News

Tracking Number:  196378

Title:  "US Proposes Strengthening Weapons Convention." ACDA Director Ronald Lehman says strengthening compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention must be the primary task of the Third Review Conference on the ban. (910910)

Translated Title:  EU propone fortalecer convencion armas.; Les U-U pour la suppression des armes biologiques. (910910)
Author:  NEWMANN, ROBIN (USIA STAFF WRITER)
Date:  19910910

Text:
*POL204

09/10/91 U.S. PROPOSES STRENGTHENING WEAPONS CONVENTION (Lehman addresses review conference) (710) By Robin Newmann USIA European Correspondent

Geneva -- Faced with a growing number of countries intent on producing biological weapons, U.S. Ambassador Ronald Lehman says strengthening compliance with the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention must be the "primary task" of the Third Review Conference on the ban.

Lehman, chief U.S. delegate and head of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), told conference participants in Geneva September 10 they "must reaffirm their support in the strongest possible terms for the complete prohibition of biological and toxin weapons. Such horrific weapons are a threat to all mankind (and) the international community cannot and must not tolerate the development, production and stockpiling of such weapons."

The convention bans the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons, and currently has nearly 120 parties. The conference opened its three-week review of the document September 9.

Lehman said "a number of countries" are working to produce both previously known and future biological weapons. Controlling the proliferation of such weapons is difficult because of the very fine line separating research and development of biological agents for medical and pharmaceutical use and research for hostile purposes, Lehman noted, but he proposed that parties adopt export controls on equipment, biological substances and toxins for non-parties to the convention.

To assist this effort, Lehman said the United States would provide to the parties the list of organisms and dual-use (civilian and hostile) equipment covered by existing U.S. export controls.

"Sadly," Lehman said, the proliferation of biological weapons is not limited to non-parties to the convention. The recent "striking" example of noncompliance is Iraq, he recalled, "which has clearly had a biological weapons program, even though it had signed the biological weapons convention."

In addition, Lehman said, "we believe the Soviet Union and other states have extensive active biological weapons programs in violation of the biological weapons convention.

GE 2 POL204 "We insist that those signatories and parties not in compliance with their obligations 'get their house in order' and take the steps necessary toward full compliance. We strongly urge the conference to express similar sentiments in its final document."

He said the international community should "draw attention to violations" and adopt a series of confidence-building measures "designed to increase the transparency of permitted biological defense activities and to support international investigations into allegations of violations."

Lehman also suggested that the data exchange already in effect among parties on biological activities be increased, notably by declarations on whether or not parties have a biological defense program and, if so, providing detailed information on it.

Parties should also report unusual disease outbreaks to the World Health Organization (WHO) rather than to the biological weapons convention mechanism, Lehman said.

Lehman said the United States would be willing to support the establishment of an ad hoc multilateral experts group to study the technical feasibility of adding effective verification measures to the convention. However, he added, "we do not currently know of any way to make it effectively verifiable." He also said the effectiveness of routine or challenge on-site inspections of biological facilities, similar to those envisaged for a chemical weapons ban, had not yet been proven.

"Research for legitimate biological, medical and pharmaceutical purposes is in many cases virtually indistinguishable from research aimed at developing biological weapons capabilities," Lehman said. "Nor is there any technology at hand, or even on the distant horizon, that can make such distinctions."

Other measures proposed by Lehman included:

-- the adoption of national legislation to prohibit any support by a country's nationals of prohibited activities in the field of biological weapons. (He noted that the United States already has criminal sanctions against U.S. citizens who knowingly assist foreign chemical and biological weapons programs.)

-- that parties declare their intention to consider sanctions against any country that uses biological weapons and other measures for violations of the convention, such as the cessation of scientific and technical collaboration on any biological activity, trade restrictions or denial of foreign assistance.

GE 3 POL204 The review conference, which began September 9, is scheduled to complete its work with a final document September 27. NNNN