MARCH 20; JULY 11, 16, 17 AND 25, 1991

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

WASHINGTON :1991 For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402
ISBN 0-16-036938-X

CLAIBORNE PELL, Rhode Island, Chairman
  JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware             JESSE HELMS, North Carolina
  PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland                 RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
  ALAN CRANSTON, California                  NANCY L. KASSEBAUM, Kansas
  CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut          LARRY PRESSLER, South Dakota
  JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts               FRANK H. MURKOWSKI, Alaska
  PAUL SIMON, Illinois                       MITCH MCCONNELL, Kentucky
  TERRY SANFORD, North Carolina              HANK BROWN, Colorado
  DANIEI, P. MOYNIHAN, New York              JAMES M. JEFFORDS, Vermont
  CHARLES S. ROBB, Virginia
  HARRIS WOFFORD, Pennsylvania
JAMES P. LUCISIT, Minority Staff Director
Subcommittee On European Affairs
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware, Chairman
PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland                 LARRY PRESSLER, South Dakota
PAUL SIMON, Illinois                       HANK BROWN, Colorado
Bartholomew, Reginald, Under Secretary or State for International Security     
     Affairs..............................................................    6
     Prepared statement...................................................    7
Hadley, Stephen J., Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security     
     Policy...............................................................    8
     Prepared statement...................................................    9
Lehman, Ronald F., II, Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency     4

       JULY 11, 1991

Baker, James A., III, Secretary of State..................................   39
     Prepared statement...................................................   44
Kerry, John F., U.S. Senator from Massachusetts, prepared statement.......   38
Lugar, Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, prepared statement..........   31
McConnell, Mitch, U.S. Senator from Kentucky, prepared statement..........   36

       JULY 16, 1991
Cheney, Richard B., Secretary of Defense..................................   81
Dailey, John R., Assistant Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps..................  131
Kelso, Frank B. II, Chief of Naval Operations, U.S. Navy..................  129
McConnell, Mitch, U.S. Senator from Kentucky, prepared statement..........  126
McPeak, Merrill A.. Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force........................  130
Powell, Colin L., Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.........................   85
     Prepared statement...................................................   89
Reimer, Dennis J., Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army.........................  131

       JULY 17, 1991

Kerr, Richard, Deputy Director, Central Intelligence Agency...............  145
     Prepared statement...................................................  149

       JULY 25, 1991

Galvin, John R., Commander in Chief, European Command.....................  162
     Prepared statement...................................................  165
Lehman, Ronald P., II, Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency   195
     Prepared statement...................................................  196
Lugar, Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, prepared statement..........  193
Parker, Robert W., Director, On-Site Inspection Agency, U.S. Air Force....  168
     Prepared statement...................................................  169
Woolsey, R. James, U.S. Representative to the Negotiation on Conventional      
Armed Forces in Europe....................................................  200
     Prepared statement...................................................  200


Questions Asked by Senator Biden and Responses Thereto......................  217
Questions Asked by Senator Pell and Responses Thereto......................  217
Questions Asked of Secretary Bartholomew and Responses Thereto..............  218
Questions Asked of Secretary Baker and Responses Thereto....................  219
Additional Questions Asked by Senator Biden and Responses Thereto...........  225
Questions Asked by Senator Pell for the Administration and Responses             
   Thereto..................................................................  225
Questions Asked of Ambassador Woolsey by Senator Biden and Responses             
   Thereto..................................................................  233
Questions Asked of Ambassadors Woolsey and Lehman by Senator Pell and            
   Responses Thereto........................................................  243
Questions Asked of General Parker by Senator Pell and Responses Thereto.....  250
Questions Asked of Ambassadors Lehman and Woolsey by Senator Helms and           
   Responses Thereto........................................................  253
Questions Asked of Secretary Baker by Senator Helms and Responses Thereto...  255
Questions Asked by Senator Helms and Responses Thereto......................  255
  Questions Asked of Secretary Cheney and Chairman Powell by Senator Pressler         
   and Responses Thereto....................................................  260
Questions Asked of Ambassador Woolsey by Senator Pressler and Responses          
   Thereto..................................................................  262
Questions Asked of Secretary Baker by Senator Cranston and Responses             
   Thereto..................................................................  263
Questions Asked of Secretary Baker by Senator Riegle and Responses Thereto..  264
Additional Questions Asked by Senator Helms and Responses Thereto...........  266
Questions From Senators Pell and Helms and Unclassified Responses Thereto...  270
Questions Asked of General Galvin by Senator Pell and Responses Thereto.....  290
Letter from Senator Biden to Hon. James A. Baker III........................  293
Questions for Secretary Baker from Senator BIDEN............................  293
Letter from from James A. Baker III to Senator BIDEN.......................  294
Questions Asked of Secretary Baker by Senator Biden and Responses Thereto...  295
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) by LTC Don Crawford..............  301

Letters From:
  Jonathan Dean, Union of Concerned Scientists..............................  315
  Stanley R. Resor..........................................................  318
  Harold Brown, Chairman, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced Internation-          
    al Studies..............................................................  320
  Paul C. Warnke, Clifford and Warnke.......................................  320
  Robert S. McNamara........................................................  321
  Melvin R. Laird...........................................................  321
  Frank C. Carlucci, The Carlyle Group......................................  322
  Elliot L. Richardson, Milbank, Tweed, Hadley and McCloy...................  323
  Lee Feinstein, assistant director for research, Arms Control Association..  323
  Paul K. Davis, corporate research manager, RAND...........................  327
  John Issacs, president, Council for a Livable World, and other organiza-       
    tions...................................................................  337
  Jerome Walker, senior associate, Carnegie Endowment for International         
    Peace...................................................................  338
Statement of Ambassador R. James Woolsey, Chief of the U.S. Delegation to        
  the Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe....................  344
Budgetary and Military Consequences of the CFE Treaty: An Update............  345
Dispute Over Treaty Counting Rules (Article 111) and Resolution.............  361
Statement of the Chairman of the Joint Consultative Group-Oct. 18,1991......  364
Joint Press Statement on Negotiations Between Government Delegations of          
  Ukraine and the Russian Federation-Oct. 30, 1991..........................  365
Soviet Pre-Treaty Withdrawals Beyond the Urals..............................  366


Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met at 3:05 p.m., pursuant to notice, in room S-116, the Capitol, Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr. (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. Present: Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Today, the Subcommittee on European Affairs will hear from administration representatives regarding the Status of the CFE Treaty which was signed last November and which Secretary Baker discussed with President Gorbachev over the weekend.

This committee, which will have jurisdiction over the CFE Treaty, if and when it is submitted to the Senate for advice and consent, is pleased to have with us today President Bush's first team, and the first team not only on this, but the whole subject of arms control.

Until recently, arms control was moving steadily forward. The Soviet leadership had signaled a profound commitment to arms control progress by making concession after concession in the INF Treaty, the CFE Treaty, and the START Treaty, and things looked like they were moving along pretty well.

Unfortunately it appears that this attitude is waning, at least from this Senator's perspective, on the part of the Soviets.

In recent months the Soviet leadership has refused to move in our direction or in the direction, quite frankly, that it should move, that it agreed to move. And in at least one case they have moved backward, seeking to reinterpret a key provision of the CFE Treaty. This new attitude means that Reggie Bartholomew will have to settle everything.

Mr. BARTHOLOMEW. Forgive me, I was in the next room.

Senator BIDEN. This new attitude means we face a new challenge to craft positions that uphold our principles, but still provide a more recalcitrant Soviet leadership with incentives to come to terms, lest we return to the strategic stalemate we all remember from the early 1980's.

As Secretary Baker said on Sunday, the CFE Treaty is the key to unlocking not only valuable cuts in conventional arms, but also progress on other fronts.

But here we confront the Gordian Knot. Both the Kremlin and the White House take the position that the Moscow summit should not occur until the START Treaty can be completed. Not an unreasonable position on the surface.

Meanwhile, Secretary Baker has indicated that START cannot be finished until problems with CFE are resolved. And thus, both the summit and START appear to be dependent upon progress and resolution of the CFE Treaty.

Yet, it can also be argued that only by having the summit can we cause President Gorbachev to be sufficiently seized with CFE as to overrule his military on the reinterpretation of article III.

This is a catch-22 without any humor, and the question is how do we move? Meanwhile, some members of the Senate are pushing for withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, a new phenomenon. You gentlemen know as well as anyone that the Soviet leadership regards the ABM Treaty as a central issue in our relationship.

Gorbachev himself has clearly demonstrated his commitment to the ABM Treaty and the consequences of its demise.

In any case, it is not an overstatement in my view to suggest that we are at a critical moment in U.S.-Soviet relations, indeed, a pivotal moment in history, with years of effort and the most important arms agreements ever conceived hanging in the balance at this moment.

Turning to the specific topic of this hearing, the CFE Treaty, I believe its implementation would serve American security very well in several ways.

First, politically and psychologically, it will codify the Soviet's new thinking in Europe by locking in, in a legally binding, way, a situation by which the Soviets can be held accountable for major reductions in Soviet forces and their withdrawal from Europe.

Second, it will set up a verification system, unprecedented in size and scope to permit American and European inspectors to determine what Soviet equipment has been removed or destroyed; where any permanent equipment is located; and whether any movement of forces is occurring that could signal a dangerous reversal in Soviet policy.

These institutions of verification will mean regular interaction between military officers from all the countries of Europe, a process that will not only ease tensions and head off problems, but also build a confidence that will allow arms reductions to proceed further.

Now I would imagine that the countries of Eastern Europe, members of the just disbanded Warsaw Pact, are essentially looking forward to such a system of inspection. They will be looking, not so much to the West, but to the East.

And third, the treaty will require the Soviet side to destroy many more conventional arms than would otherwise be the case. Unclassified estimates have suggested that 20,000 pieces of equipment will have to be destroyed, some 7,000 of which will be main battle tanks and the other 80,000, tanks and equipment withdrawn from Europe can never be returned because of the Soviet relocations outside the treaty area, which we did not anticipate and which did not violate the treaty.

These reductions are less than we originally hoped for, but they are significant nonetheless. Meanwhile, the treaty will require only marginal cuts in NATO's holdings, with few if any reductions in American equipment.

And finally, success in CFE will mean quicker action on START, on the reduction of nuclear arms in Europe, on further arms control efforts generally.

If these accords can be completed, then the hopes raised by the end of the cold war can be fulfilled through tangible reductions in U.S.-Soviet arms competition. But the CFE Treaty is now in jeopardy Secretary Baker has advised the President not to submit the treaty for ratification until several disputes have been resolved. But today, we hope that our witnesses will shed some light on whether the meetings in Moscow produced progress on these issues. it is my impression that all but one of the issues are now of quite a technical nature, and not important enough to warrant delaying ratification. But I want to hear if that is correct.

The Soviet Union is at this moment espousing what might be called a broad interpretation of article III of the CFE Treaty. The Soviets argue that some 3,500 pieces of equipment should be excluded from the required reductions on the grounds that they have labeled it, quote, "naval equipments."

Ironically, the Soviet claim resembles the claim made by a former State Department legal adviser when the Reagan administration sought to invent a broad interpretation of article V of the ABM Treaty.

The earlier broad interpretation was a matter of considerable dispute, not only between the United States and the Soviet Union, but also between the Senate and the administration.

But on the current matter there is no dispute within the U.S. Government. I believe it is fair to say that all Senators, at least all who are familiar with this issue, agree wholeheartedly with the administration's position, and fully and completely reject the Soviet view.

Today I hope to discuss with our witnesses the best way to resolve the problem, and I have suggested that one way to increase the pressure on President Gorbachev to overrule his military is for the Senate to approve the treaty, subject to the condition that it be implemented only with the strict interpretation of article III now accepted by all CFE signatories other than the Soviet Union.

This approach would not mean that the United States has ratified the treaty prematurely. The Senate does not ratify treaties, only the executive branch does, pursuant to Senate consent.

What it would mean is that we would equip President Bush to go to the ratification table and say, in effect, I have gained approval to ratify this treaty and would do so today or at any time you, the Soviet leadership, would agree to an interpretation acceptable to other signatories.

I would say to our witnesses and we can discuss this today, that by so doning the Senate would have strengthened President Bush's hand in this critical diplomatic task.

Through Senate support of the administration we would, I believe, help force President Gorbachev to choose, with the whole world Watching, whether he accepts the treaty or lets it die. For him this decision would be tantamount to choosing between being a responsible partner in a new Europe governed by international law or returning to the days when the Soviet Union was an outcast from the Western community of nations.

How to achieve a new Soviet position on article III of the CFE Treaty and pave the way for arms control progress on many fronts is the issue on our agenda today.

And I welcome our witnesses and ask that they proceed in any way they deem appropriate. We are pleased and flattered that you would all come up to fill us in on what is happening. I truly appreciate your efforts and your work thus far on this treaty.


Mr. LEHMAN. Perhaps I should begin. I have a short statement, I can present it, and then we can go on to Ambassador Bartholomew and Secretary Hadley.

Senator BIDEN. I should note for the record, that the absence of other people here is not for lack of interest. There is a full blown hearing going on which was scheduled for 9 a.m. this morning, and for a lot of scheduling reasons had to be changed to 2 p.m. But there is keen interest in this subject.

Mr. BARTHOLOMEW. Senator, we are glad to have you here.

Mr. LEHMAN. Hopefully, this will be a first-class discussion.

Mr. Chairman, we appreciate this opportunity to discuss with you the treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe and to bring you up to date on recent developments.

As you know, an interagency team was in Moscow last week with Secretary Baker to review fully with our Soviet counterparts the very serious, outstanding issues that have prevented us from sending the CFE Treaty forward for advice and consent to ratification.

Let me begin by stating the basic position of the Bush administration on the CFE Treaty. This treaty is very much in the interests of the United States, Canada, and all of Europe. Indeed, the CFE Treaty is an important step in our quest for greater global security.

Our objectives of establishing a secure and stable balance of conventional forces in Europe at lower levels, eliminating disparities prejudicial to stability and security, and eliminating capabilities for launching a surprise attack or a large scale offensive action will be met.

The negotiation has also played an important role in facilitating positive political developments in Europe. Thus, the administration believes that once the Soviet Union takes appropriate remedial action, the CFE Treaty should be ratified and implemented.

When the CFE Treaty enters into force, it will constitute a prominent feature of the European security landscape, one that makes a vital contribution to stability in Europe and to a security regime based on cooperation rather than confrontation.

It will also allow help us to verify, through onsite presence, the destruction of thousands of pieces of military hardware, and it will provide an underlying basis of stability, certainty, and confidence in an era of rapid change.

We believe that the Congress shares this assessment of the treaty, and we appreciate in particular the strong support of the CFE Treaty by members of this subcommittee.

We agree that the treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe will make a positive contribution to European security. I am certain we also agree however that all states who sign the treaty must comply with its provisions.
I know you are well aware of the problems that we have in this regard with the Soviet Union but let me summarize them briefly. First, the Soviet Union claims that equipment held by units such as naval infantry, and coastal defense forces as well as conventional equipment subordinate to the strategic rocket forces and to civil defense forces is excluded from treaty limits.

This claim, which is rejected by all other CFE signatories contradicts the language of the treaty and has no basis in the negotiating record. The treaty is unambiguous in this respect.

Unless it meets one of the clearly specified exceptions set forth in the treaty, all land-based equipment in the treaty limited categories counts against treaty ceilings regardless of service subordination.

Second, the Soviet data submitted at treaty signature contained inaccuracies with respect to equipment actually in the zone on the date of treaty signature. We recently received some corrections to the Soviet data which we are currently analyzing.

Third, Soviet pre-treaty withdrawal of equipment from the area of application is not a violation of CFE, although it raises concerns about the Soviet Union acting in the spirit of the negotiations.

Over the past 6 months we have sought from the Soviet Union a full accounting of equipment moved east of the Urals as well as assurances as to the ultimate disposition of this equipment.

We took these issues seriously. The administration will not forward the CFE Treaty to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification until the Soviet Union fulfills its treaty obligations.

Shortly after signature of the CFE Treaty, the 22 nations participating in CFE resumed negotiations, the so-called CFE 1A talks. Until the concerns that we have raised with the Soviet Union are satisfied however, we and our NATO allies agree that we will not continue follow-on negotiations on manpower limitations as if nothing has happened.

There will be no business as usual. Let me be clear, CFE 1A is in session. No one has walked away from these follow-on talks. Our delegation remains in Vienna, ready to push ahead whenever the Soviet Union makes that possible by resolving our current concerns.

The final plenary of this round, is scheduled for tomorrow, March 21, at which time we will once again explain to the Soviet representatives our position on the issues, and ask for satisfactory responses.

I In the absence of such responses, there will be no substantive negotiations, no working group sessions or any other negotiations on follow-on issues until our current concerns are resolved.
We have also made clear to the Soviet Union in the joint consultative group, the forum created by the CFE Treaty for dealing with treaty-related problems, that its actions with regard to article III of the treaty are unacceptable.

The joint consultative group has been in session since January 21. The originally proposed date for ending the session was extended in an attempt to resolve the outstanding questions. During this time, no other signatory to the treaty has supported the Soviet Union's argument on article III.

We have also used the joint consultative group to raise specific questions with Soviet representatives relating to our other concerns about the data they have submitted as part of the information exchange mandated by the treaty.

All of the other participants share our concerns. Many have also communicated their concerns directly to Moscow, some at the very highest levels of government. less than 1 week ago we reiterated this message to the Soviet leadership in Moscow.

Secretary Baker forcefully urged the Soviet Union to act to resolve the outstanding problems. The ball is squarely in the Soviet Union's court. It is time for the Soviet Union to act so that the ratification and implementation process can go forward.

I conclude, Mr. Chairman, where I began, the treaty on conventional forces in Europe represents a solid foundation on which to build a more stable, more cooperative European security structure.
The administration wants to implement the treaty as soon as possible, and we want to build on the treaty with additional agreements to further strengthen security and stability.

We will achieve the outcome we all desire only by remaining firm in dealing with the Soviet Union, and that will be possible only if we remain together in the alliance and here at home.

Congressional support for our position is very important. We appreciate the support we have already received from you and your colleagues. By staying together we will send Moscow a clear message: The Soviet Union must act responsibly and in full compliance with its obligations. When it does, we can move forward. Thank you.


Mr. BARTHOLOMEW. Mr. Chairman, I have a prepared statement, but perhaps you will just let me make a few remarks.

Senator BIDEN. Sure, anyway you want to proceed. None of my colleagues are present so I do not have to yield to anyone.

Mr. BARTHOLOMEW. I am delighted to appear before you, I always am, but particularly on this subject. We know of your strong interest and the subcommittee's strong interest and support on this. It has been important in the past. It is going to be quite important as we move forward from here.

I think that as I reflect on what you said at the outset, about the reasons why this is an important agreement, you covered much of what I might have said in fact, in an introductory statement.

So in a sense, I consider this hearing today a conversation among practitioners of the same art, with strong shared interests in an important arrangement for the United States.

I would simply say to you that I, for my part, would be interested in working with you. We all would be in any way we can, from here forward as we have in the past.

[The prepared statement of Mr. BARTHOLOMEW follows:]


Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee: I very much welcome this opportunity to meet with you to discuss current problems with the CFE Treaty and the Administration's efforts to resolve them. I certainly appreciate your own deep interest in the successful ratification and implementation of this historic Treaty. We want to work closely with you in pursuit O' this common goal.

Let the begin by emphasizing that the CFE Treaty signed on November 19 last is a monumental achievement in postwar history.

In many respects, it represents the most far-reaching arms control agreement ever concluded, and its implications go well beyond the actual weaponry that it will limit.

In testimony before this subcommittee some 8 months ago, while the negotiations were still in progress, I set out some of the reasons why conclusion of a CFE Treaty was so important to our interests. Despite the problems which have arisen since then, we believe that each one of these reasons remains valid:

Above and beyond these concrete benefits, the CFE Treaty will serve as the essential foundation for the post-Cold-War security architecture in Europe. It will create a stable European military constellation, in which no country has the incentive or the immediate wherewithal to commit large-scale aggression. Only with this foundation in place can we move from a European security order based on confrontation to one based on cooperation.

But we cannot reap these multiple political and military benefits of the Treaty unless it is fully and faithfully implemented " signed by the 22 Heads of State and Government in Paris. A Treaty only partially observed could not provide a secure or trustworthy basis for the development of a new security architecture for Europe. The Soviet Union, by its own actions, has raised a serious obstacle to the ratification and entry into force of this Treaty; and it is up to the Soviet Union to remove this obstacle.

As you are aware, the data the Soviet Union submitted at Treaty signature contained inaccuracies. We have raised this problem with the Soviet Union and these inaccuracies have subsequently been partially corrected. In addition, beginning in mid-1989 and continuing up to Treaty signature, the Soviets withdrew massive amounts of equipment from the Treaty aria of application to locations east of the Urals. Withdrawal is not a violation of the Treaty, although it raises concerns about the Soviets acting in the spirit of the negotiations. These withdrawals have diminished significantly the amount of equipment the Soviets would otherwise have had to destroy. We are continuing to pursue these two issues with the Soviets to rind solutions that satisfy our concerns.

By far the most important of the problems that the Soviet Union has created is its claim that equipment held by naval infantry, coastal defense and strategic rocket forces is excluded from Treaty limits. This claim, which is rejected by all 21 other CFE signatories, flatly contradicts the language of the Treaty and has no basis in the negotiating record. Article III of the Treaty is unambiguous: with a few clearly
-specified exceptions, all land-based equipment counts against Treaty ceilings, regardless of service subordination.

This is in the first instance an issue of principle-obligations entered into in good faith must be honored and cannot be unilaterally rewritten after Treaty signature. Moreover, if uncorrected the Soviet position would undermine the Treaty in that it would permit land-based equipment to be built up without any constraints simply by assigning equipment to naval infantry and coastal defense units.

We have repeatedly made clear to Soviet officials, at very high levels, that obligations which we all assumed when signing the Treaty must be met. At the same time, the Administration has decided that it will not transmit the Treaty to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification until the Soviet Union fulfills its Treaty obligations, particularly under Article 111. This approach, we strongly believe, is best designed to secure fulfillment by the Soviet Union of its obligations, and thus to open the way to ratification and entry into force of the Treaty. And we believe this approach will succeed.

The enormous potential benefits of the CFE Treaty are reason enough to insist that the Soviet Union fully meet its Treaty obligations. But the issue is at the same time a broader one. What is at stake is not simply the integrity of the CFE Treaty but also the international credibility of the Soviet Union in this new era. The dispute over the CFE Treaty is a litmus test of Soviet readiness to be a constructive and reliable partner in building a stable and cooperative post-Cold-War order in Europe.

There is an internal debate in progress in the Soviet Union over the wisdom of the foreign policy of greater openness and cooperation that Moscow has pursued in recent years. Opponents of this policy wish to walk back some of the progress that East and West have made together. If the West ends up yielding on CFE, we would be encouraging those in the Soviet Union who counsel intransigence and inviting further trouble down the road-on CFE and on other agreements. The effect would be to undermine the web of recent East-West agreements and the confidence they have engendered.

The Administration remains committed to the successful ratification and full implementation of the Treaty. We will move forward expeditiously on ratification as soon as the Soviet Union was fulfilled the obligations it assumed in signing the CFE Treaty last November 19. We look forward to working closely with you as we move forward with this process.


Mr. HADLEY. Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to be here today. I also have a prepared statement. I think rather than reading through it, I will just tell you briefly, the statement tries to make a preliminary assessment of the contribution that the CFE agreement can make to the overall security situation in Europe.

It is positive, obviously, for a number of the reasons that you have set out in your statement. We go into that in some detail.

I think it is important to recognize, there is a lot happening in Europe outside the legal provisions of the CFE agreement that contributes to that improvement in stability, what is going on in Eastern Europe, the negotiations of the agreements that have provided for that exist; the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the things that the Soviets are doing with their own force structure.

Nonetheless, the CFE agreement, should it be ratified and implemented will put some constraints on Soviet forces in the western part of the U.S.S.R. and that is something that we get, through the CFE vehicle, and it is important to our security for that reason.

And the statement that goes through in some detail how that works in this arcane thing called the sufficiency rule, and why we think that makes a real contribution.

I guess the other thing I would say, Mr. Chairman, is just to appreciate your support for being firm on these issues. They are important. Really, I think what we have, particularly in connection with the article III, is a situation where someone is really in some measure saying to us, it does not matter how you negotiated the treaty, we are going to implement it the way we would have negotiated, not the way we negotiated it.

And if that principle gets established here, it is going to have, in this instance, it has the potential for undermining not only this agreement but any other arms control agreement we get into.

So, we can talk about the mechanism here, but I think one of the things that we appreciate is your strong support for the position we have taken on the merits because we think it is an important principle at issue here, in connection particularly with the so-called article III debate.

With that, Mr. Chairman, let me stop and submit my statement for the record, if I may.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hadley follows:]


In the past 2 years, the European security environment has undergone profound and rapid change. In that time, we have experienced events that even the boldest visionary would have rejected as improbable. The new Europe includes a unified Germany in NATO and sovereign and independent states in Central and Eastern Europe. There are reasons for caution, however, most especially in that one of the main engines for change in Europe-Gorbachev's program for political and economic reforms is itself in doubt.

It is not my purpose today to provide a broad overview of the European security environment. Rather it is to sketch the role that the CFE Treaty has had and will continue to have-if the Soviets can be brought into compliance with its provisions-in shaping that environment.

When we began the CFE Negotiations in March 1989, NATO and the Warsaw Pact had an agreed mandate for the Negotiation.

The nations of the two alliances committed "to the objectives of establishing a secure and stable balance of conventional armed forces in Europe at lower levels than heretofore, of eliminating disparities prejudicial to stability and security and of eliminating, as a matter of high priority, the capability for launching surprise attack and for initiating large-scale offensive action in Europe."

In the period since this mandate was agreed, the security situation in Europe has moved markedly in the direction of these goals.

In this period we have seen the end of the Warsaw Pact as an effective military alliance, the collapse of Soviet dominated regimes in Eastern and Central Europe and the ongoing withdrawals of Soviet forces from Hungary , Czechoslovakia, eastern Germany and (if negotiations are successful) Poland. The Soviets have begun to restructure their general purpose forces, to rewrite their military doctrine and to devote less resources to defense. These changes alone will reduce the military threat to NATO, increase warning time, and permit significant adjustment in force levels on the part of the West. The CFE Treaty did not cause these changes. But the negotiations did play an important role in facilitating and encouraging these positive developments. And the prospect of a CFE Treaty with substantial limits on Soviet national holdings, a requirement to destroy equipment in excess of limits, and a verification regime will make an additional contribution to the security situation in Europe.

From the very beginning of the negotiations, NATO sought as one of its priority objectives the substantial reduction of Soviet forces in the CFE zone of application. This includes not only the territory of Central and Eastern Europe, but also the territory of the U.S.S.R. itself west of the Ural mountains. In order to attain this goal and ensure that Soviet force levels were strictly limited, NATO devised the 130-Called "sufficiency rule." Much of the change in relative force levels of the Soviet Union and the West that would result from the CFE Treaty is attributable to the successful inclusion of the "sufficiency rule" in the Treaty.

The sufficiency rule prevents any one State Party to the Treaty from possessing more than approximately one-third of the total conventional armaments and equipment permitted by the Treaty in the area of application. This one-third limit applies to the aggregate total permitted the States comprising both groups of States Parties;
thus, 40 months after Treaty entry into force and thereafter, no one State Party may possess more than 13,300 battle tanks, 20,000 armored combat vehicles, 13,700 pieces of artillery, 5,150 combat aircraft or 1,500 attack helicopters within the area of application. This restriction will most directly affect the Soviet Union, whose conventional armed forces in the area of application have historically far exceeded all these limits, except that on attack helicopters.

The CFE sufficiency limits, in combination with the Soviet withdrawals from Central and Eastern Europe, in effect create a national ceiling for the European portion of the U.S.S.R. The CFE limitations established by the sufficiency rule translate into approximately 50 to 60 divisions worth of treaty-limited equipment. In the past, the Soviet military threat represented a capability to mount a theater-wide campaign, utilizing forces of the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact nations, Soviet forces stationed in Eastern Europe, and the high readiness units of the Western Military Districts of the Soviet Union; all in all, some 115 divisions either positioned well forward or considered ready to fight at very short notice. These forces would have been supplemented by a substantial number of additional divisions drawn from forces based in the Moscow, Kiev, Ural, and Volga Military Districts. Under CFE limits, the Soviets would be denied the ability to mount this kind of threat, unless they contravene the terms of the Treaty.

While, in theory, the U.S.S.R. could retain more than 50 to 60 divisions ill the CFE zone, it would only do so at the cost of readiness. To legally locate additional divisions in the Treaty area would require that they have less than their full complement of treaty limited military equipment. These divisions, due to their lack of equipment, would be in a lower state of readiness, and would require additional equipment to obtain full combat effectiveness. Such a post-CFE Soviet force structure-whether it consists of a lower number of divisions at higher readiness or a higher number of divisions at lower readiness-would simply not be capable of posing the kind of attack on NATO that we have historically planned against. To pose such a threat, the Soviets would have to reconstitute additional forces as well. Such a reconstitution effort will require, at a minimum, several months and perhaps much longer, depending on Soviet objectives, the state of the Soviet military infrastructure, how the Soviet leadership might implement such reconstitution, and the number and capabilities of NATO forces maintained in Europe. It would also require breaching the CFE Treaty limits. This judgment assumes, of course, that NATO will maintain sufficient forces to respond to any potential threat, regardless of the force structure option chosen by Soviet political and military leaders. I would like to conclude my statement with one additional remark:

The military benefits for NATO of the CFE Treaty are significant. However, the value of the Treaty can only be fully realized if all the provisions of the Treaty are honored. Our strong rejection of the Soviet claim to exclude certain equipment from coverage under the Treaty must be seen in this light. If treaties can be implemented as one side had wished to negotiate them-not based on how they did negotiate them-then the treaty restrains bind only at the whim of the parties. This is not a prescription for stability over the long term. It would mean that we would have no assurance that the benefits of the Treaty would not, over time, be eroded by adoption of similar actions in the future.

Senator BIDEN. All of your statements will be submitted in the record, as if read.

Let me just say, I have four general areas I would like to discuss with you. One is the state of play at the moment. What happened in Moscow, if you are able to, in an open session, indicate? Was there any indication of movement?

Second, what do you think the difficulty is, from a Soviet perspective?

What pressure, if any, is on Gorbachev? Is this just a negotiating device? Is it designed to affect other matters? I also want to discuss the effort up here to fool around with the ABM Treaty, the way in which you and the administration view it, and what consequences that would or would not have?

And I would like to start with a discussion, particularly about article III. Let me begin by asking you, was my recitation of what I believe the logjam to be, no summit, no START, because no CFE? Is this the linchpin preventing our being able to move forward? What is the administration's position, assuming there is no CFE Treaty that is sent to the Senate for consent and ratification? Does that mean that there can be no progress on any other front, particularly START, absent that resolution?

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. Chairman, we have not established any linkage between the CFE Treaty and the START Treaty. Our problem is they both seem to be facing the same difficulty.

We are finding it difficult to proceed when agreements that were reached come undone, unstuck. That is our problem. CFE is of course very important because this is a treaty that was concluded by 22 nations. It is signed at the head of state level. We are ready to proceed with ratification.

It is a very difficult situation to have confidence that we can successfully conclude a START Treaty, which is not yet done, although very, very far along, in that kind of an environment. But I would invite my colleagues to comment.

Mr. BARTHOLOMEW. I would just say, Senator, I defer to you, Mr. Chairman, on the politics of it. But the politics are not simply in the sense of here, in terms of public and congressional discourse, but also the politics in the diplomatic sense.

It is hard to go on with business as usual, I think across a broad front and project certain diplomatic paths, summit and like this, when you are wrestling with trying to get into place so central and important an element to the whole structure as CFE.

It makes things more difficult. I mean, that is the Secretary's phrase, and I do not quote it simply because the Secretary said it, I quote it because it actually accurately characterizes and captures what we encountered for example on other fronts.

It is in part why we hammer so hard at the need to get this done, and why I think our allies share that view as well. I do want to stress that point, Mr. Chairman. This is not a U.S.-Soviet issue.

Yes, the United States-because we see the Soviets-is being vigorous on it, but we have to remember that it is a case in which 22 signatories to an agreement are on one side of a question, which they regard as important, with one on the other side. And that is, I think, the proper way to cast the question.

I just wanted to make sure we keep that context in front of us. And I make so bold to say that this is reinforced in the sense that, I think all of the other signatories share in the sense of the importance of the question as we do, and indeed, I speak more particularly of our Western allies, that we are on the basic same wavelength on this question.

Senator BIDEN. Well, the Soviet's interpret article III in a way that it seems no one else of the 22 signatories interpret it. Here you have the CFE agreement, which is now bogged down as a result of the changed Soviet position, at least changed in the minds of all of our allies and all of the nations involved; 22 interpret it one way and the Soviets another way.

Now, notwithstanding that that in a sense poisons the well a little bit as to how we operate, because on issues that remain truly unresolved. I assume theoretically you could continue to negotiate, while bringing to fruition another agreement, that is, the START agreement.

But is what you are telling me, that because it was thought to have been resolved and then walked away from, that that in effect prevents this second, equally important agreement from moving forward?

Mr. HADLEY. It is a very good point, and maybe one way to answer it is to say that when we were in Moscow we did not only work CFE. Indeed, we probably spent as much time on START as we did by CFE.

But I think the problem is the kind of rigidity we are seeing on the other side that has caused this article III to come to the fore. It is also reflected in the positions they are taking on START.

Senator BIDEN. OK.

Mr. HADLEY. So it is as if we have sort of a log-jam on all of them.

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. Chairman, it is not because of CFE we are afraid they might walk back on START, it is that we are actually experiencing it.

Senator BIDEN. Well, let me focus precisely on article III. That is the issue on which there seems to be unanimity of view, except for the Soviets.

The other two main CFE issues relate to the movement of equipment east of the Urals and the discrepancy between the Soviet declarations of their equipment and our estimates of their equipment.

It is my impression that in these two areas we really have not a great deal to complain about, maybe to be disappointed about, but not a great deal to complain about. With respect to the movement of Soviet equipment east of the Urals prior to the treaty's signature, those transfers are very unfortunate, but as I understood your statement they are legal.

Mr. LEHMAN. The transfers east of the Urals are legal.

Senator BIDEN. Now, we preferred to see more equipment destroyed under the terms of the treaty, but out of the 80,000 or so pieces of equipment moved, most of the transfers are the result of two developments that we welcomed.

One was essentially the evacuation of the Soviet Union from the Warsaw Pact countries, including Germany. And the other regards the overall data. There is, and I may be mistaken, but there is a misimpression that has been created by some bad intelligence or the bad use of intelligence.

Early on it was reported in the press that a huge discrepancy existed between our estimates and the Soviet declarations over tens of thousands of conventional areas.

Now press reports indicate that our estimates have been revised and that discrepancy is closer to a few thousand.

And my question, without getting into any classified details, is it not true that the main reason why the overall data dispute was improved is the fact that we have drastically revised our estimates of what the Soviet Union had in Europe at the time the treaty was signed? Is that correct?

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. Chairman, I would not characterize it quite exactly that way. What I would say is that the difference between the article III issue and the other issues is something like the distinction between a point of law and a point of fact.

Article III is clearly A question of what is the fundamental treaty obligation. The other issues are as you described them. They have given us their data, and we are examining this data.

They have made some mistakes in their data. They have admitted making some mistakes in their data. They have corrected some of them. There are other anomalies in their data that are difficult for them to explain. They have a rationale, a presentation, but we do not understand that. The JCG teams are spending a great deal of time by this type of data.

The question of the magnitude of what was west of the Urals on the date of November 19 was made complex by the fact that once the decision was made that a primary means of reaching your treaty obligations would be destruction, the Soviet Union began a very rapid movement of equipment east of the Urals.

That is not the same thing as the movement of forces, of force structure. As a result, as you correctly pointed out, we knew they were moving equipment east of Urals based on the reductions out of Eastern Europe. We saw this process accelerate and as you got nearer the date, it accelerated at a very rapid pace.

The result was that you cannot use certain intelligence estimates at a certain time that were based on a stasis. You have to go back and examine all sources very carefully.

So what we are doing now is that analysis, to gauge as accurately as possible, our best guess on what was west of Urals? How accurate was that data?

As I said, there are some anomalies and we are working on it. I hope that helps.

Senator BIDEN. It does help. But I want to make sure, in terms of the gross numbers, that the original discrepancy reported in the press is no where near the discrepancy we now believe it to be. Is that not correct?

Mr. LEHMAN. Well, first of all, the numbers in the press are the press numbers. But with respect to some of the numbers we saw, those are much higher than anything we are looking at. Senator BIDEN. OK.

Mr. LEHMAN. On the other hand, we do not want to give a definitive number until we have it right.

Senator BIDEN. I understand that, because if the original numbers reported in the press were correct, plus the action on article III, plus the accurate perception in many cases, of changed circumstances in the Soviet Union and Gorbachev's situation, it is creating among some of my colleagues, the impression that the prospects for meaningful arms control are much less hopeful than I believe they are. You obviously hope they continue and probably believe they will continue.

And I think that unless that impression is halted, we will find ourselves with people up here saying, well, what do we need the ABM Treaty for, notwithstanding the fact that we want to disregard it for the following reasons relating to equipment and new technology.

And by the way guys, do not worry about that because the Soviets are not supportive of arms control anyway.

Do you understand the dynamic? And that is why I just wanted to get on the record that although there is a discrepancy, we need not resign ourselves to the idea that it won't be resolved or that we shouldn't move ahead with arms control. Now, was that number you gave me classified or not?

Mr. LEHMAN. It is all classified.

Senator BIDEN. That is all I wanted to know.

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. Chairman, it might help to understand that obviously our impression is that when the Soviet Union realized that they were going to reach an agreement that required large amounts of destruction, they made a major effort to get a large amount of equipment across that line at the Urals by November 19.

The issue in many ways is, did they make it?

Senator BIDEN. Well, is not part of the issue whether or not the numbers we had in the first place were right?

Secretary Baker wrote, in an unclassified letter to me, "the Soviet data submitted at treaty signature contained inaccuracies with respect to equipment actually in the zone on the date of the treaty's signature. It now appears that the magnitude of these discrepancies may be less than we had originally believed."

And I guess all I am trying to establish here for the record is that it is less than we believed, and therefore less ominous than some are advertising; therefore, things aren't as bad as they appear. That is the only point I am trying to get across.

Mr. HADLEY. I think that is right, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to add two points to it. One, even if that is true, there still is a separate issue which is not wholly a fact issue which goes to an issue of compliance, if you will.

Senator BIDEN. I agree with that.

Mr. HADLEY. And that is what they were obligated to do under the treaty was to report what was in the zone as of a particular date, and one of the questions was: Is that what they did or did they report data on what they would like to have had in the zone on that date?

So there is still lurking in it a treaty compliance issue.

Senator BIDEN. I understand that. I am just talking, in terms of magnitude-anyway, I do not want to beat the issue to death.

Let me turn to another question, and that is the question of how to overcome the Soviet reinterpretation of article III.

The article III issue is much more significant in terms of a compliance issue than in terms of the military consequences of noncompliance; the Soviets have reassigned or redesignated several units, containing roughly 3,500 pieces of equipment, to the navy. Disregarding the clear language of article III, the Soviet negotiators say it was exempt under the treaty.

And we are all in agreement that it was not. Now, their legal claim is based on the fact that the mandate for CFE, taken in conjunction with the separate arrangement of the naval aircraft, creates an implication that naval units are to be treated differently from army units.

I point out that this is a logic familiar to those of us involved in other debates. But as I understand it, the Soviet leadership has responded to our complaints by suggesting, if I am correct, that this is a one-time arrangement, and they say no new equipment will be reassigned or rendered exempt.

So my question is, in military terms, the effect of this dispute, when we are talking about 80,000 pieces of equipment being withdrawn, and 20,000 being destroyed, the military significance of this is not as important as the compliance significance of this. Is that right or wrong?

Mr. HADLEY. I think that the compliance issue and the issue of principle is very overriding as we said in the comments that were made in the opening, I think that is clearly right.

But I would not want to discount the military significance in two ways. One, the aggregate levels of equipment TLE involved are not trivial as a percentage of what the Soviets are going to have left.

But there is also a point, most of this equipment is concentrated opposite flanks: Denmark, Norway, Greece, and Turk, and if Minister Holtz were still here, he made this point very forcefully; that as a percentage of the equipment that is opposite the flanks it is much more substantial--

Senator BIDEN. Let me explain what I am trying to establish, I have no hidden agenda here. I am trying to figure out what makes them tick and maybe you can help me.

If in fact the military significance of 3,500 pieces of equipment is not of real military consequence, notwithstanding what the flank countries think, notwithstanding their legitimate concern, notwithstanding our recognition that it is of some consequence, it is not a big deal. Why are they doing it?

Because as I sit here and try to analyze it from a purely military standpoint, it is not that significant. It would be one thing if they were talking about 40,000 pieces of equipment or 20,000 pieces. We are talking about something that, from the military guys I speak with, is not going to be that big of a deal.

So why? Am I missing the point, that it is not as significant militarily? And if that is correct, why are they doing what they are doing?

Mr. BARTHOLOMEW. Senator, you are having trouble with the why, for the same reason that we do. When it seems as though as any possible gain from this step is outweighed by the cost that I think that they have already paid in terms of the chill, I mean, the Soviet side, the chill that this has, shall we say, reminded people of the West.
But if we want to speculate, because I am not sure I could tell you that mine or Director Lehman's or Steve Hadley's view will be any better than anybody else's, quite frankly on this one.

First, no, the amount of treaty-limited equipment is not going to make a difference between the success or failure of the defense of mother Russia, this is true. On the other hand, it is not trivial, not just because where it is, but because the total number of Id, Treaty Limited Equipment, that we are talking about probably is higher than most of the other signatories have in their entire inventory. I mean, if you take it sort of in an comparative examination like that, so in a nontrivial way--

Senator BIDEN. YOU mean any individual signatory?

Mr. BARTHOLOMEW. That is right. That is what I mean. At most, I think the total number would probably be higher than the total, that we are talking about, it probably would be higher-certainly I think it is true for most allies and 1 think it is probably true for most of Eastern Europeans as well.

So, you know, yes, not all that great will mean in the context of the total mass of Soviet capabilities, but still in the context of what we are talking about, the size of forces generally in the area, not inconsequential, not trivial.

The other point that I would make on the why is, the best speculation we can come up with is, first, that I would come up with is first a straight forward notion of trying to manage your forces for maximum advantage in a certain situation in which every bit counts, squeezing the stone.

And I think that, probably powered by some sense on the part of some of the players that were involved in making those decisions, that dammit, they did not like the decisions in the first place.

Senator BIDEN. You all know more about it than I do obviously, because you are the ones sitting and looking across the table. I held a hearing all today and yesterday, as chairman of the Judiciary Committee, on whether or not a fellow should be circuit judge, and the issue was whether or not this guy was a racist based on the comments he made.

One takes at face value that they were racist comments, but look the guy in the eye, and think, was he insensitive? Did he not know? You had the advantage of looking across the table at these fellows and I do not.

It seems to me that the second rationale you offer is the compelling one. That dammit, the military does not like what is happening. As opposed to, dammit, we are just going to squeeze everything out of the stone here.

In other words, if the second did not exist, I cannot believe that the first would bring them to this point.

Mr. LEHMAN. We have speculated over this at length. Some people argue it is another Krasnoyarsk, that the bureaucracy and the defense ministry never told them the truth. Others have speculated that this has more to do with the internal domestic political situation than it does with the treaty.

Senator BIDEN. Internal domestic political situation, meaning the Baltics and/or the republics, the need for use of force?

Mr. LEHMAN. I think the broader question is one of old thinker versus new thinker, reform, that sort of thing. All of these are possibilities.

What we find particularly frustrating is that this issue of the flanks, the issue that it was related to was very, very vigorously negotiated with the Soviets, and with senior military officials, including in many cases, General Moiseyev himself.

And they did not, at that level, at that time, as we were concluding, raise this issue. So, it is a bit surprising and it raises some serious questions as to why now they have brought this up.

Mr. BARTHOLOMEW. There may be one other factor, if I may, Senator. There may be one other factor involved, and that is, I for one, and I speak only for myself, do not exclude the possibility that the people who participated in this decision miscalculated also in the sense of its broader ramifications. I do not entirely exclude that.

Senator BIDEN. Explain that to me.

Mr. BARTHOLOMEW. In the vernacular of the trade, somebody screwed up. There is also an element of that in it too.

Mr. LEHMAN. Somebody thought they would get us to pay twice. They thought they could blow it by us---

Mr. BARTHOLOMEW. Blow it by us, we are all very interested in getting this done.

Senator BIDEN. YOU mean they are committed then? They are stuck on that position, once having taken it?

Mr. BARTHOLOMEW. Mr. Chairman, we have given you a range of possible explanations. I emphasize, I, for one, ain't going to rank order them or attach a factor of validity.

Senator BIDEN. I understand that, but I have great faith in your instincts.

I know you are familiar with the condition proposition that I suggested. Based on the letter that I received from the Secretary, God bless him, I do not think he is familiar with what I-I apparently did not articulate it very well.

Because-unless you drafted the letter, Reggie. [Laughter.]

Mr. LEHMAN. Our State Department representative will answer that.

Senator BIDEN. That is what I said. I am looking at him.

Mr. BARTHOLOMEW. I want the record to show that that is not the case, sir.

Senator BIDEN. In the paragraph on this notion of condition, he says, we believe it would be a mistake to signal to the Soviet military that their behavior will produce any positive results. Such mistaken encouragement would only make it harder for the Soviet leadership to insist upon compliance with negotiated agreements as eventually they must do.

Well, obviously, that is the exact opposite purpose I had in mind. And again, I am not sure I am right about this. I am not going to bet the farm on this one.

And so again, let me just ask you on record here to tell me why the rationale does not make sense. The rationale being that if the Senate were to consent, were to vote for a treaty with a clear understanding that article III was interpreted as all 22 nations understand it to be, differently than how the Soviets interpret it, that would then equip the President and the Secretary with a document that was signed and sealed and only needed to be delivered, and would require Soviets at that point to either ante up or out. Maybe that is too much of a gamble, I do not know. Is the concern that you will get it up here and there will be a lot of loose cannons rolling around this deck preventing it from being ratified that way?

I mean, tell me why that is not a good idea?

Mr. BARTHOLOMEW. First of all, Senator, I want to start off by saying that we really do respect and appreciate the point and purpose that you are talking about.

You are talking about how to get a job done which is to get to a treaty that we can ratify and get around the article III problem. Our view of this and it governs the view of the device, the tactical device which is, as you said yourself, Mr. Chairman, unorthodox.

You qualified it as saying, somewhat orthodox. I would have said just left it as unorthodox.

But look, our view of the situation is the one we see this device. The first point is this, the administration has taken the decision that it does not yet have an international agreement on which it wishes to seek the advice and consent of the Senate. Our point is, we do not come to seek the Senate's advice and consent until we think we have made a decision, that we have an arrangement that we wish to present. This is the executive branch's responsibility.

I would hasten to add, I am no constitutional lawyer, but I think historically, when the executive branch has presented a treaty to the Senate, it is saying, I wish to ratify this treaty and I seek your advice and consent to do so.

Well, we are not ready, very simply, in terms of the problem that we have before us and that we have been discussing here, we are not ready to ask you for that advice and consent. This is the main question that I think is our starting point on this.

The second point that I think is in our mind is that we appreciate the notion of its contributing to the weight, the momentum that we are trying to generate to bring the Soviets to resolve this question, but we think we have a lot, the message is very clear. We think the message is not only very clear from us, it is very clear from allied governments, and it is very clear, frankly, Mr. Chairman, from the members of the Senate such as yourself.

You began in some of your opening remarks by saying that there is a pretty strong wind of opinion that is quite clearly expressed.

Senator BIDEN. I think it is uniform.

Mr. BARTHOLOMEW. Uniform on this question. So, there is no hidden agenda here.

Senator BIDEN. I was not assuming you thought that. First of all, anything that is new is always-I mean, the State Department is the last body to look at that, except for you, I know that.

So it is a little bit like new ideas in the Democratic Party, you know. But I think what is going to happen, since this debate is taking place between you, between everyone and the Soviet Union, assuming the Soviets change their position tomorrow, back to the interpretation of article III that we accept, I predict to you that what you will find is not necessarily me, but one or another of my colleagues on this committee, sitting to my right here, likely to attach such a condition anyway because they are going to raise issues as to whether or not you really-did he cave in? Did he not cave in?

We want to make sure this is straight. So my view is, you are going to end up with the condition anyway. And second, that this is a complicated process because we are talking about a couple of dozen nations in terms of this negotiation.

And it is not a bilateral negotiation. For example, what if everyone but Bulgaria agreed to this interpretation? I suspect you would submit the treaty anyway. I may be mistaken.

Go ahead, you are smiling. Do you understand the point I am trying to make?


Senator BIDEN. So that is the reason. That is what has moved me on this: you are going to get a condition anyway. I understand that the condition coming after you conclude that treaty is, as you want it, different than a condition coming before. I understand that.

What would happen if it were everybody but Bulgaria?

Mr. BARTHOLOMEW. Let me say, I will let Ron answer that question. [Laughter.]

Let me answer the first part of the question, Senator. Simply put, we are confident that when we are satisfied and bring this treaty to you for advice and consent, you will be satisfied. And that if there are such proposals, we will be in a position to explain to you-

Senator BIDEN. I am confident I will be satisfied. I do not think you will have a problem with me.

Mr. BARTHOLOMEW. I understand what you are saying. Senator BIDEN. You may have a problem with the fellow who sits in this seat, this very seat, and, let me make it clear, I happen to be sitting in Claiborne Pell's seat right now.

Mr. BARTHOLOMEW. But if I may, Mr. Chairman, I am not sure- I would judge that you would be a better predictor than I about the actions of your colleagues, sir, I say that.
But that said, look we are on the same wavelength. I do not detect a difference between the sides of the House, the Senate on the importance of this. I do not see any real differences where the administration's view on it is concerned in terms of it seriousness of its intent.

So if we solve the problem, I think we will have done it in a way that will be regarded--

Senator BIDEN. No sense in beating this to death. I want to be helpful on this process. The reason, by way of brief explanation is, there is still a decided minority, relatively small minority that finds arms control agreements anathema to peace and security, period.

So notwithstanding the fact they agree with you that the Soviets are out of sync on article III, they do not think there should be an article III. They do not think there should be anything.

I mean, their rationale is, you cannot trust those Soviet commies, you know, and therefore, I am not going to sign on any agreement and they are going to make it difficult whatever the agreement may be. As a matter of fact, they are going to try to undo existing agreements.

And let me go to, rather than to continue on this issue, which is even beginning to bore me, the ABM Treaty, if I may.

Am I correct in stating that the Soviets would regard any violation of the ABM Treaty and/or an outright abrogation of the treaty as impacting upon our relationship in a significant way?

I mean, how significant do the Soviets view the ABM treaty? Flat out, as you know up here, some of my colleagues are moving to withdraw the United States from the ABM Treaty. What kind of impact would that have?

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. Chairman, Soviet attitudes toward strategic defenses, defense against ballistic missiles have altered a bit over time. But clearly, we have gone through a period over the last 10 to 20 years, in which the ABM Treaty has been a centerpiece of the Soviet presentation of their approach to strategic forces. They have. insisted on keeping the ABM Treaty in effect. Their attitudes with respect to certain aspects of the ABM Treaty have not always been the same as ours. On the one hand, you have the example of the Krasnoyarsk radar where in the end they discovered they had made a mistake.

And on the other hand, you have issues with respect to interpretations of certain provisions of the ABM Treaty where we have differences today.

Obviously, they are the only nation in the world that has the permitted systems, 100 interceptors around Moscow, so they do have an interest in strategic defenses, but they have kept that number within the ABM Treaty.

We have had a number of issues with them having to do with the possibility of movable radars. We have gotten those issues largely resolved.

We continue in the SCC to discuss issues having to do with certain Soviet practices. We have made progress on some of those. Some of those remain open.

But, clearly, in the mid-1980's there was an attempt by the Soviet Union to hold progress in the START negotiations hostage to a tightening up of the ABM Treaty. They have drowned that linkage, but clearly, they have made it their position that they expect that we should be in compliance with the ABM Treaty. They certainly have the same rights we have under the ABM Treaty with respect to certain rights having to do with supreme national interest. But we have heard voices within the Soviet Union that have talked about the possibility of perhaps employing defenses that go beyond what is permitted by the ABM Treaty. Our approach has been to say to the Soviet Union in the defense and space negotiations that we think strategic defenses offer the possibility of a better, safer world, that we are exploring the feasibility of those defenses, and that if we proceed with those defenses, we think the best way would be a cooperative transition. We proposed certain confidence-building measures. We have had them visit, for example, some of our strategic defense initiative sites and projects. So, I would say that the ABM Treaty remains a centerpiece of their security policy. But there have been changed attitudes in both directions over time.

Senator BIDEN. Do we continue to view it in our security interest for it to exist, the ABM Treaty?

Mr. LEHMAN. We have not proposed abrogating the ABM Treaty. Senator BIDEN. To put it another way, does President Bush support withdrawal from the ABM Treaty?

Mr. LEHMAN. We have said that we want to explore the feasibility of advanced defenses that could enhance our security, and that once we have done that, we would like to proceed. That may involve having to go beyond the ABM Treaty and that is why we have engaged in a negotiation with the Soviet Union on how we could do that in a cooperative manner.

Senator BIDEN. Does the administration view as helpful or harmfuI the Senate initiative to withdraw us from the ABM Treaty now?

Mr. HADLEY. I am not sure of that, Senator, I am trying to think of the text of the letter that General Scowcroft sent over in connection with Senator Warner's, sense of the Congress resolution, and I, unfortunately do not have that here with me, but I think he at that point set out the position of the administration on that.

I guess what I would say is two things that may be new in this sort thing. One, as Ron mentioned, the Soviets did fall off an explicit linking between going forward on the START agreement and resolution of issues under the ABM Treaty. They did that in Wyoming and they have largely stuck to that.

Two, there was a resolution. A joint statement was issued by the President and President Gorbachev in I think July of last year which set out objectives for START II and follow-on negotiations, both in the START context and nuclear and space talks.

And one of the things that said was talked about an appropriate balance between defenses and offensive systems, in the interest of strategic stability.

And third, this GPALS Program which has one of those awful Defense Department anachronisms associated with it, it is nonetheless an effort to craft a program that does deal with a particular concern, national security threat, that was demonstrated fairly graphically in the Persian Gulf exercise, but is one which hopefully we think the Soviets ought to be similarly concerned about, and is a concept which may be a way toward allowing the Soviet Union and the United States to do what the two Presidents talked about; namely, implementing a stable relationship that has some roll for defenses in it.

Senator BIDEN. It sounds to me like what you are suggesting is that at a minimum, whatever transformation may occur in the ABM Treaty, you and the administration are contemplating that it would have to be negotiated. Are you or are you not?

Is the administration going to be up here when and if our colleagues are on the floor suggesting we withdraw from the ABM Treaty, saying, no, do not do that. It is not a good time for us to do this.

Mr. HADLEY. I think certainly there is agreement that that is obviously the best way to approach this issue, and I think as I recall the text of Senator Warner's resolution, it talked very much in those terms, in terms of encouraging negotiation with the Soviets, of something that would permit a pursuit of defenses.

Senator BIDEN. It has been called to my attention that Scowcroft said that you all would decide in 2 years whether the ABM Treaty serves U.S. security interests.

My question is today, is that correct?

Mr. HADLEY. That is what Senator Warner's resolution says.

Mr. BARTHOLOMEW. That is what the resolution says. Mr. HADLEY. That was the text.

Senator BIDEN. I am going to have to either learn to read better or he is going to have to learn to write better. [Laughter.) Anyway, why do you not ask the question? Seriously, why do you not ask the question?

Mr. RUBIN. The administration supported the Warner resolution or the basis of deciding 2 years from now whether the President believed U.S. interests were served by the ABM Treaty.

The question is whether today the administration believes we should withdraw from the ABM Treaty or keep it?
Yes or no?

Senator BIDEN. No maybe.

Mr. HADLEY. I am not aware of any statement that the administration has made saying we want to withdraw from the ABM Treaty today.

I am not aware of anything.

Senator BIDEN. I am not either. The point I am trying to get at is, I want you all to say right now, today, it is a good idea. It serves our security interests, because if you do not, I am worried you are going to give grist to the mill that I do not think you want at this moment, while you are trying to nail down a CFE agreement, and while you are trying to nail down a START agreement.

Mr. HADLEY. I think you have it right, and we have not said we are going to abrogate that treaty. But we have said and what we have proposed in the defense in space talks is to try and get the Soviets to agree to a cooperative transition, to put great reliance on defenses, to introduce defenses to, for example, relax some of the provisions dealing with sensors which we think would be useful to have.

So we have talked in the context of trying to get the Soviets to agree on a modification to that structure that we believe serves both of our interests and that is what the position has been in the defense in space talks, and I think that is really what is reflected in General Scowcroft's letter with respect to that.

Senator BIDEN. One more question about article III and then I want you to tell me a little bit, if you are able to, about what progress, if any, was made in Moscow?

We talked about possible rationales for the Soviets taking the position they took. One we did not mention is the Soviets are not at all happy that naval forces were not included, now having given up a significant advantage that they had, assuming the treaty is ratified, but already by their own unilateral action, having given up the significant advantage they had in terms of army forces, and ground forces. They now find themselves increasingly disturbed by the disparity of numbers and quality of naval forces, and therefore, are really just trying to figure out how to get the navy in the game.

And if in fact we would, notwithstanding the fact that we do not have to, but if we were willing to begin to deal with the issue of the navy, we may find the concern on article III collapsing rapidly, and maybe they would in fact be back on board.

If the United States expressed a willingness to talk about naval arms control, do you think-and I am not suggesting we should. I am just trying to get a sense. Do you think the article III issue might fade away rapidly in terms of the Soviets?

Mr. BARTHOLOMEW. With great respect, Mr. Chairman, the question is posed in a manner that says, you know, if you jumped off a building-I do not suggest you do so-do you think you would survive, in the sense that it begs the prior question, which is our interest or lack of it as a country, I think just the lack of it, in naval arms control.

Senator BIDEN. Well, I see how you could read it that way, Reggie, but the fact of the matter is, the rationale for the Soviets recalcitrance at this point goes well beyond arms control issues. If the rationale relates to the fact that Gorbachev no longer has the whole card, that Gorbachev is now controlled by the military, that the military has taken a radically different view than it had for the past 3 years, it affects a whole range of things well beyond arms control.

If it only relates to an arms control dispute, then that sheds a little bit of a different light on what the state of affairs is and our ability to deal with and operate in this new environment with the Soviet Union. So, that is the purpose of my question, and the only way I know how to get at, that is to suggest that if we were tomorrow to turn around and say, OK, navy's in the game, would we have a resolution of article III?

I am just trying to read what is moving them. Do you think that would happen? Not should we, but what would happen? It is a little bit different than jumping out of the building, and will you survive? It is sort of jumping out the building-were you pushed, or did you jump out? Is your wife kicking you out? Did the lover push you out the window, or did the military walk in and kick you out the window?

Mr. BARTHOLOMEW. I would much rather answer those questions than the ones you asked, Mr. Chairman. [Laughter.]

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. Chairman, the mandate is clear. We negotiated the mandate. That has been settled. It was also clear that these tanks are not ships, they are not aircraft carriers, they are not naval forces, as meant by the mandate, that is clear as well. I will tell you, speaking for. myself, that I think it would be a very dangerous negotiating precedent to reopen these issues in this kind of environment and pay these kinds of prices, because you will simply feed this behavior and encourage them to demand more, so I think it would be not only wrong for us to do that, but it would only feed demands for more. I think we have to understand that when the deal is done, the deal is done.

Senator BIDEN. I think that is fair enough. Let me turn to the staff of Senators who are not here to see if there is anything they would like me to pursue. Is there anything else?

I do not mean to be so humorous about this. I think the work you are doing is incredibly important.

Now, let me just conclude by asking the last thing I will ask you. Tell me what happened in Moscow, if you can, and then I will let you go.

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. Chairman, as you know, this is an ongoing negotiation so in open session let me simply say that I think our strategy is working. I think the Soviet Union is getting the message. They are isolated. Their logic does not hold up. No one agrees with them. I think they are testing to see whether or not we are willing to sacrifice the principle and therefore they have raised ideas but they do not do the job. Let me stop there in open session and invite my colleagues to comment.

Senator BIDEN. Any of you want to violate anything in open session? All right.

I really appreciate you coming Lip. I may ask you-and it will not even be necessary to have a hearing to do it, but I may ask you in the next couple of weeks if maybe I can come down and you can fill me in a little bit about what you cannot tell me now.

I truly appreciate your making the effort to come up, and I thank you all, and if there are no further comments on anyone's part, we are adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:23 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 10:05 a.m., July 11, 1991.]

Next Section

Return to Top
Return to Table of Contents