
DATE=9/4/1999 TYPE=ON THE LINE TITLE=ON THE LINE: WHAT NEXT IN RUSSIA NUMBER=1-00774 EDITOR=OFFICE OF POLICY - 619-0037 CONTENT= Anncr: On the Line - a discussion of United States policy and contemporary issues. This week, "What Next in Russia?" Here is your host, Robert Reilly. Host: Hello and welcome to On the Line. Russian President Boris Yeltsin recently fired his fourth prime minister in less than a year and a half. The political disarray has been accompanied by revelations of massive corruption among Russia's political and economic elites. Meanwhile, jockeying has begun for parliamentary elections in December and presidential elections next June. Through it all, fundamental reform remains elusive. Joining me today to discuss the ongoing turmoil in Russia are three experts. Jonas Bernstein is a columnist for The Moscow Times and a Moscow-based analyst with the Jamestown Foundation. Paul Goble is communications director of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and a specialist on former Soviet republics. And Anders Aslund is senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a former adviser to the Russian government. Jonas Bernstein, having recently been in Moscow, can you describe, much less explain, the political climate? Bernstein: The political climate has, needless to say, heated up in the last few weeks, although the summers are usually the doldrums there. It was pretty heated up all summer, but particularly in the last few weeks because there has been the formation of a new political bloc. One is Fatherland headed by Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov, which has now allied with a group of regional leaders under the name of All-Russia. And former prime Minster Yevgeny Primakov has joined them. So the political battle is now really shaping up between them and whomever the Kremlin decides they are going to put forward. Host: Have they not already decided? Bernstein: President Yeltsin did name the new Prime Minister Vladimir Putin as his heir apparent, but, given the amount of times he has shifted prime ministers, some people are waiting to see what is going to happen. This might not be the last prime minister before next year's elections. Host: Paul Goble, with all of these shifts that have taken place over the past year and a half in Russia, what are they in reaction to or in promotion of, or can one discern purposes such as those? Goble: I think it is very dangerous to try to give a single explanation for everything that has happened. There are a number of actors at work. Clearly, Yeltsin is looking beyond his own term in office and trying to make sure that once he leaves office he does not go to prison, or his family either. Second, there is obviously grave concern about where Russia is going. Russia has had enormous economic and political difficulties, and Yeltsin has not found any solution that seems to work, and he keeps looking around. Third, while in established democracies election times tend to be a time when things quiet down in terms of decision making, in emerging democracies, as Russia is, what we see is the possibility that political alliances could lead to radical shifts as people try to position themselves either to advance their own political goals or to prevent others from the same thing. So what we are seeing, I believe, is a certain amount of positioning to try to prevent or to advance particular goals, because the state is too weak to have an institutionalized inertia through an electoral period. Host: Anders Aslund, what is your view? Aslund: This is a time when we have a lot of very different things happening, and it is hard to say what will be considered important in one year's time. Is this a time when corruption is getting out of hand, or is this a time when corruption is being revealed? Host: What is your answer, since that is one of the issues in the headlines with the Bank of New York and revelations of money laundering, capital flight, or whatever is taking place? Aslund: My guess is that we are seeing a cleaning up, that all this knowledge has been there before, but now we are seeing it really coming to a crunch. Clearly some people will be ousted, probably quite a few people will be put into prison, at long last, for serous crimes. But that is only my guess. Host: One of the discouraging comments about Russia today is that it has become a kind of criminal state, that you cannot distinguish between the Mafia and the government, that corruption is endemic, that eighty percent of the businesses, according to the interior ministry, pay protection, and that there really are no clean hands left. Is that an exaggeration, Jonas Bernstein, or is there a real reform party somewhere in Russia? Bernstein: I think that is not an exaggeration, and I would also add that it is not a new story. I think that it is just that it is coming out now. There have never been really the slightest elements of what you would call the rule of law, of an independent judiciary, of protection of private property and private businesses, et cetera. And these features have really been present from the beginning. As a matter of fact, a number of the features went back prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union during the Gorbachev reform period. And I think that it is true to say that the corruption is endemic and rampant, but it has been for quite a long time. I think that just now we are starting to get more of an idea of what exactly has gone on. Host: Paul Goble? Gobel: I think Anders has it exactly right. I think that because finally people are talking about it. For a long time all of this information was available if you went to look for it, but it was not focused on by the Russian people or by the American government, let's be clear. There was a tendency to say, well these are just part of the growing pains of a shift from a Communist system to capitalism and democracy. And I think now there is a recognition that what has happened in Russia is not so simple as that. There are some things that have gone very, very wrong. And I do hope that the next year will see a winnowing out of some of the people who are guilty. I fear, however, that whoever comes to power through the Duma elections later this year, or the presidential vote next summer, that the people who come to power are not going to have completely clean hands either. And it is going to be important to us as we go through the next twelve to eighteen months to try to be very careful in saying, yes, we have one set of a criminal element that has now been put behind bars or excluded from political life, but the reality is going to be that the who people are going to come are not going to have clean hands either and we are going to have to deal with them anyway. Host: There are estimates in terms of capital flight of from three hundred and sixty to three hundred and eighty billion dollars that has moved out of Russia since 1991. Maybe the figure is even higher. However, when the Duma passed recently a law against money laundering - in fact they passed it twice - Boris Yeltsin on both occasions vetoed it. What does this tell you about the political willingness within the political establishment to do something serious, when money laundering isn't even illegal? Aslund: I do not know here exactly why Yeltsin vetoed it. It might have been good; it might have been bad. But the fundamental problem is that you have far too much state intervention in Russia. We are talking about capital flight. Would you put your money into a Russian bank? I would not. Would you hold it at home? Not very pleasant, because if you have a few thousand dollars lying somewhere where somebody knows, you will have a burglary and you will lose the money. The only safe way of keeping money for ordinary Russians is abroad. And this is the fundamental situation. Goble: I think that there are several things going on. One, individual Russians, that is certainly a rational calculation, but also a lot of the capital flight has been the result of value stripping of assets, of the oligarchs going in and selling off assets, and then exporting the capital. The tragedy of Russia is that we do not have robber baron capitalism where the people are violating the law but building things. We have what the World Bank has occasionally called robber capitalism, where the people who are the new owners, having acquired ownership by criminal means or at least corrupt means, are then value stripping, selling things off, degrading the country's economy and its prospects for the future, and shipping the assets in massive amounts abroad. Host: But that too is an old story. What, in the coming parliamentary campaign and perhaps the upcoming presidential campaign, is going to be addressed seriously by these coalitions that are in formation as we speak? For instance, you mentioned that Mayor Luzhkov of Moscow has aligned himself with Yevgeny Primakov and regional governors, and that the Yeltsin camp, whatever constitutes that today, is shaken up by the fact that there is a real political opposition. Are these groups just forming to divide what is left of a smaller pie, or is there a program for reform? Is there a program for creating a Russia where people would want to keep their money in the bank? Bernstein: I am afraid that it is the former, that they are fighting over a dwindling pie. The problem with the issue of corruption in Russia is that, while it gets covered in the Russian press frequently, it is used by the media, which is increasingly controlled by these oligarchs and financial and industrial groups, as a weapon against their foes, the other oligarchs. The problem is that nothing ever gets done about it. It is used as a political weapon to attack your foe, but when it comes to the issue of really prosecuting people for these crimes, it happens very, very rarely. Host: What does a candidate say in Russia today that will attract voter support in parliamentary elections? What sort of rhetoric are they using? Goble: They certainly have to address the problem of corruption because people are talking about it, and he has probably been accused of being corrupt himself. So he is going to lash back and say these people are even more corrupt than any of my people are. And while this may produce cynicism at one level, on the other hand I think it is terribly important that it is being talked about. I think we are watching the beginning of the creation of certain expectations that this behavior is wrong. While we all knew in the West, and while people who wanted to pay attention in Moscow knew about this old story five, six and seven years ago, the fact is that, when people are talking about it every day on television, every day in the newspapers, you are beginning to create expectations in the population that something will eventually be done. Will it happen as a result of this electoral cycle? I doubt very much. Will it create demands for something to be done in the next Duma or further afield? I'm almost certain it will. Host: Anders Aslund, Paul Goble already referred to the hope in the early days, in the early 90s, that even the people who were looting the Russian state would use the loot in a productive, creative way, instead of just shipping it out of the country, which is what they seem to have done. However, you have pointed out that since the ruble devaluation a year ago and the Russian default on their loans, the sky has not fallen and that actually the Russian economy may even have started to grow. How could that have happened? Aslund: If you look at the economic policy of the last year, it has barely existed. It has been totally passive. To the extent there has been economic policy, it has been keeping the budget under control because otherwise it was obvious that there would be a full-fledged economic catastrophe. But this has had, it seems right now, a positive effect on Russian enterprises. They have realized that they cannot get money from the government any longer and they cannot even hope for it. So they have all of a sudden, on a significant scale, started working for the market. And in Moscow today you can find a lot of decent, cheap restaurants that did not exist before. You can find decent Russian goods in the shops that did not get into Moscow before. And this is a positive sign. Host: And Russian imports have fallen by almost fifty percent, and they have a surplus in exports. Aslund: Russia has a huge trade surplus. It was thirteen billion dollars during the first half of this year, and industrial production was actually up by thirteen percent in July. Part of this is because there was such a huge fall last year; part of it is because of a massive devaluation; and part of it is because of the higher oil price that benefits Russia. But there is also something more. We are seeing that the economy is changing qualitatively. We have all heard about the massive barter in Russia, that enterprises pay each other with goods rather than money. They are doing so ever less now, month by month. We have heard a lot that Russian enterprises do not pay each other. Now, all of a sudden, they have started doing so to a much greater extent. Recently there has been a petro crisis in agriculture. Why? Because enterprises refuse to deliver petrol to the farms because they are notorious for not paying with money. So these are basically positive things we are seeing. Enterprises are fighting for money and they are providing what the market wants. Host: Jonas Bernstein, do you sense any of that having an impact on the life of the Russians in any daily way? What is their view of things? Are they more or less overcome by the repeated disappointments? Bernstein: I certainly think that is true. In other words, you had the August '98 devaluation. You also had the October 1994 devaluation. They had monetary reforms going back into the Soviet period. They have been repeatedly, the way they feel it, ripped off by the government. You had the savings loss during the inflation in 1992-93. That's on the one hand. So I think the skepticism in the average Russian is as deep as you can possibly imagine. On the other hand, there is some talk by some people of the meritorious effect of the devaluation having stimulated some domestic growth and industry. But I would also note that some observers, like the Fitch I. B. C. credit agency, said they were not sure that this effect would not start to wear off, and that, given the capital flight, given the fact that there is very little foreign investment and that they estimated that one hundred and thirty billion dollars is offshore, it would not make a qualitative difference, a sort of a breakthrough in the economy. Host: Paul Goble, where does this leave the International Monetary Fund, where does it leave U.S. policy? Goble: I think it is going to be very, very difficult to get much political support for the United States giving more money to the I.M.F. to give to Russia. It's simply going to be more difficult with the charges of corruption that are now getting so much play. Host: The American treasury secretary has recently said there should not be any more loans. Goble: One Russian official responded that he was not quite sure what the treasury secretary of the United States actually was going to be looking for in what he said, so we will have to see how that plays out. But politically, charges that the Russians have misused money in corrupt ways or siphoned it off to offshore banks is going to make it very difficult for the American contribution to go up. It may very well lead to expanded tension between the United States and Western Europe over what to do with respect to Russia. And I think you are going to see, as the electoral process goes on in Russia, some of the regional splits in Russia between Moscow, which has been doing relatively well and where you do see the market taking off, and much of the rest of the country, where you cannot describe that at all. And there are going to be a number of candidates who are going to be running for the Duma and perhaps a candidate running for president who will be calling attention to the fact that it is all very well -- what you see in Moscow -- but what is out in Vladivostok or Irkutsk is something very, very different. And there you are talking about people advocating greater state intervention precisely because there are so many disasters. That is going to get played back here too, and that is going to make it harder for the West to make a contribution through the I-M-F as well. Host: Right, but contributions through the I-M-F do not define the limits of U.S. policy. Looking back on this, do we conclude that American policy toward Russia has failed in a fundamental way, Anders Aslund? Aslund: Frankly, I do not think that Russia was there to be lost for the U.S. I think that this is a massive exaggeration of how much the U.S. could influence Russia. To my mind, there was one time that the U.S. could have really made a difference, that was the first quarter of 1992. If the Bush administration had made a big support package for the real reformers in the Russian government, it could have made a difference. At the time, the Bush administration did not do a thing for Russia and that's when it was important. And what we have seen afterwards is quite a bit of U.S. remorse that the U.S. did not act when it was possible. And then the U.S. tried to do a little bit. It has never been very important, and I do not think it has been harmful. I do not think it has been very useful either. Host: I'm afraid that's all the time we have this week. I would like to thank our guests -- Jonas Bernstein from the Jamestown Foundation; Paul Goble from Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty; and Anders Aslund from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace-- for joining me to discuss the ongoing turmoil in Russia. This is Robert Reilly for On the Line. 03-Sep-1999 11:01 AM EDT (03-Sep-1999 1501 UTC) NNNN Source: Voice of America .