NATO'S LAST CHANCE

The West Should Invite Russia to Join NATO, Eliminating Bilateral Tensions as a Result (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, December 26. In full.)

Alexei ARBATOV, Deputy Chairman of the State Duma's Defense Committee (YaBLoko faction)

The West, which is now moving to ensure NATO's eastward expansion, has created a big problem for Moscow and itself. (By all looks, this decision will be formalized by various decisions of the North Atlantic Council in the spring and summer of 1997 -- Ed.)

We can argue forever whether this move threatens Russian security. Countless statements dealing with this issue have been made over the last few years. Numerous books and articles have also been written. In the long run, all arguers have failed to convince each other. But one thing is clear. Russia, which openly opposes NATO's expansion, will simply have to retaliate. For its part, the West, which favors such expansion, will have to take certain counter-measures, moving to expand the bloc and military-integration programs still further.

Many influential Western statesmen, who can hardly be called liberals, say that NATO's decision to go ahead with its expansion program amounts to the biggest mistake made by the USA and its allies after the Cold War. But one finds it most difficult to rescind the most imprudent and irrational political decisions. The thing is that their irrationality is not affected by logical arguments and rational reasoning. Any particular decision, which being pushed through by heterogeneous and often incoherent interests and fallacies begins to snowball. The 1962 Cuban missile crisis, the US involvement in Vietnam, the USSR's involvement in the Afghan war and the Chechen show-down are a case in point.

As a result of NATO's expansion, the post-Cold-War period might well come to an end throughout 1997, ushering in an era of a new European division and confrontation. This can happen despite that incipient 1996 stabilization, which was made possible by the victory of Boris Yeltsin and Bill Clinton, as well as by peace in Chechnya and Yugoslavia.

Many people, including those in favor of NATO's expansion, understand this only too well, trying frantically to mitigate the consequences of that move. New "charters" and friendship declarations, as well as agreements dealing with the non-deployment of nuclear weapons on the territory of new NATO members, the subsequent reduction of conventional forces, "super-partnership", etc., are now being suggested. All these ideas are not bad at all. They might even be useful in some conditions. However, they fail to strike home in the obtaining situation. One gets the impression that they are simply intended to sweeten the pill (as far as Moscow is concerned).

The main problem is that it is now intended to expand NATO over the entire European continent (with the exception of Russia and contrary to its objections). NATO's projected eastward expansion would be expected to replace the bipolar military balance of the Cold-War period, as well as the common European home concept that had been dreamed of by Gorbachev, Mitterrand and Brandt. Still it ought to be mentioned in this connection that the Cold War would not have ended without Moscow. The same is true of the demise of Eastern European Communism and that newly-acquired and unprecedented Western European security. Consequently, all those conciliatory prizes now being offered to Russia don't make any sense all by themselves. Such prizes will become something effective only if they are used to untie the tight knot of the central problem, which has been aggravated by NATO's decision to expand eastwards.

As I see it, the obtaining situation can be resolved in the following way alone -- NATO should extend a personal invitation to Russia, asking this country to join the bloc in line with specific terms, forms and timeframes that, in turn, should become a subject of negotiations in line with the Sixteen Plus One formula. The appropriate North Atlantic Council declaration should list this proposal right after the invitation to Poland, the Czech Republic and other "first-line" candidates to join the bloc.

One can expect quite a few objections on this score. Among other things, people say that, according to NATO, no country is excluded from the list of prospective members; for its part, Russia should simply apply for such membership.

However, Russia is not satisfied with this arrangement. Naturally enough, all countries enjoy formal equality. In real life, though, one can't deny the fact that Russia had made the greatest contribution to ending the Cold War, making the most impressive and painful geopolitical and military sacrifices. As of today, Russia has found itself in the most vulnerable and difficult situation. Besides, future European security and stability depend on Russia to the greatest possible extent. Consequently, an individual invitation from NATO would not amount to a big sacrifice on the bloc's part. It doesn't hurt to renounce some formal principles when the game is worth the candles.

Still others may say that the admission of our huge Russia into NATO would demolish that bloc. In their opinion, that would be reminiscent of an old Russian fairy tale about a bear, who had destroyed a house. Still one should keep in mind that specific membership terms and forms should become a subject of separate talks. This issue will become something irrelevant, in case the concerned parties fail to strike a deal. On the other hand, NATO should admit Russia, provided that it meets concrete and agreed-upon membership terms, all the more so as we are being told that NATO will gradually evolve from a military bloc for defending its members against a common enemy into a system of multilateral integration and security that would be designed to tackle peace-keeping tasks, in the first place. God himself was willed that Russia should become involved in such a system.

People might object that Russia's admission into NATO would cause it to completely lose independence, with some US generals commanding its Armed Forces. But the thing is that no country can be forced to join NATO. Russia's possible NATO membership, or its refusal to become integrated into NATO, will depend on Russia itself. The same is true of specific membership terms. Harsh terms would induce Russia to keep away from NATO and to think of other forms of mutual interaction.