29 October 1997

TRANSCRIPT: JEREMY ROSNER INTERVIEW ON NATO ENLARGEMENT

(USIA electronic journal "U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda") (2480)



(In the following interview, which appeared in the October issue of
USIA's electronic journal "U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda," Jeremy Rosner,
special adviser to the president and secretary of state for NATO
enlargement ratification, says that the NATO enlargement debate, which
entails both "solemn security guarantees and a significant amount of
money," is helping "to set our course on European security policy for
the coming years." He is confident that when the debate is over, the
U.S. Senate will vote to ratify the admission to NATO of Poland,
Hungary, and the Czech Republic. Rosner was interviewed by journal
Managing Editor Dian McDonald.)


QUESTION: Is NATO enlargement the most important foreign policy issue
the Clinton administration must deal with in the next few months?


ROSNER: It's certainly one of our highest priorities and certainly
will be a major issue for Congress, given that unlike some foreign
policy initiatives, it centers very distinctly around a specific vote,
and one that requires a two-thirds margin.


Because of the stakes involved and the consequences involved, it will
be both for the country and the U.S. Senate a very major debate and
decision. In some ways, it's the first major debate over European
security policy that the country will have since the end of the Cold
War. It entails both solemn security guarantees and a significant
amount of money. And it really helps to set our course on European
security policy for the coming years. For all those reasons, it will
be quite a major decision, and I am sure will be treated that way on
Capitol Hill.


Q: To what extent is the administration lobbying Congress on NATO
enlargement, and what strategy is it using in that effort?


ROSNER: I don't know if I would call it lobbying, but we certainly are
using all of the resources available to make the case -- both to the
Congress and to the public -- for why we think NATO enlargement is
good for American national security. The president and Secretary
Albright and all of us who are working for them have spent a
substantial amount of time and effort talking to members of Congress,
engaging in hearings, preparing materials for them, including the
report on this issue that the president sent to Congress in February
and the letter that he sent September 11 to 20 senators, answering a
wide range of core questions about NATO enlargement. We are also
talking with the public, going all over the country to forums on these
kinds of issues, talking with groups who are interested in NATO
enlargement -- ranging from the veterans' community to the religious
community to the business community to ethnic communities. Because of
the level of consequence, it clearly requires a great deal of
discussion, both on Capitol Hill and outside of Washington.


And we've done everything possible to stimulate that debate as early
as possible. And I think the fact that the president and the secretary
established this office (NATO Enlargement Ratification Office, U.S.
Department of State) -- and it's dedicated to just those functions --
is a sign that they wanted more debate on this and not less -- and an
earlier debate, rather than simply attention at the last minute.


Q: What do you think will be the effect of the September 17 letter to
Secretary Albright from Senator Jesse Helms, Chairman of the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations, in which he discussed NATO enlargement
and outlined plans for committee hearings on the issue?


ROSNER: We certainly welcome the letter and the statement by the
chairman that he wants to help ratification succeed. We understand
that he still has some concerns about this, and we hope that the
congressional hearings can help address his concerns and those of his
colleagues. We have encouraged and welcomed hearings on NATO
enlargement from very early on. Both Secretary Albright and Defense
Secretary Cohen testified last April before the Senate Armed Services
Committee. We have engaged quite energetically with other
congressional forums on this, including hearings and meetings in the
House, and with the Senate NATO Observer Group that the two leaders in
the Senate established. We have met with that group on a regular
basis, everyone from the president, the vice president, and the
secretary on down. Our view is that the more this issue is aired, the
more support there will be and the more comfortable Congress will feel
about it. And we certainly hope to have the chairman's support on NATO
enlargement. We would welcome his support and are encouraged by the
statement he made in his letter.


Q: In the foreign affairs arena, is your office engaged in any
specific multilateral or bilateral activities right now related to
NATO enlargement?


ROSNER: We certainly do take close note of the ratification efforts
abroad and of the way this is being debated abroad, in part because to
a very noticeable degree the reaction to this issue overseas is having
a major impact on the debate here in the United States, and especially
in the Congress. So we stay very closely abreast of the political
debates and the press debates overseas on this. We meet with many
foreign officials who are interested in our ratification effort so
that we can get better insights into their ratification effort. And I,
along with other people in my office, have spoken overseas about what
we are doing to try to make sure there is a good understanding abroad
of our ratification effort and the concerns that the American public
and the American Congress have about this issue.


Q: What risks are inherent in the alternative to enlarging NATO --
that is, maintaining NATO at its Cold War membership?


ROSNER: I think there are a number of risks. And as people -- both in
Congress and outside Congress -- focus on the question of the costs of
this initiative, which they should, they also should focus on the
costs of not moving ahead. As the president suggested on that very
question in his report to Congress in February, there are many costs
connected with that. First, it would risk leaving the security status
of Central Europe undefined and risk making that region less secure.
And we should recall that in this century two world wars and a cold
war have had their roots, in part, in that region and its insecurity
and instability at various points. And so it would be a historic
mistake to miss the opportunity to enhance the security and stability
and definition of that region because that is probably the best thing
we can do to avoid being drawn back into war in Europe, as we have
been in this century.


Second, if we fail to enlarge NATO, we would fail to strengthen the
alliance. The three countries that will come in will bring some
300,000 troops and other security resources. They have already
demonstrated their determination to contribute to security beyond
their borders by their efforts in the Gulf War and in Bosnia. And we
would lose the opportunity to have three states that are willing,
able, and really eager to help us address Europe's new security
challenges.


And, third, I think if NATO were not enlarging, we would not be seeing
some of the very positive trends in that region. We have seen nearly a
dozen agreements reached among the states in the region to settle
their border and ethnic disputes; partly that is because states in the
region know that to be credible applicants for NATO membership they
must take such steps. And it's doubtful whether these trends toward
stability and a deepening of democracy would be taking place to the
extent they are in the region if this were not going forward.


And finally, I think there is a cost in terms of what it would imply
about our view of Europe and its divisions. If we failed to enlarge
NATO, we would in effect be making permanent the dividing line in
Europe that Stalin imposed and maintained by force through the Cold
War. And that dividing line is certainly outdated at this point and
illegitimate.®MDBO¯®MDNM¯ And so if we seek to erase the dividing line
in Europe and help build a Europe that is undivided and democratic and
at peace, then we certainly must start by taking in qualified members
in Central Europe and embracing a process that will take in more in
the future.


Q: Do you believe that the widely varying cost estimates for NATO
enlargement reported by the media could be a deciding factor in the
outcome of the debate over the issue?


ROSNER: Congress certainly will look very closely at the costs of NATO
enlargement. They have already indicated that they are very concerned
about this. And they should pay a great deal of attention to it at a
time when we are working to balance the budget. But I think now that
we know which countries are coming into NATO, and now that NATO is
formulating its own estimates of the resource implications, members of
Congress over the coming months will be able to gain more certainty
about the policy and understand what the resource implications are.
And I expect that as all that becomes clear, they will have a firmer
basis for making the core decision about whether the benefits do
justify the costs. We view this as a relatively modest investment with
an extremely high payoff. We have estimated the U.S. share of the cost
to be between $150 million to $200 million a year over the next
decade. And compared to the billions we spent on World War Two, and
the trillions we spent on the Cold War, it seems that if this can buy
us future decades of security and stability in Central Europe and the
rest of Europe, then it is an excellent investment.


Q: How would you characterize the significance of the Madrid Summit
actions for European security and also in terms of the restructuring
and future of NATO as an organization?


ROSNER: The Madrid Summit was quite historic. The alliance made the
decision to invite Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to begin
the process of entering the alliance. Certainly that was the most
significant decision since the end of the Cold War in many ways. And,
further, it declared that the door would remain open to the addition
of other members in the future. And it noted in particular the
progress of Romania and Slovenia and noted the aspirations of the
Baltics to join as well.


In addition, the Madrid Summit continued to move ahead with the
process of NATO's adaptation, its improvements, the streamlining of
its command structures, its efforts to increase its abilities in many
ways through, for example, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the
enhancements in Partnership for Peace, the charter with Ukraine, and
the Founding Act with Russia. Taken together, this is a dramatic set
of initiatives that firmly orient NATO toward Europe's new security
challenges and toward the goal that we have spoken of -- a Europe that
really is undivided, democratic, and at peace for perhaps the first
time in its history.


Q: How does NATO enlargement affect U.S. relations with non-NATO
countries other than those that are being considered for future
membership?


ROSNER: When you look at the full range of initiatives that are being
launched during this period -- not just the addition of the three
countries, but also the open door policy, the new accords with Russia
and Ukraine, the enhancements of Partnership for Peace, as well as our
own bilateral efforts with the states in the region -- I think it's
clear why so many of the states in the region that were not invited to
begin the process of joining at Madrid nonetheless have expressed
their strong support for the decisions at Madrid and have said that
even though they have not now been invited to join, they view the
decisions made at Madrid as something that will improve their security
as well.


One example that underscored this was the tremendous reception that
the president and secretary received in Bucharest, Romania, a couple
of days after the Madrid Summit. There were over 100,000 people
filling the streets to applaud the president and the decisions of
Madrid, even though Romania had expressed a keen interest in being
invited into NATO but was not. And there were strong statements by
President Constantinescu of appreciation for the process that NATO had
begun. So, I think we have a good deal of evidence that this overall
set of initiatives is something that the region as a whole has
welcomed, and that is helping to improve security and stability in the
region.


Q: How do you foresee the next steps for NATO enlargement if Poland,
Hungary, and the Czech Republic are granted membership?


ROSNER: NATO has declared that it will review the open door process in
1999, that it will keep an open door for considering the membership
aspirations of other applicant states, and will continue to work with
them through the Partnership for Peace program and the Euro-Atlantic
Partnership Council. I think after the first states are ratified --
which I am confident will happen by 1999 -- people will want to see
how that process went. But I think they will turn their attention both
to the integration of those three states in an orderly way and to
considerations about the next states that continue to have aspirations
for membership.


Q: What is the key challenge for the administration now in terms of
NATO enlargement?


ROSNER: Right now we're in the middle of accession talks with the
three states. We need to complete those. We need to complete the study
with our NATO allies of the resource implications of this, and then
move to lay this before the Senate for its ratification. I expect the
Senate will look very hard at what this means for American taxpayers,
for our relations with Russia, for the states not initially invited
in, for NATO's effectiveness; the Senate as well will consider its
relationship to decisions and operations in Bosnia. But after the
Congress looks at those issues, I am confident that after a rigorous
debate it will vote to ratify the admission of these three states. We
will then have to move to ratification by all of the other allied
states. It must be done unanimously.


And then I think the challenge will be to show that this is a plus for
the alliance and a plus for Europe and a plus for America's own
security. And the process of bringing the states into the alliance is
the best way to prove that. Although that process will take some
years, I think ultimately it is their entrance into the alliance
itself that will give people confidence that this has been good for
us, good for our allies, and good for the alliance.