12 November 1997
(Nov. 12 briefing at USIA's Foreign Press Center) (6140) Washington -- The Clinton administration expects plenty of "vigorous debate and examination" by the U.S. Congress and the public on whether to admit Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic as new members of NATO, says Jeremy Rosner, special assistant to President Clinton and Secretary of State Albright for NATO enlargement ratification. This is true despite "encouraging signs" from the U.S. Senate, which has held nine full committee hearings -- "quite an extraordinary level of attention" -- on the topic recently, he said. In a briefing at USIA's Foreign Press Center November 12, Rosner said that while "at this point we would not yet say that we have the necessary two-thirds votes in hand... we see encouraging signs of senators stating support for this." He added that apart from getting 67 senators to approve the ratification, "there will be a number of amendments, reservations, conditions and understandings likely to be raised as part of the process." Likely to be addressed, he said, are: "issues including cost, Russia, the 'open door' commitment in future rounds of enlargement, [and] the basic strategic rationale" for enlarging NATO. "Senate resolutions of ratification for treaties or treaty amendments are fully open to amendment, and there could be quite a range of issues raised." Rosner said the administration is "confident that when this comes to a vote in early 1998, as we would expect, that sufficient Senate support will be there for it to be ratified." Ronald D. Asmus, deputy assistant secretary of state for European and Canadian Affairs, joined Rosner in the briefing. He said the NATO debate "is the most comprehensive debate this country has had on European security since the end of the Cold War," adding that it is a debate not just on NATO enlargement "but about NATO as an alliance and the U.S. role and commitment in Europe as such." He said, "I think we feel quite comfortable and confident that we are coming out of this debate with that commitment reaffirmed in this country, and in the leadership and in the population as a whole." After a North Atlantic Council meeting of foreign ministers in Brussels in December, where the accession protocols will be signed, and a second meeting of the Permanent Joint Council "as set up by the NATO/Russia Founding Act," Asmus said, he expects a U.S. Senate vote on the treaty "early next year.... Perhaps March, I think, is probably the best guess at the moment." Asmus pointed out that "the other 15 members of the alliance will be ratifying the treaty, as well. And we anticipate a NATO summit in early '99, perhaps in Washington, DC, at which the new members will officially join the alliance." Following is an unofficial transcript of the briefing from Legi-Slate. (Begin transcript) USIA FOREIGN PRESS CENTER BRIEFING TOPIC: STATUS OF SENATE RATIFICATION PROCESS FOR NATO ENLARGEMENT WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 12, 1997 BRIEFERS: RONALD D. ASMUS, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EUROPEAN AND CANADIAN AFFAIRS JEREMY ROSNER, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NATO ENLARGEMENT RATIFICATION MR. ROSNER: Thank you very much, Christopher. We are just finishing an important and very intensive period in our efforts to enlarge NATO by adding Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to the alliance. In part, that's because we are moving toward the ministerial meeting for foreign ministers which will be held on December 16th in Brussels that Secretary Albright and her counterparts will attend, at which we expect them to sign the protocols of accession for these three states which legally would amend the treaty of '49 to add them to the treaty. We expect them as well to approve NATO studies on costs and military requirements, particularly related to the cost of the common funded aspects of NATO enlargement. It's also an intensive and important period because we have just last week finished a series of hearings on Capitol Hill. We saw in a 30-day period nine full committee hearings by three different Senate committees, which is quite an extraordinary level of attention. And we view these hearings as having been very constructive, and we're pleased that they culminated in the issuance of an extraordinary "Dear Colleague" letter from Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman Jesse Helms and ranking minority member Joseph Biden. And copies of that have been put into your packet. But let me call your attention to a few points that Senators Helms and Biden raise in the letter that I think are instructive as we think about what these hearings accomplished. First of all, they say in their letter that they now view the costs of enlargement as relatively small to the United States and affordable for both current and new allies. And they believe that there is now agreement that these costs must be equitably shared among new and current allies. They say in their letter that they feel that concerns about Russia were addressed, both the concern that had been expressed by some earlier that Russia might have undue influence over NATO. They now say that they believe there is a basis for believing that the Permanent Joint Council will not have undue influence or a veto over NATO's North Atlantic Council. They also say that as a result of the testimony, they now have some assurance that even as NATO enlargement is proceeding, that Russia is moving ahead with reforms and security cooperation on such areas as arms control. They state that they now see a clear rationale, and they quote the secretary of state's statement that with enlargement, a larger NATO will make America safer, NATO stronger, and Europe more peaceful and united. I think, quite interestingly, they also take note of four core principles that are at stake in the NATO enlargement discussion, which they say were, quote, "virtually uncontested" in the hearings: first, that Europe is a vital U.S. security interest; second, that NATO is effective and essential to U.S. security; third, that there's a need for continued U.S. engagement in Europe; and fourth, that Article 5 of the treaty should continue as the heart of NATO's security commitment. We would certainly agree with those observations, and we view them as quite significant. Even so, even with these very positive results and this very positive letter from the chairman and the ranking member, we think that we are still headed for a vigorous debate on this issue in the public and on Capitol Hill. We expect that vigorous debate and examination of the issue. We think at this point we would not yet say that we have the necessary two-thirds votes in hand, but we see encouraging signs of senators stating support for this. We think that even apart from the question of getting 67 senators to approve ratification, we think there will be a number of amendments, reservations, conditions, understandings likely to be raised as part of the process. One can imagine the kinds of issues that they might well address, issues including cost, Russia, the open-door commitment in future rounds of enlargement, the basic strategic rationale, as well as other issues. Senate resolutions of ratification for treaties or treaty amendments are fully open to amendment, and there could be quite a range of issues raised. As we enter this final period leading up to a vote, we are pressing ahead with this quite vigorously. I thought it was significant that the president yesterday made this a central part of his Veterans Day remarks, and it's just one of several times that he's addressed the issue inside Washington and outside of Washington. In addition, Secretary Albright, Secretary Cohen, National Security Adviser Berger, and many others have all vigorously pressed this case with the Congress and the public, as have others within the administration traveling all over the country to present the case to our public. We do, as this goes forward, see encouraging signs. I thought, in particular, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on November 5th was remarkable in that you had not only a majority of the witnesses from the public and non-governmental organizations speaking in favor of this, but quite interestingly, supporters speaking from six very different vantage points; the ethnic American community, the leading organizations of the veterans and military service organizations in America, spokespeople for religious organizations, labor, business, and human rights organizations all saying from their unique perspectives, this was a worthwhile and important initiative. So that while we think we're headed for a very vigorous discussion and debate, which is quite appropriate given the stakes involved in this discussion and this decision, we are confident that when this comes to a vote in early 1998, as we would expect, that sufficient Senate support will be there for it to be ratified. With that, let me turn it over to my colleague, Ron Asmus for some remarks about where we stand on the policy process. MR. ASMUS: Thank you, Jeremy. Just very briefly, I wanted to underscore one point that Jeremy made and was also contained in the "Dear Colleague" letter from Senator Helms and Senator Biden. I think one thing that we're quite pleased at is that this debate, which in some ways is the most comprehensive debate this country has had on European security since the end of the Cold War, has been a debate not only about NATO enlargement but about NATO as an alliance and the U.S. role and commitment in Europe as such. And I think we feel quite comfortable and confident that we are coming out of this debate with that commitment reaffirmed in this country, and in the leadership and in the population as a whole. In terms of next steps, I think many of you know them. We will be meeting in December, in Brussels at the NAC, to sign the accession protocols. There also will be a second meeting of the Permanent Joint Council, as set up by the NATO-Russia Founding Act. We expect to put the treaty before the Senate early next year with a vote. Perhaps March, I think, is probably the best guess at the moment. The other 15 members of the alliance will be ratifying the treaty, as well. And we anticipate a NATO summit in early '99, perhaps in Washington, DC, at which the new members will officially join the alliance. Why don't we open it up to questions? QUESTION: My name Gabriel Lambert (sp). I am from Hungarian daily paper Magyar Nemzet. Mr. Rosner, what do you think about the impact of the Hungarian referendum at the weekend on the whole ratification process? Thanks. MR. ROSNER: Well, we look forward to the outcome of the referendum. We expect that it will be a successful outcome. We are encouraged by the many signs of public and official support from Hungary over recent months on this issue, the support of the parties in parliament, the support that we've seen in public opinion polling, the support expressed from the government in terms of its participation in the accession talks and its commitment about future levels of defense spending and defense commitment to NATO. We find all of these encouraging, and we look forward to the outcome. I think it'll be watched closely not only by us, but by the Congress and by others involved in this process. And I think we have every reason to expect, as I said, that it will be successful. MODERATOR: The gentleman in the front row? Q: I'm Jacek Kalabinski, the Republic Daily, Warsaw, Poland. Do you gentlemen expect a second round of committee hearings in the springtime? Senator Stevens at the Appropriations Committee mentioned that you government people better bring concrete figures next time. And will you be able to bring concrete figures since the force levels and force structure and other details, but important details are only to be fixed by June, I believe? So would not the Senate attempt to delay the ratification until they hear all the concrete information about it? MR. ROSNER: Whether the Senate holds additional hearings is, of course, up to the Senate. We have seen many indications that suggest there may well be additional hearings. As you noted, Senator Stevens held out that prospect during his committee's hearings this last month. I think the Foreign Relations Committee, it might be reasonable to expect that they might hold hearings. And there are other hearings besides. The Budget Committee held hearings this last month. The Armed Services Committee held hearings last April. So there's any number of committees that might hold hearings. Senator Stevens, as you noted, did indicate the desire for additional information on the cost implications. And as we've made clear to him, and as Secretary Cohen made clear in a letter to him of October 16th, we will keep updating what we know about the cost element as we know it, and we have done so already. We do expect more information to be produced as a result of NATO studies, particularly regarding the common funded pieces of the cost of NATO enlargement. And I think that will help add some clarity to the debate. You know, as you noted, you know, if we are talking about the costs over a 10- or 13-year period, there are limits to how much precision one can attach as you go out that far into the future about what individual nations will do on their own military budgets and things of that sort. So there will never be perhaps absolute finality over the very long-term cost estimates before a vote, but I think we are getting ever-greater levels of information and clarity about the cost implications. And I think, as we see from the Helms-Biden letter, that that is beginning to address some of the concerns that the Senate had. MODERATOR: Let's go to the gentleman here in the front row on the right. Q: Stefan Cornelius (sp), Sueddeutsche Zeitung, Germany. I wonder whether you could explain the big difference between the cost studies this administration has brought up until now and the one that NATO is preparing. And the second question, how does the quick decision-making process on Bosnia affect the timetable of NATO ratification after the quite remarkable move of members of Congress, I think it was last week, to show their support for -- (inaudible) -- progress in Bosnia? MR. ASMUS: Well, I think the biggest difference between the NATO study and the U.S. government study from last February, which is the one I assume you're referring to, is that we in our study refer to three baskets of costs, as you probably know. The NATO study -- it will only analyze part of one of those baskets -- namely, the common funded costs. And so the NATO study's only covering a portion of the costs as we had originally defined them. I also hasten to add that that is the way that NATO usually operates. So this is not anything new for NATO. We had decided in our own study to show the broader picture, because we felt that was part of the methodology that we were using internally, and it was part of the overall picture that we wanted our Congress to understand. And over time, I think you will see changes in those areas that we were pointing to in our study, although NATO, qua NATO, will never attach a dollar or D-mark number to them. So the biggest difference is that they're measuring two different sets of costs. And if I can just add something that the secretary said in her testimony, which I think is quite important -- I think she used the phrase "we're interested in bang, not buck," by which she meant what we were trying to do in our study is define a level of capability that it makes sense for the alliance, new and old members, to have in this benign security environment, where we do not face an immediate threat. There are reasons we want to have that capability -- separate from Russia, separate from other factors. What's important is that we get that capability. And if we can do it cheaper than we initially thought, that's very good news that we welcome. So what's important now is that we in the alliance focus on and agree on that level of capability, which is exactly the analytical effort that is under way today in Brussels, and that it's the capability, not the dollar sign, that's important. MR. ROSNER: If I could just add to brief notes to that -- one is that, as Secretary Cohen noted in his testimony at the Appropriations Committee on October 21, and it follows on what Ron said about capabilities, he noted that, as NATO officials have looked at the military infrastructure in the three states, they have found that this infrastructure is more readily usable than was previously assumed, and that that is an additional factor that will explain why the costs end up being somewhat lower in the NATO study than in the U.S. study back in February. The second thing is about your question on Bosnia. You know, clearly, the two discussions or debates about NATO enlargement and Bosnia affect each other. And that is entirely understandable and proper since, in different ways, they're both about NATO and they're both about European security, and so they both enter into each other. They don't, I don't think, affect the timing of each other per se. Clearly, the debates will intersect. And I think the important thing from our standpoint is that we get both of the policy decisions in both of the debates right; that we do what needs to be done in Bosnia and that we do what needs to be done on NATO enlargement. And that's how we're proceeding. MODERATOR: Is there a question in the back? Q: Yes. I have a question for Dr. Asmus. I wonder if you can give us any information about what the accession protocols are likely to look like, in the end when they're signed, their structure and content, and specifically whether they'll contain commitments on the part of the new members to dedicate a certain percentage of GNP to defense or whether they will refer specifically to the new strategic doctrine that's being drafted by NATO? MR. ASMUS: We're still working on those accession protocols. I think it's safe to say that they will be more general than your question suggests, and they will not contain that level of detail. That's not the way we've done accession protocols in the past. And those issues will be handled through the NATO process and other ways, but not through the accession protocols. MODERATOR: In the front row. Q: I am with the Russian news agency Tass. My name is Vladimir Kikilo (sp). Would you please present your view on the future of NATO, both its relationship in view of security guarantees for Baltic countries recently proposed by Russia and in view of our upcoming signing of U.S.A.-Baltic charter? MR. ASMUS: I think NATO's position as such on the Baltics is quite clear. The Baltic states, like any other aspiring partner to NATO, are eligible. We said at Madrid that geography did not exclude any country. We recognize the progress that these states were making, but we also said that they, like any other country, have to meet the same criteria and pass the same tests in order to get in -- so no discrimination, but no special treatment. They have to go through the same process, the same criteria, the same hurdles. Those, I think, we describe quite clearly in the Madrid communiqu as well, which is they have to prove they're willing and able to assume the responsibilities of membership. And NATO, as an alliance, has to decide that bringing them into the alliance would serve the strategic interests of the alliance. As to the Russian proposal on mutual security guarantees, the White House issued a press statement some 10 days ago, where we made our position clear. Our position is that we of course greet the signing of the Lithuanian-Russian border treaty as an important confidence-building measure. We hope that it's possible to conclude border treaties with the other two Baltic states as well. Our position is well established in the OSCE as well as the NATO-Russia Founding Act, where we think countries have the right to choose their own security orientation. The Baltic states have made it clear what their choice is. We support their aspirations. We welcome their aspirations to join NATO and support their efforts. And so I think our position on that is quite clear. MODERATOR: On the far right. Q: Tadeusz Zachurski, Polish Public Radio. Judging from the hearings they just conducted in the Senate, one of the major obstacles in the ratification would be not the direct cost of NATO expansion to American taxpayers, but willingness or lack of willingness of the European allies to pay their share. Does the administration have any way of convincing European allies to pay their share for direct costs of expansion? MR. ROSNER: Well, I think we've seen some very encouraging signs in that regard. In the Madrid declaration back in July all 16 of the allies unanimously agreed that the costs of enlargement would be manageable, there would be costs, but that they would be manageable and that they would be met. I think since then we've seen a number of signs that give credence to that unanimous declaration. For example, we've seen the defense minister of Great Britain, Mr. Robertson, as well as Foreign Minister Kinkel of Germany both publishing articles in the American press again stressing that they understand there are resource implications of enlargement and that their countries are prepared to do their part as well as stressing the steps both of their countries are already taking to help bear the burdens of NATO and the burdens of European security. And we really see very encouraging positive signs that that perception is broadly shared throughout the alliance, including among our new allies, that the costs that result from enlargement that -- everyone acknowledges that there will be costs, that they will be borne, that the division within NATO's common funding budget that has existed for many years where the U.S. pays about 25 percent and our allies pay the rest, there still has been no suggestion that that basic system wouldn't be followed by all the states involved. So we're quite encouraged that that's broadly accepted by our current and new allies. MODERATOR: Sir, in the back row? Q: Yes. Gintos Loxidis (sp) -- (inaudible). Talking about the conditions to join NATO, many times there is discrimination used. Is there any discrimination of Russian or other minorities in the Baltics? A question to -- (off mike). MR. ROSNER: I am sorry. I am not sure I understood your question. Q: Does the United States believe that there is discrimination of minorities in the Baltic states? And if so, what countries are specifically meant? MR. ROSNER: Well, I think I would refer you to the many documents that we've issued, both on human rights and in OSCE, that document our position on the minority issue in the Baltic states. We have said all along, if I understand your question correctly, that we don't think those issues are insurmountable obstacles for NATO membership for the Baltic states. But we've also made it quite clear that we want to see them result in ways that are consistent with OSCE norms and principles that we've all signed up to. MODERATOR: Here in the third row? Q: Surein Passain (sp), (Zua ?) Romanian daily newspaper. Do you expect that the actual debates and the total cost of enlargement will have some measure of influence over the second round of extension? MR. ROSNER: Sure. I mean, in the most basic sense, there won't be a second round unless there's a first round. And I think, in many ways, the first round will affect the second round. First of all, in this first round of enlargement, we are clearly having a broad debate over the basic principles about why enlargement makes sense. In that sense, there is a process of education going on, both for members of Congress and the public, that will lay the foundation for future rounds of enlargement in what I think will be a positive way. Second, as part of this debate on the first round, I think there is quite an explicit piece of the discussion that has to do withfuture rounds. I was struck, for example, back in March, when Majority Trent Lott published a piece in the Washington Post and one of his four points that he was making about NATO enlargement, as he endorsed the concept, was that the door should remain open. And so clearly this is becoming an important part of the debate in its own right. Third, I think when we get to a successful outcome as I'm confident that we will in the ratification vote, I think that will send a strong signal both across our own country and to foreign countries that as Senator Helms and Senator Biden said in their quite remarkable letter that there does seem to be a consensus here in the U.S. in favor of European engagement, in favor of the notion that Europe of vital interest, in favor of the notion that NATO is an effective and essential security organization for us. And I think that as well will have a carry-over impact on the future rounds. MR. ASMUS: Could I perhaps add something? I think one of the reasons why the cost issue has received such attention in this country and on Capitol Hill is because of the open- door issue. It's no secret that a number of senators and Congressmen are concerned that enlargement will dilute NATO, dilute NATO's cohesion and effectiveness and that their desire to make sure that we get this right reflects their desire to make sure that NATO remains strong and be strong enough to carry out a second round of enlargement and their concern that if we don't get the first round right in terms of costs, it makes the second round more difficult if not politically impossible. MODERATOR: Well, let's go over here for another question. Q: (Inaudible) -- Latvian Newspaper. -- question to Mr. Asmus. I know that you recently reached final agreement with Baltic states government regarding U.S.-Baltic charter and could you tell please what information does it include regarding NATO. MR. ASMUS: Well, no actually I won't answer your question because it is still a confidential document and we will be briefing the press at the appropriate time in the future, and we haven't decided when and where to do that with the other parties involved in the negotiation, including the Latvian government. What I can tell you is what the charter is and what it isn't. What it is is, it's a charter that talks about the common vision we have, the four countries have, of a new Europe and Transatlantic community based on shared principles and shared values. It talks about how U.S.-Baltic cooperation can contribute to the realization of that vision. And it is, I believe, to use an American phrase for the Baltic states, it provides an answer to what we Americans sometimes call the "vision thing." What's the vision and where the Baltic states fit into the vision and the process. What it's not: It's not a security guarantee, nor is it a substitute for NATO membership. It's a politically binding document that is an attempt to lay out the strategic direction we and the Baltic states would like to take in our own bilateral cooperation in the years ahead. MODERATOR: Second row. Q: Yes, when Dr. Cohen returned from his European tour last time, he said the Czech Republic is lagging behind in matching NATO's standards. So do you think Czech Republic is still lagging behind, or which country is lagging behind in matching the standard of NATO? MR. ASMUS: I think in a sense your question reflects what I might politely term old news. You have to realize we set up these series of discussions both bilaterally and with NATO to see how the three invitees were doing and to uncover any problems that might exist. In the Czech case very early on in the process, we discovered some problems. They have been fixed. They have been addressed. But that was the entire purpose of the exercise. So it's not that it was a big deal that we discovered those problems, because that's what we set up the system to do. I think the Czech government responded very quickly, very thoroughly, and I don't see any major differences now between the three countries in terms of how they've responded and how they're performing in the subsequent rounds of discussions we've had, both NATO and the Czech Republic or U.S.-Czech, or vis-a-vis any of the other two countries. MODERATOR: Stefan (sp)? Q: Another question on burdensharing, please. Even though this government here and all the Europeans stress the importance of remaining -- or maintaining the present scheme of burdensharing, there are still a couple of voices out there on the Hill saying that this has to be altered. What makes you so convinced that you can sort of bind them in, and that there is no new debate on altering the whole structure of the 25/75 percent thing and the Europeans need to take more of the burden? MR. ROSNER: Well, perhaps I misunderstand the question, but I can't recall any voices challenging the basic 75/25 division, any voices from Capitol Hill. Q: That was the major -- like a couple of months ago, the major debate on -- when it all started, the hearings, the major concern was whether the whole burdensharing structure will remain or has to be changed. MR. ROSNER: Well, I guess I would differ, perhaps, a little bit with your characterization. I think there is a concern on Capitol Hill, as you suggest, not only about what the total cost will be for the United States but about how costs are distributed among allies, both current allies and new allies. But I did not hear that -- I don't believe that debate focuses on the current cost-sharing arrangements within NATO. And, having sat through every one of those hearings, I can't remember a single voice focusing on that particular aspect. Perhaps I'm wrong, but my own sense is that the concern is more about will -- you know, can we depend that that kind of formula will endure, which I think both Secretaries Albright and Secretary Cohen stressed that they can rely that that basic formula will endure, and will broader aspects of sharing of responsibilities be equitable relating to things outside of NATO's common funded budgets in terms of the contributions each state makes through their own national military efforts. And again, I think we were able to provide a lot of good evidence that both the new allies and the current allies are taking a number of steps in that regard to ensure that responsibilities are equitably met. But I just don't perceive the debate focusing on a dissatisfaction with that basic 75/25 division. MR. ASMUS: Could I add one sentence? I mean, we don't use the word "burdensharing" for one specific reason, because burdensharing usually means or meant, to take Germany as an example, of a debate over whether and to what degree Germany would defray the costs of the American military presence in Germany. What we're talking about now is something completely different. We're talking about the alliance as a whole extending a new set of commitments, and we're talking about how we share the responsibility of extending those commitments. That, in our view, is different than talking about, you know, the number of D-marks your country pays to defray the costs of the U.S. military presence in Germany. So we're not asking you to pay money for things we're doing. We're saying as we extend these new commitments, let's agree on how we share the responsibility and costs associated with that new commitment that we're all assuming. MODERATOR: Yes, sir? Q: The Washington Post reported yesterday that the Czech Republic, a prospective NATO member, intended to sell (Tamara ?) advanced radar system to Iraq. What did the United States government (do) to stop this transaction from going through? MR. ASMUS: I can refer you to the State Department press spokesman on that one. But I think it's safe to say that we would not view that to be the kind of behavior we expect from a current or future ally. MR. ROSNER (?): I think there was a piece in this morning's Times that that sale would not go through. MR. ASMUS: Yes. I didn't see that piece, but -- Q: Well, Mr. Klaus said yesterday that the Czech Republic will not issue an export license for this kind of equipment for Iraq. However, he didn't specifically deny the Washington Times story. MR. ASMUS: I'm not in a position to comment on that. Sorry. MODERATOR: Let's go back to the gentleman from Tass for a moment. Q: Yes. I have a follow-up on Baltics. You mentioned that every country is eligible to enter whatever defense arrangements they would like to have. In this regard, how would you respond if, for example, Cuba would enter the military alliance with Russia? How would the United States respond in this case? MR. ASMUS: Well, our position is we're pro-choice; countries can make up their own mind based on -- it's a motto we have in the European Bureau: We're pro-choice when it comes to security arrangements. Q: When it comes to abortions or -- MR. ASMUS: No, when it comes to security arrangements in Europe. MODERATOR: I think we might have time for one more question. Q: Tomasz (Lis ?), Polish Press Agency. What kind of developments in those three vital countries might negatively affect the prospects of ratification, do you think? Are you concerned at such developments, other than selling arms to Iran, etc.? MR. ROSNER: Well, I would perhaps flip the question. I think if I were to add a point to the observations that Senator Helms and Senator Biden make in their very bipartisan letter, I think one of the interesting things perhaps that didn't emerge from the hearings, that I was struck by, was any great contention over the three states. And I think there is a high level of comfort, both in the American public and the American Congress, with the notion of these three particular states being added to the alliance. And I think an enormous reason for that is because what those states have done on the ground: everything from their record of democracy, including the recent Polish elections, which were a magnificent demonstration of democracy; to their economic performance that has made the region as a whole one of the fastest-growing areas of Europe; to their success in military reforms and the progress they've made in restructuring their militaries; to the actions that they've taken to resolve -- the large number of actions they've helped lead in the region to resolve issues with neighbors or issues with ethnic minorities; to the contribution they've made in Bosnia and in other forms to lend security to the area. What I find striking is that their positive actions have produced a high level of comfort with their candidacy and with the prospect of them becoming allies. And I think, you know, it's relevant to look at their actions because that is, after all, the basis for their selection by the alliance and will be the basis for their ratification. I mean, I can't think of particular things off-hand that would cause concern. I can think of a lot of things that have lent confidence. On the Hill, both Secretary Cohen and Secretary Albright pointed out, for example, the steps they've taken -- very difficulty steps, really, to make commitments about their future military budgets to put them in line with NATO. All those kind of steps, I think, bolster confidence about their candidacy and the prospect of them joining the alliance. MODERATOR: Unfortunately, I think we're out of time. Mr. Rosner, Mr. Asmus, thank you very much for coming in today. MR. ROSNER: Thank you. (End transcript)
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