NEW THINKING ON THE IRANIAN ISSUE (Analysis by Reuven Pedhatzur, "Ha'aretz", July 28, 1998, p. B1.) The test which Iran carried out last week on the Shihab-3 ballistic missile was expected. To all those following the attempts to prevent the transfer of missile technology to Iran, it was clear that they were bound to fail. The joint war conducted by the United States and Israel had no chance against the combined economic interests of Russia, China and North Korea. It was clear that the aid of these countries, and the weak response by the international community to the nuclear tests carried out by India and Pakistan, would lead to the acceleration of the development of the Iranian missile. The acceleration was certainly faster than western intelligence bodies had anticipated, but how should this affect the Israel's appropriate preparations against this development, which was expected in any case? The assumption that the Iranians, within a short time, will be equipped with missiles capable of hitting Israel has been contained in every IDF Intelligence Branch briefing that Israeli policy makers have received in recent years. Therefore, the Iranian tests should have surprised nobody, and thus the declaration that the launching of the missile requires a large budgetary increase is not only out of place, but also attests to the shallowness of the debate on the Iranian issue. For starters, the Iranian threat is being unnecessarily magnified out of all proportion, and on the basis of completely mistaken strategic thinking, it is being turned into an existential threat. From here, it is a short step to the exploitation of public fears in order to demand more resources. After all, who would dare to oppose budgetary increases intended for defense against an existential threat? But how exactly would the security establishment use the additional budget to prepare against the Iranian threat? The problem, of course, is that nobody is asking this question, so senior security establishment figures can suffice with the demand for a few extra billions, to be justified with slogans and empty cliches devoid of all content. As in the past, as if by a sort of conditioned reflex, the solution proposed by the security establishment is always the same -- an addition to the budget. The Iranian ballistic missile development program, like the Iranian nuclear weapons project, cannot be destroyed by Israel. The idea that the leaders of Iran are only waiting for the completion of the development of the missiles in order to launch them at Israel completely avoids an analysis of Iranian national interests. The acquiring of long-range ballistic missiles is intended to turn Iran into a central player in the Middle East. Last week's test launch was an additional Iranian signal in the new strategic game developing in the region. The missiles, like nuclear weapons, are devices for turning Iran into a regional power. The ability to hit Israel is not the original intention, but rather derives from Iranian preparations in the regional context. Of course, once such an ability exists, Israel has no choice but to relate to it. A professional analysis of the options available to Israel indicates that a budgetary increase of the sort that the security establishment is currently requesting will be ineffectual against the developing Iranian ballistic missile threat. The attempt to base preparations on the acquirement and development of weaponry able to deal with the missiles is completely mistaken. It makes no difference how much money the IDF invests in the development of weaponry and combat doctrines -- aggressive and defensive -- against the Iranian missiles. In the end, the only answer to the ballistic threat is deterrence. From the moment that the Iranians possess missiles with non-conventional warheads, only the assurance of a complete and hermetic defense against them can act as a basis for preparations, since for Israel, the cost of even a single nuclear missile hitting metropolitan Tel Aviv is intolerable. Since even the most advanced measures cannot completely ensure against the possibility of a single Iranian missile getting through [our] defenses, policy makers will, in any case, have to abandon the operational track and concentrate on deterrence. Even if it is believed that the Iranian leadership intends to destroy Israel, it must be understood that the only way to prevent the realization of this threat is not investment in new and sophisticated weapons systems, but rather through deterrence. Only when Iranian policy makers understand that an attempted non-conventional strike at Israel will result in huge damage to Iran, will they be deterred from the use of the missiles. What is needed, therefore, is bold and original thinking, which does not base preparations on the easy answer: the comfortable and mistaken solution of budgetary increases. The real nature of the developing Iranian threat should be explained to the public, and it should be made clear that Iranian acquirement of nuclear weapons does not mean the end of the Zionist dream. The problem is that those who are taking great trouble to turn Iran into an existential threat will find it hard to calm the public when it becomes clear that Iran has completed the development of nuclear weapons. Increasing the budget is not the correct answer to the Iranian nuclear tests; rather, there must be a basic revision in strategic thinking on the Iranian issue. . ===================================================================== Information Division, Israel Foreign Ministry - Jerusalem Mail all Queries to ask@israel-info.gov.il URL: http://www.israel-mfa.gov.il gopher://israel-info.gov.il ===================================================================== Note: The translations of articles from the Hebrew press are prepared by the Government Press Office as a service to foreign journalists in Israel. They express the views of the authors. --------------------------------------------------------