NATO: MYTHS AND REALITY
(Krasnaya Zvezda, January 5. In full.)
Col.-Gen. Nikolai PISHCHEV, First Deputy-Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation

The Russian defence minister has completed his visit to Brussels where he had a meeting with the defence ministers of the NATO countries. That meeting has first and foremost shown our unchanged stance concerning NATO eastward expansion. Simultaneously the West has once again confirmed its unwillingness to take into account Russia's concerns connected with the admission of new members in Central and Eastern Europe to the North-Atlantic bloc.

Russia's Interests

Naturally, Russia doesn't claim any right to "veto" the admission of new members to the alliance. The governments of sovereign states, relying on the support of their population, decide themselves who their allies and what their priorities are in the sphere of foreign policy. At the same time, the leaders of the Central and East European countries who have announced their plans to join NATO must just as clearly realize that they cannot safeguard their security at the expense of the security of other states and nations. It would be extremely unwise and even dangerous to try to resolve the problems of European security without due regard for the opinion of such a country as Russia. In this case, disregard for its position might lead to dangerous consequences for the future of not only Europe, but of the world at large.

The Russian side treats with understanding the opinion of its negotiating partners, but will never agree with the relegation to low priorities of its basic security interests.

It would be a big mistake to think that the Russians look at NATO "through the prism of the Cold War". On the other hand, it should be borne in mind that it is precisely from the West that all sorts of conquerors came to our land over centuries, trying not only to seize vast territories and rich cities, but also to enslave or destroy the people living there. It would be a fair assumption that citizens of no other country have ever been subjected to such open genocide as were the people of Russia. Such things are never forgotten and a certain "on-guard" attitude is passed from one generation to another. That is why the doubtless and, one might add, historically justified concern for and special attention to everything that happens on the western borders of Russia have always been characteristic of our people.

But even if one forgets these special traits of the Russians' national psychology, this attitude to the questions of national security is certainly not a purely Russian invention.

How, for example, would the public and government of any self-respecting state react to the expansion in the immediate proximity of its borders of what is already the world's biggest politico-military alliance which has a four to six times higher number of troops and combat composition of the coalition forces compared to those of that hypothetical country. For some reason I believe that in such a situation both the leadership and the citizens of that country would be quite sceptical about any assurances of the purely peaceful character of such an alliance, and Russia in this sense is certainly no exception from the general rule.

We keep being reminded that the NATO forces are being reduced all the time. We are clearly aware of the fact that compared to 1990 when there were two opposed blocs in Europe--NATO and the Warsaw Pact--the combat composition of the joint NATO forces has undergone certain changes. In particular, we know that the ground forces have been reduced by about 25% and the number of big naval vessels by approximately 20%. The US forces stationed in Europe have been reduced by 60% and there have been considerable reductions, too, in the levels of general combat readiness of the NATO armed forces.

According to the official statements by NATO political and military leaders, these major changes in the sphere of European security since 1990 have also enabled the North Atlantic alliance to reduce by more than 80% its nuclear forces in Europe and remove all of its nuclear missiles from the continent.

We certainly welcome the new directions in the alliance's activities, aimed at maintaining stability on the European continent and at establishing partnership relations with the countries which were treated as potential enemies only yesterday. One must also mention the first practical experience of cooperation between the alliance and Russia in the settlement of the crisis situation in the former Yugoslavia.

However, despite the obvious progress towards the declared transfer of the bloc's efforts from the military to the political sphere, one has to state that the essence of the North Atlantic union as a defensive organization of a group of European states has not undergone any radical changes.

Contrary to the statements by high-ranking NATO officials about the substantial transformation of the bloc, the provisions of the 1949 Washington Treaty outlining the goals of the alliance as of a politico-military union (ten of the Treaty's 14 articles deal with collective defence and security) remain unchanged. Nor does NATO have any intention of giving them up.

Also in effect are the provisions of the strategic concept of the North Atlantic alliance adopted in Rome on November 7-8, 1991, which define as one of the main "risks" to NATO the military danger from the Soviet Union. After the break-up of the USSR, this role of the main "risk" has automatically gone to Russia. As a confirmation of the aforesaid one can cite the provision of the official US document of 1995, called the Strategy of US National Security in Europe, about the possibility of the emergence of "a hostile and aggressive Russia" and about the need for the West "to be prepared for effective countermeasures in the event of curtailing of the reforms in Russia".

The alliance's views of the Russian Federation as a source of potential threat has practically not changed to this date, which is confirmed by numerous statements made by high-ranking NATO officials.

In particular, Michael Portillo, British Secretary of Defence, spoke in this vein at the Royal Institute of International Relations in Brussels in October 1996. He clearly described the situation in Russia and its armed forces as the sources of threat to the security of NATO members.

A careful analysis of the reduction of weapons and hardware under the CFE Treaty engenders certain discomfort. Just look at the NATO's Cascade programme, which is carried out as part of the treaty and provides for the deployment of modern weapons and hardware mostly on the bloc's flanks, that is, in the countries directly bordering on Russia.

In line with this programme, the tank pool was renewed and the number of armoured vehicles was greatly increased in the Norwegian army. Back in 1992, modern tanks constituted 38% of the tank pool of the Norwegian land forces, while today the country is armed with the latest modifications of the Leopard-1 tanks, provided by the Bundeswehr as part of its arms reduction programme. And the number of armoured personnel carriers went up by 127%.

The Turkish army has received 1,032 American M60 and German Leopard tanks under the Cascade programme. These "arms reductions" renewed Turkey's tank pool by more than 35%.

The data on the reduction of the US presence in Europe is a serious argument advocated by the NATO experts. Indeed, the number of American land troops deployed in Europe has been slashed to 60,000, with two divisions and two mechanised brigades pulled out. But can this be described as a radical transformation of NATO into a predominantly political and peace-keeping organisation? We regard this conclusion as somewhat premature.

The point at issue in this case is to cast a realistic and pragmatic look at the favourable changes in the military- political and geo-strategic situation in Europe. And these changes are linked, above all, with the steps taken by Russia to ensure European security, such as the withdrawal of troops from Eastern Europe and the Baltic states, the reduction of strategic and conventional weapons, and military confidence- building measures.

As for the reduction of the bloc's nuclear weapons, the short- and intermediate-range missiles were pulled out of Europe under Soviet-American agreements. On the other hand, land-based tactical nuclear weapons, with their limited range in the absence of a direct contact with the enemy, have lost virtually all their significance.

I believe that any reasonable person caring for security will rejoice at the reduction of the US troops in Europe. However, there are certain nuances which make one look differently at these changes and highly-publicised figures.

In expert opinion, the US command can raise the strength of its troops in Europe to the 1990 level within 90 days. Scenarios of building up the US military presence in Europe are perfected at regular exercises and manoeuvres.

An effective network of weapons and hardware depots has been established in Europe for the same purpose. It includes seven depots in Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg and The Netherlands, stocked with weapons and hardware sufficient for the deployment of six US heavy-duty (that is, mechanised and armoured) brigades. The depots have, in particular, 554 Abrams tanks, 351 M2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, 341 M113 armoured personnel carriers, etc..

But even without this the NATO troops will not be impeded in their actions in case of hostilities. Judge for yourself. The US has pulled out 511 warplanes from Europe, but the first group of new NATO members (Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary) will reinforce the bloc with 731 fighter-bombers, while the 1,300 M1A1 American tanks pulled out of Europe will be replaced with over 3,400 Soviet-made tanks manned by Polish, Czech and Hungarian crews.

The admission of these three states to NATO will change the geo-strategic situation in Europe and increase the bloc's military strength.

In particular, the NATO zone of responsibility will extend 650-750 kilometres to the east, this considerably decreasing the buffer zone between the bloc's members and the Russian Federation. The strength and the combat composition of the bloc's joint armed forces will grow substantially, together with their operational possibilities.

In addition, the number of warplanes of the joint air force of NATO will increase by 17%. NATO will have at its disposal a network of 290 airfields of different class, which will give the bloc's command a possibility of delivering a major surprise aviation strike at targets in the Russian Federation.

At present, a considerable part of the bloc's tactical aviation deployed at NATO airfields cannot reach the territory of the Russian Federation fully armed, but the use of the airfields of the Vysehrad Group states will enable NATO to deliver missile and bomb strikes at Russian targets all the way to Smolensk, Bryansk and Kursk.

It should be also remembered that the NATO command will receive, together with new members, a network of highways (over 280,000km), railways (over 44,000km), pipelines (over 5,200km), up to 550 warehouses with weapons and hardware, fuel and lubricants and other material-technical supplies, and 33 testing ranges, which will considerably increase the operational scale of the European theatre and give the bloc a possibility to quickly deploy its troops there (in expert opinion, within 30 days).

The combat composition of the joint naval forces of NATO in the Baltic region will be augmented by 18% with Polish warships and by over 50% with its patrol naval aviation. In addition, the use by the bloc of the strategically sited Polish naval bases will considerably impair the freedom of movement of the Russian Baltic Fleet.

Following the admission of the Central and East European countries to NATO, the limits set by the CFE Treaty for the alliance will be greatly exceeded, and the balance of weapons and hardware of the joint armed forces of NATO and of Russia will change still more in favour of the alliance.

As a result, the treaty, whose declared aim is to establish a stable and safe balance of armed forces and to liquidate the surprise attack potential, will be undermined and a considerable imbalance in the sides' weapons and troops may encourage the resumption of the arms race.

It would be fair to say that the analysis of the possible implementation of the NATO leaders' plans to expand the alliance, even if by accepting only the Vysehrad Group states, points to a possibility of a change in the European balance of forces in favour of the alliance and of destabilisation of the military-political situation (above all in the Central European region). This can greatly damage the national interests of Russia and the other CIS states, and revive the East-West confrontation.

It can be assumed that the admission of new members to NATO will also influence the implementation of arms control and disarmament agreements in Europe.

This will create new division lines between the first few countries to be admitted to the bloc and the "outsiders." The revival of the long-buried confrontation between Catholic- Protestant and Orthodox countries in Europe can become a fact of life. In other words, some countries will enjoy privileges, while others will be discriminated against, and hence it will become much more difficult to reach inter-state consensus at the political level.

Maybe the eastward expansion of NATO will bring a shower of gold to the new members, which will at long last reach the development level of the industrialised West European states? Nothing of the kind, at least not in the immediate future. Moreover, the old members will have to increase their contributions to the bloc, too.

Experts of independent research organisations in Washington, London and Brussels have written a study of NATO expansion and subsequent destabilisation of Europe, which says that the expansion of the alliance can cost the old members additional outlays to the tune of 10 billion dollars in the next ten years.

The figure can grow to 70 billion dollars if the bloc decides to deploy modern weapons in Central and East European states. In its turn, this will lead to the creation of new military bases, operational development of the theatres of war in these countries, and the upgrading of new members to the NATO standards.

Besides, the old NATO members will have to grant loans and subsidies for building up the economic security of the new members, which will add up to another 1-2 billion dollars.

If Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary join the alliance, the annual military expenses of each of them will grow by at least 150 million dollars. This sum will be spent on the introduction of a new communications and control system and the language tuition of their servicemen. They will have to spend even more on gearing their weapons markets to Western technology. Since the Central and East European countries do not have so much money, the old members will have to shoulder this financial burden.

The financial problems of the bloc's expansion were discussed in the US Congress in June 1996. A group of Democrats argued that the expansion of NATO is being forced [on the USA] without serious discussions of its economic and military-political consequences for the USA. Referring to the report of the Congress' budgetary department, the Democrats claimed that the NATO expansion through the admission of the Vysehrad Group countries would cost the American taxpayer 5-19 billion dollars, while the financial consequences of the admission of the second group of countries have not been analysed at all.

In view of this, the Congressmen voted for amending the bill on allocations to the Pentagon with a demand to the US administration to provide the American legislators with an exhaustive report on the possible consequences of the NATO expansion to the USA by the date of the submission of the 1998 draft military budget to the Congress. In other words, far from everyone in the USA is happy about the potential NATO expansion.

So, who and why needs the expansion of NATO, which contradicts both common sense and the obligation, sealed in the bloc's strategic concept, to respect the legitimate security interests of other countries? This obligation was reaffirmed at the OSCE Budapest summit in December 1994, where the NATO leaders joined the pledge of the leaders of other countries not to pursue their national security interests to the detriment of other states.

One of the main tasks of NATO, proclaimed in its strategic concept, is to maintain strategic balance in Europe. Since the bloc's expansion will change it in favour of NATO, the strength and combat composition of its forces should be reviewed. We know, however, that this question was not widely discussed in the alliance, not even as a sign of respect for the spirit of the CFE Treaty.

All this is paving the way to the liquidation of the zone of reduced weapons and troops concentration (the buffer zone), which was designed to reduce the risk of armed conflicts.

We are well aware of the package of problems engendered by the potential expansion of NATO and are carefully monitoring the minutest changes in the situation. We do not want another armed confrontation, or worse still, a military conflict in Europe. However, if NATO expands towards Russia's borders, contrary to common sense, Russia and its armed forces will be faced with the necessity of taking adequate decisions and measures in order to strengthen national security.