11 May 1998
(May 7 discussion in Prague) (2700) Prague -- Jeremy Rosner, special advisor to the president and secretary of state for NATO enlargement ratification, spoke with Czech journalists about the "overwhelming" vote in the U.S. Senate in favor of bringing the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland into NATO. The April 30 vote was 80 to 19, 14 more votes than the two-thirds majority needed for ratification of the NATO enlargement treaty. The Senate also rejected several amendments that would have put a moratorium on further enlargement of the alliance or otherwise undermined the Clinton administration's policy, Rosner pointed out. He noted that in the wake of the vote "the debate has continued, so that although the political debate is over, the intellectual debate very much continues. And that suggests that this process of enlargement, and the new members, the prospective members, will very much continue to be under a microscope at least in the year between now and the April '99 Summit in Washington, but even in the months and years that will follow." In Congress and the intellectual community, Rosner said, questions will continue to be debated about costs of enlargement, the military preparations of the new states, relations between the new states and their neighbors and the rest of the region, relations between all of the NATO allies, and U.S.-Russian and NATO-Russian relations. Following are excerpts from a transcript of the event: (Begin text) Q&A ON NATO ENLARGEMENT Jeremy Rosner, Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State for NATO Enlargement Ratification With Members of the Czech Press Prague May 7, 1998 (Begin excerpts) ROSNER: I'll keep my remarks at the beginning short, so we can leave more time for questions. We were delighted with the Senate's vote last Thursday because of the large margin, because it was so overwhelming, and because it came at the end of an extraordinarily thorough and prolonged process of examining the question at hand. And also because it included rejection of every single one of the amendments on this issue that, we found, would undermine the policy. So there was a solid rejection of a moratorium on the process of enlargement. There was a solid rejection of an effort to limit NATO's missions; and all of these put NATO, which will soon be at 19 members, on a very solid footing going forward on questions of its future role and transatlantic security. Despite the very good news about the Senate vote, which was not just a victory of our Senate but very much a victory of the Czech people and a positive referendum on all that they have accomplished over recent years, there are also some yellow flags that were raised by the Senate debate and the Senate vote. We've been struck by how much in the days since the vote the debate has continued, so that although the political debate is over, the intellectual debate very much continues. And that suggests that this process of enlargement, and the new members, the prospective members, will very much continue to be under a microscope at least in the year between now and the April '99 Summit in Washington, but even in the months and years that will follow. The questions that were so closely examined over the last year -- of costs, of the military preparations of the new states, of relations between the new states and their neighbors and the rest of the region, of relations between all of the NATO allies and the allies with Russia -- all these will very much continue to be under a microscope. We believe that even under a microscope the verdict will continue to be positive, and we see many positive signs already in relations in the region and relations with Russia and in the work that's being done by the Czech Republic and the other two states. In our discussions this morning at the Ministry of Defense and the Foreign Ministry, we continued to hear very positive signs of progress. So we think the final verdict of history will be just as positive as the verdict of the United States Senate. But clearly, this will be an ongoing process. Let me end it there and we're glad to take your questions about the Senate process and the American debate. QUESTION: I read in the Washington Post that despite the result of the vote, it was very hard to push it through the Senate, that this was a very tough job. Please comment on this. ROSNER: Yes, I think it's worth noting how extraordinarily improbable this vote was. This is the first time in the entire history of our republic that we have extended a treaty, a military treaty commitment, to another country at a time of peace, at a time when we were not threatened. It's rare enough to extend this kind of treaty commitment. We haven't done it since 1982. But it's the first time -- at all -- that we have done it in the absence of a threat. Moreover, treaties have always been harder to pass at times when we have divided government between our two parties. Indeed, many scholars say that those two conditions of there being peaceful conditions and having divided government explain why the Treaty of Versailles was defeated in our Senate in 1919 and 1920. And yet those were the exact conditions that prevailed this time. It was in many ways, at least by historical standards, improbable that this would be adopted by the Senate, much less adopted by an overwhelming vote. I think the only way we were able to succeed was because of several factors. One, the excellent credentials, the unquestionable credentials of the three countries involved. I think it validates the approach that the United States and NATO took to keep the standards extremely high. And I think that holds a very important lesson for future rounds. Second, the efforts made by the President, Secretary Albright and many others in the Administration as well as our own (efforts) to make this case extensively to our Congress and our public.... We went to over two-thirds of the 50 states in America, making this case often with small community groups in the dead of winter in the Dakotas and in many other improbable settings. And it really took the extra effort to bring our public along and bring our Congress along. Third, it was able to succeed because of NATO. NATO is so well and widely respected in the United States as well as in other countries because it has such a tangible record of success in the Cold War, and also since the Cold War in Bosnia, that the American public was willing treat NATO somewhat differently and more favorably than many other initiatives in the realm of foreign policy. So for all these, we were able to, in a sense, beat the odds, I think. But this was by no means an inevitable result or a foregone conclusion. And I think those who are supporters of NATO can take some satisfaction that NATO is held in different regard than other initiatives, and also I think the Czech people, as well as the Poles and Hungarians, should take some satisfaction that this was such a favorable verdict on what they've accomplished. Q: Twenty-three British experts have just voiced their reservations against the enlargement of NATO and they are afraid especially that after the enlargement, NATO will not be quick enough to react, to respond to threats. ROSNER: Well, one of the striking things about this debate is that highly regarded, distinguished figures in academia and security affairs in many countries, including our own, don't think this is a good idea. And their arguments are made with great dignity. We respect the people making the arguments. We respect their argument. We don't agree with their arguments. But this has been an issue on which very serious and well-regarded people disagree, and we don't expect that to disappear. Certainly, one of the areas of great concern of our country -- that you're suggesting is being raised here, as well -- is whether enlarging NATO will, in a sense, dilute its effectiveness. Sometimes raised are questions about its political cohesion, but also about its military effectiveness. I think the fact that this is being raised as a question is in part a testament to NATO, because it shows how highly regarded security experts feel that NATO is as a military force, so in part there is good news there. And we have to be very careful to make sure that those fears are not realized -- that there is no dilution of NATO's military capabilities, that there is no dilution of its ability to carry out its core mission of collective defense of NATO territory or any of its other missions. That's in part why it's so important that the three countries coming in have made and kept commitments about their military spending, about their military modernization, and about other issues that bear on military effectiveness. And so we need to make sure that those critics are heard and that their concerns are effectively responded to. But what we have seen so far, I think we have some important practical evidence that argues a little bit against their concerns. And that's in Bosnia, for starters, because there we not only have the whole of our alliance plus the three incoming members, but a great number of our partner states in addition. There we've not seen a diminution of military effectiveness, and it's been a very effective coalition. And in addition, in the exercises that have been carried out under Partnership for Peace in the military planning process that's begun, I think the questions have been well addressed, and indeed the three countries coming in have gone through a much more rigorous process on military planning than any of the four countries who came into NATO since 1949. As you may know, they've gone through really the same process that allies go through of filling out the defense planning questionnaire, setting force goals, target goals that's now just being completed. And I think that all these extraordinary steps will help to ensure that there is no erosion of NATO's military effectiveness. But we have to watch that very carefully. Q: You mentioned that we can expect more intellectual debate about the enlargement and about the new members. What can we expect in the future to be topics of these debates and what can we prepare for? ROSNER: Yes, well at least speaking from the American perspective of what I would expect debates in our press and academic circles and in the Congress, I think there'll be several areas. One is on the issue we're just discussing of what the impact is of the new members on NATO's effectiveness as an institution, including its military effectiveness. A second, and maybe the major issue, will be the impact on relations with Russia -- including U.S.-Russian relations, NATO-Russian relations, relations between Russia and countries in Central Europe, and progress on strategic and conventional arms control. In some ways, that is the heart of the American debate, at least in the intellectual circles I think it'll be followed quite closely -- what happens to the START II treaty, what initiatives are undertaken by countries in the region with Russia in the years to come. A third area is on relations among states within Central Europe, particularly those who are coming into the alliance and those who have not been yet invited or not yet applied for membership, and there'll be a great deal of scrutiny on that. A fourth, which is in a sense a subset of the first, is particular progress of the new members on the areas where they have committed to take certain steps -- particularly on whether these long-term plans that have now been laid down on each country for military modernization are fulfilled. Whether commitments to increase defense spending as a percentage of gross domestic product are fulfilled on a yearly basis. Whether reforms regarding intelligence services and sensitive information are fulfilled. And also issues outside of the military realm, regarding property restitution, relations with ethnic minorities or religious minorities. All these I think will continue to be under the microscope, at least in our Congress and our intellectual community. Q: How strong do you think the link is between future problems with Russia and NATO expansion? ROSNER: Well, we've always believed that we could pursue this process of NATO enlargement and at the same time continually build a new and more constructive relationship with Russia, both U.S.-Russian relations and NATO-Russian relations -- in large part because those closer relations are as much in Russia's interest as in ours. We believe that the evidence of the last two years bears out the hypothesis, if you will, that this is possible. Whether it is the fact that hard-liners have not been propelled back to power on the basis of this issue, or the fact that we have continued to make progress on arms control issues, or that Russia entered into the NATO-Russia Founding Act and that the Permanent Joint Council that was set up by that act has been implemented and is having some progress... there are a number of reasons to believe that NATO enlargement can proceed at the same time this new relationship is being built. The fears are overstated, if not misplaced, that somehow this would cause a rupture in progress in relations with Russia. As Secretary Albright has said, her goal is that Russia will become bored with NATO and NATO enlargement. And we see some evidence that that is occurring. I think that one of the reporters in our papers wrote a day or two after our Senate vote about how little reaction there was from the Russian press and the Russian government to this event, so perhaps Secretary Albright's wish is coming true. We're going to work continually and very intensively to continue deepening our relationship with democratic Russia, and we see multiple signs that all our allies have that same perspective. We're also going to continue with the enlargement process. The President has said that the first will not be the last. NATO's leaders will examine the process of enlargement again at the April '99 summit, and obviously there are a number of states that have expressed interest in joining, beyond the three. We consider their interest credible, we don't rule any of them out. We don't rule out any European state, including Russia. We will continue to go forward with Russia, we will continue to go forward with enlargement. Q: The policy of the "open door" -- my question is, when could this door be closed? Is (enlargement) some never-ending process? ROSNER: We don't see the door closing. The door was first opened not at Madrid, but in 1949 in Article 10 of the treaty, which says that this treaty will remain open to any European state in a position to further the goals of the members and the security of the North Atlantic area. That open door provision in '49 had clearly a very positive impact over the years in being a magnet for positive relations with other states which were initially outside the treaty. It also proved to be wise because none of the people at the time crafting the treaty ... talked or thought about the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary being a member any time soon. Clearly, events have moved in directions that few thought possible. We don't know how events in Europe will proceed from here. And just a certain sense of humility justifies not prejudging where the process ends. Leaving the process open as we have since '49 continues to provide a magnet for positive relations and integration throughout the region. As part of this broader process along with other institutions -- the EU, and CSCE, and the Partnership for Peace program -- of stitching together a truly undivided and much broader Europe. (End excerpts)