11 May 2000
(May 11 at Wilton Park Conference in Brdo Castle, Slovenia) (3,140) The United States wants to do for Southeast Europe in the new century what was done for Western Europe in the last one, drawing upon a number of complementary institutions to help the region's states build a future based on cooperative security, Ambassador Alexander Vershbow told the Wilton Park Conference May 11. Vershbow, the U.S. Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council, was speaking at Brdo Castle, Slovenia, sketching the U.S. agenda for Southeast Europe and the role NATO can play. "Just as it was up to the countries of Western Europe to take advantage of the Marshall Plan, it will be up to the Southeastern European states to got the most out of the Stability Pact and NATO's Southeast Europe Initiative," Vershbow said. He acknowledged that the parallel to 1949 is inexact -- no immediate external threat exists, and many countries of Southeast Europe "lack the historical experience with democracy and economic development that much of Western Europe had" before the second world war. "But we also have advantages that we did not in 1949," Vershbow said. "We have prosperous and secure partners in Europe to work with us in the process. Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has transformed itself. We have gone beyond collective defense to develop new tools for helping our partners build their own stability and help us defend our common values." Moreover, the examples of Slovenia, Croatia, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, among others, offer reasons for optimism, he said. The U.S. agenda for Southeast Europe is, according to Vershbow: -- Stay the course in Bosnia and Kosovo. -- Build regional security through the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). -- Help aspirant states prepare for eventual NATO membership. -- Keep the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) actively engaged in promoting democratic development, supporting human rights, and building transparency and confidence about military activities. -- Remain committed to the success of the EU-guided Stability Pact for Southeast Europe. "In the early days of the Cold War, NATO provided the secure foundation for the Marshall Plan, and later the process of European integration, to succeed. In the same way the Partnership for Peace and NATO's outreach can be a basis extending the area of Europe in which wars are impossible -- because each state is contributing to the security of the region," Vershbow concluded. Following is the text of his speech: (begin text) Wilton Park Conference Brdo Castle, Slovenia May 11, 2000 NATO IN SOUTHEAST EUROPE -- A U.S. PERSPECTIVE Ambassador Alexander Vershbow U.S. Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council (as prepared for delivery) Thank you. I am pleased to be here today to share some U.S. views on NATO's role in Southeast Europe, although it will be difficult to follow the excellent presentations from Secretary General Robertson and Prime Minister Dmovsek. I will, however, try to sketch out the U.S. agenda for Southeast Europe and the role that NATO can play. I want to begin with a story. One of the first things a visitor to Southeast Europe notices is the rather sharp sense of humor that many of the peoples in the region have. One famous story, that I've heard told about a number of different peoples here, goes something like this: An American, a German and a gentleman from a Balkan country find a bottle, open it and discover a genie who offers each a wish. The American says, "My neighbor just built a big new house. Give me one that's bigger and better." The German wishes "My neighbor has a new Mercedes. I want one that goes faster." Finally the Balkan gentleman thinks for a minute and says, "My neighbor has a cow. Kill that cow." Too often in the past relations between Southeast European neighbors have been characterized by just such a competitive attitude: what's bad for my neighbor must be good for me. Our goal for Southeast Europe, and indeed for Europe as a whole, is an integrated community of democracies in which one state's efforts to improve its own security and prosperity will also benefit others. The U.S. vision for Europe is rooted in our historical experience. In the Balkans, one often gets the benefit of spontaneous lectures on regional history from locals, who cite incidents of five and six hundred years ago as a basis for current action. NATO is only 51 years old, so I will only go back half a century to illustrate my point. In the years after the Second World War, Western European countries were recovering from the destruction of war and were riven by deep antagonisms from the conflicts of the first half of the century. There was, of course, also a direct threat to Western Europe from the Soviet Union and its efforts to export communist authoritarianism. Opposing this threat was not, however, the only reason why NATO was created. From its beginnings, the Alliance proved a catalyst for removing the military factor from relations among its members, and promoting habits of working together to ensure peace and prosperity. At about the same time, the U.S. also launched the Marshall Plan, a means of assisting our European friends in rebuilding their societies and resisting the false appeal of communism. The often-overlooked purpose of the Marshall Plan was to promote regional reform, not just to be a source of cash. Marshall Plan assistance was explicitly linked to efforts by European states to cooperate with one another, an incentive that laid some of the foundation for what is now the European Union. The two initiatives -- NATO and the Marshall Plan -- worked in tandem to provide military security and the conditions for economic development that resulted in a stable, prosperous area on the western half of the continent. If, in 1949, someone had said that in less than 50 years another war between France and Germany would be unthinkable, or that most of Europe would have one currency, he would have been regarded as perhaps a little deranged. Flash forward 50 years and that is exactly where we are. Security in Western Europe is a great success story, and, for the first time in history, war on that part of the continent is not a possibility. The question before us now is how to export the success that NATO Allies have had in building stability from the west to the south and east. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, U.S. strategy in Europe has been to do just that. NATO still provides the security foundation, but with the EU and other European, Trans-Atlantic and global institutions now assuming the role of the Marshall Plan. Obviously, the parallel to 1949 cannot be exact. We do not face an immediate external threat the way we did 50 years ago, and many of the countries of Southeast Europe lack the historical experience with democracy and economic development that much of Western Europe had before the war. But we also have advantages that we did not in 1949. We have prosperous and secure partners in Europe to work with us in the process. Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has transformed itself. We have gone beyond collective defense to develop new tools for helping our partners build their own stability and help us defend our common values. The basic approach, however, is similar to that of 50 years ago: we want to build peace and prosperity through the involvement of complementary institutions. The role of NATO is key to the security part of the package. Through the Partnership for Peace and outreach programs, NATO can provide regional states with the tools to manage or prevent potential conflicts. But, just as in the case of the Marshall Plan 50 years ago, much depends on the states of the region to take action to help themselves. Before I discuss our agenda for Southeast Europe in more detail, I want to look at the situation in the region and so that I can relate its distinctive challenges to ideas for progress. In the field of security, there can be little question that Southeast Europe is the most challenging part of the Euro-Atlantic area. In the last few years, I would estimate that 60 to 70 percent of our work at NATO has been aimed at this region. The legacy of communism, combined with a resurgence of extreme nationalism, led to wars, civil unrest and economic stagnation. NATO struggled in the early 1990s with the wars in Bosnia and Croatia, underestimating the destructive power of nationalism and the cynicism of leaders like Milosevic, who were willing to allow their countries to go to ruin if it preserved their personal power. Other countries of Southeast Europe had their populations disrupted by the spillover effects of the Balkan wars and their economies damaged by years of sanctions against the FRY. Moreover, the communist rulers left behind militaries that were too large, loaded with obsolete equipment and independent of civilian control. Nevertheless, we see many reasons for optimism. Since we are in Slovenia, I'll mention our hosts first. Slovenia is proof that geography is not destiny. Despite having been incorporated into the Titoist system for decades, Slovenia has moved quickly to become one of the role models for transition economies while making impressive progress in developing democracy. After the brief conflict in the summer of 1991, Slovenia has remained peaceful and maintained good relations with its neighbors. Macedonia has likewise avoided the conflicts that have afflicted other parts of the former Yugoslavia. We have been pleased to see Croatia's rapid progress over the last six months toward real democratization and improved relations with its neighbors. We look forward to welcoming Croatia into the Partnership for Peace in the very near future. Other Southeast European states -- Romania, Bulgaria and Albania -- have been active participants in PfP activities. Serbia, of course, is a different case. As we saw in the case of Croatia, a change of government can bring rapid progress. It is our hope that the pro-democratic forces in Serbia can eventually make a similar change there. For without a democratic Serbia, stability in Southeast Europe will be incomplete. What then is the U.S. agenda for Southeast Europe? First we need to stay the course in Bosnia and Kosovo. We, and all the NATO countries, have invested too much money and effort to see these places slip back toward chaos and violence. Four years after Dayton, huge problems remain in establishing the rule of law in Bosnia and creating the conditions to return to peaceful coexistence among ethnic groups. Our perseverance, however, is paying off. The security situation has improved to the point where we can reduce SFOR as the International Community turns more toward building democratic institutions. Slowly, nationalist leaders are becoming less prominent, and more war criminals are facing justice. Kosovo, of course, has farther to go. NATO has been able to keep a lid on the security situation, but the UN administration continues to face a difficult task in running the province. With a chronic shortage of human and financial resources, the UN has been hampered in its role as protector of Kosovo. It faces a key challenge in organizing municipal elections this fall. This will be the first chance for the people of Kosovo to take some responsibility for their own future. Indeed, that is the way forward -- not for the UN to run Kosovo like a colony or protectorate, but for the people of Kosovo to begin to exercise the autonomous self-government envisaged by UN Security Council Resolution 1244. It is, of course, too early to make any decisions on the final status of Kosovo. Before that can oven be discussed, there needs to be change in Serbia in favor of democracy, and progress toward self-rule -- with full protection of minority rights -- in Kosovo. As the International Community works with the people of Kosovo to build a secure, multi-ethnic future, NATO will be there for as long as necessary. A second priority for the U.S. in Southeast Europe is to work on building regional security. NATO is the key means to this end. PfP and the EAPC give us means of building political and military cooperation with the states of Southeast Europe. Through dozens of PfP exercise each year, partner states are improving their own militaries while strengthening their capacity to operate with NATO in future crises. In the same vein, regional states have come up with a homegrown initiative, the Southeast Europe Defense Ministers (SEDM) process, which for the first time provides for regular coordination between the Defense Ministries of its members. At the same time, it is our view that in order for us to build lasting stability in Southeast Europe, membership in NATO must be open to those states that choose to join. In March of last year, we welcomed three new Allies, and, at the Washington Summit a month later, we reaffirmed our commitment to NATO's Open Door. That we had made the right strategic choice was confirmed twelve days after the accession of the three newest Allies, when they were called upon to play their parts in the military campaign in Kosovo. One year later, we are all the more certain that the continued enlargement of the Alliance is the right strategic choice for the future. At the Washington Summit, we created the Membership Action Plan or MAP to help aspirant states prepare for eventual NATO membership. From our point of view -- even more importantly, in the view of the "customers" -- the MAP has been a success. Each of the nine MAP countries made a strong presentation and came away with candid advice about where to improve as each prepares for NATO membership. MAP reforms will benefit aspirants on their own merits and are not meant as a definitive set of qualifications for NATO membership, although they will help aspirants make their cases. The final judgement about who gets in to NATO will, of course, be a political decision requiring consensus among all 19 Allies. I cannot speak for other Allies, but I can tell you what will be important to the U.S. in making our national decisions about which states are prepared for NATO accession. Since NATO membership means a guarantee under Article V of the Washington Treaty of the defense of member states, Americans will want to know what they will get in return. States which will be invited in the next round of enlargement will be those who can show they are contributing to building stability in the east and south of Europe -- stability that will lessen the likelihood of needing U.S. military intervention. While NATO's efforts will be vital, they will mean little without engagement of a variety of other organizations on the security front. Just as KFOR and SFOR provide a stable environment in which democratic societies may be created, NATO must work in partnership with other groups. The OSCE has played a growing role in promoting democratic development, supporting human rights and building transparency and confidence about military activities. In recent years, the U.S. has worked to strengthen the OSCE's capability to engage in preventive diplomacy before conflicts begin, and to give OSCE additional tools for rebuilding war-torn societies. We want OSCE to continue to play an active role in Southeast Europe -- building on its efforts over the past decade in Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia and Kosovo. The Stability Pact for Southeast Europe was created to coordinate efforts to support peace in the region and has taken an increasingly important place as a clearinghouse for economic assistance. While the Pact is under the guidance of the EU, the U.S. is committed to its success, a commitment made by President Clinton personally at last year's Sarajevo Summit. As with the Marshall Plan, the Stability Pact's greatest impact can be in helping states help themselves. A particular focus of the U.S. is to promote private enterprise and foreign investment. NATO may not have a direct role in encouraging democracy and economic development, but without progress in these areas, our work in the political-military arena will not end the possibility of conflict in the Balkans. Also, as an objective outside observer, I want to say a bit more about the important role of the European Union. Involvement of the EU, through the Stability Pact and through its direct engagement with Southeast European countries, will provide some of the resources essential to the development of stability. The EU's own enlargement process will, whether faster or slower than NATO's, provide another key brick in the structure of stability and prosperity in the region. As I said before, we want to do for Southeast Europe in the new century what we did for Western Europe in the last one. We want to draw upon a number of complementary institutions to help the regional states build a future based on cooperative security. How can they do this? Perhaps I can give an example from one of the projects we have developed. The United States has been engaged with the Stability Pact, the UN and others in helping Southeast European states develop a civil emergency response capability. For years, NATO has had a civil emergency coordination function that would allow Allies to help Allies in the event of a disaster -- for example, last year's earthquakes in Turkey. In recent years, there has also been cooperation in this field through the EAPC. Following proposals from Croatia and Bulgaria, we have been working on applying some of the experience gained in civil emergency planning to Southeast Europe. The aim is to help the states of the region gain access to capabilities from their neighbors, and potentially from all EAPC states, during crises. With NATO expertise and other resources from the UN and EU, the Stability Pact coordinators hope this coordination can begin later this year. The impetus for this program came from within the region and grew because of cooperation between states. Just as it was up to the countries of Western Europe to take advantage of the Marshall Plan, it will be up to the Southeastern European states to got the most out of the Stability Pact and NATO's Southeast Europe Initiative. The groundwork is in place. In the early days of the Cold War, NATO provided the secure foundation for the Marshall Plan, and later the process of European integration, to succeed. In the same way the Partnership for Peace and NATO's outreach can be a basis extending the area of Europe in which wars are impossible -- because each state is contributing to the security of the region. Rather than killing one's neighbor's cow, everyone will be able to make cheese and perhaps grill a plate of cevapcici for dinner. (end text) (Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)