STATUS OF THE MATERIAL BALANCES IN THE MISSILE AREA
In its resolution 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991, the Security Council required Iraq to unconditionally accept the destruction, removal or rendering harmless, under international supervision, of all ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres and related major parts, and repair and production facilities. To that end, Iraq was specifically required:
The inadequacy of Iraq's initial declarations was one of the elements leading to the adoption of Security Council resolution 707 (1991) of 15 August 1991, in which the Council, inter alia, demanded that Iraq provide full, final and complete disclosure (FFCD), as required by resolution 687 (1991), of all aspects of its programmes to develop weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres, and of all holdings of such weapons, their components and production facilities and locations.
With Iraq's full cooperation and its commitment to the implementation of its obligations under the Security Council resolutions, these tasks in the missile area could have been accomplished in a relatively short period of time. Instead Iraq has chosen a course of withholding its proscribed missile capabilities and obstruction of the Commission's work. Examples of this policy were Iraq's decision, immediately after the adoption of resolution 687 (1991) in April 1991, to retain two-thirds of its operational force of proscribed missiles and the concealment of its capabilities to indigenously manufacture proscribed missiles with liquid propellant engines.
By the end of 1991, the Commission had completed the task of the destruction of proscribed missile weapons and materials that Iraq had chosen to declare immediately after the adoption of resolution 687 (1991). At that time, the Commission came to the conclusion that Iraq had not declared all its holding of such weapons nor disclosed all its proscribed capabilities and programmes. In March 1992, Iraq admitted that it had withheld from the Commission a considerable amount of proscribed weapons and their component, and declared that it had destroyed them unilaterally in Summer 1991 without the Commission's supervision. This unilateral destruction by Iraq was in direct violations of Security Council resolution 687 (1991).
The Commission's verification has subsequently focussed on the following main tasks:
Through its verification process, the Commission has been accumulating evidence that Iraq's initial and subsequent disclosures of proscribed weapons holdings and missile capabilities were inadequate. This required additional actions by the Commission to dispose of proscribed items, identified through the verification process, as well as new declarations to be presented by Iraq. In August 1995, Iraq admitted that important information on its proscribed programmes had been hidden from the Commission including a considerable amount of documentation. As a consequence, Iraq agreed to prepare a new Full, Final and Complete Disclosure (FFCD) in the missile area. Such an official declaration was provided by Iraq in November 1995. The Commission did not accept this declaration as either a full or complete disclosure. Iraq submitted another FFCD in June 1996. The latter document, supplemented subsequently by numerous Iraqi explanations and clarifications, has been the basis for the Commission's verification activities.
In June 1996, Iraq and the Commission established a Joint Programme of Action and agreed to concentrate work on certain fundamental areas. The first priority among them was the material balance of proscribed weapons and their major components. The other established priorities were: the unilateral destruction of proscribed items; further provision of documentation, when available, related to proscribed weapons programmes; and the identification of measures taken in 1991 and the measures used by certain individuals to retain some proscribed items until August 1995. Subsequently, the June 1996 Joint Programme of Work was elaborated through discussions between the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq and the Executive Chairman.
This paper provides, in broad terms, information on the current status of the material balances of proscribed operational weapons and capabilities in the missile area. The material balance approach has been the cornerstone of the Commission's verification effort. This approach has been designed to allow the Commission to reconcile, in a reasonable but verifiable manner, the quantities and the types of proscribed weapons and their major parts, acquired by Iraq either through production or importation, with the quantities of these items disposed of through consumption(1) or destruction or rendering harmless. Throughout this process, it has been Iraq's responsibility alone to provide sufficient evidence to support its own data and declarations on both sides of this equation.
The methodology adopted in this paper, is to indicate, based on the most recent declarations from Iraq, quantities of proscribed items available to Iraq, and then provide factual statements as to how the declared quantities have been accounted for. Where feasible, the data is presented in a tabular format for ease of comprehension.
The paper's focus is on proscribed missile systems that either had been made operational by Iraq or had been close to an operational status. The paper also provides a report on the status of missile repair and production facilities which were required to be destroyed or rendered harmless under resolution 687 (1991). Iraq's other proscribed missile capabilities are dealt with only to the extent required for the paper's main focus.
Beyond the material balances related to proscribed missiles and the status of relevant facilities, the paper does not address other issues that were investigated by the Commission and which may or may not have reached a satisfactory resolution. This includes Iraq's efforts related to the development of missiles or their sub-systems which have been assessed by the Commission as not having achieved operational status or which would not contribute substantially to proscribed operational capabilities already available to Iraq. Examples of such issues are missile delivery means for nuclear weapons, parachute retarded missile warheads "Meteo 1", separating missile warheads, undisclosed warhead designs, Iraq's efforts to develop missiles with ranges from 1000 to 3000 kilometers and Iraq's space launch vehicle, Al-Abid. Issues related to retention by Iraq of expertise in the proscribed missile area, and design/production/assembly documentation as well as military infrastructure of the proscribed missile operational force have not been addressed in this paper. The paper does not describe the Commission's investigations of Iraq's foreign procurement in support of its proscribed missile activities.
Section 1 of the paper provides a status report of the material balances of proscribed missiles and related operational assets. Section 2 describes the status of the material balances of proscribed indigenous missiles, their related major parts, production equipment, and the status of missile repair and production facilities. Section 3 summarises missile activities in Iraq after the adoption of resolution 687 (1991) relevant to the verification of its proscribed activities.
Section 1: "Status of the material balance of proscribed missiles and related operational assets"
For the purpose of the verification of the material balance of proscribed missiles and related operational assets, the Commission has focussed on the following key items: the missiles as well as their launchers, warheads and single-use propellants for proscribed missiles. The Commission has also investigated the accounting for other elements of operational assets such as key missile guidance and control instruments and auxiliary vehicles for missile fuelling, transportation and testing. The Commission has determined that the full accounting of these latter elements, despite remaining ambiguities, could be considered secondary in importance, provided a solid and verifiable accounting of the selected key items is established.
Iraq declared that it imported 819 long-range combat missiles(2) that fall under prohibitions established by resolution 687 (1991). Over half of them were modified by Iraq, since 1987, into missiles known in Iraq as Al Hussein class missiles. Al Hussein missiles used by Iraq during recent wars had a range of some 650 kilometres.
The Commission does not have evidence to confirm reports of Iraq's importation of SCUD-B class missiles from any but a single supplier. The data on the missile deliveries, serial numbers of missile engines and other components that was provided to the Commission by the supplier, was essential in establishing the material balance in this area. Table 1 provides a summary of the material balance of the 819 proscribed combat missiles imported by Iraq.
|Expenditure/disposal event||Declared quantity||Accounting status|
|Pre-1980 expenditures, such as in training||8||Accounting is based on documentation provided by Iraq.|
|Expenditure during the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988), including the War of the Cities in February-April 1988||516||Accounting is based on documentation provided by Iraq. Iraq's data on some of these missile firings, in particular during the War of the Cities, was corroborated by independent sources.|
|Testing activities for development of Iraq's modifications of imported missiles and other experimental activities (1985-1990)||69||Accounting is based on documentation provided by Iraq. Iraq's data on a number of these test firings was corroborated by independent sources.|
|Expenditures during the Gulf War (January-March 1991)||93||Accounting is based on documentation provided by Iraq. Iraq's data on nearly all of these firings was corroborated by independent sources. A discrepancy in the accounting of a small number of fired missiles exists between Iraq's data and data provided by other sources.|
|Destruction pursuant to Security Council resolution 687 (early July 1991)||48||UNSCOM verification during the destruction.|
|Unilateral destruction by Iraq (mid July and October 1991)||85||Accounting is based on documentation provided by Iraq. The Commission carried out laboratory analysis of remnants of the unilaterally destroyed missiles excavated in 1996-1997. The Commission identified remnants of engines from 83 out of the 85 missiles declared.|
As a result of the emergency session of the Special Commission on 21 November 1997, the members of the Commission stated that they were "satisfied that 817 of the 819 proscribed missiles imported by Iraq have been effectively accounted for".
In late 1995, Iraq provided to the Commission an inventory of missiles destroyed unilaterally. This inventory contained a reference to seven indigenously produced missiles, in addition to the 85 imported missiles. The November 1997 emergency session determined that accounting for these seven missiles was one of the priority requirements. The Commission has not been able to verify the nature and destruction of these missiles. (For more details, see Section 2, below)
In July 1991, the Commission supervised the destruction of 9 Fahad missiles. Fahad missiles were Volga/SA2 surface-to-air missiles that Iraq modified for a surface-to-surface application, with ranges over 150 kilometres. Twenty-one flight tests of Fahad missiles were declared to have been conducted by Iraq before the Gulf War. No supporting documentation has been provided by Iraq to ascertain how many such missiles were modified. Unmodified Volga missiles declared by Iraq in 1996 are currently under the Commission's monitoring in order to ensure their non-modification for a surface-to-surface application or for delivery of non-conventional warheads.
Iraq declared that, during the Gulf War, it had 14 combat mobile launchers for Al Hussein class missiles, including ten which had been imported and four which were indigenously produced. It also imported one launcher of this type for training purposes. Iraq declared that it had indigenously constructed two mobile launchers that had not been made operational, and that it had three experimental prototype mobile launchers.
The quantity of imported launchers has been confirmed by the supplier. The Commission does not have evidence to confirm reports of Iraq's importation of this class of proscribed missiles launcher from any but this supplier.
Iraq declared that it had acquired from a foreign supplier ten 50-tonne flatbed trailers suitable for the construction of indigenous mobile launchers. This information has been confirmed by the supplier. Six of these trailers were converted to the abovementioned indigenously produced mobile launchers, called Al Nida. The Commission verified the destruction of the launching equipment erected on these six trailers, and allowed Iraq to use, for non-proscribed purposes, these and the four other, unused trailers that had been imported.
Iraq declared that 28 operational fixed launchers for Al Hussein class missiles had been deployed. In addition, 28 "stand-by", training, testing or decoy fixed launchers were constructed or were under construction.
Table 2 provides a summary of the material balance of mobile and fixed missile launchers.
|Launchers||Declared quantity||Accounting status|
|Imported combat mobile launchers||10||5 launchers destroyed under UNSCOM supervision in 1991. 5 launchers destroyed unilaterally by Iraq. Remnants of all 10 launcher vehicle chassis, launching arms and stools were identified in August 1997. It was not possible to identify remnants of all launching and support equipment from these launchers.|
|Imported training mobile launcher||1||Destroyed under UNSCOM supervision in 1991.|
|Indigenous combat operational mobile launchers (Al Nida)||4||Launching equipment and two associated launch control vehicles were destroyed unilaterally by Iraq. Accounting is based on documentation provided by Iraq and the identification of some remnants of destruction. The trailers of the launchers were released by the Commission for use in non-proscribed activities.|
|Indigenous non-operational mobile launchers (Al Nida)||2||Launching equipment and two associated launch control vehicles were destroyed under UNSCOM supervision. The trailers of the launchers were released by the Commission for use in non-proscribed activities.|
|50-tonne trailers suitable for Al Nida launchers||4||Released by UNSCOM for use in non-proscribed activities. 3 of these trailers have been seen by UNSCOM. In November 1997, Iraq declared that the fourth, missing trailer had been stolen and could not be located.|
|Indigenous prototype launchers||3||Destroyed under UNSCOM supervision.|
|Fixed launch sites (completed or under construction)||56||Destroyed under UNSCOM supervision or their destruction certified by UNSCOM.|
|Completed control panels for indigenous launchers||24||2 sets were destroyed under UNSCOM supervision. 22 sets were declared to have been destroyed by Iraq unilaterally. Some remnants of destroyed panels have been seen by UNSCOM.|
The Commission's verification efforts, with respect to Iraq's declarations on combat missile launchers, have been frustrated by Iraq's misleading statements. Prior to March 1992, Iraq claimed that several imported mobile launchers had been destroyed during the Iran-Iraq war. In March 1992, it declared that those launchers had been unilaterally destroyed by Iraq in the summer of 1991. This statement was repeated in Iraq's June 1996 FFCD. In the course of its follow-up verification, the Commission established that Iraq's statement on the unilateral destruction of mobile missile launchers was wrong. This finding was presented to Iraq by the Commission in July 1997. Iraq then made a new statement, in August 1997, that five imported launcher chassis had in fact been destroyed in October 1991, and not in July 1991, as had previously been declared by Iraq. A fuller explanation of Iraq's actions to retain mobile launchers after the adoption of resolution 687 (1991) and to conceal the events and timing of their unilateral destruction was requested. In September 1997, the Commission asked Iraq to explain the operational requirements for the retained proscribed missile assets that Iraq had concealed after April 1991. In response, the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq gave an explicit order, in the presence of the Executive Chairman, to the Iraqi experts not to discuss such issues with the Commission.
Iraq declared that it had imported 819 combat warheads for proscribed missiles of SCUD/Al Hussein class and that 121 combat warheads of the same type had been produced indigenously or had been under production at the time of adoption of resolution 687 (1991). Iraq's declarations on the material balance in this area have changed several times. Table 3 provides a summary of the material balance of declared warheads based on Iraq's most recent declarations of 1998.
|Expenditure/ disposal event||Declared quantity||Accounting status|
|Pre-1980 expenditures||8||0||Accounting is based on documentation provided by Iraq.|
|Expenditure during the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988), including the War of the Cities in February-April 1988||515||0||Accounting is based on documentation provided by Iraq.|
|Activities for the development of Iraq's modifications of imported missiles, establishing indigenous production of warheads and other experimental activities (1985-1990)||52||12||In most cases, the accounting is based on documentation provided by Iraq. In a number cases, particularly in relation to indigenous warheads, no documentation has been provided.|
|Expenditures during the Gulf War (January-March 1991)||87||6||No documentation on the expenditure of the warheads was provided by Iraq. Iraq's data on nearly all missile firings was corroborated by independent sources. The origin of warheads fired with these missiles could not be established.|
|Destruction pursuant to Security Council resolution 687||37
(15 conventional and 22 special(3) )
(5 conventional and 8 special)
|UNSCOM verification during the destruction.|
|Unilateral destruction by Iraq (mid July and October 1991)||120
(92 conventional and 28 special)
(73 conventional and 17 special)
|Accounting is based on documentation provided by Iraq. The Commission carried out excavation of warheads unilaterally destroyed. The results of the assessment of excavated remnants are presented below.|
Pursuant to the programme of work established in July 1997, survey and excavation work started August 1997 at the declared sites of the unilateral destruction and the burial sites of warhead remnants. By June 1998, all sites declared by Iraq, where warhead remnants could be found, were surveyed and excavated. Thus, a strong presumption is that all remnants have been collected. Table 4 provides a summary of the assessment of recovered warheads remnants relevant to the material balance.
|Category of warheads destroyed||Declared quantity||Recovered or otherwise accepted as accounted for|
|Special warheads destroyed unilaterally (modified imported and indigenously produced)||45||43 - 45|
|Imported conventional warheads (Iraq's unilateral and UNSCOM - supervised destruction)||107||83|
|Indigenous warheads of all types
(accounting method is by imported rings, as key elements in a warhead structure)
Issues related to remnants of warheads that have not been recovered, but which have been declared by Iraq as unilaterally destroyed (some 25 imported warheads and some 25 Iraqi manufactured warheads), remain outstanding in the accounting of proscribed warheads that Iraq claimed to have destroyed unilaterally. The full and verifiable accounting for proscribed missile conventional warheads remains essential for the verification of the premise that Iraq has not retained any proscribed missiles and that all proscribed missiles and their warheads indeed have been destroyed.
As a result of the Technical Evaluation Meeting on the proscribed missile warheads held in February 1998 in Baghdad, the Commission's team of international experts determined that Iraq's warhead production and acquisition records were the best way to obtain the full picture of Iraq's warhead production. No documents have been provided by Iraq in response to this request. According to the team, issues related to the warhead material balance and accounting such as duplicate counting, warhead destruction activities and warhead markings, need to be fully resolved to enable the establishment of a solid and verifiable material balance in the warhead area. In July and November 1998, the Commission again asked Iraq for clarifications to be provided to facilitate the completion of the verification. The Commission has not received answers from Iraq that would allow to achieve this goal.
Warheads with chemical and biological warfare agents
A priority aspect of the accounting for proscribed missile warheads relates to the missile warheads that were filled or were designed to be filled with chemical or biological warfare agents (special warheads). Iraq's declarations on the acquisition and disposal of the special warheads, for both CW and BW delivery, have changed several times. The current Iraqi declarations could be summarised as follows:
Iraq stated that it had produced 25 combat special warheads for BW (16 warheads filled with botulinum toxin, 5 warheads with anthrax and 4 warheads with aflatoxin(4) ) and 50 combat special warheads for CW (16 warheads filled with sarin and 34 warheads with the alcohol component of the binary system). Out of 75 declared combat special warheads, 25 warheads were declared as indigenously produced (15 CW and 10 BW warheads) and 50 warheads were modified from imported warheads (35 CW and 15 BW warheads). In addition, Iraq declared that it had produced 3 special warheads for training purposes, and that 3 additional special warheads had been used in static tests and 2 special warheads had been used in flight tests.
The 30 CW combat warheads (16 filled with sarin and 14 with the alcohol component) were destroyed under UNSCOM supervision in 1991-1993. Iraq's declarations on the disposal of the remaining 45 combat special warheads out of the 75 declared as produced, stated that they had been unilaterally destroyed in early July 1991. The assessment of the warhead remnants excavated since August 1997 allows for the identification of 43-45 special warheads coming from the sites of the declared unilateral destruction.
Iraq's declarations and supporting documents include a specific distribution, by their type and warfare agent filling, of the 45 special warheads unilaterally destroyed in July 1991. According to Iraq's declarations, 20 of them were chemical weapons and contained only the alcohol component of the CW binary system. Analysis at the laboratories designated by the Commission has detected the presence of degradation products of nerve agents, in particular VX, on a number of warhead remnants which were excavated. A meeting of international experts, including representatives of the three laboratories, which was held on 22-23 October 1998 concluded that "the existence of VX degradation products conflicts with Iraq's declarations that the unilaterally destroyed special warheads had never been filled with any chemical warfare agents. The findings by all three laboratories of chemicals known to be degradation products of decontamination compounds also do not support Iraq's declarations that those warhead containers had only been in contact with alcohols." Clarification by Iraq of these issues as recommended by the meeting would allow the Commission to make a determination whether or not the current assessment of the quantity of special warheads identified amongst the remnants excavated, accounts for all special warheads declared to have been produced by Iraq and provides for the verification of their unilateral destruction.
Iraq described in detail the procedures and methods of unilateral destruction of the special warheads by explosive demolition. After examination of the relevant destruction sites and the special warhead remnants recovered from them, the Commission found that Iraq's explanations were, in general, plausible. However, in one aspect dealing with the destruction of BW warheads, the Commission, after consulting a group of international experts, assessed that Iraq's declaration that 15 warheads had been destroyed simultaneously conflicted with physical evidence collected at the declared location of their unilateral destruction. This finding indicated that not all BW warheads had been destroyed at the same time as declared by Iraq and that Iraq had retained some BW warheads after the declared July 1991 unilateral destruction date. The discrepancies between Iraq's current declarations on its unilateral destruction of the special warheads and the physical evidence collected at the destruction site need to be clarified. In addition, the Commission's investigations showed that Iraq had not provided the true locations of the hiding, prior to the declared unilateral destruction, of at least half of the special warheads including the abovementioned 15 BW warheads. In December 1998, Iraq again identified new locations of storage pits from where the warheads had been moved to the unilateral destruction sites. The Commission could not again confirm that the newly identified locations had been used for hiding warheads. Iraq's continuous inability to disclose hide sites of the special warheads has also prevented the Commission's verification of declared unilateral destruction of the special warheads.
Evidence has been recovered pointing to Iraq's attempts to design and produce non-conventional warheads for missiles other than Al Hussein. Despite available documentary evidence of work on non-conventional warheads for so called FROG short-range missiles in 1990, Iraq insisted that all such work was done only in 1988 without any success or follow-up attempts. Iraq denied any activities related to non-conventional warheads for Volga/SA 2 surface-to-air missiles that it was modifying for surface-to-surface application.
Iraq declared that it acquired missile propellants together with imported long-range missiles in quantities required for the proper operation of these missiles. Two of these propellants (main fuel and oxidizer) are unique for use with proscribed missiles of SCUD/Al Hussein class and thus, are subject to destruction and full accounting. The third propellant (starting fuel) is also used in non-proscribed missiles in Iraq and thus, has been excluded by the Commission from the accounting.
Iraq declared that, in the late 1980's, it had also imported specific components for the indigenous production of the same type of main fuel for proscribed missiles. Iraq declared that it had never produced indigenously proscribed missile propellants from basic raw materials. (For more details, see Section 2, below)
A summary of the material balance of imported main fuel and oxidizer unique for proscribed missiles is provided below.
Imported missile main fuel (TM185): Iraq declared the importation of 818 tonnes of main fuel. No supporting documents were provided by Iraq to substantiate this declaration. Table 5 provides a summary of the material balance of the main fuel.
|Expenditure/ disposal event||Declared quantity (tonnes)|
|Consumed with missiles launched and used for static tests of missile engines||661||Accounting is based on technical requirements for missile operations. Most of the launching and testing events are supported by documentation provided by Iraq.|
|Destruction pursuant to Security Council resolution 687 (early July 1991)||20||UNSCOM verification during the destruction.|
|Unilateral destruction by Iraq (August-September 1991)||137||No supporting documentation has been provided by Iraq.|
Imported missile oxidizer (AK 27I): Iraq declared the importation of 2,895 tonnes of this oxidizer. No supporting documents were provided by Iraq to substantiate this declaration. Table 6 provides a summary of the material balance of missile oxidizer.
|Expenditure/disposal event||Declared quantity (tonnes)||Accounting status|
|Consumed during missile launch and used for static tests of missile engines||2,436||Accounting is based on technical requirements for missile operations. Most of the launching and testing events are supported by documentation provided by Iraq.|
|Destruction pursuant to Security Council resolution 687 (early July 1991)||52||UNSCOM verification during the destruction.|
|Unilateral destruction by Iraq (August -September 1991)||407||No supporting documentation was provided by Iraq.|
The full accounting for imported single-use proscribed missile propellants is outstanding. Documents, including an inventory list on the declared unilateral destruction, specifically requested by the Commission, have not been made available by Iraq to support its declaration on the quantities (over 500 tonnes) of proscribed propellants it claims to have destroyed unilaterally.
Section 2: "Status of the material balances of proscribed indigenous missiles and related major parts, production equipment, and status of repair and production facilities"
In addition to importation of missiles and related operational assets that fall under prohibitions established by Security Council resolution 687 (1991), Iraq undertook major efforts to indigenously produce proscribed missiles. For this purpose, a number of projects were established and numerous facilities were involved.
Iraq's indigenous missile production depended greatly on parts, components, materials and equipment that it procured through foreign sources. The Commission has sought information from Governments on the supply of such items. Responses from a number of Governments were of great assistance in the Commission's verification work.
Al Hussein Missile System
Iraq sought to manufacture indigenously a complete missile system called Al Hussein(5) . As with the imported missile system of SCUD-B class, the indigenous system was composed of missiles, warheads, launchers, guidance and control instruments, liquid propellants and support equipment required for the operational use of these missiles.
In practically all cases, indigenously produced assets and originally imported ones could have been used interchangeably by Iraq. For example, the Al Hussein missiles, whether modified from imported SCUD-B missiles or indigenously produced, could be launched from either imported launchers or indigenously produced launchers, both mobile and fixed. The same was true for missile warheads. For these reasons, issues related to launchers and warheads both imported and indigenously produced, are covered in Section 1. Section 2 focuses on issues related to indigenous production of missiles themselves, in particular their engines, guidance and control instruments and some items unique to the indigenously produced Al Hussein class missiles.
Iraq began the reverse engineering and production of Al Hussein class missiles in 1987. Its efforts included the acquisition and assembly/production of all airframe components (fuel and oxidizer tanks, engine covers, instrument compartments and warheads), guidance and control instruments and their components, and liquid propellant engines. By the time of the adoption of resolution 687 (1991), Iraq had achieved considerable progress, including successful testing of indigenously assembled engines, airframes, and some guidance and control instruments. In 1995, Iraq declared for the first time that it conducted four flight tests of missiles with indigenously manufactured engines, all of them in 1990. Iraq has declared that it was successful in the indigenous production of the whole missile airframe and warhead as well as missile launchers.
In April 1990, Iraq established a new military unit of Brigade size (Unit 223) to be equipped with operational missile assets. One of the available Iraqi documents of April 1990 referred to a task for different organizations in Iraq to secure the needs with respect to the brigade's combat supplies (missiles, launchers and ground support). Iraq has not responded positively to the Commission's requests to provide relevant decision level documentation on the equipping of Unit 223 with combat supplies. Such documentation could significantly clarify - Iraq's planned and actual capabilities to produce indigenously and deploy, with the Army, operational missiles and related missile equipment. In response to the Commission's request of 17 November 1998, Iraq provided some 64 pages of documents related to Unit 223. This documentation did not contain the information on combat supplies sought by the Commission. It dealt with personnel and non-combat equipment like radios and cars, to be assigned to the unit and did not discuss Iraq's capabilities and actions to equip this unit with missiles, launchers and other operational assets.
In its initial declarations in response to the requirements of resolution 687 (1991), Iraq did not disclose fully its efforts to manufacture indigenously Al Hussein class missiles or the progress it achieved. Iraq later admitted that it had a full scale programme to manufacture indigenously complete Al Hussein missiles and that it had established specialized factories for this purpose. The factories were directed, in early 1988, to plan for production of 1000 missiles. Iraq maintains that by January 1991, it had failed to produce a single operational missile.
After the adoption of resolution 687 (1991), Iraq sought to retain all available capabilities, components, materials, tooling and machines for its indigenous production of missile engines and guidance and control components, and attempted to conceal the true scope of its pre-Gulf War programme.
In the course of the Commission's verification activities, it became practically impossible to establish and verify material balances regarding airframes and related major parts due to the relative abundance of sources of their acquisition and methods of their unilateral destruction used by Iraq. Thus, missile engines and missile guidance and control systems, in particular their gyroscopic instruments, were selected as the focus for efforts to establish the material balance in the area of indigenous missile production. The Commission believed that if solid material balances could be established in these two areas, gaps in other areas of the proscribed indigenous missile production could be assessed as of secondary importance.
Complete Al Hussein Missiles
In late 1995, Iraq provided to the Commission, an inventory of proscribed missiles that it destroyed unilaterally. In addition to imported missiles that it destroyed, the inventory contained a reference to seven indigenously produced missiles. Iraq explained that these were missiles or missile engines that had been given to the Army's Surface-to-Surface Missile Forces as "training" missiles. No documentation has been provided to confirm that these particular missiles were for training purposes. Although Iraq declared that these seven indigenous missiles were destroyed together with 85 imported combat missiles, remnants of the indigenous missiles or their engines, which could prove their unilateral destruction, have not been recovered by the Commission at the declared destruction sites.
The declared unilateral destruction of these missiles has not been verified. The verification in this area is considered as a priority issue as it might involve operational missiles produced indigenously by Iraq.
In response to the requirements of resolution 687 (1991) of April 1991, Iraq did not disclose its programme to produce indigenously liquid propellant engines for proscribed missiles. In October 1991, Iraq stated that it had a limited, unsuccessful effort within its Project 1728 for the reverse engineering of proscribed missile engines and had imported some components and equipment for that purpose. For years, Iraq insisted that the main purpose of Project 1728 had not been missile production, but the development of welding and other technologies for manufacturing agricultural pumps.
In its first FFCD in May 1992, Iraq declared that all Project 1728 machines and equipment had been totally destroyed during the Gulf war. Following an intense effort to identify equipment procured for Project 1728, the Commission determined that Iraq's declared purpose for this programme was incorrect. The evidence obtained by the Commission indicated that the project had been established and operated specifically for the production of proscribed missiles, in particular their liquid propellant engines. Based on these findings, the Commission took the decision, in February 1995, on the disposal of Project 1728 equipment still available in Iraq at that time. Over a hundred machines and other major pieces of equipment were identified. Of these, the Commission requested the destruction of five machines, and established a prohibition on the use of eleven machines in any missile related production in Iraq. The remaining general purpose machines from Project 1728 were released since they could be used for non-proscribed activities and similar machines were readily available elsewhere in Iraq. Iraq protested the Commission's decision of February 1995. It agreed to implement it only in July 1995. In its November 1995 FFCD, Iraq finally acknowledged that the main purpose for Project 1728 had been the reverse-engineering and production of proscribed missile engines, and that the equipment, identified by the Commission, had been used or acquired for use in proscribed activities. A summary of the material balance of Project 1728 machines and equipment is contained in Table 7:
|Machines/ Equipment||Declared Quantity||Purpose of use||Accounting status|
|Flow forming machines||2||Manufacture of combustion chamber and nozzle (CC/N) assemblies||Destroyed under UNSCOM supervision in July 1995|
|Vacuum furnaces||2||Brazing and annealing of CC/N assemblies||Destroyed under UNSCOM supervision in July 1995|
|Balancing machine||1||Balancing of turbo- pump components||Destroyed under UNSCOM supervision in July 1995|
|Speciality welding machines||7||Welding of various engine components||Banned from use in missile production since February 1995. Tagged and under UNSCOM monitoring|
|Laser cutting machine||1||Cutting preforms for CC/N assemblies||Banned from use by Iraq in missile production since February 1995. Tagged and placed under UNSCOM monitoring|
|Test equipment||2||Testing of electronic and mechanical components||Banned from use by Iraq in missile production since February 1995. Tagged and under UNSCOM monitoring|
|Numerically controlled rivetting machine||1||Assembly of injectors into injection head of missile engine||Banned from use by Iraq in missile production since February 1995. Tagged and under UNSCOM monitoring|
|Welding machines||16||General purpose machines, used by Project 1728 in the production of missile engine components||Released for use in non-proscribed activities|
|Press||9||General purpose machines, used by Project 1728 in the production of missile engine components.||Released for use in non-proscribed activities|
|Cutting machines||5||General purpose machines, used by Project 1728 in the production of missile engine components.||Released for use in non-proscribed activities|
|Turning and milling machines||54||General purpose machines, used by Project 1728 in production of missile engine components.||Released for use in non-proscribed activities|
|Brazing equipment||1||General purpose equipment, used by Project 1728 in the production of turbo pump components||Released for use in non-proscribed activities|
|Plasma coating machine||1||General purpose machines, used by Project 1728 in the production of missile engine components.||Released for use in non-proscribed activities|
|Spark erosion machines||2||General purpose machines, used by Project 1728 in the production of missile engine components.||Released for use in non-proscribed activities|
|Rolling, drilling, grinding, bending, and rivetting machines||8||General purpose machines, used by Project 1728 in the production of missile engine components.||Released for use in non-proscribed activities|
|Testing machines||2||General purpose quality control equipment, used by Project 1728 for testing missile engine components.||Released for use in non-proscribed activities|
|Turbo pump test stand||1||Testing of turbo pumps of missile engines.||Damaged during the Gulf War. Destroyed under UNSCOM supervision in 1996|
Iraq declared that it could not indigenously produce most of the components of engines for Al Hussein class missiles. Thus, Iraq imported these components as well as some production or assembly tools/dies. Iraq provided supporting documentation for the foreign acquisition of many of these items. The Commission attempted to verify these declarations. Most, but not all, Governments of major suppliers of these items to Iraq provided the required support to this effort. At this stage, the Commission is not in a position to state that it has verified all supplies of missile engine components to Iraq. Some substantial problems remain as to the quantities and types of components sought by Iraq and the timing of their acquisition. The Commission believed that such issues might loose their significance if a verifiable material balance could be established for the most critical missile components that had been declared by Iraq as received and if these deliveries were fully verified. As described below, this objective has not been achieved.
No significant quantities of missile components for indigenous production of proscribed missiles were presented by Iraq for destruction in accordance with the requirements of resolution 687 (1991). Iraq declared that practically all of the imported missile engine components, which remained at the time of the adoption of resolution 687 (1991) in April 1991, had been secretly destroyed either by explosion in the desert or by melting in foundries. These unilateral destruction activities were claimed to have occurred from July to November 1991 and were declared by Iraq for the first time in March 1992. Based on the evidence presented by Iraq and the lack of supporting documentation at that time, the Commission was not able to verify the quantities of proscribed items declared as unilaterally destroyed. The Commission also assessed that not all items, declared by Iraq to have been unilaterally destroyed in 1991, had in fact been destroyed as declared.
In November 1995, Iraq provided inventory lists to account for the unilateral destruction of components in 1991. Iraq was unable to produce credible explanations of discrepancies between its official declarations and the data contained in the documents it provided. In 1996, Iraq admitted that most important components and tools for its missile engine production had been diverted from the declared unilateral destruction in 1991. Iraq stated that items thus concealed had been retained until March-May 1992, at which time they were secretly destroyed despite the fact that Iraq had already disclosed unilateral destruction of some other items from its proscribed missile activities. In July 1998, Iraq acknowledged that declarations provided to the Commission were not complete and that hiding of missile engine components prior to their unilateral destruction had occurred at an additional site undeclared until that time.
The Commission conducted a number of inspections to recover indigenous missile engine components from destruction and burial sites identified by Iraq. This was done in an attempt to verify declared material balances of these components. After a first round when far fewer items had been recovered than had been listed in the documents, Iraq stated that most of the missing items had been re-excavated unilaterally by Iraq in April or May 1992 and taken to foundries for melting. The Commission, then, conducted an inspection to identify ingots and other remnants resulting from the unilateral destruction activities in an effort to establish at least a rough material balance by aggregate weight of melted materials. Again, when insufficient material was recovered to account for the declared destruction of missile engine components, Iraq provided new explanations that, in fact, it had dumped the items that were missing from the accounting, into various rivers. In July 1998, the Commission conducted an inspection to recover these items.
Due to the methods of the unilateral destruction and the lack of sufficient documentation, it has not been possible to establish, to a satisfactory level, material balances of major missile engine components. The status of the material balances of missile engine components achieved, could be illustrated using the two major components of proscribed missile engines. These are: (1) the missile engine combustion chamber and nozzle (CC/N) assembly, and (2) the missile engine turbo pump, which delivers liquid propellant into a missile engine combustion chamber.
In November 1995, Iraq declared that it had indigenously produced some 80 combustion chamber and nozzle (CC/N) assemblies for proscribed missile engines. Table 8 provides a summary of the material balance of the declared quantity of CC/N assemblies.
Declared Disposal Status
|Indigenously produced CC/N assemblies which were rejected for integration into complete engines||54 - 57||Unilaterally melted in foundries from August to October 1991||Iraq stated that this number is not necessarily factual. Rather it is an estimate based on expected production. The declaration is not supported by documentation or physical evidence.|
|Indigenously produced CC/N assemblies integrated into complete engines and used in flight tests||4||Not recovered after tests or, if recovered, unilaterally melted by Iraq in foundries from August to October 1991||Accounting of flight tests is based on documentation provided by Iraq.|
|Indigenously produced CC/N assemblies integrated into complete engines and used in static tests||12||Unilaterally melted in foundries from August to October 1991||Some of the static tests are accounted for based on documentation provided by Iraq.|
|Indigenously produced CC/N assemblies accepted for integration into complete engines and not used as of April 1991||7-10||Unilaterally melted in foundries from August to October 1991||Iraq provided documents to support the acceptance of some eight CC/N assemblies some of which would require additional work.|
|Summary||some 80||Practically all indigenously produced combustion chamber and nozzle assemblies were declared as unilaterally destroyed by melting.||Ingots presented by Iraq as evidence of the unilateral destruction do not show expected evidence of the destroyed combustion chamber and nozzle assemblies.|
Iraq declared that it had not been able to produce indigenously turbo pumps for proscribed missile engines. Iraq attempted to acquire them by importing complete turbo pumps or by importing their components for final assembly in Iraq. Iraq declared that it had failed to assemble any complete turbo pumps from imported components. All turbo pump components were declared as unilaterally destroyed. Iraq stated that it had imported 34 turbo pumps from the specific foreign supplier. The importation was part of the implementation of an overall order for 305 turbo pumps from this supplier. The Commission has been able to obtain data on the quantity of the turbo pumps ordered and imported by Iraq directly from this supplier. Table 9 provides a summary of the material balance of imported turbo pumps declared by Iraq.
Declared Disposal Status
|Imported turbo pumps used in missile flight tests in 1990||4||None recovered after tests, or if recovered, unilaterally melted in foundries from August to October 1991||Accounting of the flight tests is based on documents provided by Iraq. The documents did not specify the origin of turbo pumps used.|
|Imported turbo pumps used in missile engine static tests in 1989 -1991||10||Unilaterally melted in foundries from August to October 1991||The Commission has been unable to verify the declaration either by documentation or physical evidence. Contrary to Iraq's declarations, the Commission has documentary proof that the turbo pumps arrived in Iraq only six months after their first usage as claimed by Iraq.|
|Imported turbo pumps not used as of April 1991||9||Unilaterally destroyed by explosions and buried in the desert in July 1991. They were then unilaterally excavated by Iraq and melted in a foundry in April or May 1992.||Inventory records of the unilateral destruction of July 1991 list eight turbo pumps.|
|Imported turbo pumps not used as of April 1991||11||Unilaterally destroyed by melting in a foundry in July 1991||No documentary evidence was provided by Iraq to confirm this declaration.|
|Imported turbo pump consumed in acceptance test by foreign manufacturer in 1991||1||Retained by manufacturer and not delivered to Iraq||Documentary evidence shows that all 35 turbo pumps were received by Iraq. Iraq provided no evidence to confirm the declared consumption of the turbo pump.|
|Summary||35||Practically all turbo pumps were declared as unilaterally destroyed by melting.||Ingots presented by Iraq as evidence of the unilateral destruction showed evidence of only 3 destroyed turbo pumps. The origin of these turbo pumps could not be determined without laboratory analysis.|
As its attempts to establish material balances of major engine components have not brought satisfactory results, the Commission was forced to switch from this approach to an attempt to establish a rough material balance, only by the aggregate weights, of all missile engine components declared to have been acquired or produced by Iraq and disposed of after the adoption of resolution 687 (1991). The application of the new method, by definition, could not result in accounting for individual components and had to mix, in the verification process, important key items with other items. In most cases, it turned out to be impossible to establish with any degree of certainty whether recovered materials represented missile related remnants or not. In this respect, the Commission relied solely on declarations and statements from Iraq.
Based on information provided by Iraq in July 1998, the aggregate weight of components and production tools/dies for missile engine production that were declared as having been unilaterally destroyed, were estimated to be around 108 tonnes. A rough material balance, by weight, of unilaterally destroyed components for indigenous missile engine production is presented in Table 10:
|Unilateral Destruction Event||Declared Quantity (tonnes)||Accounting Status|
|Destruction by explosives at Al Alam in 1991||35||11 tonnes recovered at the site in 1997 under UNSCOM supervision.|
|2.2 tonnes recovered by Iraq without UNSCOM supervision in 1998 from areas around the destruction site. Quantities verified by UNSCOM.|
|6 tonnes declared by Iraq as removed from the destruction site by local residents. No supporting evidence was provided by Iraq.|
|15 tonnes declared by Iraq as unilaterally excavated by it in 1992 and then melted. See entry below.|
|Melted at foundries in 1991 and 1992||77||This includes 15 tonnes that Iraq declared
it unilaterally excavated in 1992.
91 ingots weighing a total of 89 tonnes were presented by Iraq as being remnants of the destruction by melting. Ingots recovered cannot be associated, unambiguously, with the declared destruction activities.
|Dumping in rivers in 1991||2||300-400 kg were recovered under UNSCOM supervision in 1998.|
|Destruction by explosives at Nibai in 1991||1||Small quantities were recovered under UNSCOM supervision.|
|Destruction by cutting in 1992||8||The damaged remnants were presented to UNSCOM.|
It should be noted that ingots recovered can not be associated, unambiguously, with the material declared as melted by Iraq, as destruction of other materials was occurring at the same foundries at the same time. Only 24 of 91 ingots showed evidence of parts for the missile engine production.
As verifiable material balances of proscribed engine components can not be established, either component wise or by aggregate weight, additional inspections were conducted in 1997 and 1998 to assess Iraq's technical capabilities in missile engine production. International experts, invited by the Commission for a meeting in Baghdad in July 1998, came to an assessment that, by the end of 1990, Iraq had the capability to assemble a limited number of proscribed liquid propellant engines for Al Hussein class missiles but was still experiencing production related problems. The international experts also assessed that Iraq needed to account for the key components of its missile engine programme.
Missile Guidance and Control Instruments
In contravention of the requirements of resolution 687 (1991), Iraq did not declare its efforts to produce guidance and control (G&C) instruments for its Al Hussein class missiles. After the Commission discovered, in August 1991, a facility for the development and production of such components, Iraq declared reverse-engineering efforts in this area.
In early 1992, Iraq acknowledged the importation of some components for proscribed G&C systems. The Commission sought to obtain Iraq's full disclosure concerning these procurement efforts. Iraq denied most of them until August 1995. The Commission also discovered that Iraq had been receiving such components from foreign suppliers up to November 1991 i.e. several months after the adoption of resolution 687 (1991).
In 1992, Iraq declared that it had unilaterally destroyed components and tooling from its guidance and control programme by disposing them in rivers or melting them in foundries. Based on the evidence presented by Iraq at that time and due to the lack of supporting documentation, the Commission was not able to verify the quantities of proscribed items declared as having been unilaterally destroyed. The Commission also assessed that not all items declared by Iraq to have been unilaterally destroyed in 1991, had in fact been destroyed at that time. In 1996, Iraq admitted that some items for its G&C production programme had been diverted from the previously declared unilateral destruction in 1991. Iraq stated that items thus concealed had been retained until March 1992, at which time they were secretly destroyed despite the fact that Iraq had already disclosed unilateral destruction of some other items from its proscribed missile activities. Iraq provided partial inventory lists to account for the unilateral destruction. The Commission sought to verify this information by interviews, discussions and inspections during 1996 and 1997. Iraq was unable to produce credible explanations or evidence of the complete destruction.
The Commission assessed that, due to the methods of unilateral destruction and the incomplete nature of the destruction inventories provided by Iraq, the establishment of even a rough material balance for proscribed guidance and control components could not be achieved. As with missile engine production, the Commission then had to resort instead to assessment of Iraq's technical capabilities for the indigenous production of guidance and control systems, specifically the gyroscopic instruments.
As a result of an expert meeting with Iraqi counterparts in July 1998, the international experts, who had been invited by the Commission, made an assessment that by the end of 1990, Iraq did not have the capability either to manufacture indigenously or assemble from foreign components, gyroscopes for its indigenous missiles.
Available evidence showed that Iraq continued to work on the indigenous production of proscribed missile gyroscopic instruments after April 1991. Iraq continued to receive parts for these instruments until November 1991. These items were critical to the assembly of such instruments. In 1993, a tasking to work on proscribed missile gyroscope instruments was given to a facility in Iraq that previously had been involved in their production. During the same period, Iraq also attempted to procure additional critical items for these instruments. Iraq stated that all these efforts had been very short lived. It provided no evidence or documentation to support this statement. Iraq also retained a number of original imported gyro instruments until late 1995. (For more information on these issues, see Section 3, below). All these facts could not but raise a legitimate question why it was neccessary to conduct such prohibited activities when, according to Iraq, all available proscribed imported missiles had been destroyed long ago.
Iraq declared that it had acquired from foreign suppliers some 410 tonnes of chemical components to be used to prepare the main fuel for Al Hussein missiles similar to the fuel that had been imported with SCUD-B missiles. Documents were provided by Iraq to support some of these acquisitions. Iraq declared that all chemicals had been disposed of unilaterally.
Iraq declared that it has not used its nitric acid production facility to manufacture oxidizer for Al Hussein class missiles. It had instead engaged in "refurbishment" of residues of the imported oxidizer (AK27I) remaining in storage tanks after the fuelling of missiles. According to Iraq, this "refurbishment" process was conducted during 1990 and some 55 tanks of oxidizer residues, i.e., over 150 tonnes of oxidizer, had been collected. Iraq stated that most of the "regenerated" oxidizer did not pass acceptance tests. No evidence has been provided by Iraq to substantiate its declarations. Iraq declared that "regenerated" oxidizer produced and "non-regenerated" oxidizer collected were destroyed unilaterally in August 1991 together with other propellants for SCUD-B/Al Hussein class missiles.
Iraq originally denied that it had any project to produce Al Hussein class missile propellants from raw material in Iraq. During its verification effort, the Commission learned that contrary to Iraq's statements, there had been a project, prior to the Gulf War, to construct a dedicated facility in Iraq to produce proscribed missile propellants. Documents found in August 1995 confirmed the validity of this information. The documents also revealed that the implementation of the project had continued after the adoption of resolution 687 (1991) in April 1991. After the Commission presented its evidence to Iraq, Iraq admitted, in 1996, that such a project had existed and its construction had continued after April 1991. Iraq explained that the completion of the construction of the project's buildings had been accomplished after April 1991 as a part of the "reconstruction campaign" and the project had not been fully implemented due to technical difficulties in the procurement of some equipment. The site is currently used by Iraq for the production of solvents and cleaning solutions and it is currently under the Commission's monitoring.
In addition to efforts to acquire propellants for Al Hussein class missiles and as a part of its efforts to develop a next generation of long-range missile systems with increased ranges, Iraq procured a more advanced missile fuel - hydrazine based UDMH. It also established a plan to construct a factory in Iraq for the production of 500 tonnes/year of UDMH. Iraq initially denied plans to design a missile engine using UDMH. In 1995, it admitted that it had had such plans and had actually carried out a static test of a SCUD-B engine modified for use with UDMH. Iraq declared that it had imported 10 tonnes of UDMH and ordered, but did not receive, more. Except for fuel used in the static test, the remaining quantity of imported UDMH had been declared by Iraq as unilaterally destroyed in 1991. No evidence or documentation were presented by Iraq to support this declaration.
BADR-2000 Missile System
In 1984, Iraq signed contracts for the importation of 115 surface-to-surface missiles called BADR 2000(6) and for the establishment in Iraq of the infrastructure for the production of the first stage solid propellant rocket motors for missiles of this class. The construction of the infrastructure, including a facility for the final integration and testing of the complete missile, started in 1985. Iraq declared that it had experienced difficulties with the supplier Government with regard to the provision of the missiles as well as support and production equipment. After contract delays and in an effort to receive some of the contracted items, Iraq signed another contract, in 1987, for the provision of only 17 complete BADR 2000 missiles and missile ground support equipment. Iraq declared that it soon realized that it would not receive any of the contracted missiles, nor most of the contracted infrastructure. Iraq terminated the contracts with this supplier Government in late 1988. Iraq declared that, in the beginning of 1989, it attempted to complete the BADR 2000 project by itself, in particular the production of solid propellant motors. This time it decided to deal directly with the supplier companies or their middlemen, as well as to rely on indigenous capabilities. Some additional materials, equipment and technologies were received by Iraq in 1989 and 1990. In late 1995 and early 1996, Iraq provided to the Commission substantial documentation, including contracts with suppliers, to support its declarations on the BADR 2000 project. The Commission has so far been unable to verify Iraq's declarations with the original supplier Government.
Iraq declared that it had never been successful in commissioning the production or integration facilities it had been building, nor in manufacturing any complete BADR 2000 missiles, nor had it received from abroad any operational missiles of this system.
In response to resolution 687 (1991), Iraq declared three facilities which had been under construction in Iraq as part of the BADR 2000 infrastructure as well as some of the equipment and materials procured for the programme. The Commission supervised the destruction of all declared items. In February 1992, the Commission also identified, for destruction in accordance with resolution 687 (1991), additional critical equipment and buildings at these facilities. Initially, Iraq refused to comply with this decision. Following Iraq's disclosure of the unilateral destruction in March 1992, Iraq relented and the equipment and buildings at the BADR 2000 facilities were destroyed under the Commission's supervision. In 1996, Iraq declared that it had diverted critical tools and materials from the BADR 200 programme and buried them in a hide site. These items had been declared unilaterally destroyed and were shown to the Commission in May 1992. Table 11 summarizes the destruction completed at all three BADR 2000 facilities:
|Item||Quantity||Purpose of use||Accounting status|
|Buildings||11||Production and testing of proscribed solid propellant rocket motors||Destroyed under UNSCOM supervision. The remaining buildings at the facilities were released by the Commission for use in non-proscribed activities and are currently under UNSCOM monitoring.|
|Tools||12||Casting of proscribed solid propellant rocket motors||Destroyed under UNSCOM supervision|
|Missile mockup||1||Weight and balance simulation||Destroyed under UNSCOM supervision|
|Handling equipment||12||Movement and processing of proscribed solid propellant motors||Destroyed under UNSCOM supervision|
|Mixing equipment||7||Manufacture of solid propellants for proscribed solid propellant motors||Destroyed under UNSCOM supervision|
|Casting and curing equipment||2||Preparation of proscribed solid propellant motors||Destroyed under UNSCOM supervision|
|Motor case preparation equipment||10||Preparation and lining of proscribed solid propellant motors||Destroyed under UNSCOM supervision|
|Ammonium Perchlorate (APC) processing equipment||7||Grinding and drying of APC for proscribed solid propellant motors||Destroyed under UNSCOM supervision|
|Welding equipment||4||Production of proscribed solid propellant motors||Destroyed under UNSCOM supervision|
|Maraging steel (sheets and disks)||114||Production of proscribed solid propellant motors||Destroyed under UNSCOM supervision|
|Quality control equipment||5||Measurement and acceptance of proscribed solid propellant motors||Destroyed under UNSCOM supervision|
|X-ray equipment||5||Examination of motor case welds and composite nozzle||Destroyed under UNSCOM supervision|
|Presses, shearing and turning machines||7||Manufacture of components for proscribed rocket motors||Destroyed under UNSCOM supervision|
|Thermal chambers||4||Conditioning of proscribed rocket motors||Destroyed under UNSCOM supervision|
|Electronic equipment||1||Static testing of proscribed solid propellant rocket motors||Destroyed under UNSCOM supervision|
|Hydrostatic test equipment||1||Testing of proscribed motor cases||Destroyed under UNSCOM supervision|
|Measurement bench||1||Testing of the alignment of proscribed rocket motors||Destroyed under UNSCOM supervision|
Through its verification and assessments, the Commission has come to the conclusion that Iraq had not received complete operational BADR 2000 missiles nor other assets required for the operational use of such missiles. The facilities specifically dedicated to BADR 2000 missile production and testing were destroyed or rendered harmless under the Commission's supervision. What remains of these facilities is currently under the Commission's monitoring as a part of the on-going monitoring in Iraq.
In response to resolution 687 (1991), Iraq declared a project to develop a gun intended to fire rocket assisted projectiles with ranges of over 150 kilometers. In 1988, Iraq contracted a foreign company for the design of such "superguns". Components were procured by Iraq for guns with a caliber of 350mm and 1000mm. Iraq conducted several trials of the 350mm guns using lead projectiles. Iraq claimed that it had never received any design, assistance, materials or equipment for rocket associated projectiles.
In response to resolution 687 (1991), Iraq declared components that it had acquired for both the 350mm and 1000mm guns. The Commission supervised the destruction of the declared components in 1991. An accounting of the components is provided in Table 12.
|Item||Declared Quantities||Accounting Status|
|Complete 350 mm gun system||Destroyed under UNSCOM supervision|
|Tubes for 350 mm gun||Destroyed under UNSCOM supervision|
|Tubes for 1000 mm gun||Destroyed under UNSCOM supervision|
|Slide bearings||Destroyed under UNSCOM supervision|
|Hydraulic recoil cylinders for 1000 mm gun||Destroyed under UNSCOM supervision|
|Steel breech for 350 mm gun||Destroyed under UNSCOM supervision|
|Brackets for 1000 mm gun||Destroyed under UNSCOM supervision|
|Bearing for 350 mm gun||Destroyed under UNSCOM supervision|
|Propellant charges for 350 mm and 1000 mm guns||Destroyed under UNSCOM supervision|
|11 tonnes||Destroyed unilaterally|
|Slugs for the 350 mm gun||Unilaterally destroyed by Iraq. No supporting documentation or remnants were provided by Iraq.|
Based on information provided by Iraq, obtained from independent sources and through its inspection and assessments, the Commission has come to the conclusion that, without the equipment destroyed under its supervision, Iraq does not possess a capability to indigenously produce or assemble guns of such type.
In its resolution 687 (1991), the Security Council decided that Iraq should unconditionally accept the destruction, removal or rendering harmless, under international supervision, of all ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150km and related major parts, and repair and production facilities. The following describes the status of such facilities in Iraq.
Iraq has not declared any facilities as "repair" facilities. The Commission has not identified facilities in Iraq which would fall under a definition of "repair facilities" for proscribed missiles under the terms of resolution 687 (1991).
Based on Iraq's declarations and the findings of the Commission's inspection activities in Iraq, the relevant production facilities can be subdivided into two broad categories:
(a) "main facilities" i.e. projects and factories which were dedicated to proscribed missile activities;
(b) "support facilities" i.e industrial establishments and factories in Iraq which were providing support in missile production to "main facilities". Such support was mostly in the form of the manufacture of various components of proscribed missiles or tooling for their production and assembly.
At the commencement of the Commission's activities in Iraq, many missile production facilities had sustained damage during the Gulf War. Some of them were practically destroyed. The Council's requirements for destruction or rendering harmless of remaining missile production facilities in Iraq were implemented in two ways. In most cases, the Commission supervised the destruction of declared equipment of such facilities without taking any specific actions as to facilities' physical infrastructure such as buildings, power supply etc. In several other cases, destruction activities were required in relation to infrastructure where such infrastructure was specific to proscribed activities. In practically all cases, facilities where equipment or infrastructure remained have been placed under the Commission's monitoring.
The following two tables provide the status of the implementation of the requirements for destruction or rendering harmless of infrastructure of facilities for proscribed missile production in Iraq (Table 13 deals with "main facilities" and Table 14 deals with "support facilities"). Issues related to the destruction or rendering harmless of equipment for proscribed activities have been dealt with elsewhere in this report.
|Project and facilities||Main proscribed activities in the missile area||Site locations||Actions taken by the Commission pursuant to resolution 687||Current monitoring status||Remarks|
|Project 144/2 (Mustafa Project)||Production and modification of SCUD/ Al Hussein class missiles (airframes, warheads)||Taji site||No actions taken to destroy the infrastructure||Facility abandoned. Used as a storage area for some items under on-going verification||Most buildings damaged or destroyed during the war.|
|Project 1728 (project 144/3, Mutawakeel project)||Production of Al Hussein class missiles (engines)||Taji site||No actions taken to destroy the infrastructure||Under monitoring||Most buildings damaged or destroyed during the Gulf war|
|Rafah site||No actions taken to destroy the infrastructure||Under monitoring||Most buildings damaged or destroyed during the Gulf war. Converted to a facility for non-proscribed activities|
|Khadimiya site||No actions taken to destroy the infrastructure||Under monitoring||Converted to a facility for non-proscribed missile activities|
|Shahiyat site||No actions taken to destroy the infrastructure||Under monitoring||Construction had not been completed. Site abandoned|
|Project 144/4 (Karama project)||Production of Al Hussein class missiles (guidance and control systems)||Wazeriya site||No actions taken to destroy the infrastructure||Under monitoring||Converted to a facility for non-proscribed missile activities|
|Project 144/5 (Farooq project)||Production of Al Hussein class missiles (launchers)||Qa'Qa site||No actions taken to destroy the infrastructure||Facility abandoned in 1988 after destruction during an industrial accident at the site|
|Dora site||No actions taken to destroy the infrastructure||Under monitoring||Most buildings destroyed during the war. Converted to a facility for non-proscribed missile activities|
|Project 144/7||Production of Al Hussein class missiles (liquid propellants)||Qa'Qa site||No actions taken to destroy the infrastructure||Under monitoring||Converted to a facility for non-proscribed activities|
|Khalid factory||Production of Al Hussein class missiles (warheads)||Qa'Qa site||No actions taken to destroy the infrastructure||Under monitoring||Converted to a facility for non-proscribed activities|
|Badr 2000 project (Belat Al Shuhada factory)||Production of Badr 2000 missiles (final assembly and testing)||Yawm Al Azim site||2 buildings destroyed||Under monitoring||Converted to a facility for non-proscribed missile activities|
|Badr 2000 project (Belat Al Shuhada factory)||Production of Badr 2000 missiles (motor cases)||Thu Al Fiqar site||No action taken to destroy the infrastructure||Under monitoring||Converted to a facility for non-proscribed missile activities|
|Badr 2000 project (Belat Al Shuhada factory)||Production of Badr 2000 missiles (solid propellants)||Taj Al Marik site||9 buildings destroyed||Under monitoring||Converted to a facility for non-proscribed missile activities|
|Facility||Proscribed activities supported||Actions taken by the Commission pursuant to resolution 687||Current monitoring status|
|Nasser State Establishment||Programmes to modify and produce SCUD-B/ Al Hussein class missiles. The BADR 2000 programme. The "supergun" programme.||No actions taken to destroy the facility||Under monitoring|
|Badr State Establishment||Programmes to modify and produce SCUD-B/ Al Hussein class missiles. The Badr 2000 programme.||No actions taken to destroy the facility||Under monitoring|
|Qadisiya State Establishment||Programme to produce Al Hussein class missiles||No actions taken to destroy the facility||Under monitoring|
|Saddam State Establishment||Programmes to modify and produce SCUD-B/ Al Hussein class missiles. The "supergun" programme.||No actions taken to destroy the facility||Under monitoring|
|Qa'Qa State Establishment||Programmes to modify and produce SCUD-B/ Al Hussein class missiles. The "supergun" programme.||No actions taken to destroy the facility||Under monitoring|
|State Establishment for Automobile Industries||Programmes to produce SCUD-B/ Al Hussein class missiles.||No actions taken to destroy the facility||Under monitoring|
|State Establishment for Mechanical Industries||Programmes to produce SCUD-B/ Al Hussein class missiles. The "supergun" programme.||No actions taken to destroy the facility||Under monitoring|
|Salahaldeen State Establishment||Programmes to modify and produce SCUD-B/ Al Hussein class missiles.||No actions taken to destroy the facility||Under monitoring|
|Kindi State Establishment||Programmes to modify and produce SCUD-B/ Al Hussein class missiles. The "supergun" programme.||No actions taken to destroy the facility||Under monitoring|
|Nida factory||Programme to produce Al Hussein class missiles.||No actions taken to destroy the facility||Under monitoring|
|Harith factory||Programme to produce indigenously proscribed missile engines.||No actions taken to destroy the facility||Under monitoring|
|Numan factory||Programme to produce Al Hussein class missiles.||No actions taken to destroy the facility||Under monitoring|
Section 3: "Missile activities in Iraq after the adoption of resolution 687 (1991) relevant to verification of its proscribed activities"
In its resolution 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991, the Security Council decided that Iraq should unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless, under international supervision, of all ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres, and related major parts and repair and production facilities. The Council further decided that Iraq should unconditionally undertake not to use, develop, construct or acquire any prohibited items. By its resolution 715 (1991) of 11 October 1991, the Council approved the plans for monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with its obligations not to resume proscribed activities and demanded that Iraq meet unconditionally all its obligations under the plans.
Shortly after the adoption of these resolutions, Iraq started missile-related activities. Since then, a number of facilities and a significant cadre of engineers, scientists and technicians have been engaged in missile-related efforts in Iraq. While the scope of these activities has varied over the past seven years, the primary declared effort has been the development of a ballistic missile system with a range of up to 150 kilometres. Known variously as the Ababil-100 and/or the Samoud, this missile system is being developed in both liquid and solid propellant versions. Additionally, numerous other missile-related projects have been initiated by Iraq.
In November 1993, Iraq informed the Security Council that the Government of Iraq had decided to accept the obligations set forth in resolution 715 (1991) and to comply with the provisions of the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification contained therein.
Through its disarmament and monitoring inspections, the Commission obtained evidence that, after adoption of resolutions 687 (1991) and 715 (1991), Iraq undertook, in parallel to its activities declared under the Commission's Monitoring Plan, covert activities that were not in conformity with the requirements of those resolutions and the obligations of Iraq. The established cases of covert activities included:
Iraq's failure to comply with its obligations can be traced, in a number of cases, to decisions made at the highest levels of the Government of Iraq. Some proscribed or undeclared activities, planned or ongoing, were known to the Governmental ministries and agencies but were allowed to start or continue. These findings are based on Iraq's own declarations, contemporaneous documents available to the Commission and official explanations by Iraq. Iraq maintains that most or all of such decisions were made not by the Government but by Lt. General Hussein Kamil Hassan Al-Majid. Prior to his defection from Iraq in August 1995, Lt. General Hussein Kamil held a variety of top positions in the Government such as Minister of Defence, Presidential Adviser, Director of Military Industrialization Commission, Minister-Supervisor, etc.
The evidence available to the Commission and presented in this report shows that:
These findings are based on evidence obtained by the Commission and information provided by Iraq itself since August 1995. They may indicate the origin of remaining gaps in the material balances of proscribed items as presented in this report. The following provides a brief description of the main established cases of activities, after April 1991, in contravention of Iraq's obligations under Security Council resolutions 687 (1991) and 715 (1991).
Retention of production equipment, tooling, missile components and documentation which were acquired or used by Iraq for its production of proscribed missiles and would be required for similar proscribed activities in the future
After the adoption of resolution 687 (1991), Iraq attempted to retain all available production equipment from its factories to manufacture liquid propellant engines for proscribed Al Hussein class missiles. As reported above, this equipment was destroyed or rendered harmless by the Commission only in July 1995. Up to November 1995, Iraq had been misleading the Commission as to the nature and capabilities of the equipment retained.
After the adoption of resolution 687 (1991), Iraq also retained specialized tooling and fixtures that had been used with production equipment for proscribed missile production. Only after the submission of its latest FFCD in the missile area in June 1996 and after the Commission presented its evidence, did Iraq declare that "most important" tooling for missile production equipment - in particular, for proscribed Al Hussein missile airframe and engine manufacturing - had been purposefully diverted from the earlier declared July 1991 unilateral destruction. According to Iraq, these tools and some missile components were then buried at a site of the Special Republican Guard in a manner such that they would be preserved for future use. Iraq claimed that the tooling hidden at this site had been excavated secretly by Iraqi personnel in March 1992 and had been subsequently unilaterally destroyed.
Iraq declared that, at the time of the adoption of resolution 687 (1991), it had also decided to retain components and assemblies of proscribed missiles but then unilaterally destroyed them in the second half of 1991. As reported above, Iraq stated that most of the items had been melted in secret.
Iraq also retained technological and know-how documentation required for the production of proscribed missiles, in particular of the Al Hussein class. Boxes of such documentation were obtained by the Commission in August 1995 at the so-called "Chicken farm". The documentation included detailed plans, procedure manuals and drawings for production of proscribed missiles and their components. It should be noted that technological documentation for the final assembly of Al Hussein missiles was not found either in the boxes of August 1995 or since.
Iraq retained, until late 1995, a parachute device for retarding Al Hussein warheads despite repeated questions posed by the Commission concerning such a proscribed device. Iraq has not provided technically consistent explanations for the procurement of such systems prior to adoption of resolution 687 (1991) nor for the retention of the set until 1995.
Work on proscribed key missile components and designs; importation of proscribed missile components and secret acquisition of items declarable under the Monitoring plan
The Commission has obtained evidence that Iraq continued work on some key proscribed missile components after the adoption of resolutions 687 (1991) and 715 (1991). In particular, this involved such areas as gyroscope instruments for prohibited missile guidance and control systems, a technology Iraq had not fully succeeded in developing itself prior to the Gulf war. Most of these prohibited activities were declared by Iraq only in late 1995 or early 1996.
After the adoption of resolution 687 (1991), Iraq continued to import components for gyroscope instruments until at least November 1991. These components had been ordered by Iraq prior to the Gulf war specifically for use in proscribed missiles. Iraq initially denied any dealing with the supplier of these components but, given the information obtained by the Commission, admitted extensive deals with the supplier. Iraq could not provide evidence to support its statements that, contrary to available evidence and documentation, only a single contract was signed with this supplier in May 1988 for the delivery of proscribed gyroscope instruments and their components had been in force.
In November 1993, "working groups" were established in Iraq tasked to work on gyroscope instruments of the proscribed missile. Iraq declared that the order to begin this effort was issued by Lt. General Hussein Kamil. To accomplish the task, samples of original SCUD-B gyroscopes were required. As Iraq's officials told the Commission, one engineer, of his own accord, had kept one set of three such gyroscopic instruments in his home as a "souvenir". The engineer then decided to turn these instruments over to the new working groups. In addition, a technician is said to have turned in microfilmed drawings of proscribed gyroscopic instruments done by a foreign supplier prior to the Gulf War. Iraq declared that the gyroscope project had been stopped after only two weeks of work. Drawings produced by the working groups, along with the gyroscopes themselves, were claimed to have been confiscated by Iraqi authorities in 1993, but it was decided not to hand them over to the Commission at that time. The microfilm with drawings was said to have been destroyed. Due to the lack of supporting documentation, the Commission is not able to verify Iraq's declarations on the nature and duration of these proscribed activities nor on disposal of all proscribed items and drawings involved.
Evidence available to the Commission shows that during the same period of time, in 1993, Iraq attempted to procure from abroad guidance components for proscribed Al Hussein missiles. This poses the obvious question why there was a need to procure, in 1993, components specifically used in proscribed missiles when all such missiles had been allegedly destroyed in 1991. A missile facility in Iraq signed a contract with a foreign middleman to acquire a key component (potentiometers) for proscribed SCUD-B/Al Hussein gyroscopes that Iraq stated it was not able to produce or procure before the Gulf war. Under the contact, the middleman purchased and brought to Iraq a number of components and samples of proscribed missile gyroscopes. According to Iraq, its officials learned of the content of the shipment and ordered it to be removed from the country. They warned missile establishments in Iraq not to deal further with this middleman. The shipment was declared removed from Iraq in May 1994. The Commission was not able to verify the content of the shipment nor its removal from Iraq.
In August 1994, two major missile facilities in Iraq signed new contracts with the same middleman whom they had been warned not to deal with. According to Iraq, the director of one of them included in his order a "secret list" detailing a wide variety of production and other technologies including missile gyroscope instruments that the middleman was to deliver. The "secret list" from this contract was worth several million dollars. After several months, the middleman obtained from a foreign supplier a cache of gyroscopes and accelerometers for long range missiles proscribed under resolution 687 (1991). The middleman managed to ship some of these proscribed items to Iraq in July 1995. A shipment of additional gyroscopes under the contract was intercepted in Jordan in November 1995. Iraq initially denied that it had been involved in this acquisition of proscribed items. When it admitted its involvement in December 1995, it stated that the middleman mistakenly purchased gyroscopes which Iraq had never ordered. The Government of Iraq declared that it had formally investigated this case. Documents related to the middleman's activities were provided to the Commission. The Commission has conducted an extensive investigation into this case. The investigations confirmed that Iraq's authorities and missile facilities had been involved in the acquisition of proscribed components.
Until late 1995, Iraq retained a number of original gyroscope instruments for proscribed SCUD-B/Al Hussein missiles. In October 1995, Iraq turned over to the Commission more than a dozen proscribed gyroscopes and related technical drawings. Iraq explained that, following Lt. General Hussein Kamil's defection, an "amnesty" order was issued by the Government. By this order, retained proscribed components could be turned over "anonymously" at various collection points. The gyroscopes appeared as a result of this campaign. The Commission asked for specific explanations regarding the reasons for retention of proscribed items, the "collection" sites, dates of collection of items etc. Iraq has not provided complete clarifications of these events.
Available evidence revealed that Lt. General Hussein Kamil had a meeting with senior engineers in May 1993 to assess missile activities ongoing in Iraq at that time. Notes taken of the meeting indicated that among the issues discussed were a turbo pump to feed four Volga/SA2 missile engine combustion chambers and a design of the engine for a "larger missile". These activities were not declared to the Commission at that time. Such activities could have been of a proscribed nature.
Iraq declared that work on the turbo pump to feed simultaneously four Volga/SA2 missile engine combustion chambers actually started at the beginning of 1995. Assistance from abroad had been sought by Iraq for this project. Iraq stated that the effort achieved no tangible results. According to the Commission's assessment, a single stage missile with four engines of this type could have a range in excess of the permitted limit of 150 kilometres.
Iraq declared that work on the 7-ton thrust missile engine had only started in June 1995. Such an engine could increase substantially the propulsive force of the then-declared missile system under development, which already had a range just below the permitted threshold of 150 kilometres. The engineer involved in the project claimed to have no knowledge of the purpose of the development of the new engine. He stated that no designs had been completed. No documentation has been provided by Iraq regarding these activities.
At the end of 1994 or the beginning of 1995, an order was issued to design a multi-stage Space Launch Vehicle capable of placing a small satellite into a very low orbit. Such a missile system would be capable of carrying weapon payloads far beyond permitted ranges. According to Iraq's declarations, missile establishments started a feasibility study. Several designs based on Volga/SA2 surface-to-air missiles were simulated. The report on this study was prepared in February 1995, concluding that the idea was not feasible given the capabilities available to Iraq. Allegedly the project was stopped shortly thereafter. This project was declared to the Commission in August 1995. Simulations of the system's trajectory, some minutes of meetings and a portion of the final report were provided by Iraq as supporting evidence. The chief engineer involved in the project stated that he knew at the time that this subject was prohibited by the United Nations and that clustering and multi-stage techniques as well as separation techniques were proscribed under resolution 715 (1991).
In January 1996, a Commission inspection team discovered, during an on-site inspection of a missile facility, computer files with a missile simulation programme. They contained evidence that in July 1992, a flight simulation of a 3-stage missile had been executed. The simulated missile was based on proscribed SCUD-B missiles. Iraq described the product of the simulation as a "Space Launch Vehicle" that was an effort of an unidentified engineer working on his own. The inspection team later determined that the input/output data, as well as the simulation programme itself, had been copied to floppy diskettes in September 1992. Forensic examination also revealed that the diskettes obtained by the team were part of a larger collection of computer disks that were not found by the team nor provided by Iraq. Due to the manner in which Iraq interfered with the team's analysis of the acquired diskettes, a proper chain of evidence was not maintained, resulting in additional questions related to the nature and implications of the proscribed activities discovered.
In late 1995, Iraq declared that it had imported, in 1994, a large vacuum furnace without providing a notification to the Commission. According to Iraq, it ordered this equipment from a foreign supplier prior to the adoption of resolution 687 (1991) and specifically for production of engines for Al Hussein missiles. Pending results of its investigation of this illegal procurement, the Commission tagged components of the furnace and placed them under monitoring. In mid 1998, Iraq undertook to assemble the furnace and began its installation at one of its declared facilities for production of missile engines. The ongoing installation activities were under the Commission's monitoring.
In late 1993, a large shipment of ammonium perchlorate, a key ingredient of missile solid propellant, was intercepted in one of the regional sea ports outside Iraq. The shipment was intended for Iraq's missile programmes. This attempt to import missile-related materials, explicitly covered under the Monitoring plan, was not voluntarily declared by Iraq until the Commission's knowledge of this attempt was revealed to Iraq by the Commission.
Concealment of ballistic missile projects and facilities specifically established for missile-related production
Available evidence shows that around August 1991, Iraq started a secret project to construct a surface-to-surface missile called "J-1" without notifying the Commission as required by the Security Council resolutions. No aspect of the J-1 programme - from design, to parts manufactured, to flight-testing - was declared to the Commission until late 1995 i.e. some two years after it was allegedly aborted. Iraq states that Lt. General Hussein Kamil issued the orders both for the project itself and for the requirement to keep it a secret from the Commission.
During the period when work on the J-1 project was ongoing, the Commission's inspectors were told by Iraq that it was merely developing a non-proscribed Ababil-100 missile that it had declared to the Commission. As it is known now, the Ababil 100 had some specifications similar to the J-1. Iraq admitted later that its intention had been to hide the "covert" undeclared project from inspectors within "open" work being done at declared missile facilities. Specific measures were taken by Iraq to conceal the J-1 effort from the inspection teams. Components for J-1 missiles were hidden or removed before visits of inspection teams.
The J-1 project was declared abandoned in May 1993. According to Iraq's declarations, prototypes of the J-1 missile were built and six flight tests were conducted in January - April 1993. Iraq provided several documents as well as imagery showing some of the test launches. Some components said to be produced under the J-1 programme were also shown to inspectors. The Commission has conducted document and computer searches at the relevant facilities to find additional supporting data - such as contemporaneous production records - to verify Iraq's declarations, albeit without success. Iraq stated that some of the hardware associated with the project had unilaterally been melted in foundries after the J-1 project had been stopped in May 1993.
Iraq's development of the J-1 surface-to-surface missile was based on the Volga/SA2 surface-to-air missile with certain modifications, particularly to its engine and guidance and control system. There were key similarities between the J-1 missile and the Fahad missiles that were under development in Iraq before the adoption of resolution 687 (1991). The Fahad missiles, based also on modification of Volga/SA2 systems, were proscribed weapons with declared ranges of 300 or 500 kilometers.
Iraq declared that the J-1 missile had never been intended to reach proscribed ranges, and stated that the longest range achieved during the tests in 1993 was 134 kilometres. The Commission has no independent information that verifies the ranges achieved in the J-1 missile flight tests. The Commission's analysis indicates that the system, as tested, was inherently capable of reaching proscribed ranges. Given certain technical aspects associated with this project, it will be difficult to conclusively verify Iraq's declarations.
Available evidence revealed that after the adoption of resolution 687 (1991), Iraq operated in secrecy a facility for the production of liquid propellant missile engines. The facility known as the Sadiq factory was established by a team from Project 1728 (production of proscribed Al Hussein missile engines). The facility's activity was not declared to the Commission until December 1995. Iraq stated that the work on liquid propulsion missile engines began in early 1992. This effort was declared as directed at the reverse-engineering and production of the Volga/SA2 missile engine as well as the manufacture of certain components such as missile engine shut-off valves, which the original Volga/SA2 engine did not have, but which are required for a surface-to-surface ballistic missile. Specific measure were taken to conceal this effort from inspection teams.
A series of static tests under this project were conducted by Iraq in 1992 and 1993. The first five tests were not declared to the Commission and were thus not monitored by inspection teams. While the plan called for production of five sets of engine hardware, Iraq declared that a smaller number of parts and components had been actually produced but that no engine had ever been assembled. Some of these parts and components were later shown to an inspection team while others were declared to have been unilaterally melted. Little documentary evidence has been made available by Iraq to support its declarations regarding the nature of missile engine production activities at the Sadiq Factory.
Iraq had a project, prior to the Gulf War, to construct a dedicated facility to indigenously produce proscribed missile propellants for Al Hussein missiles (for details, see Section 2, above). The project continued after the adoption of resolution 687 (1991) in April 1991. After the Commission presented its evidence of such activities to Iraq, Iraq admitted in 1996 that such a project had existed and its construction had continued after April 1991. Iraq explained that the completion of the construction of the project's buildings had been accomplished as a part of the "reconstruction campaign" and the project had not been fully implemented due to technical difficulties in the procurement of some equipment. No supporting documentation has been provided by Iraq to support its declarations.
Available evidence shows that since the adoption of resolutions 687 and 715 (1991), Iraq has been seeking foreign assistance to support its declared and undeclared efforts in the missile area. The assistance sought ranged from the acquisition of particular missile parts and components, to the provision of comprehensive support for the development and production of missiles in Iraq. In most cases, Iraq did not declare these efforts or its foreign partners to the Commission until they were either fulfilled, declared abandoned by Iraq, or discovered by the Commission.
1. The term "consumption" is used broadly to include various types of disposal of relevant items in a way that they cease to exist in their original and usable form. For example, in case of missiles, "consumption" refers to combat firing of missiles, their use in testing or in the modification process.
2. A single stage, liquid-propellant missile known internationally as the SCUD-B missile. It has a maximum range of 300 kilometres. The launching of such missile requires additional operational assets which are stored and inventoried separately from the missiles themselves. Such assets include a launcher, a warhead, a set of gyroscopic instruments and three types of propellants. The operation of a military unit equipped with such missiles requires additional equipment and vehicles for fuelling, maintenance, command and control, training, etc.
3. The term "special warhead" refers to missile warheads for chemical or biological warfare agents.
4. As part of the verification of Iraq's unilateral destruction of declared BW warheads, the Commission took samples from excavated remnants of these warheads. The analysis of the samples taken in April and June 1998 identified traces of anthrax on remnants of at least 7 separate missile warheads. Once these results were obtained, the Commission informed Iraq that evidence strongly suggested that more than 5 declared warheads had been weaponized with anthrax. On 29 July 1998, a representative of Iraq orally informed the Commission's inspection team that, according to his scientific assessment, there had been in fact 16 anthrax and 5 botulinum toxin missile warheads that had been filled. Iraq did not present any supporting documents or other specific evidence to substantiate the new statement.
5. Al Hussein class missiles were developed by Iraq either through the modification of original imported missiles of the SCUD-B class or through reverse engineering and indigenous production. The one-stage, liquid propellant Al Hussein class missile has ranges from 650 to 950 kilometres. In addition to original Al Hussein missiles, this class also included H3, Al Hijara and Al Abbas variants.
6. A two-stage surface-to-surface missile (first stage-solid propellant, second stage-liquid propellant) with ranges of 620-750 kilometres.