I. PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE
- Nearly three years have passed since NATO announced
in January 1994 that it would welcome the new democracies
of Central and Eastern Europe as full and equal members.
The PfP was then launched to enhance multinational
interoperability, exchange information on defence planning
and budgeting, promote democratic control of defence
forces, and strengthen the ability to participate in
peacekeeping, search and rescue, humanitarian and other
missions as might be agreed (e.g., crisis management). An
associated Planning and Review Process (PARP) was offered
later that year to identify interoperability objectives
ranging over cartology, blood donors, mineclearing,
replenishment, common fuel requirements, and airfield
procedures with respect to PfP missions - the closest
example of NATO's own defence planning process in which
Partners can participate.
- Although some of this activity was already covered in
the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), PfP would
go beyond "dialogue and cooperation" to form a "real
partnership" and offer many of the inter-state
confidence-building benefits NATO nurtures. Another
innovation was that PfP would offer Alliance consultations
with any active Partner which perceived a direct threat
to its security.
- The PfP also introduced the link to NATO enlargement.
It was conceived in early 1993, with the concept
originating with the then Supreme Allied Commander,
Europe, General John Shalikashvili, as a substitute for
NATO enlargement. There was no consensus then within NATO
that enlargement would on balance be a positive step,
whereas the Clinton Administration openly asked whether
enlargement without Russia included would "isolate" Moscow
and create a "buffer zone" in Ukraine. However, by the
time of the January 1994 Summit PfP was identified as a
path into NATO, albeit in ambiguous terms: "active
participation in Partnership for Peace will play an
important role in the evolutionary process of the
expansion of NATO...taking into account political and
security developments in the whole of Europe".
- As we full well know, for some in the West this
perspective of membership was but the procession of
natural history, for others a statement that never should
have been made. Nevertheless, this formula also raised a
question of interpretation regarding Article 10 of the
1949 Washington Treaty, which enables the Alliance to
invite any European states "in a position to further the
principles of this Treaty" and to contribute to the
security of the North Atlantic area. With reference to
the preamble, for example, would democracy and rule of law
suffice, or would the goal of "the preservation of peace
and security" be seen by some in relation to the alleged
concerns of Russia - concerns which had been raised during
German unification but which had not prevented the speedy
unification of that nation within the Alliance ?
- Romania was the first to sign (26 January 1994) and
Ukraine the first CIS country to do so (8 February 1994),
whereas Poland proved the first to conclude its Individual
Partnership Programme (4 July 1994), the IPP. By the end
of 1995 27 countries (to become 28 if Switzerland joins,
as Berne anticipates) were participating, although some
more actively than others. As many as 16 PfP exercises
are planned for 1997 - over five times as many as in 1994
- in addition to many more exercises within the PfP
"framework". PfP exercises also evolved from
fraternization and set-piece guarding of checkpoints -
"summer camps" - to more dynamic and freeplay manoeuvres
engaging not only conscripts and NCOs but officers and,
most importantly, command post exercises. The most
complex and challenging event is a command post exercise
planned for 1997, Cooperative Guard, viewed as a
"capstone" activity for joint staff procedure drill in the
context of a peace support operation. Work on the
exercise schedule for 2000-2002 began already in the
autumn 1996.
- Fifteen nations participate in the PARP: Albania,
Austria, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Sweden, Ukraine. Twenty-one nations have opened
offices at the Partnership Coordination Cell (PCC)
adjacent to SHAPE, the body responsible for military
implementation of Partnership activity. Eleven countries
have applied for NATO membership, comprising all of the
PARP participants, except for Austria, Bulgaria, Finland,
Sweden, and Ukraine, plus the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia (FYROM).
- In December 1995, "peace enforcement measures" were
added as a PfP activity under the overall peacekeeping
rubric, in view of IFOR. NATO subsequently agreed in 1996
to go a step further by providing the Defence Planning
Questionnaire which assesses assets and readiness to those
nations who have concluded security agreements, despite
sensitivities about commercially-related technical
information (3) (Partners are not yet in a position to
provide "answers", but its release was intended as a
familiarization exercise). At least 20 NATO committees
are today involved in PfP and NACC activities, although,
as before, they maintain their normal NATO duties. To
date, 700 of the approximately 1,500 NATO Standardization
Agreements (STANAGS) have been released to Partners.
- Although some, including in our Assembly, criticized
PfP as an ersatz sidestep (US Senator Richard Lugar
memorably coined "Policy for Postponement", also terming
PfP a "band-aid instead of corrective surgery"), NATO
authorities described the Partnership as indispensable to
the smooth cooperation among NATO and thirteen Partner
forces under Allied command (US operational control in the
case of Russia) in the Implementation Force (IFOR) for
Bosnia-Herzegovina, including in multinational units such
as the Nordic-Polish-Baltic brigade in sector North. The
PCC Director, Major General Gunnar Lange (Denmark),
informed the North Atlantic Council on 20 March 1996 that
"The Partner Liaison Officers simply assumed the
additional role of IFOR Liaison Officers", and that "the
IFOR mission has had and will have a direct impact on
PfP". Although IFOR was not a "PfP" operation -
implementation (enforcement) not initially included in the
range of PfP missions (see paragraph 5), General Lange
noted that IFOR "is exactly the type of operation PfP is
intended to prepare the Partners and NATO to participate
in". As Mr. Ion Ratiu (Romania) has observed, "PfP is
proving itself a practical, realistic, and factual way" of
assessing the contribution Partners can make, including
aspiring NATO members.
- As importantly for shaping a new generation of
officer corps, student enrolment from PfP countries
attending the NATO School SHAPE at Oberammergau, Germany,
jumped from 36 students in 1991 to 350 this year.(4)
Unfortunately, Russian officers have not taken
proportionate advantage of these courses, and there is
evidence that those who do are stigmatized.
- In September 1996 the United Kingdom was the first
NATO nation ever to conduct a purely national, not a PfP,
exercise on the territory of a former Warsaw Pact country,
Poland, in the 4000-troop exercise Lancer Eagle. This is
no small progress, for only three years before some
officials of the same government (and no doubt others)
took the view that training on Partner territory could
appear "partisan" or damage relations with Moscow. So
political barriers are being surmounted, and the
Netherlands and France, as well as the Czech Republic and
Hungary, are also reportedly interested in using this
training ground, Drawsko Pomorskie, the largest in Central
Europe. Already in 1995 Greece was using Bulgarian
territory from which to test surface-to-air missiles.
- However, PfP never fully lived up to the expectations
of those seeking Alliance membership. Considering that
PfP was, again, originally intended as a substitute for
enlargement, this is hardly surprising. Among their
concerns have been:
- Undue focus on low-level tactical-level exercises,
with the BBC World Today having reported on 6 September
criticism of "unrealistic, low-level exercises" with IFOR
leaving PfP behind in events (although not all Partners
participate in IFOR) and cited the Deputy SACLANT Vice
Admiral Ian Garnett as conceding that "It will be some
years before Partners can contribute to more
complicated...[rather than] very simple...missions", which
would require "regular involvement for at least five
years".
- The limited military value of peacekeeping, cf. the
real-world "stability" mission in Bosnia.
- The unwillingness of NATO to "differentiate" in what
is offered Partners, except for Russia and Ukraine, even
though efforts to establish civilian control of the
military were unlikely to have the slightest impact in
Russia but could, sufficiently resourced, make a
difference in aiding other Partners.
- Delays in approving the IPPs, no doubt a result of
overload caused by the open-ended invitation related to
the non-differentiation approach.
- Inadequate transparency about NATO's own decisions
and chief reliance on delegations rather than the
Secretariat for such information.
- Inadequate integration at the military staff level,
e.g., at the NATO Major Subordinate Commands.
- Integration with NATO was occurring far more because
of bilateral cooperation with nations (e.g., the US
Regional Airspace Initiative to modernize airspace systems
for joint military and civilian use in Albania, the Czech
Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, Poland, Romania,
and, later in 1996, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) rather
than NATO-wide efforts as such.
- The limited scope and financing of PfP, which of
course is outside the NATO integrated military structure,
directly hindered Partner efforts to contribute to NATO's
new missions; e.g., Poland argues that it could not
contribute additional units beyond one battalion to IFOR
because the operation is fully run by NATO procedures not
all of which have been made available to Partners.
According to a Polish diplomat: "The sooner political
decisions on admission of new members are taken, the
quicker new members will be in a position to contribute
meaningfully to implementation" of such tasks.(5) Surely,
given the fact that NATO nations have reduced their forces
by 25% since 1991, expediting the process would seem in
the self-interests of the present 16 Allies.
- Perhaps most importantly, without a clear perspective
on enlargement and a timetable, Partner defence planners
were placed in a very difficult position in attempting to
design budgeted force structures: Could they count on NATO
infrastructure funding by year X? Should they buy cheaper
Russian armaments or aim for NATO-standardized Western
equipment? "The original scope of PfP is too narrow for
preparing countries for membership", a NATO analyst
observed in personal remarks, and "there will always be an
unbridgeable difference between collective defence as
practised within NATO and practical military cooperaton as
conducted between NATO and its Partners".(6) This bridge
will simply have to be eventually crossed. And, yet,
returning to the non- differentiation policy, the
September 1995 Study on NATO Enlargement cautioned that
"premature development of measures outside PfP for
possible new members should be avoided" - i.e., a
"cop-out" of critical significance.
- Perspectives naturally depended on whether one sought
to join NATO or not, and invariably those who did sought
to accelerate momentum, perhaps by exaggerating problems,
when NATO naturally had to work around agreed plans. Some
of these criticisms diminished as the PfP progressed, and
in Berlin the Ministers identified the way ahead as
follows:
- Enhancing Partner participation in CJTF
- Expanding PARP to cover interoperability objectives
beyond peacekeeping to cover all of NATO's new missions
- Increasing Partner involvement in shaping cooperation
programmes
- Producing a joint rolling evaluation of the IFOR
experience (a Hungarian proposal)
- Encouraging "regionalization" of PfP activity, such
as Denmark's major role in Baltic cooperation
- US Secretary of State Warren Christopher further
pointed in Berlin to the need to develop standards for
civilian and democratic control of armed forces (he
proposed this a year ago, but there is no single model
within NATO itself) and for greater financial resources
(as a rule Partners cover their own costs). The SHAPE
Chief of Staff, General Peter Carstens, informed
participants at the NAA Rose-Roth Seminar at the NATO
Defence College in Rome in April that the "way ahead" for
NACC/PfP should include strengthening political-military
dialogue, increasing command post and planning exercises,
democratic control, opening NATO exercises (not just PfP
exercises) to Partners, and extending the range of
interoperability objectives that could be "more intensive
for some". Observed General Carstens: "There is an urgent
need to demonstrate NATO intent". We agree.
II. 1999
- Intensified Dialogue
- 1995 was given over to the "how" and "why" of
enlargement, resulting in the September 1995 Study on NATO
Enlargement. It was an interesting "capstone" document,
including for its conduciveness to different
interpretation on issues such as full or partial
integration, foreign forces, nuclear weapons, and
pre-accession differentiation. Although the leadership of
the Polish-American Congress dismissed the text as having
"no practical significance to the countries concerned",(7)
the Study did provide important political and military
guidelines making Partners aware of what would be expected
and what would not be tolerated, e.g., demonstrate "a
commitment to and respect for OSCE norms and principles,
including the resolution of ethnic disputes, external
territorial disputes including irredentist claims or
internal jurisdictional disputes", or establish democratic
and civilian control of their defence forces (paragraph
72). In any event, 1996 moved beyond conceptual
reflection (however much required given German Defence
Minister Volker Ruhe's concerns about pursuing an
enlargement approach "determined by the highest possible
degree of ambiguity" (8)) to a second phase comprising two
elements:
- "Intensified dialogue" whereby Partners would learn
more about the details of membership and NATO more about
what Partners could or could not contribute, although
participation in this dialogue "would not imply that
interested Partners would automatically be invited to
begin accession talks", as the Ministers stated in
December 1995; and
- Consideration of internal Alliance adaptation,
including resource and staffing implications in
particular, "to ensure that enlargement preserves the
effectiveness of the Alliance".
- The intensified dialogue began on 16 January 1996.
The Czech Republic became the first country to respond
officially to the Enlargement Study with an aide m‚moire
of 14 March 1996 (the Czech Ministry of Defence takes the
position that the most active Partners should be directly
involved in NATO bodies dealing with enlargement) (9).
Thirteen countries (aspiring members plus Finland and
Bulgaria, with Azerbaijan and Ukraine not having
followed-up on initial interest) are participating. In a
format between the Partner and a NATO team led by
Assistant Secretary General Gebhardt von Moltke, the
Spring was devoted to dialogue on political requirements
such as democratic control and resolution of disputes with
neighbours (some of it repetitive of discussions the
previous year); after Berlin a more intensified
military-technical dialogue proceeded (including
information on national institutions overseeing defence
and security); and the last phase was given over to
Partners inquiring as to costs and summing-up (15
September-24 October). This post-Berlin phase was hailed
by one Central European diplomat as "a real breakthrough",
even if the dialogue was regarded by some in the Alliance
as an obvious delaying tactic.
- Russian Views
- It was refreshing to hear US Undersecretary for
Defence Walt Slocombe state on 14 June 1995 that "NATO
enlargement should not be seen merely in relation to
Russia". Other reasons for enlargement, he said, included
European integration, avoiding renationalization of
defence, providing a context to resolve problems within
Central Europe, and solidifying democratic and economic
reform in a transatlantic framework.(10) This is, of course, precisely the approach your Co-Rapporteurs and
many in our Assembly have tried to hammer home to
policymakers for many years.
- Nevertheless, an opportunity may be on the horizon
for realizing what Secretary General Solana has termed
Alliance readiness "to consider certain Russian concerns",
even if the enlargement decision will be made by the 16
Allies themselves". There was the well-known statement by
Russian Security Council Secretary General Aleksandr Lebed
in June that "We are no longer fighting anybody and we are
strong enough not to want to redraw the political map of
Europe...if you [NATO] have enough money and energy to
expand, feel free".(11) Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeni Primakov stated at the end of July that in addition to
objection to deployment of nuclear or conventional foreign
forces on the territory of new members:
"...we find it unacceptable to have NATO's military
infrastructure expanding right next door to Russia's
territory. If NATO's new members are fully integrated in
the Alliance's military systems - command and control,
communications, intelligence, rear supplies, and so on
-the deployment of NATO forces could be effected within a
matter of hours. Such a possibility, even though it might
be highly unlikely today, will become a factor of
uncertainty for us."(12)
- At the same time, the Foreign Minister stated: "I am
convinced that a way out of the prevailing situtation
might be found through compromise and reciprocal
consideration of interests".(13) He asked, even while
expressing "total opposition" to enlargement: "Can you
guarantee that the enlargement of NATO will not lead to
the installation of military infrastructures? If your
answer is yes, I too will give you a positive response".(14)
- This went some way beyond "just say nyet", but was
absurd all the same. The Study on NATO Enlargement
requires new members to join in some way the command
structure and meet interoperability standards, in
particular for command, control and communication
equipment. The Study also notes that a limited number of
new headquarters may be needed to cover new Areas of
Responsibility, as stated in its Chapter Four, A (b) and
(h). The Minister's formula insofar as these aspects are
concerned is not realistic nor desirable, descriptive in
all but name of purely political NATO membership which the
Alliance will not accept. The Study does not require a
priori the stationing of foreign troops, but signals that
pre-positioned materiel may be required, or the stationing
of nuclear weapons.
- Russia is not without foundation in arguing that the
ban in Article V of the 1990 "2+4" treaty on Germany on
foreign forces and nuclear weapons in the former GDR
should serve as a precedent the further east NATO moves to
Russia. Minister Primakov has, indeed, attempted to
demonstrate that at both the time of German unification
and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact the USSR had
received Western assurances that NATO would not expand
East, e.g., in his 20 September 1996 address to the OSCE
Permanent Council. It can also be argued, nevertheless,
that the Soviet border no longer exists, that Russia's
zone of national security has also moved further east, and
hence a resulting rebus sic stantibus.
- Moreover, the Alliance must and will "reserve the
right to dispose forces as necessary in the event of
crisis or war".(15) Certainly NATO has not demanded that
Russia eliminate its tactical nuclear weapons, and whether
deterrence is served by air-, sea-, or ground-launched
means is militarily irrelevant. Whether a nuclear-free
zone in Central Europe, as vigorously advocated also by
Ukraine and Belarus, and, of course, a persistent idea
throughout the period of East-West confrontation, should
be established is an issue we put to the Committee itself
for debate, but no likely future Ally has asked to base
some element of the remaining nuclear-capable aircraft and
their ordnance on its territory. We see no reason why
NATO could not commit to not deploying nuclear weapons in
peacetime on the territory of new Allies in light of the
current international environment.
- Although NATO seeks to develop its relationship with
Russia "in rough parallel" with enlargement, the future of
that relationship, as the General Report also notes, is
unclear. A fundamental, and probably implacable,
difference is simply the role of NATO. Whereas the PfP
was intended to intensify political and military
cooperation "throughout Europe", Russia rejects NATO "as a
basis for a new system of European security".(16) For example, it has been argued that the "16+1 formula was a
kind of political trap which split the [CIS] countries'
joint efforts in the security sphere", and that it is
politically disadvantageous because, a "special"
relationship aside, "Russia will not have the right of
veto whereas Luxembourg ... or even Iceland ... do have
such a right".(17) Russian authorities have suggested that
a "16+12" (NATO+CIS) or "17" format would be preferable to
the "16+1" framework NATO offers for NATO-Russia
relations, "17" or even "1+1" implying a full Russian
voice in decisions on issues such as enlargement and IFOR
before they are taken.
- Whether the Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe (OSCE) or the NACC could provide other options
to integrate Russia remains to be seen, as the Draft
Report of the Sub-Committee on Transatlantic and European
Relations explores. The "16+1" format remains, all the
same, what NATO offers.
- For the moment, nevertheless, we have the rich IFOR
experience on which to build, and the apparent progress in
Berlin to exchange staff officers suggests that the future
can surmount residual Russian negativism. The value of
other elements being discussed - non-proliferation,
ballistic missile defence, drug trafficking, terrorism,
defence-related ecological damage, and cooperative arms
development for peacekeeping - are self-evident. Although
the March 1996 NATO-Russia civil emergency planning and
disaster preparedness memorandum, the first cooperation
text signed by the Secretary General, may not equate with
a new Congress of Vienna, it is valuable not only for
practical cooperation but to demonstrate that the Alliance
is not a holdover "war machine".
- Whatever the future, we reiterate that if the
Russians wish to join in constructive efforts to deal with
the enlargement issue, then we should welcome them aboard
for debate. We have reasons to believe there is evidence
in support of this direction. Certainly, Russia's failure
to step through the open door could irresponsibly risk a
less secure Europe. However, either way, the Russians
have to understand, and we believe they do, that the NATO
enlargement train is about to leave the station.
- Towards Who and When
- The Danish Defence Minister, our former Colleague
Hans Haekkerup, has stated that it was his impression that
the first new members will be the Czech Republic, Hungary,
and Poland, to be decided at an extraordinary summit in
the Spring of 1997,(18) - although he is keen for the three
Baltic States to be included in the first group (see the
General Report for Baltic security issues). Hungarian
Foreign Ministry Department Head Istvan Gyarmati informed
the April NATO Defence College seminar that he foresaw a
follow-on timetable being made available within six months
of the invitation, accession negotations continued over
1997-98, signature of the protocol of accession in 1998,
and ratification in 1999 - the 50th anniversary of the
Alliance. Nevertheless, at least three possible
complications in expediting enlargement may be looming.
- Differentiation
- We have already noted the differentiation
probl‚matique in NACC and PfP. With respect to
enlargement, an inherited contradiction arises.
- On the one hand, "PfP may have to distinguish within
itself between those countries who are on the path of
membership and those who are not. The former would begin
to involve themselves in more detailed activities designed
specifically to acquaint them with the obligation of NATO
membership", which could include inviting "some Partners
to participate in some NATO meetings as observers as was
the case when Greece and Turkey were waiting formally to
join the Alliance in 1951".(19) Indeed, in 1990, when the
associate delegate status was created, the NAA did not
endorse the NACC as such, but rather attendance of
Partners "at selected meetings of the North Atlantic
Council or other appropriate bodies" - that is, coming
directly into the heart of NATO, not into appendage bodies
specifically created for all of the 38 NACC participants.
Likewise, the US Deputy Secretary of Defence, John White,
noted that "the PfP program is not a true alternative for
NATO enlargement".(20)
- On the other hand, there is the aforementioned
perceived need to "strengthen" PfP for those who do not
join at an early stage or not at all. NATO Assistant
Secretary General von Moltke has stated that "our aim is
to narrow the distinction between Allies and Partners as
much as practically possible".(21) Countries such as
Romania fear there will, in fact, be only one enlargement
(as Russia seeks). Secretary General Solana has assured
that "the door will stay open", yet Alliance diplomats and
officials express concern that those not admitted first
will be isolated, or that new Allies will block further
enlargement.
- All of this could serve as an argument for minimizing
differentiation and keeping membership applications sub
judice ad infinitum. Indeed, there is an alternative
school of thought within the Alliance that NATO should not
invite the first group of new members to begin accession
negotiations, but instead publicly acknowledge all of
those countries seeking membership and leave the accession
negotiations' date and date of admission open.(22)
- We ask, therefore: Will NATO be able to concentrate
sufficiently on preparing a limited number of new members
and at the same time intensify an already vast PfP
programme? Might the individual character of PfP be
compromised in the search to satisfy all concerned
nations?
- NATO Restructuring
- Then there is the question of synchonization posed by
the relationship between enlargement and the restructuring
of the NATO command system, as discussed in detail in the
General Report [AN 244 PC (96) 7]. In Berlin, the
Ministers stated that "the overall adaptation of the
Alliance will facilitate" enlargement. Because, as Mr.
Petersen rightly notes, the difficulties of the
restructuring process suggest no obvious and feasible
deadline, there is a risk that those who have not shared
the enthusiasm of the United States and European
personalities, namely Defence Minister Haekkerup and
German Defence Minister Rhe, could use NATO restructuring
as an excuse for enlargement delay - if not necessarily
the pre-accession negotiations, then the actual accession.
- When?
- Third and finally, the anticipated 1997 Summit may
announce who will be invited but not necessarily when they
will be admitted. German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel
has suggested membership would occur around the year 2000,
and the earlier 50th anniversary date of 1999 has already
been mentioned. There is a concern, however, that
politicians may slip into an even more "Russia-first" mode
after the invitation is extended, such that the US Central
and Eastern European Coalition has been pressing the White
House for a "letter of intent" from the President
personally pledging to complete the admission of the first
tranche of NATO members before his second term [should
there be one] expires. Others believe that the political
momentum would be too great to drag out the accession
process, that not extending precise invitations could be
devastating for the Alliance. Although the invitation
itself would constitute a political breakthrough, defence
planning cannot be held hostage to uncertainty, confronted
as it is already in every country with a resource
challenge. Moreover, as Zbigniew Brzezinski has rightly
noted: "The sooner target dates are defined and new NATO
members-to-be are named, the sooner a genuinely positive
dialogue with Moscow will begin".(23)
- The NATO Enlargement Facilitation Act
There has been too strong a tendency in US policy to
overreact to outdated Russian sensitivities....NATO
enlargement will make unrealistic the calls by Russia's
extremists for the revitalization of the former Soviet
Union or the westward expansion of Russian
hegemony...[and] will further lock German interests into a
transatlantic security structure....America's defence and
security must be structured to shape a strategic
landscape that enhances economic, political, and military
stability all across Europe....This is in our national
interest.
It is action long overdue, and it is the intent of the
NATO Enlargement Facilitation Act of 1996.
Senator V. William Roth, Jr.
25 July
1996
- Secretary General Solana informed the NAA in Athens
in May that NATO aspirants must carefully consider how
their joining the Alliance will affect their "political
and military environment" and how they see themselves
contributing to our overall security. In his view, "this
is a matter that must not be confined to expert circles,
but to a broader public debate".
- It goes without saying that this includes the
parliamentary dimension. What is important is that all
NATO nations accelerate assistance to potentially eligible
new Allies. This was precisely the aim of a literally
historic piece of legislation, the NATO Enlargement
Facilitation Act, passed this summer by Congress. The
huge majorities garnered in both Houses - 353:65 on 23
July in the House, 81:16 on 25 July in the Senate - more
than supported the call of Representative Benjamin Gilman,
Chairman of the House International Relations Committee,
that "After today's vote, it is hoped that we will never
again hear that the Congress does not support NATO
enlargement".
- The key provisions of the legislation (as adopted in
the House, HR 3564) are as follows:
- NATO enlargement will reinforce stability and
security by fostering the integration of the emerging
democracies in Central and Eastern Europe into the
structures which have created and sustained peace in
Europe since 1945, and will not threaten any nation.
- The United States continues to regard the political
independence and territorial integrity of all emerging
democracies in Central and Eastern Europe as vital to
European peace and security.
- NATO remains the only multilateral security
organization capable of conducting effective military
operations and preserving security and stability in the
Euro-Atlantic region.
- It should be US policy to actively assist the
emerging democracies in their transition so that they may
eventually qualify for NATO membership, and the Congress
finds that Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic (the
Senate version added Slovenia) have made the most progress
toward achieving the stated criteria (inter alia active
PfP Partner, significant progress toward establishing
democratic institutions, a free market, civilian control
of the armed forces, and the rule of law) and should be
eligible for additional assistance.
- Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic are deemed
eligible to receive $60,000,000 for fiscal year 1997.
- The process of enlarging NATO should not stop with
the admission of these three countries, and the President
may designate other countries as eligible, with the bill
naming Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Moldova, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine.
- Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania should not be
disadvantaged in seeking to join NATO by virtue of their
forcible incorporation into the Soviet Union (indeed, US
Senator John McCain cautioned on 27 June in Norfolk that
should Russia gravely retaliate against the Baltics or
Ukraine in response to the first NATO enlargement the
consequences would be regarded "as a challenge to
collective security", accelerate NATO enlargement without
discussion, and cause a cut-off of Western assistance to
Russia).
- The countries of the Caucasus region should not be
precluded from future NATO membership.
- Funds made available are also to support the Regional
Airspace Initiative and the PfP Information Management
System, including the transfer of items to all of the
countries named above (save for the Caucasus).
- The President is encouraged to provide excess defence
articles to cooperative regional peacekeeping initiatives.
- There were some differences between HR 3564 and HR 7,
the original bill introduced by Chairman Gilman. HR 7
(and the 1994 NATO Participation Act) urged membership "at
an early date", did not refer to the Caucasus, and did not
refer to US leadership in the PfP. There are also
differences between HR 3564 and the Senate amendment. The
latter, again, includes Slovenia as having made the most
progress, and replaces enlargement "should not stop" with
"should not be limited to consideration of", following a
filibuster threat by Senator Sam Nunn - who in the end
voted against the amendment. An earlier Senate version
also "fully expected" eventual membership of Austria,
Finland, and Sweden. The Senate version also notes that
some NATO members do not accept nuclear weapons on their
terrritory. The two bills went to conference in
September.
- Although details need to be reconciled, it is
encouraging that, after having opposed this kind of
legislation, the White House welcomed HR 3564 as
demonstrating that "the House shares President Clinton's
determination" to enlarge NATO - an interesting twist
since the point of the legislation since the 1994 NATO
Participation Act was to prod the Administration into
action and not just declaration, to determine the
reliability of the White House. The legislation was
welcomed largely, however, because it set no date and did
not specifically call for granting NATO membership to any
state. In constrast, HR 7 of 1995, as passed by the
House, called for Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and
Slovakia to be invited to become full NATO members,
whereas an earlier version set the date of 10 January 1999
as the deadline for the invitation. This positive White
House response was issued despite earlier objections, as
late as two days before the bill passed in the House, that
naming early candidates "would complicate efforts to
enhance stability and security in Europe".
- Politics eclipsing policy? Whatever, here we at
least may have an instance where Zbigniew Brzezinski's
dictum that "the four-year Presidential process has a
pernicious influence on foreign policy" may not have not
materialized - perniciously - on the issue of NATO
enlargement, thanks to the Congress.(24)
III. ISSUES FOR THE NAA
- This Sub-Committee, established at the 1995 Annual
Session in Turin, serves as the only dedicated permanent
Assembly body on this vital issue. It continues the
tradition of the Political Committee in having played the
leading NAA role since 1986 in following democratic reform
in Central and Eastern Europe and encouraging transition.
Your Co-Rapporteurs encourage comments from all members
and associate delegates on its work so that it may serve
as a useful reference tool for parliamentary work.
- The time is approaching, however, for us in the
Assembly to ask what more, if anything, beyond associate
delegate status, holding Sessions in these nations, and
fact-finding missions and seminars, the NAA should do as
enlargement approaches:
- Is there a parliamentary parallel to the enlargement
plus enhanced PfP formula NATO is pursuing? What more
could be done for associate delegates who are not likely
to enter NATO in the initial rounds or who do not seek
membership? What of our own relationship with the Russian
Federal Assembly and Ukrainian Supreme Rada?
- Should we revisit the (short-lived) 1994 discussion
about offering full membership to the parliamentarians of
NATO candidates prior to their governments joining the
Alliance? Recall that Senator William V. Roth, Jr.,
proposed early that year that full membership should be
offered to the Visegrad countries so that the Assembly
would "demonstrate a commitment to an ongoing dynamic
Alliance and, once again, show that it has the courage to
go where our national governments are slow to act?" Are
we in a position to do so when the group of likely first
candidates has shifted within a mere two years time, viz.,
Slovenia replacing Slovakia within the group of four, or
where members may not agree on the composition of the
first tranche (i.e., on 16 July Greek Foreign Minister
Theodoros Pangalos supported the "immediate" integration
of Romania into NATO and the EU, and on 17 July US
Secretary of State Christopher noted that "Romania has
done a great deal to qualify itself for early
consideration for membership"; the signing on 16 September
of the Hungary-Romania Basic Treaty can only be regarded
as highly positive and consistent with the purpose of NATO
enlargement).
- Other than offering full membership in the NAA prior
to full NATO membership (setting aside the political issue
raised by changing the rules of procedure which provide
for parallel NAA and NATO membership), what more could be
done to draw the likely first new Allies closer to the NAA
- observer status or full participation in the Standing
Committee, budgetary contributions?
- We have no instant solutions to these questions. We
do wish to stress, however, that these issues will have to
be addressed. Without ruling out other options, it would
seem sensible that when NATO invites the first future
Allies to begin the accession negotiations, at a minimum
the following two steps should be taken:
- the Standing Committee meeting in Reykjavik on 4-6
April 1997 should review options and present proposals for
approval by the entire Assembly at the 1997 Spring Session
in Luxembourg; and
- the 1997 Annual Military Tour should include visits
to those offered membership by the Alliance.
CONCLUSION
- In the final analysis, nothing could at once be more
obvious and yet highly elusive than the prescription that,
as our Chairman, Representative Gerald B. Solomon, has
argued: "The critical issue is not about avoiding new
lines but defining the purpose of those lines and
eliminating old barriers, the final vestiges of Yalta ....
Discharging this solemn responsibility is primarily for
governments to decide, but cannot be left to governments
alone".(25)
- The Assembly's trailblazing tradition must now be
put to extraordinary use at a critical time to consolidate
support for the historic enlargement of the Alliance. We
can think of no better expression of parliamentary support
for the course this Assembly has consistently supported
than for our colleagues to consider adopting legislation
akin to the NATO Enlargement Facilitation Act, and for our
Assembly to issue ex cathedra in Paris a clear statement
regarding the first candidates and a timetable for their
admission.
- We have a duty to terminate the curious phenomenon of
non-decision whereby the NATO parliamentarians themselves
have never made a collective judgment about who will soon
be ready for NATO's first wave of admissions. Our more
recent resolutions have proved less than bold, limited as
they have been to stating enlargement should proceed "as
soon as possible" (Turin 1995) or "within the next 2-5
years" (Washington 1994). This is simply ahistoric when
matched against the NAA's pioneering operational role
since 1988 on the pressing task of NATO outreach, our
signal from Madrid (1991) reminding NATO of the
enlargement provision of the Washington Treaty, and our
call in Copenhagen (1993) for the Alliance to articulate
terms and conditions for accession to be accomplished with
a timetable and involving an "associate relationship
leading to full membership". Let us collectively put to
rest the argument that ratification or approval of new
membership might prove to be a hindrance, rather than an
expeditor, of a wider Alliance, and provide a lead to our
colleagues in national legislatures.
NOTES AND REFERENCES
This is the first Draft Report of the new
Sub-Committee on NATO Enlargement and the New Democracies
established at the 1995 Annual Session in Turin. This
year members of the Political Committee participated in
two meetings in April in Moscow and at the NATO Defence
College in Rome to obtain detailed insight, with a third
encounter held in September in Kiev. Your Co-Rapporteurs
welcome the practice of opening meetings to the full
Committee.
The NATO-Russia and NATO-Ukraine relationships are treated in the 1996 General Report by Mr. Jan Petersen (Norway) [AN 244 PC (96) 7].
Defence News, 8-14 July 1994.
SHAPE Public Information Office, 29 July 1996.
Robert Pszczel, Enlargement of NATO and the Future of Peacekeeping, Verification 1996 (Westview Press 1996).
Nicholas Williams, The Future of Partnership for Peace, Arbeitspapier, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, April 1996.
Letter from Edward J. Moskal, President of the
Polish-American Congress, to Senator Robert C. Byrd, 5 October 1995.
The Wall Street Journal Europe, 16-17 September 1994. Emphasis added.
NATO Review (July 1996).
US Information Service, Washington File, 21 June 1996.
ITAR TASS, 18 June 1996. Lebed was referring to the Baltic states, but subsequently declared that NATO expansion would mean that Russia was viewed as a potential enemy and lead to a counter-bloc headed by Russia. Stern, 12 September 1996.
(Krasnaya Zvezda, FBIS, Central Eurasia, 29 July 1996.
Ibid. Emphasis added.
FBIS, Central Eurasia, 2 August 1996.
Op. cit., note 10. Emphasis added.
Russian Foreign Ministry official Vladimir Andreyev, BBC, Summary of World Broadcasts, Former Soviet Union, 10 August 1996.
Krasnaya Zvezda, FBIS, Central Eurasia, 8 July 1996.
Copenhagen Det Fri Aktuelt, 22 July 1996.
Op. cit., note 6.
US Information Service, Washington File, 24 June 1996.
Ambassador Gebhardt von Moltke, "NATO and European Security", Central European Issues (Summer 1996).
Briefing at NATO Headquarters to the Sub-Committee on Transatlantic and European Relations, 23 September 1996.
Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Russia: Terms for Accommodation With an Expanded NATO", International Herald Tribune, 22 August 1996.
Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1983), p. 544.
The Hon. Gerald B. Solomon, Blessings of Liberty: The NATO Enlargement Debate 1990-1997, work in progress (September 1996 rolling text).
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