Chapter 4 -- Standing Up the Unit

FINAL PREPARATIONS

During the 30 days prior to the CFE Treaty's entry into force, Colonel Kelley provided the inspection teams one last opportunity to shore up any weak spots in their readiness to conduct their missions. He directed the support branches to provide the inspection division with briefings and refresher training programs on specific topics he felt would be critical to a successful baseline effort. The Logistics Division reviewed and refined "bagman" procedures, vehicle operations, supply, and procuring air transportation under several different scenarios. Plans and Analysis briefed inspection teams on target folders, special databases, and other areas of direct assistance. The Plans Branch also reminded inspectors of their responsibility to provide accurate information needed to develop treaty notification messages. The Operations Branch provided training on its capabilities for assisting teams through communications and current information on different countries. Other briefings and training dealt with team equipment, photography, TLE identification, emergency medical training, and preparation of CFE Treaty reports.²⁶

Transportation

Transportation was critical for successful implementation of the treaty. Inspection teams traveled hundreds or even thousands of miles to arrive at distant points of entry (POEs) at the notified time. Liaison and escort teams had to react with minimal notice to the arrival of Eastern inspection teams at NATO states. The escort teams had to transport up to 10 people, including a bagman. Escort and liaison teams needed flexible and timely transportation to meet the limited notifications allowed in declared site or challenge inspections. Trains and commercial planes in the region were excellent, but they ran only on fixed schedules and didn't go directly to the inspection sites or all POEs. Because automobiles could satisfy mission requirements for 90 percent of the U.S. OOVs, escort and liaison teams in Germany and the nearby Benelux countries relied on minivans. Vans allowed teams to leave at any time and to go directly to the inspection site or POE. During baseline, each escort team was assigned two minivans to transport all team members and their gear. The two-person LNO teams deployed by station wagon. The motor pool at Rhein-Main could not support OSIA with a fleet of 15 minivans and 7 station wagons, so OSIA leased them from two local companies. Liaison teams pre-positioned outside Germany normally used rental cars in their missions. Motor vehicles, however, could not satisfy all of OSIA's mission requirements.²⁷

Minivans and station wagons were primary transportation for escort and liaison teams.

A C-141 from the 437th MAW prepared to depart Rhein-Main Air Base, Germany, on an OSIA mission.

To conduct CFE inspections in the Eastern states, U.S. teams would deploy to national entry points as far away as Moscow. American escort teams would also respond, on short notice, to areas across Western Europe from the United Kingdom to Turkey. Airlift was the only way to implement the treaty in those circumstances. In early planning Major Steven E. Pestana, USAF, of the Mission Coordination Branch, studied the possibility of using C-20 class aircraft. These small business jets were perhaps the best suited for the mission, although there was concern that all the inspectors and their belongings could exceed weight limits of the aircraft. With the Gulf War and the drawdown of American forces in Europe, however, the C-20s were no longer an option. There were not enough suitable U.S. aircraft in Europe to support the CFE mission. In January 1990, the director of operations at Headquarters USAFE announced that the Military Airlift Command (MAC) would provide C-141, C-130, or C-5 airlift for the CFE mission, based on passenger or load requirements. In addition, USAFE would provide C-130 aircraft to support the CFE mission. The 435th Tactical Airlift Wing at Rhein-Main, a USAFE unit,* and the 437th and 438th Military Airlift Wings from Charleston AFB, South Carolina, and McGuire AFB, New Jersey, both MAC wings, would provide airlift support to OSIA teams.

The 435th crews flew C-130s on inspection missions into Eastern Europe, and also were tasked to support CFE escort missions outside Central Europe. To perform that mission, which could be on short notice for escort operations, the 435th kept two crews and one C-130 on alert. Meanwhile, crews of the 437th and 438th flew C-141s on inspection missions into the former Soviet Union. The MAC wings alternated support with two C-141s that were pre-positioned at Rhein-Main. Wilbur Lewis, Jr., of OSIA's Military Airlift Coordination Branch, arranged for the C-141 support from OSIA Headquarters. The Plans Branch at European Operations (EO) coordinated C-130 missions at Rhein-Main.

* During the same time OSIA was preparing for CFE Treaty implementation, the U.S. Air Force underwent a reorganization. As part of this reorganization, control of Rhein-Main Air Base and its host unit, the 435th Tactical Airlift Wing, passed from MAC to USAFE. Previously, while USAFE played a major role in scheduling the 435th's C-130 theater airlift forces, it did not actually own the unit. The reorganization also resulted in many redesignations, both to field units and major commands. On 1 June 1992, MAC inactivated and was replaced by the Air Mobility Command (AMC). In addition, both Military Airlift WIngs and Tactical Airlift Wings were redegninated simply as Airlift Wings.

One of the elements of coordinating airlift support was tracking vital information on all aircrew members.²⁸ The protocol on inspection required that each signatory provide a list to all other treaty nations of aircrew members (600 maximum) and inspectors (400 maximum) designated to support or participate in CFE inspections. The list included names, gender, date and place of birth, and passport number. The long, detailed U.S. list was compiled by OSIA's Treaty List Management Branch. Once the list was compiled, OSIA turned it over to the U.S. State Department for dissemination to other nations at Vienna. The inspection protocol required each state to provide this list to all other signatories within 90 days after treaty signature. The next opportunity to update lists came within 30 days of treaty implementation. In addition, the treaty allowed a nation receiving the list up to 30 days to review it and request that the originating state delete certain names from the list; there was no right of refusal to delete names. Because of the long period between signature and entry into force, the U.S. list was outdated at entry into force. Some people were no longer available for duty but were still on the list, and others who arrived after the original list was submitted were available for duty but not listed. This situation would affect OSIA's early baseline operations.²⁹

Communications

Communications under the INF Treaty had been relatively simple. The Nuclear Risk Reduction Center (NRRC) at the U.S. State Department passed information directly to the Soviet Nuclear Risk Reduction Center in Moscow. A single conduit passed all required data. Under the CFE Treaty, a new system, the CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) communications network, was only partially functional when the treaty's baseline inspection phase started in July 1992.

The CSCE members had anticipated a communications network linking 35 CSCE capitals and three CSCE institutions 24 hours a day. The system, designed to support the Vienna Document, was linked by a central switching center at The Hague. Unfortunately, when the system was designed, the Soviet Union required only one terminal, in Moscow. With the breakup of the USSR, however, a glaring weakness in the CSCE communications system surfaced. No nation in the former Soviet Union, except Russia, had the hardware to connect to the system. Hardware was expensive, and newly emerging nations opted to apply their limited resources to other pressing matters. As a result, during CFE baseline the U.S. NRRC transmitted CFE messages to only those nations that were operating on the CSCE network.

The Nuclear Risk Reduction Center in the Department of State sent and received treaty messages.

To reach those nations that were not yet on the network, and as a backup in case of a system failure, the State Department also sent CFE notification messages through diplomatic channels. Diplomatic channels sometimes entailed hand-carried messages from the U.S. Embassy to the appropriate officials in that state. Acknowledgment of receipt and acceptance of an inspection required additional hand-carried notes from state agencies to the U.S. Embassy. This added a burden to some embassy staffs that were already extremely busy and, as was discovered during mock inspections, were sometimes unaware of notification requirements of the CFE Treaty. Meanwhile, the Plans Branch and Operations at EO had opened an informal "back door" communications network that eclipsed the formal system during the early stages of baseline.

This informal communications system was based on the excellent working relationships of staff with their counterparts in verification agencies throughout Europe. This informal system developed with the initial outreach for mock inspections and grew day to day as the agencies--particularly the German, French, British, and U.S. agencies--repeatedly looked to each other for reliable and timely information. This informal network would prove valuable during baseline, when the formal notification system occasionally failed. Fortunately, the informal communication system provided a safety net, and frequently OSIA liaison teams had to prepare or deploy based on information from this network.

As baseline drew near, the teams were trained and eager, equipment was in place, transportation stood ready, and several communications systems were operating.³⁰