U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m. in room 415, Dirskin Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., presiding.

Present: Senators Biden, Pell, Sarbanes, Cranston, Dodd, Kerry, Simon, Moynihan, Wofford, Helms, Lugar, Pressler, McConnell, and Brown.

Senator BIDEN. The hearing will please come to order. Welcome, Mr. Secretary. It is delightful to have you back before the committee. From my perspective, it is particularly delightful to have you back discussing what I think is a very, very valuable contribution you and the President have made to this country and presented to the Senate for our consideration, the subject matter of our hearing this morning.

The Foreign Relations Committee today begins hearings on the CFE Treaty governing conventional forces in Europe. Chairman Pell had intended to be here, Mr. Secretary, but he is engaged elsewhere and sends his apologies to you.

The CFE Treaty marks a watershed in the 20th century world history. It was signed by 22 signatories. This treaty will eliminate a fundamental cause of tension in Europe since the end of World War II, which has been the huge numerical advantage of Soviet conventional forces. This superiority threatened the security and prosperity of the West for many years and was integral to the Soviet domination of Eastern Europe.

This superiority also fueled a nuclear arms race. In every strategic doctrine adopted by NATO for 40 years, from massive retaliation to flexible response, nuclear weapons were intended to compensate for the Soviet edge in conventional arms.

The CFE Treaty has been widely described as historic, but few accounts have underscored just how favorable this treaty and its terms are for the United States of America. This treaty will not only end the Soviet conventional superiority in the European theater, it will reverse it. I repeat, this treaty will not only end Soviet conventional superiority in the European theater, it will reverse it by limiting Soviet forces in the theater to a level well below the combined forces of NATO.

This treaty is, as they might say in certain circles, a real good deal for the United States of America and for its allies.

An overarching question which I hope to explore in these hearings is how the new and unfamiliar reality of this treaty will affect our defense posture in Europe and our overall approach to American national security. Clearly, by eliminating the shadow of Soviet military supremacy in Europe, the CFE Treaty chips away a final foundation stone of the cold war.

But can the treaty also lay a new foundation stone for a cooperative international order that transcends the intense and relentless arms competition of the past half-century?

While I hope the CFE Treaty can help us build a new security order, and I will be asking you, Mr. Secretary, several questions about that and the treaty's significance for U.S. defense policy, I note that this treaty's immediate effect will be far less than some had originally anticipated.

With regard to the Soviet reductions it requires, the treaty has been largely overtaken by events in the last 18 months. Even before the treaty was signed the Soviet Union had withdrawn some 75,000 tanks and artillery pieces and armored combat vehicles to storage sites east of the Ural Mountains. For this reason the treaty will not require the nations of the Warsaw Pact to destroy 130,000 pieces of equipment as the administration had predicted to this committee last year.

In remarking on this phenomenon, I am not in any way assigning blame. The only practical alternative would have been to accelerate the negotiations so that less equipment would have been transferred prior to the treaty signing. Whether this acceleration could have been accomplished by bolder action on our part or more cooperation on the part of the Soviets remains a matter for historians to debate. But it may be true that if there are flaws in the treaty, this is the biggest.

To dwell on this fact, the fact that we were unable to require the full destruction of the Soviet forces retreating from Eastern Europe and from the cold war itself, would truly be an act of morbid self-flagellation in my view.

Instead, I believe we should focus on the welcome development that has given rise to this problem. If it is bad news that we did not achieve wholesale destruction of Soviet forces during their hasty retreat, surely it is good news that this is the kind of bad news that we must now cope with.

Moreover, a partial solution to this problem is contained in the Soviet government's unilateral pledge made last month to destroy 25 percent of the equipment moved east of the Urals and with regard to the remaining 75 percent of such equipment, not to position it in operational units or in any other way use it as part of a strategic reserve force.

This political commitment is necessary to ameliorate the potential, even if unlikely, threat posed by such forces. But as the Soviet pledge stands legally, it may be insufficient. I intend to discuss with you, Mr. Secretary 'y, a possible remedy in the form of a Senate condition that would not require the treaty to be renegotiated.

Another major issue requiring the Senate's attention is the Soviet effort to reinterpret article 3 of the treaty so as to exempt more than 3,000 pieces of equipment they assigned to naval forces. In last month's accord, the Soviets formally agreed to act as if that equipment is covered by the treaty. But again, while this was necessary, it may be insufficient, for the agreement took the form of a U.S. Soviet bilateral agreement that is fully separate from the treaty itself.

Again, Mr. Secretary, I would like to discuss with you the possibility of a second Senate condition that, again, would require no renegotiations, but could nonetheless render this bilateral agreement functionally equivalent to being an integral part of the treaty.

As we commence these hearings, I think it is fair to say, without intending any insult to our able negotiators, that the CFE Treaty is a nitpicker's paradise. As a result of the immensely complicated nature of the subject matter and the fact that no less than 22 nations were involved in the negotiations, the final product is not a model of clarity. Nor do I think it could possibly be.

This committee could easily attach numerous conditions clarifying the meaning of different sentences in the treaty text. Instead, "assuming we receive certain assurances from you, Mr. Secretary, it is my belief that we should place our discussion of these ambiguities in report language rather than formal Senate understandings or reservations.

In closing, Mr. Secretary, let me say that I expect this treaty to receive overwhelming bipartisan support. And I intend to work closely with the Ranking Member of this committee, Senator Helms, and with the administration on any language we add to the resolution of ratification and on any other issues that may arise throughout this process.

And again, Mr. Secretary, I welcome you and I am delighted we are here discussing this issue.

I yield to the senior member of this committee, Senator Helms. Senator HELMS. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Secretary, I do not want to be a party-pooper, but I am obliged to suggest that the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty is scarcely a landmark in the history of arms control.

I agree with much of what Senator Biden has said. In fact, the main question, it seems to me today, is whether the CFE Treaty is not totally irrelevant. It is a treaty that long ago was overtaken by events beyond its scope and its terms. The collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the reunification of Germany, the fall of Communist regimes in Central Europe, and the great cracks that are appearing in the surface of the Soviet empire have already established the withdrawal of Soviet troops at rates exceeding the provisions of this treaty.

Moreover, the treaty is deficient in my judgment in that it does not contemplate a more rapid removal of U.S. military forces from Europe. I just about decided that NATO is dead and should be given a decent burial.

In any case, it is true that there may be some marginal utility of the treaty. It does establish guidelines for withdrawal of Soviet troops. And it does set limits on the number of conventional arms and military vehicles that each group of the state party to the treaty may keep west of the Ural Mountains.

Moreover, and I especially want to complement the distinguished Chairman, Mr. Joe Biden, for his excellent work on this. It does seem to imply that the Brezhnev doctrine is dead even though the Soviet Union, in its grand tradition of bad faith, has spirited away east of the Ural and beyond the reach of the treaty thousands of armored vehicles and other weapons supposedly controlled by the treaty. The Soviets will be all set if Brezhnev rises again.

But of course the former members of the Warsaw Pact are no longer in the camp of the Soviet Union even though socialism has not been driven out completely in some areas. The Soviet Union remains the prime military threat in Eastern Europe. And insofar as the treaty has any impact at all on Soviet military deployments, it may have a smidgen of utility. At least it provides benchmarks to tell us if the Soviets are cheating.

But even that is faint praise, Mr. Chairman. The fact is there are procedures for monitoring in the treaty, but the confidence of verification is extremely low. The U.S. negotiators have strained mightily, but they have come up with, not a mouse, but with a goose egg. It is so meaningless that there is no point in opposing it.

However, there is one lesson to be learned for future arms control exercises. And that is that the Soviets regard arms control as a joke. A joke largely at our expense. Their record of negotiations is full of deceit, circumvention, data falsification, fraud, attempted violations, and reneging on the plain terms of the agreements. To put it as politely as possible, the Soviets are cheats and liars and scoundrels. They have proven that through the years.

I would get angry about this treaty if it meant anything in my judgment. But it does mean something for START. And that is the point I want to emphasize. My critique of the INF Treaty in 1988 was based upon my assessment that the Soviets had engaged in negotiating deception to preserve covert INF forces, that they had falsified their declared data on the numbers of their INF missiles, and, that they had illegally retained banned INF missiles as covert forces.

In April of 1990 the Soviets finally admitted that they did covertly provide SS-23 missiles banned by the INF Treaty to three East European nations. In March 1990, I would say to my distinguished chairman, the former chief U.S. INF negotiator, Ambassador Maynard Glickman, termed this Soviet action, quote, "deceit and mendacity." And he added that this deceit and mendacity had characterized Soviet private and public behavior before, during, and after the INF Treaty negotiations.

I might say parenthetically that I wish Maynard had mentioned this deceit and mendacity when we, were conducting the INF hearings, but he did not.

President Bush in his 1991 report to Congress on Soviet noncompliance with arms control treaties called the Soviet covert deployment an act of, quote, "bad faith." If that was not the understatement of the year, I cannot think of one.

Now the administration has new evidence relating to the SS-23 deployment, but they will not release it to the public. I asked that it be made public in March, but so far nothing has happened.

Now Ambassador James Woolsey, the U.S. CFE negotiator has accused the Soviets of, quote, "fraud" in the CFE negotations. And Russian President Boris Yeltsin told us last month when he came to this Senate that Soviet negotiators had engaged in falsification and deception in arms control negotiations. So what else is new?

What else is new? START, unlike CFE, is a treaty that matters. START needs full scrutiny even though it may not be possible to ratify in time to save Mr. Gorbachev.

But in any case, Mr. Secretary, I welcome you here this morning. And the distinguished chairman and I are going to have a little colloquy with you a little later on. But we welcome you as we do always.

Senator MOYNIHAN. Mr. Chairman, before we begin, may I make one statement?

Senator BIDEN. Let me say this, it has been the practice of this committee to only have the Chair and the ranking member make opening statements. I was about to say that I do not do that in the judiciary committee.

But why do you not go ahead?

Senator MOYNIHAN. I simply wanted to acknowledge the presence in the room of our most distinguished negotiator of this treaty, Ambassador Woolsey, who serve this country so well and so diligently.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you. Some of my colleagues apparently do want to make a statement. If we could all agree to limit it to a couple of minutes, anyone who has an opening statement, go ahead, and I will probably be dethroned for this by the full chairman when we get back. But why do we not recognize Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. Senator, you may be enthroned, not dethroned.

I will be very quick. Having listened to Senator Helms, I am somewhat reluctant to assert that this treaty does mean something since it may raise his level of opposition to the treat . But I in fact think it is significant, and I want to commend the Secretary and the administration and Mr. Woolsey for having achieved this result and brought it to the committee.

Now I think Chairman Biden is correct, this treaty is not perfect. Obviously we are going to have to go over it very carefully, and conceivably there are ways that we could strengthen it, while allowing the process to move forward.

But I believe that if new security arrangements are to be developed in Europe, they require virtually as a precondition the approval of a CFE treaty. This treaty would lock in many of the changes that have taken,place which otherwise would not have such a guarantee. It provides that no party to the treaty can station forces in the territory of another country without its express consent. It thus reinforces the arrangements for the withdrawal of Soviet troops stationed in Eastern Europe.

As I recall, when President Havel spoke to the Congress last year, he said that the CFE process not only helped to get the troops out of his country, but enabled Czechoslovakia to cut back on its own forces.

This, of course, raises the further point that approval of the treaty is important to creating new economic arrangements in Europe and indeed in the United States and the Soviet Union. That is one of the great benefits we have always sought from these arms limitation agreements.

I also think that the verification provisions contained in this treaty are very important. In fact, we will be getting a degree of verification that we have never heretofore had, and that in itself is an important breakthrough not only with respect to this treaty, but also as a precedent for arms control in general.

So, Mr. Secretary, I, for one, want to indicate to you, I do think this treaty represents an important accomplishment, and I very much hope that in the coming days and weeks we will be able to move forward with its consideration.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you, Senator Sarbanes. Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that a longer statement be placed in the record at this point.

Senator BIDEN. Without objection.

Senator LUGAR. Mr. Chairman, I welcome the Secretary's views on the CFE treaty. I congratulate him, the President, our negotiators and the rest of the administration on the truly remarkable achievement.

This treaty is so favorable to the interests of the United States that I predict it must pass the Senate by a large margin. The treaty virtually eliminates any threat of a short-notice, Soviet conventional invasion of Western Europe.

It is significant again that the Soviet Union will no longer be able to dominate Europe militarily. The combined conventional forces of NATO will be greater than, as well as technologically superior to, those of the U.S.S.R. in the area from the Atlantic Ocean to the Urals.

The treaty locks in the voluntary withdrawals of Soviet forces from Europe and requires significant additional reductions and provides insurance against the reconstitution of Soviet military forces in Europe if Soviet hardliners were to come to power.

The treaty complements the INF treaty by eliminating the Soviet conventional advantage that many of my colleagues were concerned should be rectified before we eliminated INF missiles.

The treaty's verification provisions provide additional warning time of a Soviet conventional attack against Western Europe. It will deter Soviet cheating and permit us to read the Soviet military books for the area west of the Urals during an unstable and unpredictable period of change in the U.S.S.R.

But there are three major areas that I believe will become the subject of Senatorial questioning. Let me take a moment to explain what they are and why they are of concern. First of all, verification; second, the complex issues that arose after signature of the treaty and delayed its submission to the Senate; and third, senatorial prerogatives.

With respect to the first area, we are dealing with a new and different standard of verification. Unlike arms control treaties dealing with nuclear weapons, which are much more destructive, weapon-for-weapon, than tanks and artillery, our verification standard for the CFE treaty is "militarily significant Soviet cheating." We cannot verify most small scale Soviet cheating.

With respect to the second area of concern, the issues that have delayed submission of the treaty to the Senate-Article III. Soviet movement of equipment east of the Urals, and the data discrepancy-have captured my colleagues' attention since last November.

I especially commend the President for the creative, practical, but tough compromise he has crafted on article III. But I do believe the Senate will wish to devote considerable attention to the data discrepancy issue which raises important questions about our monitoring capability and possible Soviet cheating.

With respect to the third concern, one of the reasons why the Senate takes its consent responsibility so seriously is that treaties entail legal obligations under international law, and we must be certain that they are consistent with domestic law.

But while it is clear that treaties are the law of the land, it is not clear that ancillary agreements containing binding commitments are part of the law of the land. And the Senate will need clarification of this issue.

But I believe that all of these problems can be overcome with respect to the CFE treaty if high administration officials consult closely with and pay careful attention to the concerns of members of the Senate during the deliberations.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for a chance to make this statement.
[The prepared statement of Senator Lugar follows:]

I would like to congratulate the President, the Secretary and his colleagues and staff again on what they have achieved. The Treaty is an important element of a new European order and I am pleased to support it.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you, Senator. Senator Cranston.

Senator CRANSTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, it is a pleasure, as always to welcome you, particularly in light of the fact that you come to us with such a fine treaty that you and others have worked out.

The creation of few diplomatic instruments have spanned as much history in as short a time as have the CFE negotiations. The walls of oppression and fear in Eastern Europe have given way to new expressions of democratic faith-all the way to the Urals, and beyond. These changes, the new context in which they have taken place, make this treaty as relevant today as the old order, in its time, made such an effort imperative.

I have seen a figure that I think illustrates in a rather unique way the enormous progress that this treaty will enshrine. If one includes the arms reductions that have taken place in East Germany, then the conventional weapons that will eventually be destroyed or rendered useless in Eastern Europe, under the terms of this treaty, are the equivalent of all the conventional weapons held by NATO, and that is a pretty remarkable accomplishment.

The changed atmosphere amongst those who were once our enemies and our technical national means and onsite inspect capabilities, make this treaty a very wise investment, politically and diplomatically, for the United States.

You, Mr. Secretary, and other members of the administration deserve high praise for this achievement, and so does President Gorbachev -- a fact, I am sure you will remember, as you consider what help the United States might offer to Soviet reformers in the upcoming G-7 talks and thereafter.

This treaty is a tribute to the pragmatism and goodwill of President Gorbachev and the reformers, inside and outside the Kremlin, who have helped sustain these important gains even in very difficult times for them. This treat is not just in our interest. It is in the Soviet interest as well.

I look forward, Mr. Secretary, to working closely with you on closing this excellent deal for American foreign policy and security interests.

I hope you will soon be back with us with a START treaty in your hands. I look forward beyond that to even more post CFE accords in the conventional area and elsewhere, as we work to bring new ideas of peaceful coexistence to the old continent.

I look forward to those days ahead.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much. Senator Pressler.

Senator PRESSLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to congratulate the Secretary on this fine piece of work. I know the process of negotiation has been long and hard, and I know that Jim Woolsey and others have done a great job.

To summarize, I hope that the ratification of this treaty will start us down the road, which it will, to significantly reducing our troop levels in Europe. I recall that several years ago, Congressional Quarterly picked one of my amendments as one of the 10 key Senate votes of the year. That amendment was an effort to reduce our troop levels in Europe.

I know that this has been a controversial subject, but it seems as though the weight of the bureaucracy in Washington is to keep our troop levels very high or as high as possible in Europe. The European countries are very wealthy.

They have reached a point where Europe can defend Europe in my judgment, and I mention this only to underscore the fact that I have been a strong supporter of reducing U.S.-European troop commitments. This CFE effort today, and the ones to follow, should help us get to the point where our wealthy European allies do a better job of defending themselves. With the base closure commission, we are closing bases in the United State, but that commission does not cover overseas bases.

And a lot of taxpayers are asking, if we must have those troops, why not relocate them to our own country, where they would stimulate our economy or be ready if we need them.

So I thank the Secretary and I look forward to this hearing.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much. Senator Simon.

Senator SIMON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to join in commending you, Mr. Secretary as well as the President and Ambassador Woolsey and everyone involved. It is hard to realize, just a few years ago, we were worried about a confrontation that might literally destroy civilization and how dramatically we have moved away from that.

And what this entails is not only a lot of detail, some of which I do not begin to understand in terms of equipment, but it also is a general message to the nations of the world: let us solve problems in a nonmilitary way, and that seems to be to be a very, very sound message, and I hope it is a message that is heard in Yugoslavia today and elsewhere where the question people are asking is whether we are going to solve the problems in a military way.

I would add that I hope that beyond this and beyond START, that we would also seriously take up the question of whether or not we should not take up an earlier Soviet offer to stop all nuclear warhead testing. I think the time has arrived when we can not only safely do it, but increase the safety of the world by moving in that direction.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much. Senator McConnell.

Senator MCCONNELL. Mr. Chairman, I too want to congratulate the Secretary, but I am anxious to hear from him. So consequently, I will insert my statement in the record.

[The prepared statement of Senator McConnell follows:]

With the end of the cold war, the CFE Treaty limits the possibility of a world theater of combat in Europe. It enjoys broad bipartisan support in the Senate, and I look forward to hearing Secretary Baker's testimony.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very, very much, Senator McConnell. Senator Moynihan.

Senator MOYNIHAN. I would like once more to acknowledge and welcome the presence of our genuinely distinguished negotiator, Ambassador Woolsey.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Woolsey, would you please stand? [Laughter.]

Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. Senator Brown.

Senator BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would simply like to note that the very distinguished Secretary of State that is before us today has participated in a historic change in public policy. This Nation in the 1960's and 1970's thought the way to deal with the Soviets, at least at times, would involve unilateral concessions and at times, not standing behind the brave men and women that represent this country in times of combat.

And so we went through a painful period of experimenting with unilateral disarmament or aspects of it and a period of backing our and not supporting the people who put their very lives on the line to represent this country.

The Secretary has played a critical role and an important role in a change of policies in the 1980's and now the 1990's, that suggest that the way to deal with the world is to insist that disarmament should be mutual, not unilateral, and that the men and women who represent this country deserve to have the Nation stand behind them when they are in combat.

The results speak louder than any political rhetoric ever could. What has come is a historic and landmark disarmament that is mutual and a resolution on the battlefield that has renewed America's pride in itself and in the men and women who represent it.

Mr. Secretary, I salute you not only for this great achievement that is before us today but the integral role you played in changing American policy from a policy of unilateral disarmament to one that insisted it had to be mutual, from a policy change that instead of bringing defeat and disgrace to this Nation, has brought it, I think, a very advantageous disarmament that reduces tensions in the world.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much, Senator. Senator Wofford.

Senator WOFFORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, you have played a significant part in the new process that must take us all the way to peace and the nuclear strategy for peace.

You walk in the shoes of a secretary of state from the State I originally came from, Tennessee, who led us, Cordell Hull, into the process of reciprocal trade. This is a process of reciprocal peace. It will be a long journey.

This is a very important step, and to all of those who have been part of this process here with you and those have joined with you from other countries, to proceed on that long journey to the next step: test bans and strategy for nuclear peace, that makes full use of this opportunity that we have in the world today.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much, Senator. We have almost ended our long journeys, Mr. Secretary. Senator Kerry.

Senator KERRY. I would ask unanimous consent my full statement be placed in the record.

Let, me just very quickly say, as I am sure my colleagues have said, Mr. Secretary, you and the President and the administration deserve gratitude and the respect of people all over the face of this planet for this accomplishment, and I think that for a long time, ever since World War II, we have spent trillions upon trillions of tax dollars in both blocs to build ever more sophisticated weapons, and for a long time we just dreamt about the possibility of even putting a cap on it, let alone reducing it.

I think the fact that we are now in an extraordinary moment when there is such a significant reduction-asymmetrical reductions, where NATO will be effectively in a stronger position, I think-and you have accomplished this, is really a remarkable accomplishment. It is a first step. I think we all recognize that. There is more to be done.

I am sure colleagues will have questions, as we all will, on the verification issue, as well as oh the questions that arose regarding data and transfers and the difficulties before you, but I also congratulate you and the President for the tough stand you took with respect to those difficulties, and I think that we are better off for it.

So, Mr. Secretary, I think this is obviously an historic moment of huge import, and the world looks to see how we can take advantage of this and further codify the extraordinary changes that have taken place in Europe as well as the rest of the world, and I congratulate you.

[The prepared statement of Senator Kerry follows:]

I look forward to the committee's consideration, to the Senate's action, and to the ratification of this very significant and welcome step toward a safer world.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much, Senator. Mr. Secretary.

Secretary BAKER. Mr. Chairman, I should start by thanking you and the members of the committee for those very generous comments and tell you that I am really honored to appear before you today to present the case for ratification of this treaty. Your constitutionally mandated role in the ratification process is critical, of course, to the protection of the interests of America all around the world, and so the administration asks that you weigh the merits of this treaty carefully with due regard for our long-term strategic political and economic interests.

Having said that, let me interject here that we think this is a darn good treaty, and we think, as many of you have already pointed out, that it very well serves our strategic political and economic interests, and I hope, Mr. Chairman, when you and the members of the committee have finished questioning all of us in the administration, not just the Secretary of State but our legal and technical experts as well, that you will find this treaty worthy of ratification.

It is a legally-binding commitment entered into by Europe's major military and political powers, and as such it can help protect America's national security and help protect it for decades to come.

It marks, in my view, Mr. Chairman, a fundamental shift away from the cold war to a Europe which is whole and free. Not only is it an essential foundation for the new Europe, but I think it will serve as a bulwark against a return to cold war dangers and to cold war animosities.

Not only does this treaty alter the shape of military confrontation in Europe and I think one of you alluded to this-it does, indeed, lock in more stable and predictable security relations in Europe and thereby fosters a political and military environment that is essential to healing old divisions and to safeguarding the new democracies of Europe.

To understand the importance of this treaty, I think we might step back to the world before 1989. I think Senator Simon, among others, alluded to this, to the cold war world that a ratified and fully implemented CFE treaty can help us lock away for ever.

If you remember, the concerns we had then included the massive preponderance of Soviet offensive forces which were capable of an overwhelming attack on Western Europe, the danger of a short-warning blitzkrieg-type offensive that was created by military secrecy, and was enhanced by the closed societies of the Central and Eastern European States, the political weight of Soviet occupation forces in Central and Eastern Europe which burdened the prospects for reform, and the economic cost of defending against the threat.

We worked very long and hard for a long period of time to deal with these concerns through the mutual and balanced force reduction talks. You will all remember that those talks led to a complete stalemate for over 15 years. Even relatively modest reductions of forces in Central Europe eluded our negotiators.

Then in December 1988, just months before the CFE negotiations were scheduled to begin, President Gorbachev announced what were then viewed as very dramatic unilateral force cuts, yet these cuts, even when implemented, would have left the Warsaw Pact with a 2 to 1 advantage in key capabilities, and the main point, I think, is that these cuts were far from irreversible.

Gorbachev's announcement, however, did serve as a catalyst to the CFE negotiations, setting a more hopeful environment for those negotiations. NATO moved forward promptly with proposals that would allow everyone in Europe to be more secure, including, I would submit, the Soviet Union.

We and our allies were determined to reduce sharply the massive forward deployments of Soviet forces, it being our hope that this would diminish the Warsaw Pact's potential to launch a short-warning attack. It would foster the prospects for political change in Central and Eastern Europe, and it would lessen the burden of defense through stability at lower levels of forces.

The CFE treaty helps turn what were those fond hopes into realities, and let me briefly explain that. Strategically, the treaty codifies a radically new European security environment. It provides a strong foundation for future European security negotiations.

The CFE requires the destruction and the limitation of key offensive weapons, thereby locking in a new basis for strategic stability in Europe. It also introduces what is the most extensive and intrusive verification regime ever adopted by an arms control treaty, locking in increased openness and increased predictability.

The treaty will codify stability by eliminating many thousands of pieces of military equipment, primarily through destruction, subject to notification and to observation. It will codify stability by reducing and limiting five categories of armaments-tanks, artillery, armored combat vehicles, attack helicopters, and combat aircraft -- those being the most suited to the conduct of offensive military operations.

It limits any one State from possessing more than roughly one-third of the total treaty-limited equipment in the area, thereby restricting the potential for any one State to achieve military and political hegemony on the continent of Europe. It limits equipment in active units and requires that other ground forces equipment under the overall ceilings be held in certain designated storage areas.

It creates an interlocking system of geographical limitations on the size of military forces, thereby constraining force concentrations and ensuring balances not only in Central Europe but on the flanks of Central Europe as well.

The treaty will also codify predictability and openness, and they will do so by the extremely intrusive verification regime that I just mentioned. In conjunction with our national intelligence means, this will virtually eliminate the possibility of militarily significant clandestine build-ups.

This regime includes exchanges of detailed information it includes openness requirements, and several forms of onsite inspections to complement national technical means. Military installations of all 22 signatory States in the Atlantic to the Urals zone will be subject to mandatory inspections, and challenge inspections will be possible at any suspect site.

In addition, the treaty provides for the establishment of a joint consultative group designed to address any questions relating to compliance or interpretation and to consider measures to enhance the effectiveness and the viability of the treaty.

Politically, the treaty helps lock in the removal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe. The treaty reinforces the sovereignty of those emerging democracies. It provides that no State party to CFE may station forces on the territory of another State party without the express consent of that State.

Reinforcing the bilateral accords that called for the elimination of all stationed Soviet troops, the treaty assures that any Soviet military deployments in Europe without the consent of the host country would also violate the treaty, and President Havel said in his address to Congress last year, as one of you has already alluded to, the CFE process not only facilitated the removal of Soviet forces from his country, but it also created the conditions for the reduction of Czechoslovakia's own national armed forces.

In each of these ways, Mr. Chairman, CFE helps to safeguard the security and independence of the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe.

Economically, CFE allows us to maintain deterrence at much lower levels of forces-Senator Pressler has already mentioned this-allowing for reductions in the resources that we devote to Europe's defense.

It also allows the Soviets to turn new thinking into new policy, and to convert their defense resources to civilian uses, something we have been talking to the Soviets about-specifically, something we will be talking to them about in London at the economic summit there this weekend and early next week-and it will permit them to convert defense resources to civilian use by defining security through a negotiated and legally binding regime rather than through the threat of a massive use of force.

Above all, legally, Mr. Chairman, CFE locks in these unprecedented strategic political and economic facts through a treaty that we submit to you is legally binding, and one that has been agreed to by all of the major military powers in Europe.

It is true, some of these facts could have come about-Senator Helms has made this point-through unilateral steps taken by various States, and some, indeed, have already come about through unnatural steps. But any unilateral action, Mr. Chairman-and this is the key to this criticism of this treaty-can be unilaterally reversed, and that is why we worked so hard to get a multilateral, legally binding and effectively verifiable agreement.

Given the continuing uncertainties that we see in the Soviet Union, this treaty's contribution as a bulwark against any return to cold war military confrontation I hope will weigh very heavily in your considerations. As the President has made abundantly clear, we support perestroika and the new thinking, and we are actively working toward their success.

But as I said in San Francisco almost 2 years ago:

Any uncertainty about the fate of reform in the Soviet Union is all the more reason, not less, for us to seize the opportunities presented at the present. For the works of our labor-a diminished Soviet threat and effectively verifiable agreements-can endure even if perestroika does not endure.

If the Soviets have already destroyed weapons, it will be difficult, it will be costly, and it will be time consuming for any future Kremlin leadership to reverse the process and try to assert military superiority, and with agreements in place, any attempt to break out of treaties will serve as an indicator of an outbreak of the old thinking.

Those words from 2 years ago, Mr. Chairman, I would submit to you, are just as true today, and that is why we ask you to give your consent to the ratification of this treaty.

Many of you have mentioned your concern about resolution of the so-called article III question, so let me devote a brief bit of time to that before we get to the questions and answers.

Shortly after the treaty was signed last November, the Soviets came to us with an assertion of the right to apply treaty counting rules in a way that we felt was at odds with the text, was at odds with the negotiating record, and was at odds with the views of the other 21 participants to this negotiation.

Most importantly, the Soviets claimed that equipment and units subordinate to the Navy were not accountable under various CFE limitations, despite the fact that this equipment fell within the treaty's scope of coverage. By that, I mean it met the definition for treaty-limited equipment and was permanently based on land within the CFE area of application.

The President made clear that this problem would have to be rectified before we would even send the treaty up here to the Senate for advice and consent, and you will recall, Mr. Chairman, we had an exchange on that during the course of one of my recent appearances before the committee.

There were other treaty-related problems as well. During the final months of the negotiations, it became clear that the Soviets had moved tens of thousands of pieces of equipment East of the Urals, where they are not subject to the treaty's provisions, and sever al of you in your opening statements have referred to this matter as well.

Last, there were questions about the accuracy of Soviet data on their holdings of equipment in the Atlantic-to-the-Urals zone of coverage, and Senator Lugar has referred to that. After months-many months of bilateral United States-Soviet discussions and high-level communications, after activities in the Joint Consultative Group and a number of bilateral exchanges between Moscow and several other participants, we produced a package that we would submit to you, Mr. Chairman, preserves the integrity the inviolability of this treaty.

In a separate, legally-binding statement, the Soviet Government committed itself to a number of undertakings to reduce and limit naval infantry and coastal defense forces that will effectively bring them into compliance with treaty ceilings and other key provisions. While separate from the treaty, the preamble of the Soviet statement explicitly notes these undertakings are designed to promote implementation of the treaty.

This statement also affirms the comprehensive nature of the CFX counting rules. That is, that all equipment in treaty-limited categories in the zone of application is covered by the limitations of the treaty except as provided for in the treaty and associated documents. We think that this solution will reduce the likelihood of similar disputes in the future.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, this statement resolves another area of dispute by specifying that armored personnel carriers in strategic rocket forces, as with similar vehicles involved in analogous internal security functions, do not count against treaty ceilings. The Soviets are proscribed from increasing their holdings of such vehicles in the strategic rocket forces and from providing any other types of treaty-limited equipment to these forces.

In addition, the Soviets undertook several political commitments concerning equipment East of the Urals. They will destroy or convert by 1995 at least 14,500 pieces in an open and observable fashion. They also pledged not to use the withdrawn equipment to create a strategic reserve force. These assurances satisfy our major concerns about the disposition and possible future use of this equipment.

The information to be provided by the Soviets and the actions they have pledged to undertake will facilitate effective monitoring by national technical means of that equipment, that is, the equipment East of the Urals.

Discrepancies between our estimates and the Soviet data provided at signature have been narrowed considerably as a result of further analysis and information, including data which has been provided to us by the Soviets.

Remaining questions are going to be fully explored, Mr. Chairman, in the Joint Consultative Group, or through other channels. In our view, none of these data issues warrant any delay in acting on this treaty.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, let me simply say this. In 1989, Europe underwent a political earthquake. We saw there an eruption of democratic values that changed the political map of the continent. Now we are working with the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe and with a reforming Soviet Union to ensure that democracy continues to flourish from the Atlantic to the Urals.

One of the surest ways, in our view, to do that, is to ratify this treaty and then move forward with its implementation, because, Mr. Chairman, this treaty can be an enduring pact of mutual advantage. It can be a treaty in which all Europeans and Americans find their interests advanced, and in so doing CFE can reduce the uncertainties of the future by helping make certain that the military map of Europe reflects our fundamental interest.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Baker follows:]

Thank you.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Secretary, I should note for everyone that although you are a most important witness, we will give Ambassador Woolsey an opportunity to testify before us and the Joint Chiefs as well, and the Secretary of Defense and the intelligence community. So although we have many, many questions, we will not attempt to direct all of them to you, nor do we need to direct all of them to you today.

I would also indicate, particularly for those who may be watching this on television, that we have said all these nice things about the treaty and your efforts and I suspect what you are going to hear now are a number of questions on areas where we have concerns about the treaty. This may be confusing to people. If you dwelled on what was good about the treaty, we could spend view, the next several days alone talking about it.

It is, in my opinion, overwhelmingly favorable to the United States and clearly and overwhelmingly in U.S. interest to ratify. But there are, and I suspect most of us will be focusing on, those portions of the treaty where there are ambiguities or where we think there may be some difficulty. I know you are aware of that.

But I know there are a number of people in here who are watching this proceeding and who may wonder what it is we're talking about. We just said all those nice things about that treaty and now we are going to spend all our time asking questions that seem in conflict with that notion.

But before we begin the questioning, there are two housekeeping matters that Senator Helms and I are obliged to take care of. And I would like, Mr. Secretary, to ask your cooperation on both of these.

The first item concerns the significance this committee and the Senate at large should attach to the testimony of administration officials. In that regard I would like to ask you several simple questions.

When you and other key officials, such as Secretary Cheney, testify before this committee on the CFE Treaty, can we assume that you are speaking for the executive branch?

Secretary BAKER. Yes.

Senator BIDEN. And when you and other authoritative officials testify on this treaty and explain it to us, do you believe that your testimony is contributing to, to use the term of art, a shared understanding between the executive and the Senate as to the meaning of the treaty and the way the United States will interpret that treaty?

Secretary BAKER. Mr. Chairman, let me, having said that it is my view that the testimony of Cabinet officials is testimony for and on behalf of the administration, let me say that I do not think I ought to pronounce on specific legal questions. We are going to provide you with legal witnesses. But I think maybe I can help you by elaborating on my yes answer to you.

First of all, let me say that obviously my testimony and that of the Cabinet officials you mentioned, and for that matter I think other executive branch witnesses, within their authorized scope, I should say perhaps within the authorized scope of each of us, is authoritative. And you can and should treat it as authoritative. The testimony and materials that we submit for the record here can, I think, be considered as authoritative by you without any need for you to incorporate them in your resolution of advice and consent, if that is what you are asking me.

The administration does not intend to depart from the interpretations of the CFE Treaty that we are presenting to the Senate. I hope that answers your question.

Senator BIDEN. It does.

And so this does not seem cryptic to those who may be listening, we have met with a mild dilemma here. This is an extremely complicated treaty. By definition it is complicated when 23 nations get together and try to deal with such a complicated subject.

And what Senator Helms and I want to ensure, or as I should speak only for myself, what I want to make sure of is that we do not, as a consequence of not going through every single line in this treaty with you, leave the Senate open to the assertion at a later date that, notwithstanding the fact that we accepted the assertions made by the administration officials as to what the treaty provisions meant, have a situation whereby the Senate consented to something different than it thought it did because we should have gone back and taken every line where there was any possible ambiguity and attached a Senate understanding to that line.

And so, as you know, the phrase shared understanding is a term of art which is used for the purpose of us being able to rely on the interpretation given by you and other authoritative administration officials that the treaty means what you say it does so that when we consent, we are consenting to the treaty according to the administration's definition of it.

And that is the purpose of this. I just want to make sure that you would agree with the opening premise that if you speak and the committee does not take issue with your statement, then the statement contributes substantively to our shared understanding.

Secretary BAKER. Let me say with respect to the question of the term of art that was embraced in your second question, Mr. Chairman, shared understanding, it would be my hope that my testimony and the testimony of other executive branch witnesses will contribute to a shared understanding. Whether or not the committee chooses to comment on any particular point or not, is up to the committee.

On the other hand, as I indicated earlier, I would prefer not to attempt to pronounce on the legal affect of complicated hypothetical scenarios because I cannot.

I will say that we will be up here giving you our best understanding of the meaning of treaty provisions, taking into account the negotiating history of those provisions.

Our testimony can be accepted by the Senate as authoritative. And I would hope that it would contribute to a shared understanding, as I have just mentioned. I hope that answers your question.

Senator BIDEN. It almost does.

Let me just say that possibly before this process is over we would have to hear from the legal office of the Secretary of State because otherwise we find ourselves in the position that it might be necessary for this committee to have the entire negotiating record and for us to examine the negotiating record in detail prior to any movement on the part of the Senate to agree to ratification of this treaty.

And I would hope that is not what is necessary and that we are able to constitutionally and technically rely upon your assertions as to what the treaty means unless it is apparent on the face of the treaty that it does not mean what you have previously asserted.

Secretary BAKER. Let me try one more time and see if this pushes the envelope a little further, Mr. Chairman.

It would be our hope that the Senate will act on the assumption that it can rely on administration witnesses to interpret the treaty and it will rely upon the administration to interpret the treaty in accordance with the testimony of the administration witnesses.

That is certainly our intention.

I cannot pass on the legal consequences of certain hypothetical scenarios as I think would have been required in a fuller response to your second question.

Senator BIDEN. I thank you.

I yield to my colleague, Senator Helms.

Senator HELMS. You use the word best understanding. I am sure that is correct.

But can we rely on all of you from now on to give us full answers? We ran into this on the INF hearings. And now it is coming to light and has been coming to light that we were not told any falsehoods, but we were not told all of the story. I mentioned a couple of those examples in my opening statement.

Let me try to summarize my understanding of what has been said here. If the treaty text and your presentation of the treaty's meaning are clear and mutually consistent, then can we expect the executive branch to act in accordance with that interpretation even if the Senate does not explicitly state in the resolution of ratification that we are relying upon you to do so?

Secretary BAKER. I would rather answer that question for the record, Senator Helms. Let me take it and confer with the lawyers, I will be happy to answer that.

[The information referred to follows:]

Yes. The administration will in no way depart from the interpretations of the CFE Treaty that we are presenting to the Senate.

Senator HELMS. I understand why you want to do that because it is a heavy question.

Now let us turn to the second housekeeping question which relates to the relationship between this committee and the administration on the matter of information sharing and consultation as we head into a period of considerable arms control activity.

With the CFE Treaty now before us and Soviet and U.S. negotiators working even as we speak to try to finalize the START Treaty, there is a great deal on the agenda. In my view, and I know Senator Biden shares it, it is simply imperative, Mr. Secretary, if this administration expects to work closely with the committee of jurisdiction on arms control matters that the administration share with this committee the same information that is being conveyed on a routine basis to other entities in the Senate.

Let me be specific. I am referring to information being transmitted to the Senate on a regular basis by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, but not to the Foreign Relations Committee. Perhaps you are not even aware of this anomaly.

But I am confident, Mr. Secretary, that Senator Biden and I speak for this entire committee in saying to you quite firmly that this anomaly should be corrected without any delay if there is to be a sound basis for a constructive interaction on this and forthcoming treaties.

Before I ask for your response, Senator Biden indicated that he might wish to comment.

Senator BIDEN. I would concur with Senator Helms both in his suggestion that this is an unacceptable situation and in his supposition that you may not even know about it, Mr. Secretary.

But may we have your assurance that this committee will receive, under all the same strictures regarding the handling of classified information, the same data and reports being supplied to others in the Senate?

Secretary BAKER. Let me answer both of you by saying that our job and particularly my job is to keep this committee informed of arms control developments. That is and should be a priority for us. I am not familiar with exactly what you are referring to.

But if you let me know what it is that you are talking about and you are lacking some material, I am sure we can try and work something out. Let me see what it is, see what the problem is. I cannot answer this in a vacuum.

Is this something that has gone to the Arms Control Observer Group?

Senator BIDEN. That is right, the Arms Control Observer Group has staff to go and get information that this committee is not able to get through the same means.

Secretary BAKER. And they will not share it with you?

Senator BIDEN. We are not looking to be shared with, we are the outfit that decides whether or not we recommend that the treaty be ratified.

As we go into the negotiation on the START Treaty we are going to have to wait in line and determine whether or not we think we have all of the information.

It is real simple. I am supposed to dance around that subject, Mr. Secretary, but I am not a very good dancer. And so that is it, straight and simple.

Secretary BAKER. Let me reflect, Senator, as I know you are aware and the thrust of your question even, I think presupposes this, that it is not material that has come to the Arms Control Observer Group from the Department of State. And so let us look at it and take my statement that I made about supplying this committee of jurisdiction with information as a priority at face, if you will. And let me see what the situation is or what the problem is.

[The information referred to follows:]

I will take whatever steps are necessary to ensure that the anomaly will be corrected and that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, as the committee of jurisdiction over these treaties, receives on a regular basis all information relative to these treaties that the executive branch is sharing with any other entities. I understand that Ambassador Lehman has already taken steps to satisfy the committee.

Senator BIDEN. It will be very helpful. And I assure you we will both follow-up with you on both of those issues.

Now I know the time is short and I apologize to my colleagues for going through what I characterize as housekeeping, but quite frankly, unless we know the ground rules upon which we are beginning these discussions on this significant arms control agreement, as well as the one that hopefully will be coming our way soon, I think we may otherwise have wasted a lot of time.

Let me begin the questioning and shorten my questions to give my colleagues some more time.

Mr. Secretary, as I said, obviously part of the focus here is going to be on the things we are more skeptical about and not the things we think are great about the treaty.

I mentioned to you earlier the issue of the withdrawal of 75,000 pieces of equipment, artillery, tanks, armored combat vehicles that are east of the Ural Mountains. And we all know this occurred. It is not a violation in the sense that it occurred for a whole range of reasons, partly as a result of unilateral reductions, partly due to bilateral agreements with Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Germany and with also, apparently, and partly by the defense establishment of the Soviet Union wanting to get these pieces of equipment out of harm's way. But for whatever reason, they sit there.

And you have negotiated a political understanding with the Soviets that says that they must destroy 25 percent of them and the remaining 75 percent they cannot put in any position that would be of any threat to us, to oversimplify the situation.

My question is, would their inability to keep this political pledge constitute a circumvention of the treaty as proscribed by article 14? And could it thereby warrant withdrawal from the treaty on the part of the United States?

I said 14, I meant 19. I had better start wearing these glasses all the time.

Secretary BAKER. Say it again, Senator.

Senator BIDEN. Could Soviet actions in violation of this solemn political pledge that they made, could it constitute a circumvention of the treaty as proscribed by article XIX and could it thereby warrant U.S. withdrawal the treaty?

Secretary BAKER. I think that we have withdrawal rights that are perhaps a bit broader than just for reasons of circumvention of the treaty. We attach a great deal of importance to this political statement and we expect when we take a political statement, that it will be complied with.

And you are asking though the specific legal question, and I am not absolutely certain. [Pause.]

I was right, Senator. We would have the right under our national security withdrawal rights. If it was a substantial violation of a major political commitment, we could pull out.

Senator BIDEN. Maybe I was not clear enough. I understand that. The question is would you? I mean, you clearly could.

Secretary BAKER. That is very Hypothetical. I would have to know, before we recommend to the President that we withdraw from a treaty that is so favorable to us as this one, the exact scope and extent of the failure to observe the political commitment.

Suppose they did not destroy 1 APC, would we pull out? No.

Senator BIDEN. If there was a gross disregard?

Secretary BAKER. Where do you draw the line, Senator? Is that 52 tanks? Is that 70 artillery pieces?

Senator BIDEN. I assumed that would be your answer, and that is why I have drafted a condition that would formalize to a greater extent that political condition. I will not introduce it prior to going into some great detail with you and your people privately.

I will not take your time with that now, but I would just ask you whether or not you would be willing, I would hope you would be willing to spend some time, to determine whether or not you would accept consent on a condition that would not require renegotiation, that would more clearly formalize the political commitment made by the Soviet Union on this issue.

Secretary BAKER. It is very difficult to answer that question. It is purely hypothetical because. you really have to look at the situation prevailing at the time. You have to know the degree and extent to which the political commitment had not been carried through on.

Let me just say, generally speaking, with respect to conditions-whether it is a category one or otherwise-I would hope we could move forward with the ratification of this treaty without the imposition of conditions, because I really think it is a good treaty.

It is very favorable to the United States and we do not think that conditions are prudent or necessary. But get through the hearing process, talk to the experts, both the experts on substance and the legal experts and if you still have a problem, we are prepared to sit down and try and work through it with you.

I just think it will be very difficult to draw an arbitrary line, and we may be better served by not trying to draw an arbitrary line. We do have this national security grounds provision for termination any treaty.

Senator BIDEN. That is correct, we do. I have drafted two such conditions, one pertaining to the article III issue as well, and I will be giving you copies of that and asking you to speak about it, because quite frankly, I think you are going to find that you will be confronted with that issue one way or another, and I would hope that we could do it in a way that the administration would find to be consistent with and supportive of its intentions.

Now, Mr. Secretary, there are a whole range of additional questions I have. Your time is limited at this point, and I am going to have an opportunity to spent a lot of time with your colleagues in the administration.

But let me just ask one broad question relating to American defense policy overall. What is the likelihood of there being a CFE 2 treaty?

Secretary BAKER. In the future--

Senator BIDEN. Cuts in equipment?

Secretary BAKER. I think probably not, Senator, because the pace and scope of political events are such that I think they might outstrip CFE 2 by the time you got to it. But you will see a CFE-1A, which will be devoted to questions involving manpower in Europe and will be devoted to the development of an aerial inspection regime. Both of these things are called for in the CFE Treat.

So there will be a follow-on negotiation. It will not be CFE 2, in the sense that it will be limiting and eliminating equipment. It will deal with manpower and it will deal with an aerial inspection regime.

Senator BIDEN. Well, as I said, I have many questions. I am taking too much of my colleagues' time, but let me just conclude by saying that I would hope the administration, at some point in the near future, would be willing to share with. us the impact this treaty has on its judgment as to how many forces, an issue our friend from South Dakota has raised, how many U.S. forces are required in Western Europe?

And what impact this has on our strategic requirements, beyond what is being negotiated in the START agreement now, including what impact it has on the SIOP, but, we will have plenty of time to talk about that.

Secretary BAKER. Yes, sir. Let me say only, that this-particularly with respect to CFE-lA-that these are matters that we are looking at and are engaged in, and there will be a follow-on negotiation, characterized as CFE-1A dealing with manpower and aerial inspection.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you.

The yellow light is on and I yield to my colleague from North Carolina.

Senator HELMS. Let me try to be brief too because others want to ask questions and I will file some in writing.

I was particularly intrigued with your very brief statement regarding the Soviet's armored personnel carriers and strategic rocket forces. This was a sticking point right at the end of the negotiations, is that not right?

Secretary BAKER. Well, both of those were part of the article III controversy, yes, Sir.

Senator HELMS. The Soviets, did they not, demanded to be authorized to deploy 500 extra personnel carriers in the Baltics? That is right, is it not?

Secretary BAKER. Demand the right to deploy 500 extra personnel carriers in the Baltics? I do not think so. Let me ask the negotiator. [Pause.]

Ambassador Woolsey tells me that there was during the course of the negotiations a request from them to this effect, to which we did not accede, and they did not insist, so that was not agreed to. Senator HELMS. Now, my understanding, and I hope my understanding is incorrect, that a "compromise" was accepted, namely that the Soviets could have an extra 1,500, not 500, 1,500 personnel carriers for deployment all around their strategic rocket forces. Now, some of the strategic rocket forces are deployed in the Baltics. Do you see what I am getting at? They want to use this weaponry and these weapon carriers to suppress the people we ought to be supporting.

Does this mean that the Soviets got more than their original request for 500 personnel carriers, to suppress freedom in the Baltics?

Secretary BAKER. I do not think that is the proper interpretation, Senator. Let me say that under the solution that we worked out to the article III problem, first of all, none of the treaty ceilings are going to be exceeded, including those for armored personnel carriers.

In the statement of June 14 which laid out the solution to the article III problem, that is, the Soviet statement, they pledged to reduce another 1,725 armored combat vehicles which brought them down to the treaty permitted level.

But we agreed that they could do this through a combination of destruction, conversion for nonmilitary use, and the internal modification of a certain type of armored personnel carrier, called the MTLB, in a manner specified in the treaty, to reduce its troop-carrying capacity.

But that method of eliminating armored personnel carriers from the accounting requirements of the treaty was already in the treaty and it was not a part of the article III dispute.

We also agreed that the Soviets would not have to count against the treaty ceilings the armored personnel carriers in their strategic rocket forces, and we did that because these APC's are used for security at their missile installations.

So that is the best way I know to answer your question: to lay out here what was actually agreed to.

Senator HELMS. I want to know about the Baltics. Did anybody think about the use of the personnel carriers and other things to put down these people yearning for freedom in the Baltics? That is my question, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary BAKER. Well, I think that there was a lot of thought given throughout the negotiation of this treaty, Senator Helms, to getting this equipment removed from the zone, whether it was through removal or destruction. We wanted to reduce the size of the Soviet armed forces that represented a threat to Western Europe.

The goal and purpose of CFE was, as I stated in my opening remarks, to eliminate the threat of conventional, overwhelming conventional forces, directed against Western Europe.

It was not intended to deal with what they would consider, and we would not, internal security matters within the Soviet Union. That is the best way I know to answer your question.

Senator HELMS. I hope that there is a little more to it than that, Mr. Secretary, because I believe most Members of the Senate are concerned about what is going on in the Baltics. But I will leave it there.

Secretary BAKER. Well, let me say to you that we in the administration are concerned about what is going on in the Baltics, and we do not pass up any opportunity to raise this.

Senator HELMS. Well, I just did not want you to do it inadvertently. That is what I am talking about.

Now, is it fair to say that this treaty repudiates the Brezhnev doctrine under which the Soviet Union claimed the right to invade any socialist state in order to suppress counterrevolution?

Secretary BAKER. Senator, before I answer that question, let me just put, into the record a note that Ambassador Woolsey has passed me saying that very few, if any, of the strategic rocket force, APC's of the Soviet Union are deployed in the Baltics.

However, we would be pleased to get into the exact numbers with you in closed hearings. This is some information that the negotiators would have and we would be delighted to make available

Now would you repeat the question?

Senator HELMS. Yes, Sir. It is fair for me to conclude that your reading of this treaty repudiates the Brezhnev doctrine under which the Soviet Union claimed the right to invade any socialist state in order to suppress counterrevolution?

Secretary BAKER. I am not sure the treaty represents the first renunciation of that doctrine. I think that when the Soviet Union agreed to the unification of Germany as a member of the NATO alliance, when the Soviet administration and President Gorbachev and others agreed to the removal of all of their forces from Eastern and Central Europe, that these actions perhaps taken together with this treaty, clearly amount to a renunciation of that doctrine.

Senator HELMS. Very well. One final question, not really related to the treaty, but I am obliged to ask it. I am informed that on June 20, the American intelligence community issued a report accusing Communist China of engaging in a massive nuclear proliferation program with a country of concern in the Middle East. Are you aware of that?

Secretary BAKER. If I was, I would not talk about it at this hearing.

Senator HELMS That means you are not aware of it.

Secretary BAKER. That does not mean anything. That just means that this is not the place for us to discuss that subject.

Senator HELMS. Well, I might have staff pass you an envelope.

Secretary BAKER. If it relates to intelligence matters, you know I cannot discuss them in an open hearing.

Senator HELMS. The report number, Mr. Secretary, notwithstanding your feeling about it, is contained in that envelope that is being handed to you, and I hope you will look at it and we can get on a secure telephone or whatever. I would like to have your opinion about it.

Secretary BAKER. Since it obviously has to do with an intelligence matter, I would be delighted to discuss it with you under secure conditions, Senator.

Senator HELMS. Well, we are both cleared.

Secretary BAKER. I am not so sure our entire television audience and the audience behind us here are.

Senator HELMS. I said on a secure telephone, did I not?

Secretary BAKER. After you asked me the question, you said we will talk about it. After I gave you a non-answer you said we will talk about it on a secure telephone, that is right, and I am happy to do that with you, but I cannot talk about it here and I think you know that.

Senator HELMS. I did not ask you to talk about it. I asked you if you were aware of it.

Secretary BAKER. That would entail my talking about it, and you know it.

Senator BIDEN. Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, who will monitor this treaty?

Secretary BAKER. Are you referring, Senator Sarbanes, to the Joint Consultative Group?

Senator SARBANES. No. Who will ascertain that the equipment is being destroyed and that the numbers are being reduced in conformity with the timetable in the treaty, and so forth and so on?

Secretary BAKER. You are not talking about compliance disputes, you are simply talking about--

Senator SARBANES. No.

Secretary BAKER. Hang on. [Pause.]

Senator SARBANES. Mr. Secretary, I do not want to intervene in the State Department's business, but I think that if Ambassador Woolsey would come sit in the front row it would eliminate the concern of some of us that the Ambassador is going to fall over. [Laughter.]

Secretary BAKER. It is the On-Site Inspection Agency, Senator Sarbanes, that is located under the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense.

Senator SARBANES. So that is a NATO operation, I take it?

Secretary BAKER. This was a 22-nation treaty.

Senator SARBANES. But the inspections will be done through a NATO structure?

Secretary BAKER. Ambassador Woolsey tells me that this is a U.S. Agency, that we will do our inspections through this agency, the On-Site Inspection Agency, and other nations will be responsible for theirs.

Senator SARBANES. What happens if one of the Eastern European countries which was part of the Warsaw Pact during the negotiation of this treaty and during the arms reductions it mandates, later becomes a part of NATO? What happens then with these arrangements, or what conceivably could happen?

And further, does the monitoring of this treaty address the prospect of having to construct new security arrangements for Europe, one of whose principal functions will be arms control monitoring?

In other words, you have a treaty essentially concluded between the members of NATO and the member of the Warsaw Pact. You are bringing the numbers down. You have a political dynamic going on in Europe which may, in fact, lead to the dissipation of the old alliance structures. Actually, I would regard it as an advance if the monitoring of this treaty could lead toward evolving new security arrangements that were more inclusive and less related to the old confrontational approach between the two pacts.

Secretary BAKER. Senator Sarbanes, that might well happen at some point, and as you know we have had a lot of discussions about the political adaptation of the NATO alliance, and one of the things that has been discussed is a verification activity, or responsibility, but under this treaty if a question such as that arose, any country could call a conference under one of the articles of the treaty. We do not have new structures in place now, and we have to verify this agreement on the basis of the structures we now have in place.

Senator SARBANES. Is there any kind of deadline for completing ratification of this treaty, with respect to how quickly other parties will act on it, as you see it?

Secretary BAKER. Not that I am aware of. I think we are starting the process ahead of many others. For instance, I feel certain the Soviet Union has not begun the process in the full Supreme Soviet. Senator SARBANES. Does the treaty limit the ability of countries affected by it to send their arms outside of the treaty area? The treaty limits how the arms are distributed within the treaty zone. How about outside the treaty zone?

Secretary BAKER. No, there is no restriction that I am aware of with respect to, for instance, our transferring arms to an area outside the zone covered by this treaty, or any of the other nations doing the same, [Pause.]

That is correct. There are no restrictions on transfer. Ambassador Woolsey makes the point that transfers from now on w