News

Tracking Number:  196372

Title:  "Conference Can Strengthen Biological Weapons Regime." ACDA Director Ronald Lehman's address to the Third Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. (910910)

Date:  19910910

Text:
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09/10/91 CONFERENCE CAN STRENGTHEN BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS REGIME (Text: Lehman remarks to Review Conference) (3370)

Geneva -- The Third Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention currently underway in Geneva represents an important opportunity to "consider ways to strengthen the implementation of the regime against" such weapons, the United States says.

U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director Ronald Lehman told the conference September 10 that the United States is "prepared to consider carefully whether and how the prohibition of biological and toxin weapons can be verified."

"In particular," he said, "we plan to explore possible ways to increase participation in the convention and to build confidence through greater openness. Finally, we will continue to emphasize the importance we place on compliance and on the review conference recognizing and addressing compliance concerns."

Following is the text of Lehman's remarks:

(begin text)

Twenty years ago, negotiators here in Geneva completed the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. They were determined, in the words of the convention's preamble, "...to exclude completely the possibility of biological agents and toxins being used as weapons." The task of those of us gathered here today, as reflected in Article XII, is to review the operation of the convention, with a view to assuring that the purpose of the preamble and the provisions of the convention are being realized. This is an important responsibility; it is one the United States takes very seriously.

In fulfilling their responsibilities, participants in this conference must reaffirm their support in the strongest possible terms for the complete prohibition of biological and toxin weapons. Such horrific weapons are a threat to all mankind. The international community cannot and must not tolerate the development, production, and stockpiling of such weapons.

The international community has certain widely-accepted standards of behavior that allow it to function. The BW Convention provides the only comprehensive international standard with respect to biological and toxin weapons. It

GE 2 TXT202 also provides a rallying point for international reaction to violations of agreed codes of conduct by any nation.

The United States has a vital interest in maintaining the viability of the BW Convention. The United States unilaterally renounced biological and toxin weapons well before the convention was completed. It is fully committed to the convention and its effective implementation.

Like any human instrument, the BW Convention is not perfect. One of our goals for this conference will be to pursue actively practical and effective measures to implement the convention and to strengthen confidence in it. But in pointing out what needs to be improved, the United States would like to emphasize its confidence in the convention itself. Whatever its flaws, the convention will remain the world's principal bulwark against biological and toxin weapons.

Strengthening the implementation of the convention is our primary task, and the U.S. delegation is prepared to consider carefully at this Third Review Conference how the prohibition of biological and toxin weapons can be implemented more effectively.

A key element of the BW Convention is the question of intent; actions associated with a biological or toxin weapons program are prohibited. It is up to states parties to provide assurance, therefore, that their intent in pursuing biological activities is peaceful.

Our fundamental premise is that the best approach to bolstering the BW Convention is by building confidence among the parties that all participants are abiding by its terms and by bringing violators into compliance. The convention is not effectively verifiable and we do not know any way to make it so. Our efforts during this conference, therefore, will stress transparency and openness by all parties. States must be as open as possible about their biological activities. We plan to propose our own measures -- and support those proposed by others -- that emphasize confidence-building. In doing so, we will strengthen the implementation of the BW Convention, reaffirm our commitment to the convention, and stress the binding nature of the convention under international law.

To achieve our goals of strengthening the implementation of the BW Convention, we must address a number of important issues in the weeks ahead, including proliferation, noncompliance, means for increasing confidence in compliance, inadequate implementation of existing confidence-building measures and lack of adherence by key countries.

Proliferation Concerns

GE 3 TXT202

The proliferation of biological and toxin weapons is frightening and threatening for all of us. Such weapons may be more potent than the most deadly chemical weapons, and many are highly unpredictable in their effects. In our judgment, a number of countries are working to produce both previously known and future biological weapons.

Control of proliferation is difficult because many research and development efforts in this field are dual-use in nature. In contrast to the production of chemical weapons, there are no precursors or equipment that can be used solely for the production of biological agents for hostile purpose; for example, the same materials are critical for vital research to control the spread of many serious diseases and for certain types of vaccine production. Many substances that may be used as biological weapons occur naturally on the territory of a number of parties. Actually, any nation with a modestly developed pharmaceutical industry can produce material for biological or toxin weapons, if it so chooses.

We must ensure that such a choice is not an option. The United States is doing its part. President Bush, last November, issued an executive order tightening U.S. sanctions aimed at preventing proliferation of several weapons of mass destruction. The Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative, which in part implements that executive order, was announced in December 1990. The export of dual- use equipment suitable for making chemical and biological weapons will require an export license. In addition, the president has directed the imposition of criminal sanctions against U.S. citizens who knowingly assist foreign chemical and biological weapons or missile programs. I will speak to this later.

Proliferation is a global problem, and requires a global solution. At the same time, the current situation in the Middle East poses unique dangers and opportunities. Thus, President Bush's May 29 initiative to curb the spread of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons concentrates on the Middle East as its starting point, while complementing other initiatives such as those taken by Prime Ministers John Major and Takishi Kaifu.

Part of the president's Middle East initiative focuses specifically on biological weapons and builds on our existing global approach and our global standards. The president's initiatives:

-- call for strengthening the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention through full implementation of existing provisions and through improved mechanisms; and

-- urge regional states to adopt biological weapons confidence-building measures.

GE 4 TXT202 These initiatives also complement U.S. support for the continuation of the U.N. Security Council embargo against arms transfers to Iraq, as well as the efforts of the U.N. Special Commission to eliminate Iraq's remaining capabilities to use or produce nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and the missiles to deliver them.

The U.S. delegation will seek to strengthen the implementation of the BW Convention in ways that do not impede the biotechnology industry or legitimate biological defense activities. Specifically, the United States will propose that the parties declare their intention to:

-- Establish national export controls on pathogenic biological organisms and toxins and on dual-use equipment transfers to non-state parties and organizations in non- state parties of such biological organisms and toxins, as well as related dual-use equipment.

It is not appropriate for the review conference to negotiate a specified list of controlled items. We will, however, provide to parties, as a model, the list of organisms and dual-use equipment controlled under U.S. export control. The United States will also encourage other states to consider similar measures in their individual export control policies. It is important that all nations do what they can to ensure that they or their industries are not contributing to the proliferation of BW. One important step in this direction is the adoption of national export controls on pathogenic biological agents, toxins and related equipment.

Compliance Concerns

Sadly, the BW proliferation problem is not limited to states who have not yet signed the convention. Among the proliferators are states who have thrown aside the international obligations and standards they assumed when they signed and in some cases ratified the BW Convention. We must not and cannot turn a blind eye to states not in compliance with the object and purpose of the convention. We must not and cannot accept arguments that attempt to explain away noncompliance as a difference in what lies in the eye of the beholder. Proliferation is a problem for all of us, in part because some states have not lived up to their international obligations.

We have a striking recent example of the threat posed by noncompliance and the importance of addressing the issue head-on. That example is Iraq, which has clearly had a biological weapons program, even though it had signed the Biological Weapons Convention. Iraq's denial that it had a BW program was transmitted in the same documents stating that Iraq had deposited its instruments of ratification.

GE 5 TXT202 No one really knows how much BW Iraq has produced or what it may be hiding in order to continue to pursue this deadly trail.

Obviously, such behavior is unacceptable. And Iraq should feel the full international opprobrium that we -- the other parties to the convention who respect our obligations -- can muster. Any state in noncompliance with the convention must never be able to escape the pressure that comes from knowing the international community will not countenance such disregard for treaty obligations and expects action to rectify the situation.

At this Third Review Conference, the United States will emphasize the continued importance it attaches to compliance with the provisions of the convention. In this context we will seek recognition by the review conference of compliance concerns and call on states parties to make every reasonable effort to resolve them.

We believe the Soviet Union and other states have extensive active biological weapons programs in violation of the BW Convention. We insist that those signatories and parties not in compliance with their obligations "get their house in order" and take the steps necessary toward full compliance. We will strongly urge the conference to express similar sentiments in its final document.

Confidence Building

It is the U.S. view that, given constantly evolving scientific and technical developments that further complicate the already daunting problem of verification of a comprehensive ban on biological and toxin weapons, the BW Convention cannot be made effectively verifiable either through amendment or redesign. Rather, the key to success of the BWC is confidence, and we will stress ways to increase transparency and openness by the parties. Our first step in this regard is to make those confidence- building measures on which we have already agreed work as effectively as possible. Our strategy supports the international norm against biological and toxin weapons by:

(1) continuing to draw attention to violations of the BW Convention and to the lack of international response to those violations as a threat to the norm; and

(2) advocating adoption of a series of confidence-building measures designed to increase the transparency of permitted biological defense activities and to support international investigations into allegations of violations.

In the Second Review Conference final document, participants endorsed several measures committing parties

GE 6 TXT202 to the BW Convention to the implementation of several confidence-building measures. These were steps in the right direction.

Unfortunately, implementation of data reporting provisions is only voluntary and only a quarter of the parties have participated. Many presumably do not report because they have no facilities of the types covered by the confidence- building measures. Lack of resources in foreign ministries of small countries may also contribute to the low rate of participation. While the low rate of participation may be understandable, it is not acceptable.

We must do better. All parties should participate in the data exchange even if some simply have to state that they have no facilities or activities to declare. We will propose, therefore, that parties provide annually by April 15 either the specific information requested in the BWC data exchange or a "null report." Such "null" reports can also help to build confidence through greater openness. I urge the smaller states in particular to give greater political priority to participation.

Beyond this we will encourage parties to better implement, bolster, or expand the existing CBM on "Active promotion of contacts between scientists engaged in biological research directly related to the convention, including exchanges for joint research on mutually agreed basis."

Along these lines, we would encourage parties to report to the convention on such exchanges.

Another measure is that:

-- Data declarations should include lists of publications resulting from research in the declared facilities.

In a major improvement to the data exchange, the United States will propose that:

-- Parties declare whether or not they have a biological defense program, and if so, provide detailed information on facilities, activities and funding.

Such information could include: a general description of the principal research activities underway; the location of each biological defense research facility; and the source and amount of aggregate funding for a given year at each facility for biological defense research, development, testing and evaluation involving any biological or infectious agent or toxin. This should be part of the annual data declaration. If, however, a party does not have a biological defense program, a "null report" would be required. This would increase openness on work related to BW defense.

GE 7 TXT202 Another measure is that:

-- Parties would report unusual disease outbreaks to the World Health Organization (WHO), rather than to BWC parties as provided in the 1986 BWC CBM.

This CBM has been poorly observed, and reporting to the WHO -- a standard practice -- is likely to be more successful than reporting through the BW Convention mechanism.

Problems in Verification

It is our view that the BW Convention is not effectively verifiable. In this context, this means that the United States acknowledges the inherent difficulty of detecting and verifying illegal activities under the convention. Nonetheless, we have been able to discover some firm evidence of noncompliance. The United States would be interested in studying potential measures that would assist in verification of the convention, but we do not currently know of any way to make it effectively verifiable. So far, no persuasive case has been made for the effectiveness of either routine or challenge inspections of biological facilities. Ineffective verification regimes and measures that adversely impact biological defense programs and other peaceful biological activities are not acceptable. Nor are regimes that foster a false sense of confidence.

Great technical and practical barriers to verification exist. These difficulties are inherent in the methods of producing microorganisms and toxins. From the standpoint of technology, production of such materials for offensive purposes is extremely difficult, and in some cases perhaps impossible, to differentiate from production for peaceful purposes. Moreover, research for legitimate biological, medical, and pharmaceutical purposes is in many cases virtually indistinguishable from research aimed at developing biological weapons capabilities. Nor is there any technology at hand, or even on the distant horizon, that can make such distinctions.

An ineffective verification regime force fed into the BW Convention could ultimately make cheating easier and more rewarding by creating a false sense of confidence. Since the practical problems of differentiating between legitimate and illicit activities would remain, it would have no value in detecting noncompliance and no deterrent value. Ironically, an unworkable verification regime forced into the BW Convention also would diminish the concept and value of verification in other important arms control areas.

Focusing on the lack of verification measures in the BW Convention detracts from the convention's fundamental value

GE 8 TXT202 as an international standard which carries the cumulative weight of the solemn and sovereign pledges of almost 120 states. We all have a vital interest in reinforcing the convention as an international standard and in highlighting the significance of each party's sovereign commitment to the convention.

Efforts Toward Effective Verification

As I have already pointed out, although we have not found any such measures, the United States is prepared to explore the feasibility of effective verification of the BW Convention. Therefore, we would be willing to consider a move by the review conference to establish a multilateral effort to give the issue careful study.

We would be willing, for example to:

-- Encourage parties to study on a national level the technical feasibility of effective verification of the BW Convention.

Reporting of the results of these studies to other parties should also be encouraged.

We would also be willing to:

-- Support the establishment of an ad hoc multilateral experts group to study the technical feasibility of effective verification of the BW Convention.

Such a study, however, should have carefully drawn terms of reference, including: specific goals, limited duration, government representatives only, reports based on consensus, and no mandate for drafting verification provisions. Of course, any decision about further work on verification provisions, inspection measures or other verification issues would have to await the results of such studies.

Consultation/Enforcement Measures

We will propose that parties:

-- Adopt national legislation that includes domestic penal legislation to prohibit any support by its nationals of prohibited activities in any country and report annually on measures taken in this regard.

The report would include: what legislation or other legal measures had been enacted; what enforcement measures had been taken pursuant to the legal measures; and what

GE 9 TXT202 prosecution or other punitive action had been taken against violators of the legal measures.

We will also propose that parties:

-- Commit themselves to consult and cooperate in "solving any problems" involving the convention that arise and on the request of any state party to consider allegations of BW use.

Parties could agree to make every reasonable effort to address concerns regarding an alleged breach of their obligations under the convention; provide a specific, timely response to any complaint submitted through the consultation process or through the U.N. Security Council alleging a breach of their convention obligations; and cooperate fully with any U.N. secretary general investigation of biological or toxin weapons use pursuant to U.N. General Assembly Resolution 45/57C.

We will ask parties:

-- To declare their intention individually to consider sanctions for any country that uses BW and to consider other appropriate measures for violations of the BW Convention.

Possible measures might include cessation of scientific and technical collaboration on any biological activity, trade restrictions or denial of foreign assistance.

Facilitation Mechanism

There is currently no mechanism for oversight of CBM implementation between review conferences. An improved mechanism for distribution of information provided in the data exchange is badly needed. Reports are circulated solely in the original language and are not readily available to those that wish to get this information. A facilitation mechanism may help remedy this situation. We will propose, therefore, that:

-- The review conference establish a mechanism for facilitating the implementation of the CBMs during the five-year period between review conferences.

Such a mechanism should be informal and flexible. Its possible functions might include: facilitating implementation of the agreed CBMs; making arrangements for consultative meetings requested by a party; providing support for meetings mandated by the review conference; serving as a clearinghouse for scientific and technical information pertinent to the BW Convention; obtaining information from WHO on unusual outbreaks of disease that

* PAGE 10 PAGE 10 TXT202 are relevant to the BW Convention; and providing a channel to facilitate such protective or humanitarian assistance to parties as parties deem appropriate.

In conclusion, we believe that the Third Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention represents an important opportunity to review how well the convention has functioned and to consider ways to strengthen the implementation of the regime against biological and toxin weapons. We plan to take an active and constructive role at this review conference. We are prepared to consider carefully whether and how the prohibition of biological and toxin weapons can be verified. In particular, we plan to explore possible ways to increase participation in the convention and to build confidence through greater openness. Finally, we will continue to emphasize the importance we place on compliance and on the review conference recognizing and addressing compliance concerns.

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