds, if for the record, and not now, you can name
one scientist of consequence who will tell the committee or you
that they can use the stolen package without testing it, if you
can submit one serious scientist who will tell me that, I would
appreciate it very much, and you have time. We are probably not
going to vote soon.
Mr. Weinberger. Your assumption is they are prevented from
testing if we sign this treaty, and my assumption is that if
they want to develop--if they are going to use any method they
have to do it, and if we find out they have broken the treaty,
Senator, we pass resolutions, we say it is a terrible thing,
editorials are written, and they go right on doing what they
want to do.
Senator Biden. So your primary concern is, we will not have
the will?
Mr. Weinberger. The primary concern is not to give them the
capability of doing that whether there is a treaty or not, and
unfortunately a lot of that has already been done.
Senator Biden. I have great respect for you, Mr. Secretary.
Mr. Weinberger. I share the respect for you, but I think
your argument is totally full of holes where the security of
the country is concerned.
Senator Biden. I have not found a single scientist to take
issue with what I said. If you can produce them, I would be
delighted.
The Chairman. I want to be fair to everybody, including the
witnesses, and Secretary Weinberger, if you wish to add
anything, you go right ahead.
Mr. Weinberger. I am sorry.
The Chairman. I want you to have adequate time to respond
to the various questions, so go right ahead.
Mr. Weinberger. Thank you. That was the point that I wished
to make, that it is very imperative that we try to get a
defense, it is very imperative that we recognize that in the
world in which we live, rogue countries, countries like North
Korea and Iraq and others, are certainly going to try to get
every capability they can, and China, as we already know, has
one way or another acquired this extremely valuable technology,
and will certainly make every effort to use it, regardless of
whether we do or do not sign this treaty.
The Chairman. Now, I have got something I am going to say
on that, but the Senator from California has been waiting and
waiting, so you proceed with your time.
Senator Boxer. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. I am glad
to be here in this committee on a very important issue, and I
think just following up on the last exchange between Senator
Biden and the Honorable Caspar Weinberger, I would say that
listening to Mr. Weinberger, my sense of it is he is saying,
well, we sign the treaty, and then China goes ahead and does
these tests, and what have we gained?
The bottom line is, if they sign the treaty and they break
the treaty, we can get out of the treaty, so I think what is
important for us, and it sort of gets back to what Senator
Hagel was driving at, is what do we really do to make our
people safer from this threat?
Now that we have won the cold war, proliferation is a very
important issue. I am sure we all agree on that. But we have a
disagreement on how we get to the place we want to get, where
our people are safer.
Now, after reading both sides, and I have to say as I look
at this, it is sort of a sad situation, it seems to me that
Republicans are lining up mostly opposed--there is a few
exceptions, and there is a bipartisan group who supports, and I
am going to go into who those people are.
I worry about our foreign policy becoming partisan, either
side, because the one thing I have noticed in all the years I
have been in Congress, it has been a very long time, and I
would say to my friend Caspar Weinberger, we remember each
other from the days I was on the Defense Committee over on the
House side.
I always believed that military policy, foreign policy
needed to be bipartisan, and we were so strong when we were,
and I worry that this argument is taking another shape and
form, and I am very concerned about that, because I think it
weakens us, and I want to talk about what weakens us in the
world. It is when we are divided, one from the other, and so I
hope we can pull together at some point, however we dispose of
the matter that is before us.
But as I look at the people who are for this treaty, and I
read the comments of our President and our Vice President, but
in addition to that, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
General Shelton, who says he supports it because he believes
that those six important conditions strengthen us, they make
us--he says it would reduce conflict and reduce tensions.
And former Joint Chief of Staff under Ronald Reagan,
William Crowe, supports the treaty and says that the safeguards
will strengthen U.S. intelligence, and John Shalikashvili
supports it. He signed a statement that said it would
strengthen our ability to verify.
Colin Powell, former chief of Staff under George Bush
supports it, and he signed a very powerful statement.
Thirty-two physics Nobel laureates support it from
institutions from all over this country: Princeton, Brown,
University of Washington, UC-Berkeley, MIT, Illinois Institute
of Technology, Cornell, Columbia, Bell Labs, Gaithersburg,
Florida State, University of Texas, Harvard-Smithsonian, Ohio
State--and I ask unanimous consent to put this statement that
they made into the record.
Thank you so much.
The Chairman. Without objection.
[The information referred to follows:]
A Letter from Physics Nobel Laureates
To Senators of the 106th Congress:
We urge you to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
The United States signed and ratified the Limited Test Ban Treaty
in 1963. In the years since, the nation has played a leadership role in
actions to reduce nuclear risks, including the Non-Proliferation Treaty
extension, the ABM Treaty, STARTs I and II, and the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty negotiations. Fully informed technical studies have
concluded that continued nuclear testing is not required to retain
confidence in the safety, reliability and performance of nuclear
weapons in the United States' stockpile, provided science and
technology programs necessary for stockpile stewardship are maintained.
The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is central to future efforts to
halt the spread of nuclear weapons. Ratification of the Treaty will
mark an important advance in uniting the world in an effort to contain
and reduce the dangers of nuclear arms. It is imperative that the CTBT
be ratified.
Philip W. Anderson--Princeton University--1977 Nobel Prize
Hans A. Bethe--Cornell University--1967 Nobel Prize
Nicolaas Bloembergen--Harvard University--1981 Nobel Prize
Owen Chamberlain--UC, Berkeley--1959 Nobel Prize
Steven Chu--Stanford University--1997 Nobel Prize
Leon N. Cooper--Brown University--1972 Nobel Prize
Hans Dehmelt--University of Washington--1989 Nobel Prize
Val L. Fitch--Princeton University--1980 Nobel Prize
Jerome Friedman--MIT--1990 Nobel Prize
Donald A. Glaser--UC, Berkeley--1960 Nobel Prize
Sheldon Glashow--Harvard University--1979 Nobel Prize
Henry W. Kendall--MIT--1990 Nobel Prize
Leon M. Lederman--Illinois Institute of Technology--1988 Nobel Prize
David M. Lee--Cornell University--1996 Nobel Prize
T. D. Lee--Columbia University--1957 Nobel Prize
Douglas D. Osheroff--Stanford University--1996 Nobel Prize
Arno Penzias--Bell Labs--1978 Nobel Prize
Martin L. Perl--Stanford University--1995 Nobel Prize
William Phillips--Gaithersburg--1997 Nobel Prize
Norman F. Ramsey--Harvard University--1989 Nobel Prize
Robert C. Richardson--Cornell University--1996 Nobel Prize
Burton Richter--Stanford University--1976 Nobel Prize
Arthur L. Schawlow--Stanford University--1981 Nobel Prize
J. Robert Schrieffer--Florida State University--1972 Nobel Prize
Mel Schwartz--Columbia University--1988 Nobel Prize
Clifford G. Shull--MIT--1994 Nobel Prize
Joseph H. Taylor, Jr.--Princeton University--1993 Nobel Prize
Daniel C. Tsui--Princeton University--1998 Nobel Prize
Charies Townes--UC, Berkeley--1964 Nobel Prize
Steven Weinberg--Univ. of Texas, Austin--1979 Nobel Prize
Robert W. Wilson--Harvard-Smithsonian--1978 Nobel Prize
Kenneth G. Wilson--Ohio State University--1982 Nobel Prize
Senator Boxer. I think this is important. The labs all
support it, the current people in the labs, and the other thing
I am trying to search for as I look at who falls in each place,
who has been really influenced by the cold war, and who is
ready to get beyond it into where we are today, and I think we
have to take the lessons of the cold war and be very, very wise
about what we learn, but also understand that it is a new day,
and we have to look at things in, therefore, I think a
different way.
I want to say a comment about Ms. Kirkpatrick's statements
on the President, because I support her right to her views, and
she has very eloquently stated those, and she is very strong on
those, but I also feel I want to put my strong views on the
record when she said, and I am trying to remember exactly. The
record will show. I believe she said the President is not
defending the people against the most important threat of
nuclear weapons, and I think that is a fairly safe repetition
of what she said.
Ambassador Kirkpatrick. No, I did not, Senator Boxer.
Senator Boxer. Well, we will go back to the record, but I
would say that she said that his policies on nuclear weapons
are not--because he is not doing enough on the missile defense,
but we will get back to the exact words, but it was something
like that, and I just want to say in the record that it was
under this administration that we had the first successful test
of a national missile defense, on October 2.
It is under this administration that we have the stockpile
stewardship program, which we are spending $4.5 billion. I do
not think any President who did not believe we needed to retain
our nuclear deterrence would spend $4.5 billion in a time when
we are so much worried about expenditures, so that started 3
years ago.
We are spending $32 billion a year on our nuclear arsenal,
and so I really just wanted to take issue with that statement,
and if I am incorrect in your exact words, well, the clerk will
get those words back to us.
But I worry about that, because I think every President,
Republican or Democrat, goes to sleep at night and the one
worry on his, and perhaps some day her mind will be the safety
of the American people. I think this President is no different.
Now, we may disagree on how we get from A to B, but I guess
my question to the opponents of our treaty, our distinguished
panel who oppose it, what do they take issue with John
Shalikashvili, what do they take issue with