U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing
Thursday, January 9, 1997

RUSSIA / NATO Position on NATO Charter Negotiations and Enlargement/US Proposals Made to NATO Secy Gen Solana/Importance of CSCE Limits 5-7

QUESTION: To go back to the Russian issue with NATO. There have been reports recently that Yeltsin has hardened his position on the elements of a charter and that this was communicated to Kohl at their meeting. Does the United States believe that Yeltsin has hardened his position?

MR. BURNS: First of all, Carol, Mike McCurry, I think, gave a short summary of President Clinton's conversation with Chancellor Kohl, and I would refer you to that. It was quite general, I understand. I cannot speak about the Yeltsin-Kohl discussions. That's for the German and Russian Governments to speak about. But you've asked a good question.

The Russians have been opposed to the idea of NATO expansion for three years - since January 10, 1994. We're one day short of three years. They've been consistent in that. We have heard from the Russian leadership - Yeltsin, Chernomyrdin, Primakov, Kozyrev before him - fluctuations of concern over the last three years, but they've been fairly consistent about their opposition, in general. They do know that we're going ahead. NATO will go ahead on July 8 in Madrid.

The importance of these charter negotiations is to ensure the Russians that we want them to participate in the security life of the West, and we want to have a mechanism whereby NATO and Russia can ensure that we continue to live at peace and we continue to, in fact, cooperate together militarily. Whether they're hardening or not, I can't say that we believe that they're hardening because it's always been a very tough, difficult issue between us.

QUESTION: But you acknowledge that there have been fluctuations. Sometimes -

MR. BURNS: There have been fluctuations.

QUESTION: And sometimes you seem more amenable to it than others. How would you characterize the Russian position at this time?

MR. BURNS: My own impression is that the Russian position of the last several weeks is quite consistent with what we heard from Mr. Primakov throughout the autumn and indeed at the Berlin NATO Ministerial last June, which is opposition.

QUESTION: Have they asked for new and stronger - a new and stronger Russian role? For instance, there is a report that Yeltsin has asked for a legally binding commitment that Russia would have a decision-making role with NATO?

MR. BURNS: I should be clear about one thing. We and NATO have had a lot of conversations with the Russian Government over the last three years, but particularly since about the time of the Berlin NATO meeting last June until now. But they've been mainly bilateral discussions - the United States with the Russians, Germany with the Russians, France with the Russians.

Now we have on January 19th and 20th the beginning of the formal negotiations which Secretary General Solana will lead for NATO. He will speak on behalf of all NATO countries. I think all the NATO countries have heard a variety of things, sometimes contradictory, from the Russians over the last six months, eight months or so. We really won't know for sure, I think, what the Russian position is on these details until these negotiations start.

QUESTION: But how does it strike you? I mean, would the United States be inclined to consider some kind of legally binding commitment that would insure Russia's participation in NATO decision-making?

MR. BURNS: I think one thing is clear, and I know that Secretary Perry and Secretary Christopher have both spoken to this many times. No country outside of NATO will have a veto over NATO decision-making. Carol, you've asked a very specific question. We're just going to have to see how these NATO-Russia negotiations go. The United States will not be making the decision for NATO - it's a collective enterprise - and Secretary General Solana will have to lead us through this process over the next six months or so.

I cannot anticipate what specific decisions we're going to arrive at. We do hope to accomplish the accord, but again if the negotiations drag out, we will continue with our objectives of announcing the new countries at Madrid.

QUESTION: One last question. Can you say anything about any proposals or ideas that the United States may have given Solana today?

MR. BURNS: Secretary General Solana was given, I think, a very detailed and clear view of the objectives that the United States believes that NATO should have, and on some of the detail questions what we think NATO's position should be. But, of course, I can't go into that publicly.

Sid.

QUESTION: Nick, so there's not yet a unified NATO position on what - at least from NATO's side what this charter should be - what it should look like?

MR. BURNS: Oh, I think there's a pretty clear idea, that

Secretary General Solana has on behalf on all of us, of what our objective is, what the outlines of an agreement should be. But again, in any negotiation, since you can't anticipate all the tactical questions that will arise, there will be a process of the Secretary General having to come back to the NATO community - the Sixteen - over the course of the next couple of months to decide some of these important tactical questions that Carol's been asking about.

Yes, Ugur.

QUESTION: On the same issue. What importance do you think the CSCE limits on the Caucasus and flanks - what kind of a role it will play in these negotiations? Will the United States insist on the original limits, or are you ready to cut some slack for Russia on this issue?

MR. BURNS: The CFE Treaty and all of the discussions since its signing in 1990 - all of that is important. In fact, for the Russian Government and for us and others, it's one of the most important issues being discussed these days on European security. It does not have, however - a CFE Treaty - a formal role in the NATO-Russia charter negotiations, but it provides part of the backdrop to it.