News

USIS Washington File

09 March 2000

Text: Asst. Sec. Grossman on NATO, European Security and Defense

(Mar. 9: Tells Senate hearing "we want to get ESDI right")  (1,720)

In March 9 testimony on the development of the European Security and
Defense Identity (ESDI), U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for
European Affairs Marc Grossman told a Senate panel, "Our goal is
simple: we want to get ESDI right. That's because we want ESDI to
succeed."

If the United States and its partners in Europe can get it right, "and
I think we can if we pay attention, ESDI will be good for the
Alliance, good for U.S. interests, and good for the U.S.-European
relationship," he told the European subcommittee of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee.

"More European military capacity will make the Alliance stronger, lift
some of the burden we now have to act in every crisis, and make the
U.S.-European relationship more of a partnership."

Grossman said ESDI should develop in the way NATO Secretary General
George Robertson has prescribed -- his three "I's" concept --
improvement of capabilities, indivisibility of security structures,
inclusiveness of all Allies.

"We support that vision. The job over the next year is to turn
commitments into reality," he said.

In the coming months the United States wants to help create concrete
NATO-EU links, make it possible for non-EU NATO Allies to participate
in shaping EU security decision making, and press all Allies to carry
out their commitments to improve defense capabilities, Grossman said.
"The right NATO-EU links will ensure that organizational decisions
about future military operations will not be taken in isolation by
either NATO or the EU."

In the end, Grossman told the subcommittee, ESDI's success will depend
on the ability of America's European partners to create new military
capabilities, but he said progress in this area will not be possible
"without more resources."

The "way forward," he said, involves: keeping the focus on
improving-military capabilities through the Defense Capabilities
Initiative; working "to establish NATO-EU links and to find the right
way to include non-EU NATO Allies in EU structures and processes;" and
continuing the support from Congress.

Following is the text of Grossman's prepared statement:

(begin text)

U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Marc Grossman
Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Subcommittee on European Affairs

Washington, D.C.
March 9, 2000

EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE IDENTITY (ESDI)

I welcome this opportunity to testify on the U.S. foreign policy
interest in the development of the European Security and Defense
Identity.

The views of this committee -- and of the Senate as a whole -- play a
key role in how we think about trans-Atlantic security. The Kyl
Amendment guided our work both on NATO enlargement and on the
Alliance's new Strategic Concept. The Roth Resolution describes the
framework for the way we want ESDI to develop. In resolutions passed
last fall, the Senate and the House reinforced the Administration's
approach to ESDI.

Our goal is simple: we want to get ESDI right. That's because we want
ESDI to succeed. If we and our Allies and partners in Europe can get
it right, and I think we can if we pay attention, ESDI will be good
for the Alliance, good for U.S. interests, and good for the
U.S.-European relationship. More European military capacity will make
the Alliance stronger, lift some of the burden we now have to act in
every crisis, and make the U.S.-European relationship more of a
partnership.

When Frank Kramer and I were here just before the NATO Summit, we laid
out our goals for the Summit and for a NATO for the 21st century. I'd
like to report to you on how we're doing one year later. I'd also like
to describe our ideas for promoting an ESDI which advances American
security interests and a strong NATO.

Last April, we told you that ESDI should focus on enhanced
capabilities and be compatible with U.S. and European security
commitments in NATO. We said that ESDI should develop in a way that
avoids duplication of existing NATO capabilities, avoids the delinking
of European and NATO decision making, and avoids discrimination
against non-EU NATO Allies.

At the Washington Summit Allies reaffirmed the indivisibility of the
trans-Atlantic link and the need to pursue common security objectives
through NATO wherever possible. NATO is the institution of choice when
Europe and America want to act together militarily. NATO's leaders
also recognized that there could be cases where the Alliance does not
want to engage as a whole but where there is a need for some kind of
military intervention. So at the Washington Summit, Allies also agreed
in principle to presumed access to NATO assets for EU-led operations
while recognizing that the actual provision of these assets would be
decided on a case by case basis.

[Grossman then referred to information presented in chart form.]

The charts are a way to took at where things stand. They compare what
NATO agreed at Washington and what the EU agreed at the Helsinki
Summit, which took place last December.

At the Helsinki Summit, our European partners said that, "NATO remains
the foundation of the collective defense of its members and will
continue to have an important role in crisis management."

The EU also said, like we did in Washington:

The EU should have the autonomous capacity to take decisions, and
where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch, and then to conduct
EU-led military operations in response to international crises.

The Helsinki statement also took a key step in improving European
capabilities by committing to develop a pool of rapid reaction forces
of 50-60,000 troops, deployable within 60 days, sustainable for at
least one year. This would increase the deployable forces available
for NATO operations as well as for EU operations.

And the EU recognized that efforts to enhance its military
capabilities should be "mutually reinforcing" with NATO's Defense
Capabilities Initiative.

There is still work to be done, which I believe can be done
successfully.

For example, NATO and the EU must be able to work together.

On March 1, the EU established in Brussels interim committee
structures to address security and defense matters. These structures
will provide the basis on which to develop institutional links to NATO
and to engage the non-EU NATO Allies in EU deliberations.

We want to use the coming months to help create concrete NATO-EU
links, make it possible for non-EU NATO Allies to participate in
shaping EU security decision making, and press all Allies to carry out
their commitments to improve defense capabilities.

We want the EU to meet the objective it set for itself in Helsinki to
develop agreed principles for NATO-EU links by its Summit in Portugal
in June. NATO needs to work on its own position so that links can be
established quickly after June. The best institutional links will be
transparent and cooperative. We believe that the new EU structures
should interact fully with NATO.

The closest possible links are necessary if NATO is to support an
EU-led action where the Alliance is not engaged. The right NATO-EU
links will ensure that organizational decisions about future military
operations will not be taken in isolation by either NATO or the EU.

We also believe that Allies, who, like us, are not members of the EU,
deserve special status in the EU's security and defense deliberations.

ESDI's success depends in the end on the ability of our European
partners to create new military capabilities. The EU's commitment to
meeting its "headline goal" is key. But, as Secretary Cohen has
reiterated in recent months, our European Allies and partners will not
be able to make progress on improving capabilities without more
resources.

Assistant Secretary Kramer will have more to say on this subject.

Some worry that ESDI will weaken the Alliance. If we get it right,
NATO will be stronger and U.S. interests served.

The critical issue is that we and the EU share a common vision of the
indivisibility of our security interests. We've successfully met the
security challenges of the past fifty years through this shared
commitment. As long as we continue to "be in this together" and create
the right institutional framework, ESDI and ESDP can strengthen the
Alliance. I know NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson and EU HiRep
Solana share that commitment.

But, there is a trap I warn against today. Some demand that EU
candidates in Eastern Europe "choose" between Europe and the
trans-Atlantic relationship. As Secretary Albright said on January 26,
"What a false choice that is. What a fatal choice it would be."

NATO remains the foundation of our common security and defense. Our
European partners have pledged to improve their defense capabilities.
ESDI should develop in the way Lord Robertson has prescribed,
highlighting his 3 I's: improvement of capabilities, indivisibility of
security structures, inclusiveness of all Allies.

We support that vision. The job over the next year is to turn
commitments into reality.

Here's how we see the way forward:

First, we must keep the focus on improving-military capabilities
through the Defense Capabilities Initiative. Building real, new
capabilities is hard, expensive and takes time. But without them,
there is no ESDI, no ESDP, no headline goal. The Alliance will be
unbalanced and weaker.

Second, we will work with our NATO and EU partners to establish
NATO-EU links and to find the right way to include non-EU NATO Allies
in EU structures and processes. We are consulting with all Allies in
NATO, the EU, in capitals, and Washington; with NATO Secretary General
Robertson and EU HiRep Solana; and with the Portuguese EU Presidency.
Detailed arrangements for the presumed access to NATO assets for
EU-led operations will follow from these links.

Third, your continued support and the time you take to meet Allies and
to travel to NATO and EU countries will help us build the practical
security links between NATO and the EU that will help make ESDI
operative.

ESDI can increase the European contribution to our common defense,
ease the burden on the U.S., and strengthen the trans-Atlantic
partnership so vital to our nation's security.

Thank you. After Assistant Secretary Kramer's testimony, I'd be glad
to answer any questions.

(end text)

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