29 March 2000
(Winning American support will be critical to ESDI) (1955) NATO Secretary General Lord George Robertson said March 29 that American support for the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) will be one of the keys to making ESDI a reality. Robertson's remarks came at a European defense conference in Brussels. To win American support, Europeans must exercise what he called "rhetorical discipline. An ESDI that comes across as being just about European self-assertion will fail to win support in the United States," Robertson said. "In making our case for ESDI we must also underscore the wider trans-Atlantic rationale: as a means to make Europe a more valuable partner of the U.S.; as a contribution to a more mature trans-Atlantic relationship." Robertson acknowledged that skepticism about ESDI is not confined to Americans. "To explain to a European electorate why European defence budgets should not be cut further, or why they should even be increased, will be no less difficult. But the effort must be made," Robertson said. "Kosovo has brought home even to the most ardent ESDI-skeptic that the asymmetry between Europe and North America is not healthy. Everyone senses that a change is overdue. This has created a unique window of opportunity to make our case." Robertson outlined four other keys to success for ESDI: -- Stay the course. "In the last 18 months Europe has made more progress on ESDI than in 18 years before. This momentum must be maintained." -- Resolve institutional questions quickly. NATO-EU links must be developed and the role of non-EU European allies must be resolved satisfactorily. The support of Turkey, Norway, or Poland for an EU-led operation is as important politically as it could be militarily, and the other NATO partners must not be forgotten. -- Focus on capabilities, not just on institutions. "Institutional changes are faster and certainly cheaper to implement than capabilities. But capabilities remain the ultimate litmus test for ESDI." -- Avoid unnecessary duplication. Competitive defense structures must be avoided: "Each country has only one defense budget and one set of armed forces." Following is the text of Robertson's remarks: (begin text) NATO Speeches 29 March 2000 "The Vision" REMARKS BY NATO SECRETARY GENERAL AT THE CONFERENCE "DÉFENSE EUROPÉENNE : LE CONCEPT DE CONVERGENCE," BRUSSELS Minister Flahaut, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, Over the course of yesterday and today, this conference has tackled the issue of European Defence from every conceivable angle. You looked at the ambitions, the capabilities, and at the economic and transatlantic prerequisites for success. This panel -- the last panel -- is about the "vision thing." The organisers had a reason for putting the "vision" panel towards the end of the conference: they wanted me and you to look at how everything should fit together some years down the road. This gets us into the realm of prediction -- and predictions are a hazardous undertaking. John Maynard Keynes avoided the embarrassment of long-term predictions with his famous phrase "in the long run, we're all dead!" But sometimes we can't escape making predictions. And in such situations, I cannot help but remember that American local newspaper which informed its readers that the horoscope section had to be cancelled "due to unforeseen circumstances." So predictions are dangerous. But I would nevertheless suggest at least a few ideas about the shape of Europe, of NATO, and of the transatlantic link as I see them in the years ahead. Let us take the view of, say, just 5 years ahead. Let us look at European Security Defence Identity in 2005. Where will we be? With the usual caveats, here is my scenario: By 2005, Europe will have developed its capabilities for military and non-military crisis management. Political and military structures will have been established to exercise political control and strategic direction over EU-led operations. The European Allies will make a more effective contribution to Alliance security and to Europe's security in general. And, because of this, transatlantic relations will be stronger. And my three "I's" (inclusiveness of all NATO Allies, indivisibility of the transatlantic link, improvement of capabilities) will have been carved in stone -- on a monument outside the building where joint NATO-EU Council sessions are being held. By 2005 NATO and the EU will enjoy a close and confident relationship at all levels. Both formal and informal exchanges between the secretariats and the military authorities will be a matter of routine. Joint meetings will be held, and senior officials of our respective organisations will brief each other on a regular basis. The non-EU NATO Allies will be closely involved in the EU's deliberations on European security and defence policy and crisis management. In a similar vein, mechanisms will have been put in place at NATO to accommodate those EU nations which are not members of the Alliance. NATO defence planning will take EU requirements into account, and the two organisations will closely co-ordinate their activities in this area. The EU will have access to NATO's planning capabilities. Arrangements will be in place to enable NATO's command structure to provide Headquarter elements and command positions for EU-led operations, and the Deputy SACEUR will be the focal point for all ESDI-related issues. And arrangements for the provision of NATO assets and capabilities will be well developed. A NATO-EU security agreement governing the exchange of classified information will be in place. And NATO-EU joint crisis management exercises will be held to test all these arrangements and mechanisms. By 2005, this NATO-EU link will have become the strongest addition to our ability to shape the strategic environment for the better. Not only will it enable us by then to make a quantum leap in managing European security and defence, it will also begin to have beneficial effects beyond ESDI, for instance in the two organisations' policies vis-à-vis Russia, enlargement, or the Mediterranean, to name just a few of the strategic interests our two organisations share. So much for the institutions. What will our capabilities look like in 2005? There will be at least one important difference. By 2005, the EU will have long met its Headline Goal. This will mean that we will have a 50,000 man force available, trained and equipped, ready within 60 days notice and sustainable in the field for at least a year. This will be a significant change: troops ready to be deployed, properly supported at short notice and flexible in their tasking. By 2005, the first concrete results of NATO's Defence Capabilities Initiative will have become visible. The transatlantic technology gap will remain but, having identified the most significant shortcomings, we will have started to rectify them. This, then, would be a benevolent scenario for a workable ESDI. It would be a scenario of a Europe that is capable of taking more responsibility for maintaining security and stability on this continent. It would be a scenario where NATO and EU are not rivals, but Partners. In short, it would be a scenario of an enlightened Atlanticism, an Atlanticism that can adapt to the challenges of this new century. After so much fortune-telling, I do not want to end my remarks without having asked the "mother of all questions": What do we have to do now to make this benevolent scenario succeed? First, stay the course. In the last 18 months Europe has made more progress on ESDI than in 18 years before. From Saint-Malo to Cologne to Helsinki a new sense of direction has become visible -- and this new sense of direction is not confined to the EU. Indeed, all three institutions involved in building an ESDI -- EU, WEU and NATO -- are reflecting these new political and military imperatives. The EU's Headline Goal, the WEU's "Audit", and NATO's new command structure and DCI: they are all converging towards the same ends: a stronger Europe and a stronger transatlantic relationship. This momentum must be maintained. Second, resolve the institutional questions quickly. NATO-EU links must be developed to ensure transparency and mutual confidence between both organizations. The role of non-EU European Allies must also be resolved in ways satisfactory to all. This is more than a psychological matter. The support of, say, Turkey, Norway, or Poland for an EU-led operation is as important politically as it could be militarily. Nor must the other NATO Partners nations be forgotten, from Romania to Albania to Ukraine. A key lesson of Kosovo is that we need their political and military support as well. Third, focus on capabilities, not just on institutions. Institutional changes are faster to implement and certainly cheaper than capabilities. But capabilities remain the ultimate litmus test for ESDI. Indeed, ESDI is meaningless if the right capabilities are not delivered. As far as I am concerned, as NATO Secretary General, I will keep on pressing on Allied Governments to remind them of their commitments on capabilities to make sure they deliver. Fourth, avoid unnecessary duplication. No one questions the need for the EU to establish the structures necessary to exercise political control and strategic direction over EU-led operations, regardless of whether they use NATO assets and capabilities. What should be avoided, however, is competitive structures, in particular when it comes to defence planning. That is why NATO believes that EU member states should make use of existing NATO defence planning procedures as much as possible. The fact is each country has only one defence budget and one set of armed forces. Fifth and finally, make a sustained information effort to explain ESDI -- on both sides of the Atlantic. We need to explain ESDI to an American audience that is still sceptical. This will require that Europeans exert what I may call "rhetorical discipline." An ESDI that comes across as being just about European self-assertion will fail to win support in the United States. In making our case for ESDI we must also underscore the wider transatlantic rationale of this endeavour: as a means to make Europe a more valuable Partner of the US; as a contribution to a more mature transatlantic relationship. Of course, the challenge of explaining ESDI is not confined to Americans. To explain to a European electorate why European defence budgets should not be cut further, or why they should even be increased, will be no less difficult. But the effort must be made. And it can be made. Kosovo has brought home even to the most ardent ESDI-sceptic that the asymmetry between Europe and North America is not healthy. Everyone senses that a change is overdue. This has created a unique window of opportunity to make our case. We must grasp this opportunity. For the first time in decades -- perhaps for the first time in half a century -- we can see a convergence of views about the nuts and bolts of ESDI. Philosophical questions about the desirability of ESDI are no longer dominating our agenda. We have moved beyond that: we are finally discussing the practical questions of implementation. This indicates that all players know how much is at stake. And that they are determined to get it right. Minister Flahaut, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, Making predictions may be dangerous, but can also be quite instructive. Perhaps the most important thing one can derive from this approach is to put things in perspective: Five years from now, many issues that right now seem unresolvable will have been resolved. And many things that at the current stage may seem like make-or-break issues will suddenly look "matter of course" as we look at them with hindsight. Thank you for your attention. (end text) (Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)