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YELTSIN'S 'NYET' TO NATO ENLARGEMENT: ROOM FOR COMPROMISE?
U.S. Information Agency Office of Public Liaison

1/13/97 (Foreign Media Reaction Daily Digest)

Analysts overseas vigorously discussed the implications of President Yeltsin's firm "nyet" on NATO enlargement during talks with German Chancellor Kohl in Moscow Jan. 4. This latest indication that Russian "hostility" toward NATO membership for some former Warsaw Pact allies "has not slackened" found commentators once more disagreeing as to how rigorously Russia will adhere to its opposition and whether the Alliance could proceed to admit new members without alienating Moscow.

The dominant segment of editorial opinion maintained with Paris's right-of-center Le Figaro that "Russia has resigned itself to the first 'wave' of new members" but is trying to wring out "as many concessions as possible." This view of the Kremlin's "maximalist position" was confirmed by Moscow's reformist Izvestia (1/5), " Russia is going for 'the maximum' here and intends to seek partnership relations with the North Atlantic bloc, in view of its nuclear might and great-power status." Another piece in Izvestia conceded, too, that Russia "at present does not have either the financial or the political possibilities to make the West change its plans" regarding enlargement. Reformist government Rossiyskiye Vesti, in turn, bluntly laid out the Kremlin's asking price: Russia "would not want to discuss the problem of the admission of new members until agreement had been reached between Russia and NATO. And that would mean a clear agreement rather than further charters or declarations, which commit nobody to anything." This frequently repeated demand that NATO-Moscow ties must be defined before the issue of new members is considered worried Central Europeans writers, who feared that their future once more will be decided behind their backs by the great powers. Center-left Gazeta Wyborcza of Warsaw alluded to the "threat" that Poland will be shut out of the NATO talks with Russia. "The current line of Polish foreign policy," it said, "is correct on this matter and it should not succumb to even the smallest fluctuations: Poland must be present during these negotiations, too." London's independent Financial Times suggested that some ground rules for talks with Moscow must be laid down, since they will be "difficult" and "secret." The daily called for giving Russia "the option" of consultations on issues such as peacekeeping and nonproliferation, but warned that this should not lead to giving Russia "any power to interfere with core Alliance business." A second school of thought on enlargement did not believe that the Yeltsin stance was simply "a negotiating tactic" and therefore urged the Alliance to slow down its rush to the East, since he has "very little room...to soften his position." Pessimistic journalists also did not see the Allies as capable of meeting Moscow's demands. Centrist Koelner Stadt-Anzeiger stressed, "Russia cannot...be compensated with preferential treatment or even membership in the European Union.... And it would also be wrong to subordinate an extended NATO to the OSCE." Countering these concerns, however, were right-of-center Frankfurter Allgemeine and Riga's centrist Diena. They held that a new "economic and financial" class in Russia will not permit it to return to "its course of confrontation with the West," even were NATO to edge closer to its borders.

This survey is based on 45 reports from 19 countries, Jan. 1-13.
EDITOR: Mildred Sola Neely

EUROPE

RUSSIA: "Russia Would Need Sovereignty, Security Guaranteed"

Rudolf Kolchanov, Bonn correspondent of centrist, labor Trud, commented on the results of the visit to Moscow by Chancellor Helmut Kohl (1/9): "It is realized in the West that, for the average Russian, NATO's enlargement is by far not the greatest problem at present. Most Russians demand first of all a radical improvement in their present most difficult socio-economic conditions. If this improvement does not happen in the foreseeable future, the Western leaders will be quite right in anticipating the prospect of having to deal with a more rigid stand taken by Moscow. It appears that this logic is prompting the NATO leaders to quickly solve the problem of admitting new states that are located in direct proximity of Russian territory.

"Russia's national interests, especially in the long-term aspect, demand a very balanced approach and a firmness of counteractions that would not plunge the world back into the time of the Cold War, but would really guarantee Russia, which is now going through a most difficult period of her history, sovereignty and security on the level of a great power."

"NATO Train Will Start For East On Schedule"

Under the headline above, analyst Boris Vinogradov wrote in reformist Izvestia (1/9): "It appears that Russia is now in a difficult situation, lacking weighty arguments and, to use a current expression, adequate steps by means of which she could seriously counter the NATO initiative.... Russia at present does not have either the financial or the political possibilities to make the West change its plans. Russia cannot count on the creation of a military alliance on the basis of the Tashkent Treaty of CIS countries because the majority of her partners, with the possible exception of Belarus, are oriented more at the NATO Partnership for Peace program rather than at confrontation. What remains in reserve only is the variant with the refusal to ratify the Russian-American START II Treaty, but it is the most risky one because it is fraught with the danger of unavoidable sanctions and international isolation."

"NATO Focus Of Bilateral Talks"

Reformist government Rossiyskiye Vesti said in this piece by Yuriy Nikolayev (1/6), "One important result of the meeting between the two leaders was Helmut Kohl's promise to inform his NATO partners about what Boris Yeltsin told him. Moscow's position is well-known--we are opposed to the Alliance's eastward expansion and would not want to discuss the problem of the admission of new members until agreement had been reached between Russia and NATO. And that would mean a clear agreement rather than further charters or declarations, which commit nobody to anything. So it is entirely understandable that the subject of European security and NATO was at the focus of the bilateral talks."

"Yeltsin Remained Firm On NATO"

Boris Vinogradov wrote for reformist Izvestia (1/5), "As the chancellor stated as he flew out from Moscow, they primarily discussed 'the same old thing'--NATO's Eastward expansion and the creation of a new security architecture in Europe. For all his friendliness and benevolence toward his guest, witnesses note, Boris Yeltsin remained firm in his attitude to NATO's plans and stated that he will not back down from his idea of 'first a NATO treaty with Russia, then everything else.' What kind of treaty we would like to have with NATO is still unclear. In principle, Russia is going for 'the maximum' here and intends to seek partnership relations with the North Atlantic bloc, in view of its nuclear might and great-power status. By starting from these points the sides might be able to find mutually acceptable options."

GERMANY: "Keep Silent, Mr. Kinkel"

Right-of-center Frankfurter Allgemeine's editorial observed (1/8), "Russia will not be very happy when it hears from the German foreign minister that NATO enlargement to the East has already been decided on and all the wailing is in vain. And neither is it a diplomatic strategy when Kinkel states that in the future NATO will not allow Russia to have a say in the Alliance's decision-making.

"With remarks like that, Kinkel depreciates the hoped-for security charter between NATO and Russia by saying in public what might be true. But some truths are better left unsaid, especially when the reputation of a project is at stake whose political sense depends on high public esteem."

"Russia Still Against Enlargement"

Independent Rhein-Neckar-Zeitung (1/8) of Heidelberg commented: "Helmut Kohl had already believed that a compromise would be achieved.... Immediately after the guest's departure, the Russian president commissioned his foreign minister with working out a program against NATO enlargement towards the East. And that was the end to the Russian winter's tale.... So, who was fooled here? One thing is certain: If Kohl had expected to be able to soften Yeltsin after his operation, he was wrong. Because Russian rejection of NATO enlargement to the East has not changed. And domestic pressure on Yeltsin to show 'determination' has even increased."

"Moscow Will Swallow Bitter Pill, But Drive Up Price Of Enlargement"

Right-of-center Die Welt (1/8) of Berlin, in an editorial by Karl-Ludwig Guensche, held, "NATO Secretary General Javier Solana will travel to Moscow by the end of January with a clearly formulated mandate in order to explain to the Russians that they can only win if they swallow the bitter pill (of enlargement). Russian Foreign Minister Primakov, on the other hand, will be commissioned by Yeltsin to present the Russian position. In doing so, the Russians demonstrate their recognition that the process can no longer be stopped. This is an indication of the fact that more progress has been made in the internal formation of opinion than the public saber-rattling makes us think. Rather, it seems to be a matter of driving up the price."

"Kohl's Visit Not The Great Breakthrough"

Moscow correspondent P. Hoefling commented on commercial PRO 7 TV (1/4), "This visit was certainly not the great breakthrough. The question of NATO's enlargement to the East continues to be controversial. But the fact that Kohl evaded a clear answer to several questions of journalists allows at least the conclusion that the two narrowed their views at least in some aspects. But the NATO partners need to be informed about these views first."

"Russia's Mixed Signals"

According to Guenter Nonnenmacher in a front-page editorial for right-of-center Frankfurter Allgemeine (1/6), "Seen from the angle of strategic thinking, it must be a thorn in the flesh of the Russian military that the West is shifting its borders eastward which means that Russia's military as well as its political sphere of influence will be reduced. And it is also clear that the circles that determine Russia's economic and financial developments do not want its profitable relations with the West to be frozen in a 'cold peace.' These two groups have many links--the military-industrial complex also still exists in Russia-- but their interests have been diverging over the past few months. This explains the maneuvering of the Russian leadership regarding NATO's enlargement, the changes between signals for a willingness for compromise and statements of a threatening, tough 'nyet.' It can hardly be assumed that this will change until July, when NATO convenes for its summit."

"Where Is The Latitude?"

Centrist Koelner Stadt-Anzeiger stressed (1/6), "Where is the latitude for the NATO compromise which Chancellor Kohl is hoping for? Russia cannot, as some people suggest, be compensated with preferential treatment or even membership in the European Union.... And it would also be wrong to subordinate an extended NATO to the OSCE, because in this case many other partly unstable states would have a say apart from Moscow."

BRITAIN: "Do Not Hasten Into Eastward Enlargement"

An editorial in the liberal Guardian judged (1/8): "The future of NATO, rather than of Hong Kong or even the Middle East, may become the most explosive international issue for 1997.... Most observers in Moscow interpret Boris Yeltsin's hard line against expansion as much more than a negotiating tactic.... Russian hostility has not slackened. There are genuine fears that the eastward expansion will change the strategic balance. And Mr. Yeltsin has very little room to maneuver politically if he appears to soften his position.

"Meanwhile, Washington is deeply divided on the subject--by contrast with the European capitals where the case for enlargement seems to be going through on the nod.... The proposed S-17 consultative body made up of the 16 NATO states plus Russia is a transparent attempt to square the circle which will end up by satisfying no one. Just what would meet the bill is much harder to say. It needs time and serious thought to attempt to reach a solution. Neither are afforded by the hasty scramble now under way."

"Ground Rules For Dealing With Moscow"

The independent Financial Times' editorial concluded (1/7): "The puzzling signals that emerged from Chancellor Helmut Kohl's weekend visit to Moscow have come as a reminder of the formidable task faced in the coming months by would-be constructors of a new European security order. Russia has sought to dampen the breezy optimism expressed by Mr. Kohl by staking out a maximalist position. So the chances are that the run-up to the Madrid meeting will see a hectic search for terms on which the Alliance and Moscow can do business, while allowing enlargement to go ahead.

"Faced with the prospect of all this secret diplomacy, European citizens are entitled to suggest some ground rules. Perhaps the first point is that NATO should be prepared to offer Russia substantial assurances over the deployment in Central Europe of new weapons. NATO should also offer Russia the option of wide-ranging consultation on issues of common concern such as peacekeeping doctrine and non-proliferation. But NATO must avoid giving Russia any power to interfere with core Alliance business. The mixture of courtesy and firmness which NATO showed when involving Russia in its Bosnian operation might, perhaps, be extended to the larger game of European security as a whole."

FRANCE: "Yeltsin's Action Plan Against NATO Enlargement"

Isabelle Lasserre said in right-of-center Le Figaro (1/7): "Western nations were counting on Yeltsin to help them advance in their negotiations and to set up a European security system appropriate for the new post Cold War realities.... But Russia feels that NATO's plans are a threat to its security. (Nevertheless) experts think that Russia has resigned itself to the first 'wave' of new members and is trying to obtain as many concessions as possible before the Madrid summit in July....

"Still, Yeltsin is threatening the West with the non- ratification of international disarmament agreements planned for 1997."

ITALY: "The Year Of New Big Chill?"

Renzo Cianfanelli filed from Moscow in centrist, top- circulation Corriere della Sera (1/7): "1997 risks going down in history as the year of the new big chill between Russia and the West. The plan for NATO expansion towards Eastern Europe, examined yesterday by Yeltsin in a closed- door meeting with Chernomyrdin and other officials...threatens to reopen a split which seemed completely overcome."

BELGIUM: "New 'Iron Curtain'?"

Edouard Van Velthem wrote in independent Le Soir (1/11), "Now that Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic, and perhaps also Slovenia or Slovakia already have a foot in NATO, the risk is great of seeing the establishment of a new 'Iron Curtain' that would exclude from Europe a few Balkan states considered as too 'barbarian' or too 'unstable.' In short, nations with which you would not mix according to the so-called 'civilized' norms of the community of nations. That is also probably the meaning of the message forcefully launched under the pressure of events in Sofia and in Belgrade and in the serenity of the successful transition in Bucharest."

BULGARIA: "The Kremlin Bluffs Against West"

Readers of center-left Standart (1/7) saw this piece under the headline above, "The Kremlin's counter against NATO's enlargement gets even bigger. Russia puts everything on the table--the possibility of integrating Belarus, the refusal to ratify START-2 and of destroying its SS-18 missiles. The goal is to allow Moscow the right of veto on some of the East European countries' accession to NATO. The truth is that Russia is an economic and military giant standing on clay legs. Not long ago, the Soviet leaders bluffed in the same way and lost everything."

HUNGARY: "Don't Miss Chance To Join NATO"

Readers of conservative Magyar Nemzet (1/9) saw this op-ed piece, "There is peace in Europe right now and dictators threatening democracy only exist in theory.... However, NATO was established at a time when there was a real danger of dictators running the world and as long as there is a possibility of dangerous systems emerging or strengthening, the Alliance must continue to exist.... It is very naive to consider the new European security structure as an alternative to NATO, since the first provides security only as long as there is no real danger; on the other hand NATO becomes really efficient in the light of an apparent security threat.

"The time may once come when Moscow is offered NATO membership, too. But until this happens, now that Russians themselves are still unsure about their democratic future, the chance for Central European democracies to join the Alliance must not be given up."

"Is Hungary Ready For NATO?"

A very vocal opponent of NATO enlargement wrote for influential weekly Elet Es Irodalom(1/3), "Having signed the treaty with Romania, Hungary seems to have secured its place among the first countries to be invited to NATO; on the other hand, Romania is very unlikely to be admitted in the first ( and most certainly last) round. It is the political elites of the two countries rushing into NATO who needed the treaty and it is almost irrelevant what it contains. NATO member countries have serious problems with one another (Greece,Turkey) and once they are in the Alliance they are given a green light to handle their minority problems the way they like (Turkey and the Kurds.) What all of this boils down to is that the treaty between Hungary and Romania was signed on the altar of integration.

"The Hungarian opposition was almost unanimous in condemning the treaty and it was also vehemently criticized in Romania. This has a serious message: It shows that neither political elite is mature enough for integration. Hungarian parliamentary parties are incapable of cooperating in foreign policy issues and their support for membership in NATO is only superficial and ill-advised."

ICELAND: "NATO Enlargement Is In Russia's Interest"

In the editorial opinion of leading Morgunbladid (1/5), "The settling of disputes with neighboring countries, civil control over the military, democratic government, and respect for human rights are among the conditions which the member states of NATO have to fulfill. Therefore it is in Russia's interest, like other European countries, that NATO should be enlarged. It would increase stability and secure the peace in Europe. The Western countries must respect the Russian attitude towards NATO. Nevertheless a change in these attitudes, along with continued democratic progress, is a prerequisite for Russia itself finally becoming a member of NATO."

LATVIA: "Don't Overestimate Moscow's Opposition"

Ainars Dimants told readers of centrist Diena (1/9), "One must not overestimate Moscow's 'strong opposition' to NATO expansion. NATO expansion will happen, and the Baltic countries are included. This general conclusion can be drawn in Riga after the latest developments in NATO and Russian relations. In it, the NATO actor was Germany, which...has a special role due to its geographic situation....

"I must agree with...Frankfurter Allgemeine...that it is a mistake to think that Russia will return to its course of confrontation with the West. (Russia) will not have enough strength for a long time to come, and...a (new) class of Russians from the world of economics and finance...has already formed...that is not interested in a new 'cold peace.'"

"Only Estonia?"

Right-of-center Neatkariga Rita Avize (1/9) said in a commentary by Voldemars Hermanis, "German Foreign Minister Kinkel's statement that Estonia may be accepted into NATO earlier than the other two Baltic countries has an intriguing political touch.... What would have been Kinkel's motivation in making a public statement like that?... The final decision will not be made behind closed doors in Bonn, but rather this summer in Madrid. It will take place under U.S. leadership, and there is a whole string of barriers before NATO accepts one of the three most often mentioned and most motivated among the (Baltic) countries."

MALTA: "How Much Division Can Boris Create?"

An editorial in the independent, English-language Times of Malta (1/7) pointed out, "Boris Yeltsin is seeking huge influence over decisions by NATO, wanting a legally binding commitment from the Western Alliance to involve Russia in formal consultations with the Alliance on any issue including enlargement.... The NATO Allies have not yet agreed among themselves what special relationship they can offer Russia, to ease Moscow's security concerns about enlargement, and Mr. Yeltsin's demands may be an attempt to see what extent of division he can cause by this hard line."

NORWAY: "U.S. Has Its Own Reasons For Wanting A New NATO"

In social democratic Arbeiderbladet, Norwegian Foreign Policy Institute researcher Svein Melby discussed what the United States has in mind when proposing to expand and reshape NATO (1/7): "A change in NATO is to the benefit of long-term U.S. political interests.... A new NATO will secure the U.S.' need for stability and political balance in Eurasia.... A structural change in NATO will not only preserve the organization's relevance for the present security policy situation in Europe, but also ensure that NATO, in the future, will remain the core of Eurasian security policy structure.... By preventing the EU from becoming the central institutional core in Europe, the Americans have made sure their leadership role in Eurasia is continued and they can keep setting the rules for future development of international defense policies."

POLAND: "NATO Considers Granting Russia Right To Jointly Decide"

Channel 1 TV's main evening news said (1/10), "NATO is considering an idea of granting Russia the right to jointly decide on the most important questions in exchange for its agreement on Polish, Czech and Hungarian membership to NATO. This issue is a topic of hot discussion between the Secretary General and American politicians in Washington. At the end of January, Javier Solana is going to bring an offer to Moscow."

"Russia's Price, Poland's Concerns"

Center-left Gazeta Wyborcza (1/9) emphasized in a commentary by Bartosz Weglarczyk: "Primakov specified very clearly [on January 8] the Russian price for NATO enlargement: a strategic agreement with NATO, and alterations in the CFE on the reduction of conventional forces in Europe. The majority of the Russian demands in the face of the CFE will probably be met because this is what the signatories of the agreement want. Russia could then deploy more tanks, aircraft, and troops than at present along the borders with the Baltic republics, Belarus, Ukraine, and in the northern Caucasus.... Poland will surely take part in negotiations of the CFE agreement because it is a signatory of it, and it participated in such talks in the past. What threatens us, however, is the fact that we will be moved away from the talks between Russia and NATO on the issue of a 'strategic partnership.' Both sides can recognize that the agreement concerns only Moscow and the present, not the future, member nations of NATO. The current line of Polish foreign policy is correct on this matter and it should not succumb to even the smallest fluctuations: Poland must be present during these negotiations, too. Otherwise, this agreement which is key to European security, will be, one more time in history, concluded without those whom it concerns."

"Russia's Arguments Against NATO"

Foreign Minister of the Polish Republic Dariusz Rosati said in center-left Gazeta Wyborcza (1/8), "The argument which is most often made by the Russians is the danger of creating new dividing lines in Europe, which should zero in on cooperation and rapprochement instead. In an extreme version, there is even talk about the danger of isolating Russia. This is a pointless argument. Most of all, its proponents don't seem to notice that, despite the fall of the Berlin Wall, Europe still remains divided. One dividing line runs between NATO countries and Central-Eastern European countries. Although these two groups of nations have close ties of cooperation, and a community of shared ideas and values, their security status is different--to the disadvantage of the nations of our region. The eastward expansion of NATO is not only not creating a new division, but is eliminating the existing one--between Western and Eastern Europe. But there is also another, much newer, line of division that Moscow does not seem to take into consideration: between the countries aspiring to membership in NATO, and Russia and other countries which do not have such aspirations. This division--being an objective and inevitable result of the demise of the Soviet empire and the regaining of full sovereignty by the former satellite countries or the Union republics--is a fact. Thus, the enlargement of NATO is not creating a new division in the area of the former Eastern bloc but is only sanctioning the existing state of affairs....

"Another argument which the Russians make is that the opening of NATO must lead to deterioration of the strategic position of Russia, and therefore weakens Russia's security. This argument is based on the false interpretation of the real nature of the North Atlantic Treaty.... NATO is an alliance of democratic countries, and as the history of international relations shows, democratic countries are not aggressive.... Russian politicians warn that the enlargement of NATO will rouse nationalist moods and strengthen the position of the Communists in Russia which, in turn, may lead to a stiffening of Russian foreign policy, and even a change of administration.... After the presidential elections, the configuration of forces in Russia is relatively stable, and its future will largely depend on internal factors: most of all, the economic situation....

"For us Poles, the moral meaning of the opening of NATO is important. Some Western commentators show hypocrisy and arrogance on this issue. One of them wrote recently that granting security guarantees to Central European countries would be risky because the democratic order in those countries has not yet been settled ('I have shoes which are older than those democracies.') One should remind those commentators of the fact that it was the Yalta agreement, and not our sovereign decisions, which imposed an undemocratic system of government on Poland (and other countries) and deprived us of the possibility of participating in the Alliance from the outset. One should also recall that Western nations agreed to and approved of this deed of constraint. The majority of Central European countries can show an older tradition of democracy than some NATO countries, and there is absolutely no reason to undermine the stability of the democratic order in those countries."

"Still 'Nyet' In Moscow"

Moscow correspondent Andrzej Lomanowski filed this for center-left Gazeta Wyborcza (1/7) on remarks by Yeltsin's press secretary, Sergei Yastrzhembsky: "It apparently means that in Russia's view, the Alliance can expand in any direction except the East, which is so dear to Russia."

"Russia Does Not Change Its Stand On NATO"

Katarzyna Kolodziejczyk wrote for centrist Rzeczpospolita (1/6), "Kohl had nothing new to say on the issue of Russia's stand on NATO enlargement after his return from the Saturday meeting with Boris Yeltsin. Neither the mutual sympathy and friendship that both leaders show nor NATO's clear signals...to consider some of Moscow's viewpoints...made President Yeltsin change his stand on the issue of NATO enlargement to the East...

"The talks between the Germans and the Russians about the matters of our region are particularly interesting questions for the Poles. The pessimists will try to prove that the meeting confirms only the supposition that it will be Moscow with which the conditions of NATO enlargement will be discussed. They will also add that this means that Russia will co-decide again about our future, and that undermines the meaning of the 1989 changes, and, at the same time, the credibility of the West. For the less hot- headed, the announcement of further German-Russian talks signifies the opposite: that the West has not written off Central Europe, including Poland, as a has-been, that it consequently zeroes in on the goal."

SLOVENIA: "NATO's New Challenge"

Left-of-center, independent Dnevnik (1/7) stated in a commentary: "Most probably, the new NATO will no longer be directed against Russia. Russia threatens and shouts, but it is increasingly evident that-- with its outdated and unkept military machinery--it can hardly preserve peace at home, while it can simply forget about any adventures abroad. Even more: China, the economic superpower of the coming millennium, has been rising on Russia's southeastern border; if Beijing decides to spur nationalistic tendencies in the Russian southern, non- Slavic republics, Russia will need all the Western help it can get.... Russia, which is constantly on the brink of chaos, should be more concerned with (the situation in China) than with the shame of being a loser in the Cold War and of losing some former satellites.... The line going across the Balkans and in the direction of northern Africa, the Middle East, and western Asia will be in the coming decades a threat to Europe as important as an unstable and rising Russia."

SWEDEN: "More Responsibility For NATO Needed"

Stockholm's liberal Dagens Nyheter editorialized (1/13): "An increasing number of Swedes, including members of the government, must have become aware that this year will be important, maybe even crucial, with regard to NATO's importance for European security. The moderate party leader Carl Bildt has more markedly than before brought to the fore the question of Swedish membership in the new NATO. A recent opinion poll also shows changed popular opinion with regards to NATO...

"But there is a problem that primarily the Swedish government has put the lid on debate when cooperation with NATO within the PFP and in other fora is being intensified. The electorate should also be brought closer in the political debate to issues dealing with NATO's future enlargement eastward, the risks facing the Baltic states if they are left outside, and the danger that Russia's bargaining with NATO will worsen the political climate. More than a few voices must be heard, and more people must take responsibility on issues regarding NATO. One cannot hide behind opinion polls. Decisions on Sweden's security will need more than this."

EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC

CHINA: "NATO Enlargement Point Of Contention Between Russia, West"

This piece by Xinhua News Agency's Moscow correspondent Zhang Jinhai ran in official, municipal Beijing Daily (Beijing Ribao, 1/3), "In 1996, Russia consistently expressed its strong opposition to the NATO enlargement plan. But each time NATO, headed by the United States, responded that it intended to go ahead with the plan. Thus, the issue of NATO's eastward enlargement becomes a point of contention between Russia and the West. NATO enlargement is an established plan of the West. Russia had stood on principle in working hard to block NATO enlargement. As the date for the 1997 NATO summit approaches, the disagreement between Russia and the West over this issue will grow increasingly fierce."

SOUTH ASIA

INDIA: "Russia Reverts To Tough Stand On NATO"

An analysis in the centrist Hindu (1/8) by Moscow correspondent Vladimir Radyuhin concluded: "Moscow has reverted to a tough stand on a proposed NATO expansion, declaring its uncompromising rejection of plans to admit Russia's East European neighbors into the Alliance.... NATO was the first foreign policy issue...Yeltsin discussed with top government officials since his return to the Kremlin two weeks ago after a six-month illness. The Kremlin appeared to be trying to dispel recent optimistic reports in the West that Russia was coming round to accept NATO's eastward expansion in exchange for a 'charter' granting Moscow a special status in consultation with the North Atlantic Alliance.... Moscow demands from the West a binding agreement that NATO would not deploy its forces on the territory of its new East European members.... Moscow has also indicated that it will push for closer ties with China and India to balance NATO expansion in Europe."

LATIN AMERICA

ARGENTINA: "The Status Of A Great Power"

Guillermo Ortiz, international analyst for business- financial El Cronista (1/7), said, "After the dissolution of the USSR, the Kremlin began a process of state reconstruction aimed at refunding the status of great power. That is all. That is why it moved 'on all fronts': It had to show that the 'strategic gap' left in that wide area east of NATO needed Moscow's action and that this option is reliable and cheaper for the Western world.

"The task began three years ago... with the approval of a new military doctrine which assumed the right of Russian troops to bring peace to the Caucasus.... Moscow's 'nyet' to an enlarged NATO means that (Moscow) supports such an extension as long as it does not imply 'a guarantee of security' for the new members nor the installation of military infrastructure close to its borders."

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1/13/97