09 March 1999

TEXT: NATO SEC-GEN SOLANA AT "NATO AT FIFTY" CONFERENCE MARCH 9

(The New Security Agenda is both complex and challenging) (3070)

London -- NATO Secretary General Javier Solana says NATO's New
Security Agenda is both "complex and challenging."

As NATO celebrates its 50th anniversary, he said, the real security
agenda faced by Europe is to successfully manage the three major
processes of transformation: 1) the transformation of Europe, 2) the
transformation of Russia, and 3) the transformation of the
transatlantic link.

Speaking at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) in London March
9, Solana said if these processes move in the right direction, "they
will give us the political, economic and military tools to deal with
any conceivable challenge, from regional conflicts to proliferation."

By contrast, Solana said, "if one of these processes fails, our
concept of a comprehensive Euro-Atlantic security architecture will be
compromised. Our approach to the security challenges of the future
would be more likely to be marked by ad-hockery and inconsistency. We
would risk being victims of the agenda; we would not be able to set
it."

Solana said that the "creation of new relations between an integrating
and widening Europe, a participating Russia, and an engaged North
America is what NATO's post-Cold War agenda is all about."

The Kosovo Implementation Force, he said, "should also be the start of
yet another new feature of how we manage security today: it should be
the start of a stronger European role in NATO."

NATO has become an invaluable instrument for shaping Euro-Atlantic
security,-- a catalyst for a broader security order," he said.

Following is the NATO text:

(begin text)

At the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)

London

9 March 1999

Speech by the Secretary General of NATO, Dr. Javier Solana

Your Royal Highness [Duke of Kent],
Excellencies,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

I am very pleased to have the opportunity to address the Royal United
Services Institute on the occasion of the "NATO at Fifty" Conference.
RUSI has been at the forefront in analysing defence and security
issues since 1831, the year it was founded by the Duke of Wellington.
This year's Conference extends that long and distinguished tradition.
The UK has been a firm supporter of NATO from the very start. It is
fitting, therefore, that our keynote 50th anniversary conference
should be held here at RUSI in your beautiful capital city.

The subject I would like to address is an ambitious one: "The New
Security Agenda". As NATO celebrates its 50th anniversary, our new
Agenda is both complex and challenging.

The old security agenda, over NATO's first 40 years, was based on a
relatively simple strategic imperative: territorial defence. It was a
passive, reactive agenda, imposed by the dictates of the Cold War. We
are now, thankfully, rid of this straitjacket. The end of ideological
confrontation in Europe changed the security landscape. And with this
change, we can shape the security agenda, not be driven by it. We can
lift our sights higher.

The real security agenda faced by this continent is to successfully
manage the three major processes of transformation: the transformation
of Europe, the transformation of Russia, and the transformation of the
transatlantic link. If these processes move in the right direction,
they will give us the political, economic and military tools to deal
with any conceivable challenge, from regional conflicts to
proliferation.

By contrast, if one of these processes fails, our concept of a
comprehensive Euro-Atlantic security architecture will be compromised.
Our approach to the security challenges of the future would be more
likely to be marked by ad-hockery and inconsistency. We would risk
being victims of the agenda; we would not be able to set it.

Clearly, the successful management of these processes requires
participation by far more players than NATO alone. Indeed, in recent
years all major organisations have become engaged. Security should now
be seen in its broadest sense, no longer the exclusive purview of any
one institution. The European Union is a case in point. Its
enlargement process, its special programmes for Russia and its growing
Mediterranean dimension all testify to its broader role today. In a
similar vein, the OSCE has broadened its role: defusing minority
problems across Europe, organising free elections in Bosnia or, most
recently, with on-the-ground verifiers in Kosovo.

But NATO remains special. This Alliance offers a unique combination no
other institution can match: trustful political consultation,
undisputed military competence, and a strong transatlantic dimension.
This unique combination makes NATO a major player in re-shaping
security. NATO is helping Europe grow together. NATO is helping to
draw Russia closer to Europe. And NATO is at the forefront in
developing a new transatlantic relationship. NATO's role is not only
to help manage these transitions individually - it is also bringing
them together in a coherent way.

In short, the creation of new relations between an integrating and
widening Europe, a participating Russia, and an engaged North America
is what NATO's post-Cold War agenda is all about. And the Washington
Summit next month is a key link in pushing this agenda boldly and
strongly into the century ahead.

What do I mean by a widening Europe? I mean a continent in which each
country has an opportunity to participate in forging a new cooperative
security order. A continent in which opportunities for breaking down
barriers far outnumber the points of separation. Europe is widening in
the sense of new patterns of interaction: political, economic, social.
And this brings stability and greater security.

NATO's essential role in this endeavour is clear: to help bring about
a new cooperative security order of which no country feels excluded.
Today, more than two dozen nations are cooperating with us militarily
in the Partnership for Peace, and politically in the Euro-Atlantic
Partnership Council. Their regular presence at the NATO table has
become a distinct feature of the new Europe - a Europe where dividing
lines are being replaced by ever closer political, economic and
military links.

NATO's cooperative approach has enabled us to forge links with
countries of the most diverse backgrounds and security traditions.
Even neutral countries such as Switzerland and Moldova have closely
associated themselves with the cooperative agenda of the Partnership
for Peace programme and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. They
all have a stake in European security, and they all can make their
contribution. Ukraine, a country of considerable geo-political
importance, has its own distinct partnership with NATO. This young
nation, too, has a stake in the evolution of this continent, just as
we have a stake in the stability and well-being of Ukraine. The
widening of Europe in terms of security cooperation and partnership is
becoming a reality. And NATO is a major instrument in achieving it.

NATO's enlargement adds another dimension to the widening and
integrating of Europe's security relationships. The accession of the
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland in three days' time is perhaps the
clearest demonstration of the fact that Europe is growing closer
together. Extending NATO membership to these three democracies helps
to stabilise a region that historically has been the staging ground
for many of the disasters of this century. In doing so, it also
signifies that, in this new Europe, geography is no longer destiny.
And it provides a powerful incentive for other nations sharing the
same ambitions and values to get their house in order.

Let me turn now to Russia. Russia has not yet found its own confident
role in this new Europe. It still has to overcome many difficult
challenges to find its right place. As Russia struggles with her
transition, it will remain a country of many contradictions. In my
view, however, neither blatant optimism nor blatant pessimism are
categories by which one can judge Russia. I apply another, more
meaningful, category: Russia's potential. Russia has 150 million
well-educated people, a wealth of natural resources, and a
demonstrated capacity to contribute to European security. To bring out
this potential - to help Russia to make a positive contribution to
European security - is something the West can and must help.

NATO can be more than a bystander to Russian developments. It can
engage Russia constructively - even if this may sometimes mean walking
the extra mile - and even if this may sometimes mean registering
differences of view on some subjects. NATO has clearly signaled that
we take Russia seriously as a major actor in the Euro-Atlantic
security order.

We sent such a signal by the NATO-Russia Founding Act. The Permanent
Joint Council reinforced it. And we have translated vision into
reality. We have opened entirely new venues of cooperation, ranging
from preventing proliferation to joint approaches to crisis
management. Such initiatives have closed a gap in the European
security architecture. Even if consultations in the PJC will not
always lead to common positions, they serve to minimise
misunderstandings or conflicting signals in a crisis. That is why the
NATO-Russia relationship remains a major investment in the future of
this continent.

Neither the transition of Europe nor the constructive engagement of
Russia would be possible without a strong transatlantic link. And this
means the continuing engagement of the North American Allies.

The ties that bind North America to Europe still contribute to healthy
intra-European relations. They also ensure that no country falls
victim to the temptation of again pursuing its security interests at
the expense of its neighbours. And let us not forget: the United
States remains a unique crisis manager - from its role in German
unification to its role in the Dayton Accords.

These are the reasons why a new European security architecture must
always be a Euro-Atlantic architecture. However, if the transatlantic
link is to function smoothly in the future, we must not assume that it
will indefinitely be "business as usual". On both sides of the
Atlantic, a new generation is taking over which no longer views NATO
through the prism of personal experience or emotional attachment. On
the North American side, they will look towards Europe and naturally
ask: "what's in it for us?"

Today, the answer is simple and clear. What North America gets in
return for its involvement is reliable Allies; Allies who pull their
weight when required; Allies who shoulder their fair share of the
common burden; Allies who are viable Partners of North America in
managing wider contingencies; Allies who play a security role
commensurate with their economic strength.

We can answer this question in such an affirmative way because, on
both sides of the Atlantic, we have made the right decisions. The
United States has overcome its latent scepticism of a distinct
security role for Europe. It has realised that a stronger Europe is
the precondition for managing an ever-growing transatlantic agenda.

By the same token, Europe has understood that establishing such a
stronger European role is not just about self-assertion. Rather, it is
about making a genuine contribution to a new, more mature
transatlantic partnership.

In my opinion, we have never before had a better basis for building
such a new relationship. The UK has led the field into this. Your
Strategic Defence Review can demonstrate that military reform is
genuinely foreign policy-led, and not simply an excuse for
cost-cutting. It has been an inspiration that others are following,
and the success of the Strategic Defence Review can do much to
reassure our North American Allies about Europe's willingness to
create efficient and flexible armed forces.

The development of a European personality in NATO decided in Berlin in
1996 and the recent Anglo-French initiative on European defence
demonstrate the commitment amongst European Allies to move beyond the
status quo. This year, with the EU Summit in Cologne following on
NATO's own Summit in Washington, there is a unique opportunity to
demonstrate that a stronger European role in security and defence is
more than just an idea.

NATO is ready for such a stronger European role. Our new command
structure allows for European-led operations - but with the material
support by the United States, if required. Building the ESDI in NATO
also ensures that other strategic partners - Canada, Norway, Turkey,
Iceland and soon the three new members - remain fully involved in the
process, even if they are not full members of WEU or EU. In this way,
Europe can make progress in deepening its integration, without being
caught in a painful split between political ambitions and limited
military means.

A Europe widening and deepening, a Russia evolving into a stable
democracy, a transatlantic Partnership of equals - these are the three
most important areas of change and transition. NATO is vital to all of
them. And we can already see the results. We have instruments for
crisis management that were not available to us just a few years ago.

Bosnia is the foremost example. Here, the strategic relationships we
have been building have paid off. Without NATO's military clout, no
diplomatic breakthrough at Dayton. Without NATO's Partnership
mechanisms, no SFOR with 30 nations. Without a NATO-Russia
relationship, no Russian participation in SFOR.

If Bosnia-Herzegovina today is slowly turning into a viable state, it
is not least because NATO has been helping to rally the key players -
Europe, America and Russia - behind a common strategy. And here I want
to pay a heartfelt tribute to the day-to-day contributions made in
Bosnia by the armed forces of so many nations here today.

Kosovo is different, and yet in many ways similar. Without NATO and
PfP, we could not have provided assistance for states neighbouring
Kosovo the way we did. Without NATO's military clout, we could not
have prevented the humanitarian disaster that threatened last autumn.
And without our relationship with Russia, we would not have had the
means to discuss with the Russians the rationale, as well as the
concrete planning, behind the Alliance's military preparations,
thereby allaying many of their concerns.

Let me add one more word on the Balkans.

The international community can assist in many ways other than through
implementation of a peace settlement in Kosovo. If we want to
encourage a long-term peace in Kosovo and surrounding regions, we have
to broaden our perspective. In my view, the start of the Kosovo
Implementation Force should signal the start of a wider initiative to
put all parts of the Balkans on the path towards regaining their
rightful place in Europe - politically as well as economically.
Without such a comprehensive approach we will never get beyond
treating the symptoms only. We must do more than protect the peace. We
need to tackle the root causes of these conflicts. We must create the
conditions for reconstruction, the climate for reconciliation, and we
must give strong incentives for progress. That is why the entire
Euro-Atlantic community - its nations and institutions - must become
engaged.

But it is not only engagement on our part. We need the engagement of a
new generation of citizens and leaders in the re-building process in
the troubled parts of the former Yugoslavia. We need the people of the
region to take the responsibility into their own hands, to seize the
opportunities that are open to them. With the first signs of such
re-generation can come the first steps in a longer-term re-integration
process. A re-integration back into the normalcy, the stability, the
prosperity of mainstream Europe. And it can be done if the will - on
their part and on our part - is there.

In short, what the Balkans need is a "Partnership for Prosperity".

I believe that such a Partnership for Prosperity is not only feasible;
it is also in our long-term strategic interest. Its short-term cost
will be far outweighed by its long-term benefits.

The Kosovo Implementation Force should also be the start of yet
another new feature of how we manage security today: it should be the
start of a stronger European role in NATO. The Kosovo peace
implementation mission, should it materialise, will have a far greater
European input, and will even be led by a European - a NATO first.
This is the new way we do business in a NATO responsive to the needs
of a dynamically-evolving transatlantic relationship. It demonstrates
that we are serious about striking a new transatlantic bargain for the
next century. Such a new bargain does not mean "less America". It
simply means "more Europe".

The Washington Summit will be a reaffirmation of this logic. It will
set the new security agenda. In addition to welcoming our three new
members, we will unveil a new package of measures to help prepare
aspiring members. A new, more flexible command structure will be
finalised. New ideas for deepening our relations with Partner
countries will be put forward. We will outline the way ahead on the
European Security and Defence Identity, paving the way for the EU
Summit in Cologne. We will launch an initiative to enhance NATO's role
in coping with the spread of weapons of mass destruction. And an
initiative to enhance our military capabilities - for example, in
terms of interoperability and sustainability - will help us maintain
NATO's military excellence.

All these new features will be embedded in a revised Strategic
Concept. This document will confirm the Allies' commitment to the core
function of Alliance collective defence will and the indispensable
transatlantic link. But it will also provide a synthesis of the
Alliance's many new political and structural innovations with its
enduring tasks and principles. The Strategic Concept will take a fresh
look at the risks and challenges facing the Atlantic community - today
and into the next century. And NATO's new roles in crisis management
will find their rightful place in the Alliance's strategy.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

NATO has become an invaluable instrument for shaping Euro-Atlantic
security - a catalyst for a broader security order. At the age of 50,
NATO has left the passive, reactive approach of the Cold War days
firmly behind. Today, NATO is setting the security agenda in ways we
could only dream of a decade ago. We make a major contribution to the
widening and deepening of Europe. We are constructively engaging
Russia. We are re-shaping the transatlantic relationship. We are ready
to tackle the hard security questions ahead.

So it is true what they say: life begins at fifty!

Thank You.

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