Security Council

15 December 1994


                        NOTE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

    The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the Security Council
a report submitted by the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission
established by the Secretary-General, pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of
Security Council resolution 687 (1991).

94-50308 (E)   161294                                                     /...

              Eighth report of the Executive Chairman of the Special
              Commission established by the Secretary-General
              pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council
              resolution 687 (1991), on the activities of the
              Special Commission

                               I.  INTRODUCTION

1.  The present report is the eighth on the activities of the Special
Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b)
(i) of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), submitted to the Security
Council by the Executive Chairman of the Commission.  It is the seventh such
report provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Security Council resolution
699 (1991).  It covers the period from 10 June to 9 December 1994, and is
further to the reports contained in documents S/23165, S/23268, S/24108 and
Corr.1, S/24984, S/25977, S/26910 and S/1994/750.

2.  As noted in the report contained in document S/1994/1138 and Corr.1
submitted under Council resolution 715 (1991), during the six months to
October 1994, the Commission allocated the bulk of its resources to the
establishment of the ongoing monitoring and verification system.  Since the
time of that report, the Commission has been forced to redirect more of its
total resources to resolving outstanding issues in relation to the past
programmes and to the establishment of the export/import mechanism required
under paragraph 7 of Security Council resolution 715 (1991).  Even so, a
large part of the developments to be covered in the present report have
already been addressed in the October report.  Consequently, there is
considerable overlap between the two reports.

                              II.  DEVELOPMENTS

                                 A.  General

3.  Much has been achieved in the period under review.  The Commission has
moved on from the initial stages of establishing the system of ongoing
monitoring and verification to a stage where the system is provisionally
operational and its efficacy is being tested.  Interim monitoring in the
biological area began in December 1994.  In addition, the Commission has
advanced its understanding of the past programmes and has pursued the
establishment of an export/import mechanism for dual-purpose items as defined
by the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification.  The political dialogue
between the Commission and Iraq has continued; high-level meetings, both
general and technical, were held in New York in July, September, October and
November and in Baghdad in July, October and November 1994.

4.  The emphasis of the Commission's efforts in this period was clearly to
establish the ongoing monitoring and verification system.  This required the
collation and analysis of data about Iraq's dual-purpose capabilities, the
preparation of monitoring and verification protocols for each site to be
monitored, the inventorying and tagging of identified dual-purpose items, the
installation of sensors, the establishment of the Baghdad Monitoring and
Verification Centre and communications with remote-controlled sensors, and
the dispatch of resident monitoring groups to Iraq to serve in the Centre.

5.  Concurrent with this major effort, the Commission followed through on the
understanding reached with Iraq in October 1993 to resolve outstanding issues
related to Iraq's past proscribed programmes in parallel with the
establishment of ongoing monitoring and verification.  In this regard,
further discussions were held with Iraq, Iraqi personnel were interviewed,
the Commission obtained some limited additional documentation from Iraq and
further inspections were conducted.  Furthermore, the Commission intensified
greatly its contacts with supporting and supplier Governments as part of its
efforts to corroborate, in the absence of direct supporting evidence from
Iraq itself, Iraqi accounts of its imports for the past programmes.  Analysis
of the data available to the Commission from all these sources has indicated
new avenues of investigation to pursue in order to obtain an independently
verified account.  In many instances, new information obtained by the
Commission contradicted the accounts given by Iraq.  Detailed, complete and
accurate data on previous imports of prohibited and dual-purpose items is
necessary to fulfil the mandate to account fully for Iraq's past proscribed
capabilities and to ensure a comprehensive ongoing monitoring and
verification system covering all of Iraq's dual-purpose capabilities.

6.  Considerable effort was also expended on another aspect of the
Commission's work, completion of which is a prerequisite for fulfilling the
terms for the lifting of the sanctions - development of the concept and
operational plan for the export/import mechanism required under paragraph 7
of Security Council resolution 715 (1991).  Further seminars were held with
international experts to elaborate the items to be covered by the mechanism
and to create a practical, effective and durable system.

7.  Iraq was, during the period under report, generally cooperative in the
Commission's efforts to establish the physical aspects of ongoing monitoring
and verification.  Access was provided to all sites designated by the
Commission for inspection and to personnel involved.  Iraq provided much
support for the installation of monitoring sensors, for the inventorying and
tagging of dual-purpose items, for the construction of the Baghdad Monitoring
and Verification Centre and for the establishment of communications between
the Centre and the remote-controlled sensors.

8.  However, Iraq's attitude to the provision of data and supporting evidence
still fell far short of its obligation to provide full, final and complete
disclosures of its past proscribed programmes and of its current and recent
dual-purpose capabilities subject to ongoing monitoring and verification.  It
appears that many of Iraq's declarations are incomplete and sometimes
contradictory.  The Commission has both direct and indirect evidence that
Iraq is still failing to declare equipment and materials acquired for and
capable of use in proscribed programmes and that its accounts of certain of
its projects do not reflect their true purpose and their role as part of now
proscribed weapons programmes.  In general, in relation to the past
programmes, Iraq has not volunteered information and has shown marked lack of
transparency, disclosing information only when confronted with evidence by
the Commission.  Iraq maintains its claim, not believed by the Commission,
that it has destroyed all documentation related to these programmes and that
no other tangible proofs exist to support its accounts.  Indeed, events of
the past six months have strengthened the Commission's conviction that
important documentation still exists and that the Iraqi authorities have
taken the conscious decision not to release it freely to the Commission.  In
any case, Iraq has not fulfilled its undertaking to resolve all outstanding
issues in relation to the past programmes in parallel with the establishment
of ongoing monitoring and verification.  The importance of doing so has been
repeatedly impressed upon Iraq at each of the high-level meetings referred to
above, as has the need for Iraq to provide documentation and supporting

9.  The situation is better in relation to declarations required under the
plan for ongoing monitoring and verification.  Generally, despite omissions
and inconsistencies, these declarations have been sufficient to permit the
initiation of ongoing monitoring and verification.  However, early in the
reporting period, major problems continued in the biological area, where
incomplete declarations, the failure to declare all equipment and materials
which should be monitored, together with a failure to declare movement,
repair or modification of equipment between inspections, resulted in a
situation where the establishment of reliable baseline data from which to
start monitoring was not possible.  This, clearly, delayed the initiation of
ongoing monitoring and verification in the biological area.  However, in
November 1994, Iraq presented new declarations in the biological area and has
undertaken to work with the Commission to continue to improve these
declarations.  As a result of these developments, interim monitoring in the
biological area has now started.

10. Initially, a delaying factor was that managers and senior personnel at
sites being monitored were not sufficiently aware of the nature of ongoing
monitoring and verification and of the Commission's rights to conduct it. 
However, the situation appears to be improving significantly as Iraq gains
greater experience in ongoing monitoring and verification and so understands
the need to educate key personnel at monitored sites.

11. There have been fewer problems in the exercise of the Commission's
privileges and immunities during the period under review, with fewer
challenges as to whether the Commission's activities are indeed related to
resolution 715 (1991) (i.e. covered by the mandate to conduct ongoing
monitoring and verification), only a few minor attempts to restrict or delay
access to sites or personnel, and limited instances of tampering with tags. 
Harassment of Commission personnel has all but stopped and, while minor
problems arose in relation to the operation of the aerial inspections, there
have been no attempts to prevent the Commission from taking the photographs
it is instructed to obtain.

12. However, in the autumn, the Iraqi authorities created a serious crisis
with regard to the implementation of resolution 687 (1991).  On 22 September
1994, the Iraqi authorities started to make threats to block the work of the
Commission.  In an effort to normalize the situation, the Executive Chairman
visited Baghdad early in October 1994.  In meetings with the Foreign Minister
of Iraq and other officials on 4 and 5 October 1994, the Iraqi side rejected
all appeals by the Chairman to withdraw those threats.  At this time, Iraqi
troop movements in the direction of Kuwait had already started.

13. On 6 October 1994, a joint meeting of Iraq's Revolution Command Council
and the Iraqi Command of the Ba'ath Party indicated that, unless the Security
Council's consideration of the Commission's biannual report on the
implementation of ongoing monitoring and verification (S/1994/1138 and
Corr.1) to take place on or about 10 October 1994 were favourable to Iraq,
Iraq might withdraw its cooperation with the Commission.  This was rejected
by the Council on 8 October 1994 in a statement by its President on behalf of
the Council (S/PRST/1994/58).  On 15 October, the Security Council adopted
resolution 949 (1994), demanding "that Iraq cooperate fully with the
Commission" and the withdrawal of "all military units recently deployed to
southern Iraq to their original positions".

14. Subsequently, it became clear that Iraq did not follow through on its
threats and, throughout the events surrounding the troop movements of
October 1994, the Commission was able to continue its operations as usual. 
These developments served to underline the need continuously to watch Iraq's
intentions and actions closely in relation to the work of the Commission. 
Any change in Iraq's current attitude towards the Commission will be reported
to the Council immediately.

                                 B.  Missiles

15. In the missile area, the Commission has a fuller account of Iraq's past
programmes but the issue of verification remains.  Areas of particular
concern relate to accounting for known imports of components and production
equipment.  Efforts to address these concerns have focused on increased
contacts with supporting and supplier Governments and further discussions
with Iraq.  However, on several occasions, Iraq has not declared the full
facts when issues have first been raised.  A prime example relates to the
import of a high-precision instrumentation radar which the Commission has
firm evidence was imported for proscribed ballistic missile programmes and
was used as part of the testing of proscribed missiles.  Iraq denied this
outright and has presented numerous different and conflicting explanations of
the use and purpose of this radar.  On 14 December 1994, the Commission
informed Iraq by letter of its decision that the radar must be destroyed, stating:

    "The Commission's investigations into and judgements on this matter have
    relied on information obtained from a variety of different sources and on
    your authorities' own statements.  From Iraq's own declarations, the
    radar was used around the time of two Al Abbas missile launches on
    28 December 1990.  Iraq subsequently acknowledged that the radar was
    installed at the testing site in Basrah on 26 December 1990, that
    adjustment and initial operations began on 27 December 1990, that testing
    activity and adjustment continued on 28 December 1990, and that the radar
    was disassembled and packaged on 29 December 1990.  Most recently, Iraq
    further acknowledged that the radar was operating and the radar dish was
    pointed in the direction of the missiles during the two test launches.

    "The Commission has, on the basis of all the information available to it,
    concluded that the radar was indeed involved in the tracking of
    proscribed missile systems on 28 December 1990.  Consequently, the radar
    is an item which is proscribed under paragraph 8 of Security Council
    resolution 687 (1991).  The radar and associated equipment has therefore
    to be disposed of in accordance with that paragraph."

16. Ongoing monitoring and verification has proceeded well in this area. 
Monitoring and verification protocols have been completed for the sites to be
monitored and all missiles, components and equipment identified for
monitoring have been tagged and inventoried.  Fifty monitoring cameras have
been installed at 15 sites and the missile monitoring group is proceeding
with monitoring activities.  In general, Iraq's declarations for missile
monitoring have been adequate, although there have been some omissions, such
as failure to declare stored dual-purpose equipment.  These shortcomings are
being addressed in the course of monitoring activities.

                             C.  Chemical weapons

17. Similar problems exist in the chemical area regarding past programmes. 
The list of letters of credit obtained from Iraq in April 1994, while neither
accurate nor complete, has provided the Commission with much new data and new
avenues for further investigations.  However, the Commission cannot yet be
certain that it has accounted fully for all the precursors and production
equipment imported.  These uncertainties, coupled with a lack of
substantiation of the disposition of chemical munitions, renders a full
material balance for the chemical weapons programmes impossible for the

18. Ongoing monitoring and verification is also proceeding well in this area,
although it is less advanced than in the missile area.  Monitoring and
verification protocols have been completed for all the key sites and the key
items have been tagged and inventoried.  A chemical monitoring group is in
Iraq operating out of the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre.  It is
completing the protocol-building and tagging process at sites of secondary
importance, such as universities, while conducting ongoing monitoring and
verification of key sites.  Four chemical sensors have been installed at one
site and a further 20 should be installed at other sites in January 1995. 
Monitoring cameras and flow meters should be installed by the same date.  A
small chemical laboratory will be installed at the Centre in February 1995.

19. The Commission will experiment with a number of different configurations
for the disposition of the chemical sensors, some being placed inside
buildings and others outside, to assess the best combination of sensors,
given the chemical processes and number of buildings involved and the
prevailing wind conditions.  These experiments should take about six to eight
weeks to complete.

                            D.  Biological weapons

20. The Commission faces its greatest problems in accounting for Iraq's past
biological programme.  Iraq's account is minimal and has no inherent logic. 
While access has been provided to interview the personnel involved in the
declared programme, interviewees refused to answer questions relating to the
programme, providing only incomplete and misleading information.  While Iraq
maintains that the programme was in the early research stages and would be
defensively oriented, the indications all point to an offensive programme. 
In these circumstances, the Commission cannot yet provide a material balance
for this programme.

21. The Commission has also faced greater problems in seeking to establish
ongoing monitoring and verification in the biological area than it did in the
other areas.  Iraq's declarations of dual-purpose items were, until recently,
often largely incomplete, inconsistent with each other and with the findings
of inspection teams, and not updated with notifications of movement of
declared items from one site to another.

22. To redress this situation, the Commission requested that Iraq provide new
and complete declarations for all the sites to be monitored and instructed
Iraq on how these declarations should be formatted.  New declarations were
submitted in November 1994.  Currently, Iraq is working with inspection teams
in Iraq to improve these declarations.  In addition, an interim monitoring
group has been dispatched to Iraq to obtain for the key sites the information
that Iraq should have declared and which is required to create monitoring and
verification protocols for those sites.  Thereafter, this group will monitor
these key sites.  However, as this procedure is time- and resource-intensive,
it cannot be followed for each of the numerous biological sites to be

23. In the meantime, the Commission has identified, inventoried and tagged a
large number of dual-purpose items which will need to be monitored.  A second
round of inventorying has been necessitated by Iraq's failure to declare all
such equipment and to notify movement of it and because of damage to tags
already installed.  Plans are in hand to install monitoring cameras at a
number of sites to monitor activity levels and to install a biological
laboratory at the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre.  

                           E.  Aerial surveillance

24. Aerial surveillance, both by helicopter and by high-altitude aircraft,
continues to be key to the efficacy of the Commission's overall ongoing
monitoring and verification effort.  Without these assets, the Commission's
ability to identify undeclared facilities of potential interest for ongoing
monitoring and verification would be greatly diminished.  Furthermore, the
efficiency with which the Commission could monitor the large number of
declared sites would also be greatly reduced.  It is worrying, in this
regard, that Iraq still objects to each flight of the Commission's high-
altitude surveillance aircraft.

25. The aerial inspection team continues to perform a valuable task of
obtaining close-up photography of monitored sites.  Furthermore, with the
arrival of the monitoring groups resident in Iraq, joint aerial inspections,
with inspectors from the aerial inspection team and the weapons experts from
one or more monitoring group, are creating new synergy and efficiency in
monitoring.  The contribution by the Government of Germany of three CH-53G
helicopters, crew and maintenance staff is key to the performance of this and
other essential tasks.  It has been of the greatest importance in the
implementation of the mandates of the Commission and the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA), particularly in areas remote from Baghdad.  The
Commission's aerial assets are currently fully utilized and it is envisaged
that monitoring efforts will increasingly rely on their use.

                F.  Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre

26. Work continues to complete the installation of the equipment for the
Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre.  Some installation work in the
period under review had to be delayed and rescheduled because of the lack of
funding.  Recent assurances as to new financial contributions have permitted
the resumption of the work involved, and it is hoped that the Centre will be
fully equipped and staffed by the end of February 1995.  Thereafter, only
minor adjustments to its staffing would be envisaged in the light of
experience until the addition of an export/import control group to supplement
the monitoring groups.

                              G.  Data handling

27. The Commission's activities generate a large amount of data.  The
Commission, with the help of a supporting Government, has developed and is
continuing to develop software for a single relational database to allow easy
and full analysis of the data obtained from all sources.  In addition,
another Government is helping with customizing a second, compatible database
specifically for handling the export/import data.  This system should be
installed by the end of February 1995.

                         H.  Export/import mechanism

28. The Commission has conducted further seminars with international experts
to develop further the export/import mechanism.  There appears to be general
agreement in the Sanctions Committee on the underlying concept of the paper
submitted to it by the Commission and IAEA in May 1994.  The Commission hopes
to reconvene its seminar of international experts in early January 1995 and
so to be able to submit a final version of the concept paper to the Sanctions
Committee towards the end of January 1995.  It is envisaged that the paper
would be forwarded to the Security Council for its consideration soon after. 
Revised annexes to the plans of the Commission and IAEA for ongoing
monitoring and verification will also be brought to the Council's attention
before they are implemented.  These revised annexes will contain the
comprehensive listing of items to be reported by exporting Governments under
the mechanism.


29.  Iraq must provide credible accounts for all its past proscribed
programmes and capabilities and supporting evidence to enable the Commission
independently to verify its declarations so that the Commission can achieve a
material balance for the past programmes and thereby have confidence that its
ongoing monitoring and verification system is proceeding from a sound basis. 
Without such confidence, the Commission cannot be certain that it is indeed
monitoring all the facilities and items in Iraq which should be monitored if
the requirements of the Security Council are to be fulfilled.  Furthermore,
failure by Iraq to provide full and transparent accounting of its past
programmes can only undermine confidence in its intentions and in the
completeness of its declarations in this regard.  The speed with which this
issue can be resolved is primarily dependent on Iraq's openness and honesty,
although supplier Governments can also play a significant role in responding
to the Commission's requests for assistance in verifying Iraq's accounts of
its imports.  The absence of such responses can only delay the Commission's
efforts to obtain a credible material balance for Iraq's past programmes. 
Certain supplier Governments have been very forthcoming and the Commission is
pursuing its efforts with those which have still to reply.

30. Iraq should also provide complete data on all its current dual-purpose
capabilities as defined in the plan for ongoing monitoring and verification
contained in document S/22871/Rev.1.  While, in the absence of full Iraqi
declarations, the Commission could conduct intrusive inspections at all
relevant facilities to uncover all such capabilities, this would be neither
an efficient use of the Commission's resources nor the quickest means of
implementing the terms of paragraph 22 of Security Council resolution 687

31. Iraq has also yet to adopt the necessary legal and administrative
measures to give effect to its obligations under the plan for ongoing
monitoring and verification, although it is known to be working on the
necessary legislation.

32. Efforts to establish an effective ongoing monitoring and verification
system are well-advanced.  The system is provisionally operational and
testing of it has begun.  With the installation of further elements of the
system, the Commission will gain experience in operating and confidence in
the efficacy of the system.  By the end of February 1995, the Baghdad
Monitoring and Verification Centre should be fully staffed for its current

33. An increasing share of the Commission's resources will in the future be
devoted to the establishment and, upon the easing of the sanctions in
accordance with paragraph 21 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991),
operation of the export/import mechanism.  The export/import mechanism is a
fundamental element in the overall ongoing monitoring and verification
system.  Without it, once Iraq is able to import dual-purpose items, the
system could not be expected to be effective.  It is essential that this
mechanism be operational prior to the easing of sanctions to the extent that
Iraq is able to import such items.  The Commission is pressing to have all
the legal and practical elements adopted as soon as possible.

34. A major concern facing the Commission at this stage is financing. 
Activities to equip the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre have
already been delayed because of the lack of guaranteed funds to pay for the
materials required.  Furthermore, while the short-term financial crisis
reported in October 1994 appears to have been addressed through the promise
of funds from Kuwait and the United States of America, the Commission only
has promises of funding until the end of March 1995.  Insecure medium-term
funding limits the Commission's ability to conduct long-term planning and
hence will inevitably create inefficiencies.  It may, in the worst case,
adversely affect the effectiveness of the Commission's ongoing monitoring and
verification regime or even endanger continuous operations.  A long-term
solution to the issue of the Commission's financing is necessary to ensure
the fulfilment of the mandate contained in section C of Security Council
resolution 687 (1991).

                               IV.  CONCLUSION

35. While the preceding paragraphs inevitably dwell on outstanding issues
where further work remains, much progress has been made during the period
under review towards the fulfilment of the Commission's mandate.  All items
verified as being proscribed have now been destroyed.  The ongoing monitoring
and verification system is provisionally operational.  The major elements for
chemical and missile monitoring are in place.  Interim monitoring in the
biological area is about to commence.  Testing of the system has begun, and a
mechanism for monitoring Iraq's trade in dual-purpose items (the
export/import mechanism) has been elaborated and appears to meet with