Many U.S. tanks deployed from U.S. Army units in Western Europe to the Gulf War.

   For a variety of reasons, national reductions of these weapons continued after the mid-November 1995 treaty deadline. A few nations--such as Belarus, Ukraine, and Russia--had not reduced all their TLE as required under the treaty. Other nations--Poland, Romania, and others--continued to reduce CFE weapons because they were excess to their national force structure. By the time of the CFE Treaty's First Review Conference in May 1996, the state parties announced that the total number of reductions had exceeded 58,000 items. At that conference, Russia pledged to destroy by the year 2000 the weapons and equipment located beyond the Ural Mountains and in certain naval units.

A comparison of selected states' CFE holdings at the beginning of the baseline period (July 1992) and at the end of the reduction period (November 1995) indicates that the larger nations had significantly reduced their conventional weapons in the treaty's territorial zones (table 8-3).

Not all of these reductions were driven by the CFE Treaty. The massive withdrawals of U.S. military forces from Western Europe, for example, were caused by the need to deploy combat troops to the Middle East for the Gulf War and by reductions in the American military services following the Cold War. Russia's large-scale reductions were also caused by historic forces, largely economic and political, that were external to the requirements of the CFE Treaty. Consequently, one must be cautious in drawing conclusions from these numbers alone. Nations did not make excess reductions in their military forces and weapons to comply with the treaty; rather, they were compelled by economic, strategic, and military reasons to reduce their military forces.

 

Table 8-3. Comparison of Selected National Holdings of CFE Treaty TLE

  Tanks Artillery ACVs Aircraft Helicopters Total
United States
July 1992*
Nov 1995**		 5,163
1,254		 1,973
854		 4,963
2,238		 398
222		 349
150		 12,846
4,718
Germany
July 92
Nov 95		 7,170
3,061		 4,735
2,056		 9,099
2,679		 1,040
578		 256
225		 22,300
8,599
France
July 92
Nov 95		 1,335
1,289		 1,436
1,251		 4,387
3,556		 695
667		 366
317		 8,219
7,080
Russia
July 92
Nov 95		 9,338
5,492		 8,326
5,680		 19,399
10,372		 4,624
2,986		 1,005
826		 42,692
25,356
Ukraine
July 92
Nov 95		 6,128
4,026		 3,591
3,727		 6,703
4,919		 1,648
1,008		 271
270		 18,341
13,950
Romania
July 92
Nov 95		 2,967
1,375		 3,942
1,471		 3,171
2,073		 508
373		 15
16		 10,603
5,308

* CFE Treaty entry into force.
** CFE Treaty 40-month reduction period.
Source: Arms Control Today, December 1995, pp.29-30.

 

The numbers, however, do confirm that there have been major reductions in national military forces on the European continent. The United States, for instance, reduced or withdrew 8,128 CFE TLE items from its forces stationed in Western Europe. This was a 63 percent reduction in its offensive forces on the European continent. Collectively, the states of the former Soviet Union possessed 71,080 weapons in July 1992; three years later they had reduced these weapons to 39,581 or 55 percent. For Russia, the largest of the new republics, the figures indicate that its November 1995 holdings of tanks, artillery, ACVs, combat aircraft, and helicopters west of the Ural Mountains was 25,261. In July 1992, Russia had declared 42,692 CFE weapons; three years later it had reduced 17,431 items or 41 percent. Germany reduced more CFE weapons--13,701--than any other NATO nation. Certainly German unification in 1990 had skewed these figures, with the addition of the former German Democratic Republic's ground and air forces. In July 1992, Germany declared 22,300 CFE items; in November 1995, it stated it held 8,599 TLE, a reduction of 13,701 or 61 percent.    

 

Table 8-4. Comparison of CFE 1A Military Manpower Figures for Selected Nations--July 1992 to November 1995

  CFE 1A Ceiling
July 1992		 Declared Holding
November 1995
United States 250,000 107,166
Germany 345,000 293,889
Turkey 530,000 527,670
Russia 1,450,000 818,471
Poland 234,000 233,870
Ukraine 450,000 400,686

Source: Arms Control Reporter, 407.A.11, (1993): Arms Control Reporter, 407.B.533 (1996).

    Reductions of full-time military personnel occurred in virtually every CFE Treaty state. The CFE 1A Agreement dealt with limits on full-time military personnel. When the states parties agreed to implement the treaty provisionally in July 1992, they declared that 40 months later their military manpower would be at or below a specific numerical ceiling. The states, themselves, set the ceilings; consequently, they were quite high. When the 40-month reduction period ended in November 1995, all nations reporting military personnel force data were in compliance with the CFE 1A Agreement. Three nations--Armenia, Georgia, and Belarus--reported no data. Table 8-4 contains military manpower figures for selected nations at the starting and ending periods, July 1992 and November 1995.

One should approach these figures with caution. As in other comparisons associated with the CFE Treaty, larger forces must be considered. Most of the reasons for these manpower reductions lie outside the CFE Treaty; the treaty was not the single causal factor that forced these manpower reductions.

There is no comprehensive set of figures listing all on-site inspections conducted by every nation under the CFE Treaty. The NATO nations recorded on their VERITY database system only the inspections for the Group of Western States. Inspections conducted by the Eastern nations, especially inspections on each other, were not systematically recorded in any central database or repository. It was not until June 1994 that most of the CFE Treaty states agreed to record their on-site inspections in the VERITY system; thus, no comprehensive list exists of inspections by all states before June 1994. The United States, through the On-Site Inspection Agency, did record the number and type of its own CFE Treaty inspections. Compiled annually, these figures indicated an intense involvement by the United States in monitoring every aspect of the CFE Treaty (table 8-5).

 

Table 8-5. U.S. On-Site Inspections Under the CFE Treaty

Treaty Period Baseline1 19932 19942 19952 19963
Declared Site 43 16 12 14 31
Challenge 1 2 5 1 7
Reduction 5 49 47 41 --
Singletons4 9 86 89 50 56
Totals 58 153 153 106 94

1 July 18, 1992-November 13, 1992.
2 Annual figures, mid-November-mid-November.
3 Residual level validation period (RLVP): November 18, 1995-March 16, 1996.
4 U.S. inspectors on teams led by other state parties.
Source: On-Site Inspection Agency, May 1996.

EVALUATING THE TREATY: FINAL THOUGHTS

If one asked in May 1996 why the CFE Treaty had succeeded as a continental European arms control treaty, there were many answers. On the geopolitical level, Europe had experienced historic changes from 1989 through 1992 that ended the Cold War, unified Germany, dissolved the Soviet Union, and created new European states. On the military level, Europe had witnessed in just five years (1989-1994) the Soviet Union's and Russia's withdrawal of more than 700,000 military personnel from Germany, the Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, and the Baltic states. The United States had withdrawn 220,000 troops from Germany, Italy, Great Britain, Belgium, Holland, and other Western European nations. On the economic level, Central and Eastern European nations had shifted from socialist economies to capitalist market economies, creating a broad political consensus for consumer goods over military equipment. In nation after nation, this economic transition proved extraordinarily difficult, creating societies racked by inflation and unemployment. Arms reduction treaties held a strong appeal for the citizens of most European nations, east and west.

    

 

Trust and verify.

   On the institutional level, some Eastern European nations sought entry into the European Union and the established NATO alliance. Adherence to the CFE Treaty, one of the NATO alliance's fundamental post-Cold War objectives, furthered the foreign policy objectives of these nations. Finally, on the level of international law, the 30-nation CFE Treaty represented a fundamental legal commitment to a single continental arms control treaty permanently limiting five categories of conventional military offensive weapons. The treaty contained important provisions for sharing force data and for verification by on-site inspection, thus creating a legal basis for transparency across national borders on a heavily armed continent. All things considered, national compliance with the CFE Treaty was the result of a broad European consensus constructed on significant changes in geopolitics, military strategy, economics, institutional desires, and a determination to establish international law across the vast continent.

These factors were widely known; what was not so well known were the contributions of the 30 nations' verification agencies, the on-site inspectors monitoring the treaty's provisions and protocols, the military forces reducing the weapons, and the Verification Coordinating Committee and the Joint Consultative Group facilitating implementation. Collectively, these elements had implemented the complex, continent-wide treaty day by day, month by month, year by year.

The people of these organizations were predominantly, but not exclusively, military officers and noncommissioned officers. They were the closest to treaty operations; they knew whether the treaty was meeting its objectives or not. Most believed that the CFE Treaty had achieved its objectives: reducing the level of offensive conventional arms on the continent, marking out territorial zones for the permanent reduction of forces and weapons, and establishing a rule of law for the future of Europe, west and east.

These achievements were important. The CFE Treaty states were constructing the foundations of post-Cold War Europe.

Trust and verify.

 

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