13 January 2000
(The future should see "more prevention and less intervention") (1470) While the NATO campaign in Kosovo is useful as a study in crisis management, "it should not be seen as a model for the future," NATO Secretary General George Robertson said January 13. "Ideally, the future should be characterised by more prevention and less intervention." Lord Robertson's remarks came during the "Conference on the Trans-Atlantic Century" at the Aspen Institute in Rome. The conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo made it clear that Europe "is still subject to the political, economic and military pressures that can and do lead to open conflict," he said. "Accordingly, all our institutions must prepare themselves to face these new challenges." Kosovo can serve "as an example both of the complexities of crisis management and of the wide variety of means NATO has applied -- and still is applying" -- including conflict prevention, isolation of the conflict and efforts to stabilize the region, humanitarian assistance, bringing Russia "on board" through dialogue and consultations, a robust peacekeeping force, and economic assistance to the region. "We were able to stop the crisis from spreading, we reversed the ethnic cleansing, and we are now working together with the Stability Pact and the wider International Community to offer all of Southeastern Europe the perspective of a brighter tomorrow," Lord Robertson noted. "In an historically unprecedented display of solidarity, virtually all nations of the Euro-Atlantic area have demonstrated that they share common values, and that they are prepared to defend these values." He said that that NATO political and military reforms begun long before Kosovo paid off during the campaign. "This Alliance has adapted its political and military tools....We have opted for political and military cooperation across the continent. We engaged Russia and Ukraine constructively. And we changed our strategy and force structures to better respond to the challenge of peace support operations.... In the Kosovo campaign, all these reforms paid off." But acknowledging that "despite all our efforts, we couldn't prevent the Kosovo conflict," Lord Robertson said that preventive mechanisms, from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to NATO's Partnership initiatives, must be strengthened. Following is the text of Robertson's remarks: (begin text) PEACEKEEPING AND CONFLICT PREVENTION: WHAT RISKS AND THREATS IN GEOPOLITICS IN THE FUTURE? Intervention by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson At the Conference "The Trans-Atlantic Century" Aspen Institute, Rome 13 Jan. 2000 Ladies and Gentlemen: The British novelist Joyce Cary once was asked why he had volunteered for the Balkan Wars of 1912. He replied that he had not wanted to miss the experience of war, for he had thought that this would be the last of all wars. Unfortunately, Mr. Cary's haste was quite unnecessary. Even 80 years later, the experience he had so eagerly sought is still tragically available. The conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo have made it utterly clear that peacekeeping and conflict prevention are no longer concepts that just apply to other regions of the world but not to today's Europe. Nor are they concepts that concern the UN alone. On the contrary. Europe has to accept that this continent is still subject to the political, economic and military pressures that can and do lead to open conflict. Accordingly, all our institutions must prepare themselves to face these new challenges. NATO is preparing to meet these challenges. Over the course of the 1990s this Alliance has adapted its political and military tools to cope with conflicts in the Euro-Atlantic area. We have opted for political and military cooperation across the continent. We engaged Russia and Ukraine constructively. And we changed our strategy and force structures to better respond to the challenge of peace support operations: with more mobility, more flexibility, and more Partner involvement. In the Kosovo campaign, all these reforms paid off, as I would like to illustrate in the remainder of my remarks. Let me be clear: I don't want to imply that the Kosovo conflict could serve as some template for the future. Yet it can certainly serve as an example both of the complexities of crisis management and of the wide variety of means NATO has applied -- and still is applying. What were the elements of NATO's approach? Above all, the imperative of conflict prevention. From the outset, NATO supported the international diplomatic efforts with military pressure. With its threat of airstrikes in the fall of 1998, the Alliance even ended an existing serious refugee crisis. We then supported the OSCE Verification Mission in Kosovo, and then the Rambouillet talks. It was only after all diplomatic means had been exhausted, that to inhibit and eventually end the violence we had to resort to force. But even then we did not confine ourselves to airstrikes, as may have been the public impression. From the outset, our strategy was wider and long-term. First, we isolated the conflict. As soon as the situation worsened in 1998 we undertook measures to stabilise the immediate neighbourhood. Preventive deployments in FYROM and exercises in Albania clearly demonstrated our determination not to allow the conflict to spread. Last March we also created a Consultative Forum with seven countries in the region. All these steps were only possible because of our developed policy of partnership and cooperation. Without it, we would have had to work from scratch. Secondly, we provided humanitarian assistance to FYROM [Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] and Albania. Although almost unnoticed by the broader public, NATO's air campaign was accompanied by an unprecedented humanitarian operation to provide food and shelter for the hundreds of thousands of refugees from Kosovo. This helped alleviate the enormous pressure being put on the very fragile economies and political structures of our two key Partners in the region. Again, it is doubtful whether we could have done this without the years of cooperation with FYROM and Albania. Thirdly, we brought Russia on board. When the air campaign began, Russia suspended its consultations with us in the Permanent Joint Council. But our efforts to re-engage Russia never ceased. When Russia realised that NATO was determined to prevail, Russia became part of the diplomatic solution -- and of its military implementation through KFOR. Consultations in the PJC resumed. Our relationship is still not where we would like it to be. But I would maintain that our years of dialogue have made a difference. Unlike the early 20th century, when the Balkans were Europe's powder keg, Kosovo saw all major powers finally acting on the same side -- the side of peace. Fourthly, we created a robust peacekeeping force, incorporating contributions from many of our Partner nations. KFOR, like its counterpart SFOR in Bosnia, could only be set up as rapidly and effectively as it was because Allies and Partners had been cooperating militarily for years. Through KFOR, NATO and its Partners have created the secure environment for other organisations - governmental and non-governmental - to help with civil and economic reconstruction. Finally, we are looking beyond the conflict region itself. All of Southeastern Europe must be given a perspective of re-joining the European mainstream - because the clearest lesson of the last 50 years is that integration breeds trust, stability and prosperity. Put differently, integration is conflict prevention in its ultimate. That is why NATO, through its own Southeast Europe Initiative, is supporting the EU Stability Pact for Southeast-Europe. We will explore ways to enhance regional security cooperation. And we will help aspirant countries from Southeastern Europe to prepare their candidacies for NATO membership. Ladies and Gentlemen, let me conclude. As I said before, Kosovo should not be seen as a model for the future. Ideally, the future should be characterised by more prevention and less intervention. That is why we must strengthen preventive mechanisms, from the OSCE to NATO's Partnership initiatives. Despite all our efforts, we couldn't prevent the Kosovo conflict. As the recent OSCE Report proved, Milosevic was intent on ethnically cleansing Kosovo. But we were able to stop the crisis from spreading, we reversed the ethnic cleansing, and we are now working together with the Stability Pact and the wider International Community to offer all of Southeastern Europe the perspective of a brighter tomorrow. In an historically unprecedented display of solidarity, virtually all nations of the Euro-Atlantic area have demonstrated that they share common values, and that they are prepared to defend these values. This is an auspicious beginning for the Transatlantic Century, as you name it in the title of your Conference, a century in which NATO is ready to play a central part and make a lasting contribution to peace and stability. Thank you. (end text) (Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State)