12 December 1997
(Says NATO's "forte" is political capability to deter) (2960) Boston -- Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Henry Shelton says that "NATO's great forte is its political capability to deter crises before they escalate." In his first major speech to Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government December 11, Shelton stressed that NATO "is no longer an alliance against anything." Instead, he said, "it is an alliance for peace and stability." On the issue of costs for enlarging the alliance, he said, "the truth is that no one can give a definitive answer because the planning assumptions vary greatly between each study resulting in a comparison of apples to oranges." Shelton also urged NATO members to resist efforts, suggested by some, that the alliance "transform itself into principally a peacekeeping force." He also discussed how the U.S. military will help shape the strategic environment. "The role of allies," he added, "is a major variable in shaping the environment and helping to respond to strategic shifts." Looking toward the future, Shelton said, "we must not only continue our existing security assistance and foreign training programs, we must also rely to a greater extent on developing new security partnerships and building on major alliances." The following is the text of Shelton's remarks as prepared for delivery: (begin text) The title I finally chose for my speech ..... "Surviving Peace." I decided on this title after being reminded that this week is the anniversary of the poet John Milton's birth in 1608. It was Milton that said ..."Peace hath her victories no less renowned than war." This is an appropriate quote because as I think back on the events of the past century, the decisions made and the actions taken during the inter-war periods typically left our national defense apparatus greatly diminished, undermining the credibility of our commitments and finding us ill-prepared to handle major crises. So this evening I want to talk about protecting the victories of peace by heeding the lessons of history and developing a strategy that addresses the uncertainties of tomorrow. I'm finding it increasingly more difficult to listen to those singing the praises of the "new" international security environment. This latest "siren's song" lures its listeners with the following chorus: there is no major threat to America so we should drastically demobilize; arms control is an effective way to "level the playing field" and reduces the potential for state-to-state violence; the United Nations is capable of solving all the tough issues; and America should tend to business at home and refrain from involvement in external crises. Most of you in this distinguished audience should recognize that the copyright on this sheet of music lists not only the year 1989 but 1900, 1920, 1946, and 1955 as well. Because each of the inter-war periods of this century was generally characterized by trends that later proved perilous and nearly fatal to U.S. interests. These trends can be generally categorized as: the rise of several "isms," particularly nationalism, that eventually led to conflict; the growth of international organizations and agreements purportedly capable of addressing every crisis that might arise; an over reliance on some "ing" words thinking, hoping, wishing, and praying instead of planning and resourcing; and calls for military demobilization and reform principally as a by-product of post war fatigue, peace movements, and with little apparent thought to long-range considerations. The conclusion I reach as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs is that there are too many conditions today that were also present during the inter-war periods of 1900, 1920, 1946, and 1955 to ignore the potential once again, for problems. And the greatest threat to America today is not Iraq, Iran, North Korea, terrorism, or weapons of mass destruction. It is the potential that we will become too complacent during this time of peace. We must proceed cautiously and with great forethought if America is to avoid finding itself unprepared to handle a major challenge to its vital interests. And if Professors Earnest May and Dick Neustadt are in the audience let me assure you that we are mindful of your warning that policymakers ordinarily use history badly. We're trying hard to heed your advice. Perhaps to your surprise, I am not here tonight lobbying to have the Defense budget increased, arms control halted, or certain aspects of the drawdown stopped. But I am suggesting we consider the potential side effects of these actions and plan alternative strategies accordingly. Because it is the military that historically pays the highest price in the blood and lives of American men and women for poor planning and resourcing. The question before us then is what can the Department of Defense do to accommodate current fiscal and domestic realities while simultaneously learning from our past mistakes? It is just as President Eisenhower stated in 1958: "Our real problem is not our strength todayTODAY...it is the vital necessity of action today to ensure our strength tomorrow." I'm convinced the solution lies in two strategic initiatives: the prudent management of near-, mid-, and long-term risk; a strategy outlined in the recent Quadrennial Defense Review and the expansion of meaningful, capable alliances, particularly NATO. The prelude to our strategy development was an analysis by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of what the world looks like in the near-, mid-, and long-terms and what security challenges America potentially faces. After a lengthy review by many military and civilian experts both in and outside the Department of Defense, we agreed on a number of key points. First, the good news is that America is not likely to face a peer competitor, that is a nation capable of successfully threatening our vital national interests with conventional forces, at least not until the year 2015 or beyond. While we can take comfort from the absence of any potential superpower competition, continued spurts of nationalism in some areas of the world, terrorism, and the growing-pains of continued democratization still leave us with many security-related concerns if left unattended. This audience knows better than most that there are many lingering disputes remaining in the aftermath of communism's demise. Any one of these minor crises could potentially erupt into a larger regional conflict that might affect America's economic interests, endanger the lives of our citizens abroad, threaten our friends or allies, or demand humanitarian assistance. There appears to be an almost endless number of ethnic, ideological, and political disputes greatly complicating efforts to maintain a peaceful and secure environment. It is unfortunate but probably true that in the next 15 years, we will face an increasing number of challenges that will confirm what we already know from the past century -- regional maladies often have global effects. While the consensus is that America needs to continue to maintain the capability to prosecute two nearly simultaneous major theater wars, the study also emphasized that there are also those who wish to do harm to the United States but cannot do so militarily. So alongside the need to be able to deal with traditional force-on-force conflicts we have to prepare for asymmetrical threats, such as more sophisticated terrorists utilizing chemical or biological weapons, or attacks on our information infrastructure. Given this rather challenging outlook of the environment and our current defense downsizing the Secretary of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff had to develop a strategy that would allow us to balance risks against reality in this uncertain environment: a strategy best suited to advancing and protecting America's worldwide interests well into the next century. After looking at the challenges faced by America it seemed there were three basic strategic options. First, we could simply "do nothing." This entailed continuing to plug along as we have been, attempting to meet extensive near-term obligations with diminished resources. The services would continue to rob current readiness and modernization accounts to pay for the very high operations tempo currently experienced. The second option was fairly dramatic. It suggested the Armed Forces make significant cuts in force structure, as much as 26 to 30 percent beyond the cuts already made and use the money to fully embrace the "Revolution in Military Affairs," particularly information technologies. The third, and preferred strategy, fell somewhere in the middle of our risk management dilemma. We decided it prudent to assume some small amount of near-term risk in order to devote resources for our long-term modernization. We'll do this by continuing cautious force structure and vigorous infrastructure reductions to the extent that the leadership feels comfortable with the remaining combat capability. We'll ensure our remaining forces possess sufficient flexibility or "adaptiveness"' to handle a reasonable array of crisis scenarios while fully supporting the objectives of our National Security Strategy. Today, America has approximately 1,470,000 service members on active duty and after implementation of the Quadrennial Defense Review, will have roughly 60,000 to 70,000 fewer; a number the Joint Chiefs believe can achieve the objectives of this strategy. But the most important component of our strategy is the way we intend to moderate our near to mid-term risk. And that is by using our remaining forces to support stability and peace by preventing crises from escalating. We'll do this by helping to shape the strategic environment and deterring threats before they emerge. "Shaping" means creating a security setting such that it is unnecessary to fight to protect one's interests. It also seeks to prevent instability by curtailing incentives for interstate competition. You'll notice I said that America's military will help shape the environment because this isn't a task that we can or should do alone. The role of allies is a major variable in shaping the environment and helping to respond to strategic shifts. So in my judgment, we must not only continue our existing security assistance and foreign training programs, we must also rely to a greater extent on developing new security partnerships and building on major alliances. If time permitted I would give you a full accounting of all our efforts in the Pacific, Latin America, Southwest Asia, and the Middle East to develop the kind of trust and confidence between forces that is contributing to the shaping equation, but the Senate is about to embark on a debate over NATO enlargement, so allow me to focus exclusively on the European continent where we fought two World Wars this past century and where we are laying the cornerstone of our strategic effort. It is all too easy in today's environment to succumb to the natural tendency to be nearsighted, to focus NATO strategy and resources mainly on the world as we knew it during the Cold War when our principal security challenges were clear. But in today's world the threat forecast is blurry. We must try and focus our strategy and requirements to meet the uncertain challenges of the long-term. From my perspective, stabilizing a part of the world where wars have claimed in excess of 50 million lives this century is a worthwhile component of preparing for uncertainty. Yet the debate over NATO expansion is surprisingly vigorous. The current debate is caged roughly in these terms. Those opposing NATO enlargement claim the alliance is a relic of the Cold War whose mission is over and has little relevance to the contemporary world. Enlarging NATO they assert, will draw new lines in Europe placing non-members in the difficult position of providing for their own security or seeking alternatives, presumably along the lines of the defunct Warsaw Pact. Opponents also point to the potential costs, which range from a low of $27,000 million dollars according to the State Department, to the Congressional Budget Office's estimate of $60,000 million. But perhaps the greatest concern centers on what NATO expansion could potentially do to the U.S.-Russian relationship. And even on this matter there is a wide range of opinion. Proponents of enlargement, and this includes all the Joint Chiefs, point to the fact that as the bulwark of our successful Cold War strategy NATO allowed Europe to enjoy more than 50 years without war, the longest such period in history. They suggest that NATO enlargement will not draw new lines in Europe but erase old lines, and NATO's openness to membership indicates that new lines have not been drawn. On closer examination of the various cost estimates, the truth is that no one can give a definitive answer because the planning assumptions vary greatly between each study resulting in a comparison of apples to oranges. One study based its estimate on rapidly integrating and modernizing a new member's military force over the course of a few years, while another planned for gradual improvements over 15 years. This month NATO completed its own cost estimate based on actual military requirements and not supposition. Costs are now estimated at $1,300 million compared to the initial DoD estimate of $5,000 million to7,000 million. As for the deterioration of the U.S.-Russian relationship, I would point to the successful establishment of a NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council agreed to by (Russian) Foreign Minister Primakov and NATO Secretary General (Javier) Solana this past May, as a way to mitigate concerns. And in Bosnia, where American soldiers stand alongside Russian paratroopers, we've already proven that former adversaries can work together and achieve peaceful goals through military cooperation. From my perspective the true success story of the alliance entails much more than the fact it provided a shield against external attack. We must not forget that the alliance helped knit together a family of nations where democracy flourished, old quarrels faded, and economies prospered. Moreover NATO's great forte is its political capability to deter crises before they escalate. The nations that aspire to NATO membership likewise are seeking more than just protection. Collective defense partially relieves the economic burden of unilateral defense allowing more resources to flow to domestic requirements, thereby helping to bolster faith in democracy and market economies. Mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of disputes offer alternatives to conflict and most importantly, NATO's requirement that military forces be placed under firm civilian control alleviate the fears of past historical precedent. Already progress is being made by those aspiring to membership. Old rivals have set aside their differences and are reaching new agreements on old disputes and issues that previously led to armed conflict. NATO is no longer an alliance against anything, it is an alliance for peace and stability. I believe that in time the leadership in Russia will realize that it also stands to benefit from NATO enlargement by having stable democratic governments as neighbors, by enjoying the economic side-effects of greater European integration that will certainly spill-over into Russia, and by continuing the closest military working relationship they've ever had with the West, including the integration of military officers at SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Europe) and NATO Headquarters. In short, Russia has everything to gain and nothing to lose. We are in the process of trying to replace the Iron Curtain with a picture window. If they want us to believe they are a new Russia then they have got to believe we are a new NATO. But NATO enlargement is not the only initiative offering us the opportunity to work with friends and old foes to shape the environment. Equally important has been the Partnership for Peace (PFP) program. In addition to the 16 NATO nations, the PFP program continues to help build a zone of stability throughout the continent by engaging 27 additional nations including Russia, in meaningful confidence-building measures. In fiscal year 1997 there were 50 exercises in addition to numerous military seminars, planning conferences, and political-military games. It seems clear to me that opening NATO membership to additional nations is in the best interests of both Europe and the United States but I offer one caution. Although I have tried to impress upon you that this is a new NATO, alliance members must resist the efforts of those suggesting NATO transform itself into principally a peacekeeping force. NATO is first and foremost a military alliance. Members must be prepared to defend the alliance and posses the military force to honor their commitment. Unless we have the military capacity to back words with deeds, we run the risk of offering little but a hollow promise. History has shown that the United States ignores Europe's problems only at great costs. Twice this century, America has been drawn into world wars that had their beginnings in Europe primarily because we did not maintain our alliances, we did not reach out to nations needing assistance, and we did not maintain our leadership. America can ill-afford to repeat these same mistakes. We have a solid strategy for maintaining America's greatness in the next century; a strategy that honors our responsibility to our country, to our children, and to our friends and allies, to sustain a military force equal to our commitments while helping to close the door on suspicion and mistrust. We have begun a process whose seeds were planted at the end of World War Two, whose delicate shoots emerged during the Marshall era, whose buds survived the bitter Winter of the Cold War, and whose blossoms burst open with the fall of the Berlin wall. We have a strategy developed so we will not have to pay dearly once again, for missed opportunities. A strategy willing to accept intelligent defense reductions in favor of protecting near-term interests and preparing for long-term challenges, a strategy to help secure order in a greater Europe. And it is a strategy for surviving peace. (end text)