31 January 2000
(Bland title masks its importance to security and stability) (4550) Geneva - Despite its "unexciting" title, the NATO Strategic Concept is vitally important to the security and stability of both Europe and the United States, Ambassador Alexander Vershbow said January 27. Vershbow, permanent U.S. representative on the North Atlantic Council, made his remarks to an audience at the Geneva Center for Security Policy. "Anyone who lives in Europe -- or in any other nation affected by events in Europe -- has a stake in NATO's ability to implement its Strategic Concept effectively and thereby provide a force for security and stability for the Euro-Atlantic area," he said. Vershbow traced the history of the Strategic Concept, noting that NATO's strategy prior to 1991 aimed at "resisting a monolithic Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact." In contrast, he said, "the 1999 NATO Strategic Concept refers to Russia only in the context of cooperation and partnership. This dramatic shift in emphasis mirrors NATO Allies' perception that there is great potential for political and military cooperation between former adversaries." The new Strategic Concept, which was agreed to at the NATO 50th Anniversary Summit last year, recognizes that there is a new security environment in Europe and adapts NATO to that environment, Vershbow said. It revalidates "NATO's fundamental security tasks of security, consultation, and defense" but also adds crisis management and partnership, new tasks that "are critical to enhancing the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area." Despite misgivings on both sides of the Atlantic, he said, the new Strategic Concept is not a change to the North Atlantic Treaty; it does not make NATO "a global cop," and it does not subordinate NATO to the United Nations or any other organization. Vershbow said the Strategic Concept is working as NATO intended, for example in NATO's response to the Kosovo crisis: -- It set out the conditions for meeting and containing a threat "on the periphery of NATO." In Kosovo, "Allies acted to stop the scourge of ethnic cleansing and to make clear that genocide and the politics of hatred and conquest are not acceptable in 21st-century Europe. Beyond this, instability in Kosovo had potential impact on the security of NATO Allies. Thus, the Alliance acted. The Strategic Concept sets out why and how it acted and may need to act in the future." -- Only NATO possesses the military capability to conduct such a campaign, and the Strategic Concept "will continue to guide improvements in NATO's capabilities." -- The Strategic Concept calls for "further development of the kinds of forces which successfully operated in Kosovo.... Such increased European capabilities are essential for an effective ESDI [European Security and Defense Identity] and for any future NATO operations." -- Kosovo and Bosnia are examples of how interaction between NATO forces and civil institutions and organizations works in real-world situations. This interaction is an important facet of the Strategic Concept. -- Kosovo also "validates the increased accent on partnership, outreach and enlargement as aspects of NATO strategy." Partner nations -- including Russia -- are participating in the Kosovo Peace Force (KFOR), and "partnership was the key to solidifying the coalition of front-line states whose support was so critical to the success of the air campaign." The new strategy "charts clear and compelling course for the Alliance through the first years of the new millennium and perhaps beyond," Vershbow said. "It is flexible enough to accommodate the development of ESDI," while preserving "NATO's core ability to defend its members. It is a path we would do well to follow because it is the road to lasting peace and stability in Europe and the entire North Atlantic area." Following is the text of Vershbow's remarks as prepared for delivery: (begin text) Ambassador Alexander R. Vershbow U.S. Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council CONTINUITY, CLARITY, AND CONSTRUCTIVE CHANGE: NATO'S STRATEGIC CONCEPT AT THE START OF THE 21ST CENTURY Geneva Center for Security Policy January 27, 2000 Ambassador Lehner, ladies and gentlemen, I am pleased to be able to join you today to give a U.S. assessment of NATO's new Strategic Concept. Let me start with an assessment of the term "Strategic Concept." It is wooden, bureaucratic, unexciting, and off-putting. That said, I am afraid we are stuck with it. But what the Strategic Concept lacks in crowd appeal as a term, it more than makes up for in its sheer importance to security and stability on both sides of the Atlantic. Put simply, the Strategic Concept expresses the shared determination and common values of some of the most prosperous and advanced democracies in the world. It was tested severely in Kosovo and is being tested daily as the Alliance works to improve its defense capabilities, find the right relationship with Russia, and develop a sound, workable European Security and Defense Identity. In my view, it has stood those tests well. It matters to all of us in two important respects. First, most of us here deal directly with European security issues as part of our professions. It is important for us to know what NATO's strategy is and what it is not. We need to understand how NATO plans to move into the third millennium. More generally, anyone who lives in Europe -- or in any other nation affected by events in Europe -- has a stake in NATO's ability to implement its Strategic Concept effectively and thereby provide a force for security and stability for the Euro-Atlantic area. A great number of people are touched by Euro-Atlantic peace or conflict. Europe without NATO would be a less secure and less certain place. So it seems to me that if you live in North America, in Western, Central or Eastern Europe, or even in Russia, you have a vested interest in the success of NATO's Strategic Concept -- whether you have ever read or heard of it, or whether you particularly like what it says. With these thoughts in mind, I'd like to address the Strategic Concept itself so that it is clear what we are dealing with. How we got to April 1999 The April 1999 NATO Strategic Concept is the fifth-generation NATO strategy. Its immediate predecessor was agreed in 1991 as the Cold War was ending, and reflected an Alliance very much in transition. The 1991 Concept was guarded about maintaining "strategic balance" between the East and West and reflected skepticism that the conventional threat was really fading. It identified a new catalogue of risks and called for development of more mobile forces appropriate to counter them. The changed security environment was an opportunity for the Alliance to adopt a broad approach to security, characterized by the themes of dialogue, cooperation and collective defense. Crisis management first emerged as a role for the post-Cold War NATO, but in 1991 Allies were reluctant to say much about how we would play that role. Prior to 1991, NATO strategies were classified and were far less optimistic documents. They aimed squarely at resisting a monolithic Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact. In stark contrast, the 1999 NATO Strategic Concept refers to Russia only in the context of cooperation and partnership. This dramatic shift in emphasis mirrors NATO Allies' perception that there is great potential for political and military cooperation between former adversaries. Part of the long-term prospect for the success of our new approach to security will hinge on continued cooperation with Russia -- at least on the important issues. Political changes occurring all across Europe during the early 1990s spurred NATO leaders at the Madrid summit in 1997 to mandate a review of the 1991 strategy. The work took almost two years, with Kosovo providing a somber, real-life backdrop for debates on NATO's approach to crisis response operations and its relationship to other international organizations. In the end, 19 Allied nations arrived at their new Strategic Concept through a consensus-driven process that fundamentally respected the views of every Ally -- including the three new members -- and took account of the positions of all NATO's partners, including Russia and Ukraine. NATO's Strategic Concept is, above all, about defense -- it is about national commitments of significant resources and human lives. It is serious business. A common approach on such central issues is only possible because Allies take seriously their common tasks of providing an essential foundation for Euro-Atlantic security, and consulting fully, as a transatlantic alliance, so as to coordinate their efforts in fields of common concern. These are a sine qua non for NATO; without effective consultation, the Alliance simply could not function. I would add that, no matter what direction European defense might take, it is critical to retain open, constructive consultation among all Allies at NATO's conference table. Let me turn briefly to the content of NATO's current strategy and the directions it sets for the future. The 1999 Strategic Concept NATO currently finds itself in an environment of generally positive change, unlike the Cold War's relatively dangerous certainty. The chance of general war in Europe is low, but there is new instability on NATO's periphery. Circling the wagons is not an option. The Alliance has to think over the horizon about emerging threats and actively shape its strategic environment. The new Strategic Concept addresses both challenges. NATO now extends stability outward through political consultations, military-to-military cooperation, preventive diplomacy and other Partnership activities, including special relationships with Russia and Ukraine. We are building a stronger European Security and Defense Identity, including an EU defense dimension that was not fully foreseen in 1991. We recognize that the nature of warfare is different from what the Washington Treaty's signers had in mind in 1949: this half-century's military actions have mostly been about threats to interests, not to territory. With Bosnia and Kosovo, we can now add threats to our values to the list. Some of the new threats are non-traditional: rogue states; weapons of mass destruction (WMD); terrorism; stampeding refugees; ethnic cleansing -- to name a few. I can tell you from experience that it is exceedingly difficult to arrive at a consensus for action where home territory is not at stake. It should -- and will -- demand higher levels of diplomatic effort and military effectiveness in order to justify public support. To adapt to the new environment, the new Strategic Concept revalidated NATO's fundamental security tasks of security, consultation, and defense, but added to these crisis management and partnership. These new tasks are critical to enhancing the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area. Without diminishing the importance of collective defense, the new Strategic Concept puts a necessary emphasis on defense of common interests and common values. This is probably the most significant single evolution from the 1991 and previous NATO strategies. The 1991 Concept very tentatively opened a door to partnership. In contrast, the outreach effort reflected in the 1999 Concept -- Partnership for Peace, enlargement, NATO-Russia, NATO-Ukraine relations -- constitutes an unprecedented effort to shape the European security environment in a positive way. Through transparency and through military, political, economic and scientific cooperation, NATO aims to extend the stability originally provided to its own members to other European democracies. This is a pivotal step for NATO's approach to security. You have every right to ask, "What makes NATO's Strategic Concept different from any other policy paper?" The answer is: "implementation." The Strategic Concept is the essential defense guidance from NATO's political leadership to NATO's military authorities and to national force planners. It provides the authoritative direction for development of forces that are equipped and trained to do the missions which flow from NATO's fundamental security tasks. Implementation of the Strategic Concept is often overlooked in the glare of the spotlight focused on the sections that deal with NATO's broad politico-military approach to security. A clear statement of policy is important. But mustering the political will to build the military forces we need, to meet the threats and assume the roles set out in the Strategic Concept, is what separates NATO from everyone else. What the 1999 Strategic Concept is NOT: Before explaining about how the Strategic Concept is standing up to the test of the real world, I'd like to touch briefly on what it is not. It is not a change to the North Atlantic Treaty. The Treaty has always called for Allies to "promote conditions of stability and well-being," and to collaborate in ways that go beyond the Article 5 commitment to collective defense. In some ways, the "new" Strategic Concept is actually a return to the broad original purposes of the Treaty, identifying the means -- both old and new -- to carry out the original objectives framed in Washington. The Strategic Concept does not have the legal obligations of a treaty and, therefore, does not have to be ratified by the parliaments of the member states of the Alliance. The 1999 Strategic Concept is not revolutionary; it is evolutionary. It is a logical development of the Washington Treaty, NATO's previous strategies, and the common interests of Allies, reflecting the current strategic environment. Its explicit inclusion of crisis response and partnership as fundamental tasks simply reflects theory catching up with the practice of the 1990s. In the last decade, NATO launched its first crisis management operations and far surpassed the limited partnership ideas of the 1991 Strategic Concept. It also matches reality at NATO headquarters, where three-quarters of our time is dedicated to crisis management (in Bosnia and Kosovo) and to working with Partner nations. Our willingness to work to protect common interests was expressed 50 years ago in the North Atlantic Treaty -- and put in practice in the Balkans. That said, collective defense is still the most important if not the most pressing Alliance task. NATO is still willing and able to defend its members. The 1991 Concept's focus on leaner Alliance forces capable of deploying anywhere within the Alliance to counter an Article 5 threat is essential to NATO's ability to execute new non-Article 5 missions. So what we have is not so much new as a sound evolution of the fundamentals developed together by Allies over the past 50 years. The new Strategic Concept does not mean NATO aims to be a "global cop." Willingness to respond to crises affecting the interests of NATO members does not mean that the Alliance will build an intervention force for use in any circumstances it wishes. Kosovo proves this point. It demonstrates both the need to be able to resort to force where extreme circumstances warrant, the tremendous gravity of any such decision, and the need to consult and coordinate with other international organizations. On the periphery of the Alliance, turmoil in Kosovo threatened wider regional instability; the degree of humanitarian suffering was immense and was approaching a full-scale catastrophe, with hundreds of thousands of lives at risk; and all our diplomatic efforts over more than a year had proven fruitless in convincing Milosevic to accept a viable, enforceable political solution. It took this rare coincidence of factors for NATO as an Alliance to agree to use force as it did, even in the absence of a UN Security Council mandate. In that sense, the new Strategic Concept is not something that subordinates NATO to any other organization. We reaffirmed the primary responsibility of the UN Security Council (UNSC) for maintenance of international peace and security. But after prolonged negotiations, the 1999 Concept does not contain an explicit requirement for a UNSC mandate. NATO's 19 sovereign nations would, I think, prefer to have such a mandate in every case except Article 5 defense. But as we saw in Kosovo, there may be times when an exception is necessary, if one or more permanent members of the Security Council do not live up to their responsibility. The new Strategic Concept is not a static set of ideas. Although it is now complete, and is unlikely to be revised for some time, the 1999 Strategic Concept is flexible enough to encompass the changes foreseen for the next ten years or more. It sets broad direction for development of defense capabilities to deal with future, evolving risks. It anticipates further development in the institutional framework of the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), the evolution of Partnership, and the extension of further invitations to potential new members. It responds to particular risks that NATO faces, such as from proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. It anticipates change and attempts to guide preparation for the full range of possible risks. The new Strategic Concept is not a detailed blueprint. Other documents will implement the broad guidance contained in the Strategic Concept. It is a mistake to expect it to be very detailed or very precise on any single issue. Ongoing work to interpret and extend the decisions made in the Strategic Concept must honor the intent of the Concept -- but pragmatic implementation will be absolutely necessary in order to give effect to the directions mandated by Heads of State and Government. Translating the Concept into Practice I've talked about what the new Strategic Concept is and isn't -- but it is legitimate to ask whether it is working as NATO leaders intended it to. The simple answer to that question is "yes." I think you will find, if you read the Strategic Concept carefully, that it is not only up-to-date, it is very effectively guiding NATO through circumstances we couldn't entirely foresee. Let's examine a few key issues that have evolved since last April to see their relationship to the Strategic Concept: I'll start by observing that the Kosovo operations clearly validate NATO's newly clarified focus on crisis response operations: First, Milosevic's actions on the periphery of NATO demanded a response from the Alliance. His brutality directly assaulted the civilized values which we share -- and as I said earlier, one of the hallmarks of this Strategic Concept is Allies' expressed willingness to defend not only their territory, but their common values. Confronted with a challenge to those values, Allies acted to stop the scourge of ethnic cleansing and to make clear that genocide and the politics of hatred and conquest are not acceptable in 21st-century Europe. Beyond this, instability in Kosovo had potential impact on the security of NATO Allies. Thus, the Alliance acted. The Strategic Concept sets out why and how it acted and may need to act in the future. Second, NATO -- and only NATO -- possessed the military capabilities to conduct the air campaign that brought Milosevic to heel. It did so because the defense, operational planning and decision-making systems developed over the years before Kosovo had produced forces and structures capable of handling the task in a multinational environment. The new Concept will continue to guide improvement of NATO's capabilities. Third, Kosovo underlined the asymmetry in U.S. and European military capabilities, particularly because it was waged principally as an air campaign. The Strategic Concept calls for further development of the kinds of forces which successfully operated in Kosovo, and specifically notes that European Allies will further enhance their contribution to the common defense. Such increased European capabilities are essential for an effective ESDI and for any future NATO operations. Fourth, the Strategic Concept highlights the importance of the interaction between Alliance forces and the civil institutions and organizations around them in real-world crises. We are seeing this in KFOR and SFOR. Finally, Kosovo validates the increased accent on partnership, outreach and enlargement as aspects of NATO strategy. Partner nations are participating in KFOR with a degree of interoperability that would be unattainable without PfP. Beyond that, Partnership was the key to solidifying the coalition of front-line states whose support was so critical to the success of the air campaign. NATO's strategy recognizes this and guides future development of NATO and NATO-Partner interoperability in a variety of ways, including through increased training and exercises. As the essential guidance for the development of NATO defense capabilities, the 1999 Strategic Concept is a key impetus for a number of very important initiatives. The most visible of these is the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI), which targets key operational capabilities for the future: deployability and mobility, sustainability and logistics, survivability of forces and infrastructure, effective engagement, and command and control. The DCI focuses the efforts of NATO planners and Allied governments on a number of priority improvements in each of these areas. The objectives we have set for ourselves are in many cases the most difficult things NATO has had on its list for some time, but Allies have put new energy into the process. The threat posed to Alliance populations, territory and forces by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the means to deliver them is not new -- NATO dealt with a formidable Soviet nuclear arsenal almost from the signing of the Washington Treaty. But in the future, we need to worry even more about the diffusion of the threat, the variety of delivery means, and the much less clear-cut political calculus that possessors of WMD may have. Through the WMD initiative agreed at the Washington Summit, Allies are working hard to share information and to take action to meet emerging WMD risks. In this context, the Strategic Concept calls for improvement in Alliance defense posture against risks and potential threats of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and their delivery means, including through work on missile defenses. NATO forces may be called upon to operate outside NATO's borders, so these capabilities to deal with proliferation risks must be "flexible, mobile, rapidly deployable and sustainable." I will not tell you that there is an Alliance theater-level missile defense system around the corner. But Allies recognize the need to protect their forces. We have said, in the Strategic Concept and elsewhere, that we will find a satisfactory solution. As I noted, outreach to Partners is now one of NATO's fundamental security tasks. This explicit commitment to cooperatively shape and condition our strategic environment is a landmark. We should not underestimate its importance for long-term stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. We are moving forward with Partners across a broad front. Open and transparent consultation occurs in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council on a wide range of political issues of common concern. NATO Allies and Partners participate in exercises designed to foster interoperability and increased understanding. Partners who participate in the Partnership Planning and Review Process (PARP) -- the PfP counterpart to NATO's collective defense planning -- are this year working on Partnership goals that will, depending on their efforts, bring them to a higher level of interoperability with the Alliance. As Kosovo has demonstrated, NATO's ability to conduct crisis response operations benefits immeasurably from the participation of Partners. The still-evolving Operational Capabilities Concept -- underpinned by the Strategic Concept -- will not only allow NATO to better assess and plan for contributions from Partners, but will also allow Partners to make an earlier and more effective contribution to crisis response operations. For nations which have expressed the wish to join NATO, the Alliance's outreach program has gained sharp focus in the form of the Membership Action Plan (MAP). The MAP is providing aspirant nations with the feedback necessary for them to effectively guide their defense modernization and reform efforts in directions that are compatible with NATO. Our experience with MAP has yet to run a full cycle, but NATO is clearly providing the candid feedback that MAP participants were promised, so that they can become more credible candidates in advance of the next NATO Summit in 2001 or 2002, when further invitations will likely be issued. NATO was serious about partnership with Russia when the NATO-Russia Founding Act was signed in 1997. We remain serious about building a strong, stable and enduring relationship based on common interest, reciprocity and transparency. The NATO-Russia relationship was largely put on hold by Moscow in the wake of the Kosovo air campaign. The Russians came back to Brussels last summer willing to take up a limited agenda, Kosovo only, and there are signs that further normalization will be possible soon. Despite this openness, some in Russia still see NATO's willingness to act in Kosovo or to enlarge the Alliance as a direct threat to legitimate Russian security interests. That is far from the case, but I am afraid we have work to do to overcome the misperception that the Strategic Concept constitutes a provocative, aggressive assault on Russia's role as a great power. I'd like to mention one last area where the Strategic Concept's influence is being felt, which is the strengthening of the European pillar of NATO and the building of a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI). These two must be fully consistent: one cannot successfully build a European Security and Defense Identity without strengthening the European pillar of NATO and vice versa. The EU is clearly embarked on a major project that, if realized, will endow it with new military capabilities for crisis response. We welcome the increased focus on capability. Our challenge now is to get the details right: We need to make sure that NATO's experience and planning infrastructure is used most effectively, including adaptations where necessary to support ESDI. We need to make sure decision-making arrangements evolve in a way that respects the identities of both organizations but allows NATO and the EU to cooperatively and effectively assess and appropriately respond to crises. The new Strategic Concept was written with the future in mind and with full support for the development of ESDI. For example, it calls for the Alliance command structure to be capable of supporting operations "under the political control and strategic direction of the WEU or as otherwise agreed." This means NATO is ready to support the WEU, and in fact we will test the arrangements that have been worked out over the last four years just next month in a NATO-WEU crisis management exercise. It also means we are ready to support the EU as it completes its friendly takeover of the WEU. To do this we will need to establish joint consultative structures to begin substantive discussions on arrangements between NATO and the EU. We must also work out arrangements which will include the six non-EU European Allies in EU military planning and operations early and fully. We should not be distracted in this important work by questions of institutional prerogative. Our publics care about successful and efficient resolution of crises which affect their resources, their soldiers, and their security. The Strategic Concept is focused there. Conclusion: As I admitted at the outset: NATO's Strategic Concept is more mystifying than mesmerizing. It will never be set to music and be performed on Broadway. It will never inspire a great novel. But as politico-military documents go, it is one of the most important you will see anytime soon. In my view, NATO's new strategy charts a clear and compelling course for the Alliance through the first years of the new millennium and perhaps beyond. It focuses our efforts on building constructive relationships with Partners, including Russia, and with other international organizations. It is flexible enough to accommodate the development of ESDI in light of the Helsinki decisions taken by the EU. It preserves NATO's core ability to defend its members, and will improve NATO forces' capabilities to deal with the diverse range of new risks they may face. It expresses Allies' determination to be a force for peace and stability. It is not perfect -- it will need to be reviewed in time -- but it sets a good course. It is a path we would do well to follow because it is the road to lasting peace and stability in Europe and the entire North Atlantic area. (end text) (Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State)