17 March 1999

TEXT: AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW SPEECH ON NATO FUTURE AT EUROPEAN INSTITUTE

(U.S. leadership "still essential" for Allies' interests, he says)
(3770)

Washington -- Alexander Vershbow, the U.S. Permanent Representative on
the North Atlantic Council, presented a U.S. perspective on future
challenges to NATO in a speech March 16 at the European Institute. He
said a few of these challenges can be described in general terms as
regional instability, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
and terrorism. But by their very nature, he added, "these new risks
are harder to pin down and address than a conventional military threat
to an Ally's territory."

Vershbow outlined some of the initiatives that are being developed to
deal with these risks, and that will be the main topics of discussion
at the 50th Anniversary NATO Summit in Washington in April. These
include a new vision statement and Strategic Concept, a Membership
Action Plan to help aspiring members strengthen their candidacies, and
a Political-Military Framework to articulate operational ties between
Allies and Partnership for Peace members.

Another key U.S. goal for the Summit, he said, is agreement on a
Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) which is designed to produce a
common concept of operations that prepares all Allies for the 21st
century battlefield, with less emphasis on overly large standing
forces and more emphasis on deployability and sustainability.

Vershbow said the United States sees a strong connection between the
DCI and the development of the European Security and Defense Identity
(ESDI) within NATO. He noted that Allied leaders at the Washington
Summit will mark the completion of ESDI arrangements to permit the
Western European Union to take the lead in some security operations,
drawing on NATO assets and other support.

"One of the most important and exciting challenges" that the Alliance
faces within its partnership agenda," Vershbow said, is building a
cooperative NATO-Russia relationship through the Permanent Joint
Council. He said the Alliance is committed to cooperating with Russia
as much as possible in such areas as peacekeeping operations,
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, even the Year 2000
computer problem, but stressed that Russia would not have veto power
over NATO actions.

In conclusion, Vershbow said the United States cannot expect to be a
leader, or reap the benefits of a strong transatlantic partnership, if
it tries to deal with European security problems "on the cheap and a
la carte." He said U.S. leadership and commitment "is still essential"
-- for both U.S. and European interests.

"As for Europe," he said, "there can be no real transatlantic bargain,
nor any meaningful ESDI, nor any prospect of banishing the ghosts of
violent nationalism, unless European Allies develop the military
capabilities and political will to deal with crises that occur well
beyond their own territory. And in developing these capabilities,
Europe must have the confidence not to draw dividing lines among
European states, or shape institutions in ways that inhibit
cooperation with the United States."

Following is the text of his speech:

(Begin text)

New Challenges for the Transatlantic Alliance:  A U.S. Perspective
Ambassador Alexander Vershbow
U.S. Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council

Speech at the European Institute
Washington, DC

March 16, 1999

It is an honor to be here today. Let me especially thank Jacqueline
Grapin for the invitation to speak here, and for bringing this group
together. And let me thank the Spanish Ambassador, Antonio Oyarzabal,
for his kind introduction.

Probably the most important thing the European Institute does in
Washington is put Americans and Europeans in a room together and force
them to talk to each other outside of their normal venues and
routines. It is always good to be reminded of how much we agree on,
given that most of our day-to-day work is focused on dealing with
disagreements.

While the United States clearly has global interests that go well
beyond Europe, the relationship that we have with Europe -- nations
that share our values and vision for democracy, peace, and prosperity
-- is truly unique.

Jacqueline asked me to give an American perspective on "New Challenges
for the Transatlantic Alliance." In approaching this subject, I am
reminded of an exchange that took place in the NATO committee that is
working to revise NATO's Strategic Concept for next month's Summit.

At a place in the document discussing how the new risks differ from
the old military threat of the Cold War, one Ally suggested using the
phrase "threats that are mostly unpredictable in nature." Heads
nodded, and everyone around the table dutifully took note of this sage
advice until another Ally, an inveterate optimist, spoke up, saying,
"Mr. Chairman, I don't object to the insert, but I would prefer to say
'threats that are mostly predictable' in order to be more accurate."

This exchange not only shows what passes for humor inside NATO
committees, but it neatly sums up where we are within the Alliance in
trying to think about the new challenges that face us.

We know that the simple, old, East-West divide is gone, and with it
the kinds of clear military threats that we spent 40 years deterring.
We know that there are new challenges and risks, and we can say in
general terms what they are -- regional instability, often related to
ethnic conflict, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and
terrorism, to name a few. But by their very nature, these new risks
are harder to pin down and address than a conventional military threat
to an Ally's territory.

Nonetheless, we know that it is NATO's job to deal with these risks
and challenges, and so we are working hard to make sure that NATO has
the right stuff for the next 50 years, just as it did for the past 50
years.

This is the number one U.S. objective for the Alliance -- getting NATO
ready for the next century. It is an objective fully shared by our
Allies. And it is an objective that we believe the Washington Summit
will go a long way toward achieving, recognizing that no one can fully
anticipate the challenges NATO will be called upon to address in the
coming years.

In terms of explaining NATO's role, Allied leaders will issue a brief
declaration at the Summit that reaffirms their 50-year-old commitment
to common values and common defense, and lays out their vision of how
NATO will deal with the new challenges of a new century. This "vision
statement" will be important for Allied publics -- and especially the
U.S. public beyond the Beltway. Its purpose is to make clear that
America's connection to Europe through NATO will not just wither away
in the absence of Cold War. It will reflect both NATO's success in
achieving its original mission and its extraordinary transformation
over the past decade in promoting peace and security across a newly
undivided continent.

At the more practical level, the Summit will make decisions and
statements on a wide range of issues. These will define in practice
how NATO is not just reacting to, but actually shaping the new
strategic environment.

Given the ceremony in Independence, Missouri, last Friday, and the
flag-raising ceremony that took place in Brussels just a few hours
ago, the specific step that is foremost on everyone's mind is NATO
enlargement.

At the Summit, the participation of the three new allies -- and the
commitment of all 19 allies to continuing the enlargement process in
the future -- will send a clear message: that Stalin's division of
Europe is truly over. Moreover, the Summit will make equally clear
that continued enlargement is a key part of NATO's strategy for
creating a democratic, prosperous and secure Europe in the next
century. The first round of enlargement will not be the last. For the
United States, enlargement remains a strategic imperative.

NATO enlargement does not merely extend security to the new members.
It also promotes the adoption of democratic norms and peaceful
relations with countries throughout the Euro-Atlantic area and brings
additional strength to the Alliance in carrying out its missions, new
and old.

To help pave the way for future enlargement, we expect that Summit
leaders will approve a package of measures -- which he have proposed
calling the "Membership Action Plan" -- in which NATO will commit to
helping aspiring members become the strongest possible candidates for
joining the Alliance.

Of course, the issuance of an actual membership invitation will depend
upon a political decision by the Allies that a nation's membership in
NATO will contribute to our overall security. But by giving aspiring
members more feedback and guidance on their defense reform and their
modernization efforts, the Membership Action Plan will demonstrate
that NATO fully expects to admit additional countries in the not too
distant future.

Enlargement, however, is far from the whole story. Perhaps most
important in addressing the new challenges of the 21st century will be
the Summit's approval of NATO's revised Strategic Concept -- NATO's
over-arching roadmap for ensuring stability and security in the
Euro-Atlantic area. This document will lay out in some detail the
nature of the Alliance, the challenges of the new security landscape,
and NATO's approach to security and defense.

Unbeknownst to many, however, is the fact that the Strategic Concept's
most important function is to instruct Alliance military authorities
how to configure NATO defense forces so that they are equipped for the
full range of Alliance missions, from collective defense to
peacekeeping.

The U.S. has long believed that one of the most important, new
elements of the revised Strategic Concept must be a recognition that
one of the fundamental tasks of the Alliance is to carry out so-called
"non-Article 5" missions -- operations in response to crises that go
beyond defense of Allied territory.

This is not to say that collective defense is no longer NATO's job one
or, on the other hand, that NATO is going to turn into some form of
"globo-cop," set to intervene in every crisis both in Europe and out.
Rather, it is merely a recognition that many of the threats to the
security of the Allies emanate from outside NATO territory -- whether
through weapons of mass destruction or regional conflict -- and NATO
must be prepared to deal with these kinds of threats whenever there is
an Alliance consensus to do so.

We have sought to sum up this approach as the "defense of common
interests" -- a seemingly straightforward concept that has aroused a
surprising degree of controversy and fears of a U.S. agenda for a
"global NATO." When we speak of defending our "common interests," we
do want our European allies to take account of the wider landscape.
But we also recognize that our common interests are not pre-ordained,
but rather will be defined day-to-day in the consultations that are
the bread and butter of our work at NATO.

In practical terms, NATO has already taken on these kinds of missions
through the Bosnia and Kosovo operations. By raising the profile of
this type of action in the Strategic Concept, we will be giving
guidance to NATO's defense planners to prepare the mobile,
sustainable, and survivable forces necessary to carry out these types
of missions in the future, whether they be high-intensity or low.

A further step to be taken at the Summit will be to articulate new and
closer operational ties between NATO and Partner countries in
responding to crises in Europe. As we have seen in Bosnia and in
Kosovo, when NATO acts to deal with instability outside its borders,
it will usually seek the participation of non-Allies as contributors
to a NATO-led operation.

To facilitate this, NATO has developed together with Partners a
document that explains how Partners will be involved -- not only by
their putting troops on the ground -- but in the operational planning,
political direction and military command arrangements of future
NATO-led crisis response operations.

This document -- which has been given the catchy title of the
"Political-Military Framework" -- will be the centerpiece of "Day Two"
at the Summit, when leaders from 44 countries will participate in the
largest ever summit meeting in Washington, the Summit of the
Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. A further document, with the even
catchier title of "Operational Capabilities Concept," will lay out how
NATO plans to help improve the interoperability and military
effectiveness of Partner contributions to NATO-led operations.

Thus the Summit will make clear that NATO is not merely the Alliance
of 19 members. It is, to quote Secretary of Defense Cohen, the core of
a larger "cooperative security network" that links all of Europe's
democracies in tackling the security problems of the entire continent.

Lest there be any misperception, let me stress that this new
operational focus within the Partnership for Peace is not replacing
the old Partnership for Peace. For the past five years, PFP has
successfully promoted democratic and military reform in partner
nations, encouraged cooperation among countries whose historical
suspicions might otherwise run unchecked, and helped promote and
extend stability well beyond NATO's borders. At the Summit, leaders
will celebrate PFP's amazing success, as well as marking the
implementation of enhancements to PFP made since their last meeting in
Madrid (in the areas of defense planning, political consultation
through the EAPC, and partner involvement in the day-to-day work of
NATO's political and military staffs and committees). And they will
give direction to new work in areas such as education, training, and
exercise simulation.

Within NATO's partnership agenda, building a cooperative NATO-Russia
relationship is one of the most important and exciting challenges we
face. Without giving Russia a veto over NATO action, the Alliance is
committed to working with Russia as much as possible in specific areas
of cooperation -- for example, in discussing peacekeeping operations,
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, science and the
environment, and even the Y2K problem.

Even on the difficult and contentious issue of Kosovo, the NATO-Russia
Permanent Joint Council proved itself as a valuable forum for
consultation. Allies and Russia were able to exchange views candidly,
and this indeed helped to manage differences and focus attention on
our common goal of reaching a peaceful settlement.

We hope that President Yeltsin or Prime Minister Primakov will decide
to attend the Washington Summit, in which case there will be a Summit
meeting of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council.

The Washington Summit will in any event include the first-ever Summit
meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission, symbolizing the importance of
this distinctive relationship and providing a vehicle for defining
further joint NATO-Ukrainian cooperation aimed at bringing that
strategically important country into the Central European mainstream.

On the intra-Alliance side, a key U.S. goal for the NATO Summit is
agreement on a defense capabilities initiative. The aim is to match
capabilities to the new strategic requirements by agreeing on a common
concept of operations that prepares all the Allies for the 21st
century battlefield.

Our goal here is to enhance capabilities, not to get the European
Allies to "buy American" (at least not exclusively!). Most, though not
all, Allied nations do not need to spend more -- but they do need to
spend more wisely. They must move away from overly large, standing
forces and toward more emphasis on deployability and sustainability.
They must ensure that the communications and weapons systems they will
rely on for the next decade and beyond are modern and capable enough
to operate effectively with those of the United States.

We see a strong connection between the Defense Capabilities Initiative
and the development of the European Security and Defense Identity, or
"ESDI" as it is usually called.

In Washington, Allied leaders will mark the completion of arrangements
agreed at the 1996 Berlin Ministerial on developing the ESDI within
NATO -- including arrangements that will permit the Western European
Union to take the lead in some operations, drawing on NATO assets and
other support.

Completing the Berlin package will help lay the foundation for the
further work on ESDI, which the UK and France have taken the lead in
developing since their summit at St. Malo. The Clinton Administration
has consistently supported ESDI. It would be in the U.S. interest for
the European Allies to develop their defense capabilities, strengthen
their collective political will, and make a greater contribution to
security and defense in Europe.

In the past, discussions about ESDI focused almost exclusively on
institutional arrangements. Such arrangements are indeed important.
But a discussion about ESDI that is not based on real capabilities
will be just a paper exercise. These points were very much the center
of UK Prime Minister Blair's calls for a renewed European dialogue on
ESDI, and we welcome this focus on capabilities.

At present, the U.S. provides the lion's share of the strategic lift,
logistical support and intelligence assets needed to sustain military
operations beyond NATO territory. If ESDI is to mean something in
practice, it must address these questions of capability. If it does,
it will be a genuine "win-win" for both Europe and NATO. We would like
to see the European Allies adopt the NATO Defense Capabilities
Initiative as one of the tools that will help give real substance to
ESDI.

On the institutional side, the new debate after St. Malo is pointing
toward an increased EU role in security and defense under the
Amsterdam Treaty -- perhaps even a friendly takeover of the WEU by the
EU. This "EU-ization" of ESDI can be done in a way that builds on the
Berlin foundation. As this process unfolds, the chief U.S. concern is
to preserve NATO as the over-arching framework and avoid the waste and
political divisiveness that could come from efforts to establish
separate European capabilities and structures.

We also need to preserve the kind of genuine, open consultations we
now have within NATO, as well as the full participation of the six
European Allies that are not members of the European Union. A European
operation will have the greatest chance of success if it has the
political and practical support of the U.S. and other non-EU Allies --
not least of all Turkey.

To summarize the U.S. view, a stronger ESDI backed by real
capabilities can contribute directly to greater burden-sharing and
responsibility-sharing that will strengthen European security overall.
Continued U.S. engagement, and cooperation with a stronger Europe,
will be the key to dealing successfully with challenges that still
face us, long after the Cold War has ended.

Having covered in great detail the work being done for the NATO
Summit, I know I have set myself up for the question, "Is NATO
fiddling while Kosovo burns?"

I think just the opposite is true. At the same time that we have been
addressing NATO's role in the next century, the Alliance has been
actively engaged in trying to convince the parties in Kosovo to accept
a peaceful settlement. And NATO will stay involved -- whether backing
up diplomacy, implementing a settlement, or bringing force to bear
against Serbian repression.

To be sure, there is a grave risk that Kosovo will again be aflame
when NATO leaders meet in Washington. If the new talks that got
underway yesterday do not lead quickly to FRY acceptance of the whole
Rambouillet package -- including a military implementation force led
by NATO -- the Alliance is ready to carry out its previous threat of
airstrikes to avert a wider war and a humanitarian catastrophe. We
know that our publics and parliaments will evaluate the Washington
Summit decisions about NATO's role in managing future crises on the
basis of how well we manage this one.

Let me equally be clear, however, that the future is not just about
addressing regional crises, although that is certainly important. The
future is about building a secure, undivided and democratic
Euro-Atlantic community.

Indeed, one can say that NATO's Partnership for Peace and the
relationships with Russia and Ukraine are also "out-of-area" missions
of a more positive kind. In helping to shape the future security
environment, NATO can ensure that there are fewer crises that it may
be called upon to manage in the coming years. This effort will be
reinforced by the work of the OSCE, the European Union, and the
U.S.-EU relationship in preventing conflict and promoting stability
and integration.

This brings me to one final point. I have discussed the specific
challenges facing NATO in the new strategic environment and what NATO
is doing to address those challenges. But the biggest challenge we all
face is maintaining the transatlantic commitment to our common values
and common cause. Here I am addressing both the United States and
Europe -- and forgive me if I sound a bit too much like a high priest
of Atlanticism, but that is part of my job description.

On the U.S. side, we have to remind ourselves that security in Europe
is linked directly to our own security. Not because a small place like
Kosovo or Bosnia has a direct effect on the most vital U.S. interests,
but because problems like these have an enormous effect -- both
tangibly and intangibly -- on our strategic objective of building a
Europe that is democratic, prosperous, secure and a key partner of the
United States.

The United States cannot expect to be a leader, or to reap the
benefits of a strong transatlantic partnership, if it tries to deal
with European security problems on the cheap and a la carte. U.S.
leadership and commitment is still essential -- for U.S. interests as
well as for Europe's.

As for Europe, there can be no real transatlantic bargain, nor any
meaningful ESDI, nor any prospect of banishing the ghosts of violent
nationalism, unless European Allies develop the military capabilities
and political will to deal with crises that occur well beyond their
own territory. And in developing these capabilities, Europe must have
the confidence not to draw dividing lines among European states, or
shape institutions in ways that inhibit cooperation with the United
States.

On both sides of the Atlantic, to ignore these challenges would be to
ignore the shared values that give us common purpose -- the values
that make NATO different from all previous military alliances, and
that also underpin the success of the European Union. Beyond the many
concrete initiatives for the Washington Summit, it will be a success
if it reaffirms our common belief that the United States and Europe
must work together. Thank you.

(End text)

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