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First, let me emphasize that this amendment is based on the language of the North Atlantic Treaty itself. For the Administration, which is opposing this amendment, I have one question: what do you have in mind for NATO that is not contained within the treaty itself? All my amendment does is restate the language of the treaty, specifically article 4. My amendment will not restrict NATO's ability to respond to collective defense threats from outside NATO territory. My amendment will not restrict NATO from responding to the new threats of post-Cold War world like weapons of mass destruction and international terrorism.
The very purpose of NATO has been to prepare for collective defense threats emanating from outside the North Atlantic area. Any threat from outside the treaty area which posed the threat of an attack on NATO territory would be covered by the treaty and allowable under this amendment.
This Administration, however, has something much different than collective defense in mind. NATO is in danger of changing, but the transformation is from Administration officials pushing for a global NATO. The United States Constitution has provisions for altering treaties, and it is called obtaining the Senate's advice and consent. If we want a global NATO, the treaty should be resubmitted for the Senate's consideration.
For those of us who are concerned that NATO will get into far-flung operations, former officials Bill Perry and Warren Christopher write that the unanimous consent required among NATO members will guard against reckless deployments (New York Times, Oct. 21, 1997). For Mr. Perry and Mr. Christopher, the advice and consent of the U.S. Senate is replaced by the NATO bureaucracy. Thank you, but I like the United States Constitution just fine.
Secretary Acheson had it right in 1949--the treaty would be altered by constitutional processes. Acheson stated: `. . . the impossibility of foretelling what the international situation will be in the distant future makes rigidity for too long a term undesirable. It is believed that indefinite duration, with the possibility that any party may withdraw from the treaty after 20 years and that the treaty as a whole might be reviewed at any time after it has been in effect for 10 years, provides the best solution' (Letter transmitting the treaty to the President, April 7, 1949).
Acheson recognized that the world would change. His answer for how NATO would respond--countries can withdraw from the treaty or the treaty could be reviewed. Notice Acheson did not mention a review of NATO's Strategic Concept, on which the Senate has no vote, but a review of the treaty, with any modifications subject to Senate advice and consent.
If this treaty was so elastic as to be stretched to cover any conceivable military operation, why would Acheson even talk about reviewing the treaty? Acheson did have a view of an alliance established for a specific purpose, with a limited scope.
In the letter transmitting the treaty to President Truman, Secretary Acheson acknowledged the parameters of the treaty and stated flatly that the North Atlantic Council will have `. . . no powers other than to consider matters within the purview of the treaty . . .' (Letter to President Truman transmitting the NATO treaty, April 7, 1949). If Acheson viewed the treaty as limitless in scope, why did he testify about the careful limits of the various articles? Why did he explicitly state that NATO could not consider matters outside the purview of the treaty?
The Foreign Relations Committee, in its report on the treaty, took pains to show NATO was not an `old fashioned military alliance.' The report states: `. . . in both intent and language, it is purely defensive in nature. It comes into operation only against a nation which, by its own action, has proved itself an international criminal by. . .attacking a party to the treaty . . . If it can be called an alliance, it is an alliance only against war itself' (SFRC Report, June 6, 1949).
The Ashcroft amendment is designed to advance U.S. interests by keeping NATO focused on this historical mission of collective defense. Without the Ashcroft amendment, the Senate is setting NATO--the most successful military alliance in history--on the course of becoming a mini-UN with a standing army. My amendment will preserve the historical strength and effectiveness of NATO by keeping the alliance focused on the mission of the treaty itself. The Ashcroft amendment will only preclude the global policing operations outside the scope of the treaty.
Drift in NATO is already underway. Frederick Bonnart writes of the Madrid summit in July 1997 where expansion was endorsed: ` . . . behind the euphoria, a hollowness has appeared that had not been evident before. The leaders seem unclear about the purpose of the organization, and therefore about the political and military shape it is to take. Worst of all, strains have shown up in the alliance that indicate weaknesses in its most vital asset: its cohesion' (Intl. Herald Tribune, July 25, 1997).
Cohesion means something in a military alliance. If you want to turn NATO into the bureaucratic free-for-all of the UN, then oppose the Ashcroft amendment. If you want to keep NATO on a successful course, vote for this amendment.
The Administration and some of my colleagues are arguing that NATO has no parameters, that's its mission can evolve, and that the Senate has no role to play in this evolution. Some of the Senators who are criticizing this amendment were championing the Senate's constitutional prerogatives during the `reinterpretation' debate over the ABM treaty in the 1980's.
This Administration is setting NATO on a crash course to policing the brushfires of Europe and beyond. The lives of American soldiers are at stake if NATO is transformed into a mini-UN with a standing army. The first Somalia experience you have with NATO, and the alliance's credibility will be undermined.
The historical setting for the establishment of NATO, the Senate record surrounding ratification, and the treaty language itself make it clear that collective defense was the clear mission of the alliance.
Treaties are not formed in a vacuum. Two world wars were not enough for the United States to abandon a 149-year tradition of no peacetime military alliances. It took Soviet aggression in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Poland; a civil war in Greece which threatened to install a communist government; the coup in Czechoslovakia in February, 1948; the threat of communist victory in Italian elections in April, 1948; a tightening blockade of Berlin, and threatening moves by the Soviet Union to subjugate Norway to a non-aggression pact to bring the United States to the point of making a peacetime alliance with Europe.
When analyzing the Treaty itself, you see a document that commits the U.S. to carefully defined military contingencies. NATO is given the flexibility to consult on an array of issues, it is charged with coordinating mutually constructive economic policies, it is allowed to invite new members to join when doing so would advance the security of the North Atlantic area. But when it comes to the use of military force, careful limits are placed on NATO's scope.
Careful parameters are seen clearly in article 5, the heart of the Treaty: `The parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.'
This article establishes the principal of collective defense. The use of armed force in this article and in other parts of the treaty is discussed only within this framework of collective defense: (1) The preamble of the treaty states that NATO allies `are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security;' (2) Article 3 states that `In order to more effectively achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack;' (3) Article 9 establishes a council for the alliance, now called the North Atlantic Council, which is charged with establishing `immediately a defence committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 5,' the two articles which outline the collective defense mission.
Article 5 excluded NATO's involvement in civil wars in general. The Committee Report states `. . . purely internal disorders or revolutions would not be considered `armed attacks' within the meaning of article 5.' Article 5 applied only when a NATO member had an internal civil war aided by an outside power or when a civil war outside NATO threatened an attack on a member.
NATO's geographical scope was defined carefully in article 6. Article 6 goes on to define `armed attack' and the territorial parameters in which the armed attack must occur for Article 5 to be invoked to include the territory of any NATO member, the islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer, the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.
As is clear in articles 5 and 6, when the deployment of U.S. troops was possible, the U.S. drafters of the Treaty took extra precaution to define parameters.
Article 4, the article the Administration would use to create a global NATO, reinforces the alliance's collective defense mission. Article 4 states `The parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.'
This language is not the basis for a global NATO engaged in flashpoints from the Middle East to Central Africa. Article 4 reinforces NATO's collective defense mission. Words like `security' and `political independence' were taken seriously in 1949. The world had lived through two world wars and the Cold War was beginning. Security was not given the casual, domino-theory definition of today. Take, for example, comments by Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott: `If there were to be instability and conflict of any kind, whatever the origin of it, in Central or Eastern Europe, it would be a threat to the Continent as a whole' (Voice of America Interview, April 10, 1997).
As Lawrence Kaplan, perhaps the dean of NATO historians, writes:
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The alliance's preoccupation with expansion seemingly prevents an exploration of the problems `out of area' issues raise. The Rome Summit [1991 NATO summit at which the Strategic Concept was adopted] did mention Article 4, which calls for consultation whenever any member believes that its territorial integrity, political independence or security is threatened. But this article is too vague, compared with Article 5 to serve as a guide for the future. (Lawrence Kaplan. NATO & Out of Area Issue. March 13, 1998).
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report on the NATO Treaty in 1949 reinforces the careful limits of the Treaty language itself. The first paragraph of the Report, entitled `Main Purpose of the Treaty,' states:
The basic objective of the treaty is to [make] clear the determination of the members of the North Atlantic community to safeguard their common heritage of freedom by exercising collectively their inherent right of self-defense in the event of an armed attack upon any of them . . .' (U.S. Congress. SFRC. North Atlantic Treaty Report, June 6, 1949. Pg. 1)
With regard to article 3, the Report states,
Questions have also been raised as to whether the United States, under article 3, would be obligated to assist the other parties to develop the capacity of their overseas territories to resist armed attack. The objective of the treaty is to maintain the peace and security of the North Atlantic area. During the negotiations there were no suggestions that this article should be interpreted as applying to any other area. The United States is under no obligation to assist the other parties . . . in resisting armed attack outside the area defined in article 6 (U.S. Congress. SFRC. North Atlantic Treaty Report, June 6, 1949. Pg. 11)
With regard to article 4, in testimony on NATO in 1949, Senator Vandenberg stated that he wanted to make it clear in the Committee Report on the treaty that article 4 `was as limited as the balance of the pact' (Testimony before the SFRC, May 4, 1949).
It is no surprise, then, that the SFRC Report carefully ties the use of article 4 to the collective defense mission of the alliance. The Report states that
A situation arising anywhere might be cause for consultation, provided that it constituted a threat to one or more of the parties and might involve obligations under the treaty. The committee underlines the fact that consultation could be requested only when the element of threat is present and expresses the opinion that this limitation should be strictly interpreted.
The Report goes on to state that
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Article 4 carries no obligation other than that of consultation. (U.S. Congress. SFRC. North Atlantic Treaty Report, June 6, 1949. Pg. 12)
In discussing the obligation to consult, the Committee Report states that consultation takes place when a threat `might involve obligations under the treaty.'
It is important what those obligations were. Referring to the Committee report:
1. To maintain and develop, separately and jointly and by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, the individual and collective capacity of the parties to
resist armed attack (art. 3);
2. To consult whenever, in the opinion of any of the parties, the territorial integrity, political independence, or security of any of them is threatened (art. 4);
3. To consider an armed attack upon any of the parties in the North Atlantic area an attack against them all (art. 5); and
4. In the event of such an attack, to take forthwith, individually and in concert with the other parties, such action as the United States deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area (art. 5).
The obligation to consult is linked to other obligations in the treaty, all of which pertain to some aspect of collective defense. As Secretary Acheson said, article 4 was broader in scope than article 5 and gave NATO flexibility to respond to out-of-area threats related to collective defense. Almost without fail, article 4 was discussed within the context of responding to aggression less than armed attack--political aggression by a hostile power.
Secretary Acheson himself linked article 4 to NATO's collective defense mission, stating that any action taken after consultation should be `in the spirit of the treaty' (Letter transmitting the treaty to the President, April 7, 1949).
Floor statements by key Senators in 1949 make the limits of article 4 clear. Comments by both Senators Connally and Vandenberg, the Chairman and ranking member of the Foreign Relations Committee in 1949, reveal an understanding of article 4 in the light of NATO's collective defense mission.
Senator Connally stated in his opening remarks on July 5, 1949 that
I think that article 4 goes a long way to emphasize that the period of dividing and conquering has come to an end. The consultation provided for in that article addresses itself to the threatening of the territorial integrity, the political independence, or the security of any of the parties. Consultation is not an unnecessary luxury; it is a logical requirement to gain the objectives of the treaty. For one thing, article 4 . . . rightly faces up to the brutal fact that peaceful peoples have become more and more conscious of a sinister kind of danger--indirect aggression. Let us not forget that no bombs were dropped by the Soviet Union on Bulgaria, Hungary, or Czechoslovakia. (Congressional Record, July 5, 1949, Pg. 8814)
Senator Vandenberg stated in his opening remarks the following day that:
The question arises whether articles IV and V of the pact cover armed aggression against colonial or dependent or otherwise related areas of the signatories outside the area of the North Atlantic community as geographically defined in article VI. My own understanding is clear and unequivocal. The answer is `No.' There can be no other logical answer. The doubts seem to have arisen because article IV, relating solely to consultations, is unlimited in the circumference of these consultations. But there is not a word of obligation in it except to talk things over.' (Congressional Record, July 6, 1949, Pg. 8896)
Senator Vandenberg again:
The obligations are spelled out in articles III and V. It is significant, in this connection, that when article IX establishes a council to implement the treaty, it directs the council's attention specifically to articles III and V. It omits article IV in this connection. This is as it should be. It is by significant design. Our pledge of action under the United Nations Charter is general . . . But out pledge of action under the North Atlantic Pact is limited and specific. It applies only to armed aggression in the area clearly defined in article VI which is the North Atlantic community, set up by metes and bounds. (Congressional Record, July 6, 1949, Pg. 8896)
Moving to article 5, the Committee Report identifies Article 5 as the `heart of the treaty,' and goes on to define what constitutes an armed attack. The Report states that `article 5 would come into operation only when a nation had committed an international crime by launching an armed attack against a party to the treaty.' (U.S. Congress. SFRC. North Atlantic Treaty Report, June 6, 1949. Pg. 13)
The Committee Report's discussion of article 6 further reinforced the territorial basis of the Treaty, stating that `Article 6 specifies the area within which an armed attack would bring the provisions of article 5 into operation. Thus, the obligations under article 5 are strictly limited to the area described.' (U.S. Congress. SFRC. North Atlantic Treaty Report, June 6, 1949. Pg. 15)
The Foreign Relations Committee obtained a commitment from the President in 1949 that the Senate would be able to give its advice and consent for new NATO members. New members are important, but new missions are just as critical. The mission of NATO is changing radically, and the Senate has not engaged in the debate.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO planners scrambled to find new missions for the alliance: countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, advancing the political `interests' of NATO members, NATO as a police force and crisis manager.
The catch-phrase that defined this effort was that NATO must go `out-of-area or out of business.' After the Cold War, NATO began evolving into an organization to pursue new missions.
The Strategic Concept of 1991 pushed the traditional functions of NATO--to provide for collective defense and serve as a strategic balance in Europe--to the bottom of the list of the alliance s fundamental security tasks.
The security task that rose to the top was for NATO to be `one of the indispensable foundations for a stable security environment in Europe . . . in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any European nation or to impose hegemony through the threat or use of force.' (1991 Strategic Concept in NATO Handbook, p. 239)
This is an amazing expansion of mission. No longer is collective defense the singular mission of the alliance, but NATO has the impossible task of stopping intimidation and coercion throughout NATO and non-NATO Europe alike.
In NATO's Strategic Concepts of the past, collective defense was paramount.
The State Department has provided my office with the three NATO Strategic Concepts that preceded the 1991 version: the Strategic Concepts of 1950 (with a revised version in 1952), 1957, and 1967.
The contrast between the first three Strategic Concepts and the 1991 version is striking. The mission of collective defense permeates the first three Strategic Concepts. Collective defense is carefully defined as the North Atlantic area described in article 6 of the Treaty. When potential out of area security developments are discussed, they are mentioned in the context of NATO members having the capacity to maintain their commitments to NATO while individually addressing the out of area threats that may affect their interests.
NATO's Strategic Concept of 1957 explicitly states that `NATO defense planning is limited to the defense of the Treaty area. . .' and that `NATO military authorities have no responsibilities or authority except with respect to incidents which are covered by Articles 5 and 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty' (1957 Strategic Concept of NATO, p. 12).
Throughout NATO's Strategic Concepts, the means of collective defense changed, from `massive retaliation' in the 1950's to `forward defense and flexible response' in the 1960's, but the mission itself remained the same.
NATO has an uncertain course for the future, however. The New Strategic Concept of 1991 presented the first significant shift in NATO away from its traditional military mission. The Strategic Concept says that the `. . . clear preparedness to act collectively in the common defense remains central to the Alliance's security objectives.' The reliability of this assertion is belied by NATO s activity since 1991, however.
Stan Sloan, one of the senior NATO analysts at CRS, states that since the formation of the New Strategic Concept in 1991, `. . . most of NATO's military activities have been focused on `non-Article 5' requirements, most significantly in Bosnia.' (Stanley Sloan. NATO's Evolving Role & Missions. CRS rpt.97-708F. Mar. 4, 1998, Pg. 4) No longer is collective defense the singular mission of the alliance, but NATO is committing to the impossible task of stopping intimidation and coercion throughout NATO and non-NATO Europe alike.
Nelson Drew writes of this development:
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While the word `peacekeeping' did not appear in either the new Strategic Concept or the Rome Declaration, it was difficult to envision a means by which NATO or the NACC [North Atlantic Cooperation Council] could make good on their commitment to stability and peace throughout the trans-Atlantic community without consideration of an Alliance role in peacekeeping activities.' (Nelson Drew. NATO Confronts `Test Case from Hell.' INSS: McNair Paper 35)
NATO was not created to douse regional brushfires in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. When the deployment of NATO forces was considered, it was for collective defense. NATO's institutional development has followed the alliance's expanded mandate: NATO's goals as a police force and crisis manager have resulted in new institutional capacities. NATO has agreed to make its resources available, on a case by case basis, for brushfire operations under the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the United Nations, and the European Union (NATO Handbook, p. 332-34).
In the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the Partnership for Peace, and the Combined Joint Task Force Concept, NATO has taken many positive steps to promote cooperation with other countries, but also has signaled that international policing actions will be an important part of NATO's activity in the future.
This institutional transformation signals little strategic thinking. NATO signals its intention to be an international police force and crisis manager by its internal transformation. The Administration refuses to establish parameters for how far NATO expansion will proceed. Where are the limits on NATO's mission and membership? Alliance cohesion is at risk.
The Administration views the Partnership for Peace as the `path to [NATO] membership for countries wanting to join' (U.S. Security Strategy for Europe and NATO, DOD, June, 1995). NATO makes brushfire troubleshooting an important part of the PFP and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). The Administration launches the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept to make it easier for NATO to engage in crisis management.
The question must be asked as to how far NATO will expand its mission and membership. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright was quoted in the Washington Post as saying that NATO should become a `force for peace from the Middle East to Central Africa' (Washington Post, Feb. 22, 1998). President Clinton, in his recent trip to Africa, spoke of the need for some type of `multi-national force' for responding to African crises (White House Bulletin, March 27, 1998). Is this really the kind of mission the Administration wants NATO to have?
Other countries take NATO signals seriously. For example, allow me to quote from the latest issue of Defense News: `Kosovo Fray Forces NATO s Hand.' `The violent uprising in the Yugoslav province of Kosovo may force NATO to extend its military influence across the Balkan region. . .' (Defense News, March 22, 1998). A U.S. official quoted in the article said `Macedonia is a Partnership for Peace country potentially in trouble from external sources. It needs help. It is not out of the realm of possibility . . . that a NATO-led mission in cooperation with PFP countries could take over when the UN deployment withdraws on August 31.'
On March 11, Albania called the first emergency consultation within the framework of the PFP. NATO diplomats responded with a plan for `a robust Partnership for Peace program for rapid implementation in Albania.' (Defense News, March 22, 1998). This PFP program reportedly will include military training and steps to secure Albania s northern border.
If we want to send American soldiers into these cauldrons of ethnic unrest, then let's have that debate. Nothing in this amendment would preclude the U.S. from deploying its forces anywhere. This amendment has to do with preserving the integrity of NATO. Just don't use the banner of a successful military alliance to entangle U.S. troops in Europe's brushfires.
Comments by both former and present senior Administration officials indicate a radical shift in the scope of NATO. Former Secretary of Defense William Perry and former Secretary of State Warren Christopher stated in a New York Times editorial: `Shifting the alliance s emphasis from defense of members territory to defense of common interests is the strategic imperative' (New York Times, Oct. 21, 1997).
Secretary of State Albright has confirmed NATO's shift to defense of interests. I questioned her on two separate occasions before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Secretary Albright confirmed that advancing out-of-area interests would be the modus operandi for NATO, but gave no realistic limits. In other forums, Secretary Albright has been quoted as saying that NATO should evolve into `a force for peace from the Middle East to Central Africa' (WP, William Drozdiak. Feb. 22, 1998). Strobe Talbott, one of the senior officials at the State Department, stated that geopolitical and military considerations can be put aside and `other nonmilitary goals shape the new NATO" (Jesse Helms, Wall Street Journal, March 23, 1998). Talbott reportedly looks favorably on Russia joining NATO.
Inconsistency in the Administration's policies is creating more confusion in the alliance, however, and hurting U.S. leadership in NATO. Take, for example, Administration policy to combat the spread of weapons of mass destruction. The U.S. almost goes to war against Iraq in February over the threat of WMD. The U.S. maintains a sizeable force in the Persian Gulf to deter Iraqi aggression. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright states that fighting WMD should become the new `unifying threat" that binds NATO allies together (Washington Post, Feb. 22, 1998).
The Administration's actions speak louder than words, however. In spite of the rhetoric and the object lesson of Saddam Hussein, the Clinton Administration has entered into nuclear cooperation with China, the world's worst proliferator of weapons of mass destruction
technology (CIA report, June 1997). The President refused to halt nuclear cooperation even as China was caught trying to send Iran hundreds of tons of anhydrous hydrogen fluoride.
This material is used to enrich uranium to weapons grade and was being sent to Iran's Isfahan Nuclear Research Center--the principal Iranian site to manufacture the explosive core of an atomic device (Washington Post, March 13, 1998). Clinton allows sensitive missile technology to be exported to China, undermining a Justice Department investigation of similar possible transfers by Loral Space and Hughes Electronics (New York Times, April 4, 1998).
The missile technology possibly transferred by Loral and Hughes could be used on Chinese nuclear ICBM's (Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles) to reach the United States. Just so happens that Bernard Schwartz, CEO of Loral, is the DNC's largest personal contributor.
With policies like that, U.S. has no credibility in tasking NATO with new mission to fight the proliferation of WMD.
European comments on NATO's future mission are just as troubling. President Chirac, at the NATO/Russia Founding Act, stated: `NATO, initially conceived to face a clear-cut and massive threat, is now a lighter, more flexible organization adapted to its new crisis management and peacekeeping missions.'
In a telling statement about the current evolution of the alliance, NATO Secretary General Javier Solana stated `NATO was born when Europe was divided, and now it has become a leading instrument in the reconstruction of the continent. This is an incredibly dynamic process. If this pace continues, it is hard to predict what NATO will be like just three years from now.' (Washington Post, July 6, 1997)
Crisis management and brushfire engagements are the kinds of missions and the kinds of problems NATO was never intended to address. As Mark Esper writes in the Washington Times: `NATO was designed for collective defense of its member states, not for suppressing civil wars in peacekeeping missions that jeopardize the alliance's core purpose.' (Washington Times, Feb. 15, 1998)
From the defense of territory to the defense of `common interests' is a quantum leap. Charging NATO to defend nebulously defined interests would have been unacceptable to the Senate in 1949 and it should be unacceptable for the Senate today.
Resting on fifty years of NATO's success is not the way to ensure that U.S. interests are preserved and NATO remains a viable alliance in the future. `Just trust us' is essentially what the Administration is saying, as they transform NATO into a mini-United Nations with a standing army for ill-defined brushfire operations.
Beware the Administration strong on NATO expansion but weak on defense. The U.S. is making a collective defense commitment to new NATO members while slashing defense. Those countries comprise 301,000 square miles of new territory and 2,612 miles of new NATO frontier to which the collective defense commitment is extended.
Here are some of the statistics for U.S. defense cuts (in real 1999 dollars) between 1990 and 1998:
Military Personnel funding: fell by 28% (from $102 bn in 1990 to $71.7 bn in 1998);
Procurement: fell by 53% (from $98 bn in 1990 to $45.5 bn in 1998); Total National Defense Spending: fell by 27% over last eight years (from $375 bn in 1990 to $273 bn in 1998);
Army divisions reduced from 26 in 1991 to 18 in 1998;
Active Air Force tactical wings reduced from 35 in 1991 to 20 in 1998.
The Clinton Administration is finding more things to do with a downsized force. Outside normal training and alliance commitments, the Army conducted 10 `operational events' between 1960-91 and 26 since 1991. The Marine Corps conducted 15 `contingency operations' between 1982-89 and 62 since the fall of the Berlin Wall. According to the Army Chief of Staff Dennis Reimer, the Army reduced manpower by 36% while increasing the number of deployed operations by 300% (CRS).
Officers from deployable Army units now spend 180-190 days away from home annually. Shortly after announcing that U.S. troops would stay in Bosnia indefinitely, Clinton increased funding by 20% to expand U.S. influence overseas--not funding for military personnel, though, but money for the Peace Corps (National Review, Feb. 9, 1998). President Reagan's deputy undersecretary of defense, Dov Zakheim states: `. . .like Gulliver's enfeeblement by the Lilliputians, [the U.S.] will be tied down in so many parts of the world for so long that it will be hard-pressed to respond to major threats against which only overwhelming force would prove effective' (Defense News, April 12, 1998).
Over-extension is hurting readiness. Misguided deployments harm readiness, inhibit weapons modernization, and undermine morale. The Army just completed its worst recruiting year since 1979. Just one third of the Army's women and just over half of the men believe that to fight and win in combat is the Army's principal mission (National Review, Feb. 9, 1998).
The `two major regional conflict' strategy of this Administration is becoming increasingly unrealistic. The U.S. would be hard pressed to even replicate the Desert Storm operation.
Hillen writes in the National Review: `In 1998, almost all the active Army's heavy-tank and armored-cavalry units outside of Korea and Bosnia would have to go to the Persian Gulf in order to equal the fighting power of America's VII Corps in 1991. And VII Corps was only one of three American corps engaged in Desert Storm' (National Review, Feb. 9, 1998).
Inconsistent foreign policy is the root of the problem. Effective and credible diplomacy addresses potential crises before the deployment of U.S. troops is needed. This Administration's foreign policy inconsistency is almost reflexively compensated by the deployment of American armed forces. The National Defense Panel created by Congress in 1996 said of the Administration: `. . .the current approach to addressing national security engages the Department of Defense and services too often and too quickly in situations that should have been resolved by nonmilitary means' (Defense News, April 12, 1998).
The Saddam Hussein's of the world that threaten the U.S. need to be dealt with, but the complacent policy of this Administration over the last six years has left U.S. troops dangling in the Persian Gulf. Our troops serving in Southwest Asia and Bosnia deserve better leadership from this Administration.
The Administration's `assertive multilateralism is a fig leaf for lack of leadership. This Administration has an instinct to strike for the capillaries, to use the phrase of Jonathan Clarke. Policy drift with no finality in addressing national security threats, coupled with the brush fire mentality of this Administration, is squandering U.S. national defense resources.
The Administration wants to apply its foreign policy muddle to NATO, to hollow out the clear mission of the alliance just as the U.S. military is being stretched thin and to use NATO as another tool for a globalist agenda with little application to real U.S. national security interests.
When U.S. armed forces are struggling, reliable cost estimates for NATO expansion become more important. There have been a wide range of cost estimates for NATO expansion. The Administration's initial estimate (Feb, 1997) was $27-35 billion, with a U.S. share $100-150 m per year for ten years. This initial Administration's estimate, not surprisingly, was revised downward last December: the U.S. now only has to pay $40 million per year over ten years.
The estimate of Congressional Budget Office (March, 1996) was a bit different. Different scenarios ranging from minimal reinforcement of four new members ($60.6 bn total) to NATO stationing a limited number of forces forward in new member countries ($124.7 bn total)
The wide range of cost estimates is more confusing than helpful, but one thing is clear: the cost estimates rise precipitously when NATO take steps to provide a limited defense to these new members. The Senate should not accept the lowball estimates. We should consider the ends of our actions in expanding NATO--the real costs of actually defending these countries.
If U.S. resources are stretched too thin, will Europe take up the slack? Not some of our European NATO allies. NATO allies have agreed only to pay for the cheapest expansion estimate yet: the $1.5 billion price tag from the NATO cost study accepted by the North Atlantic Council in December, 1997. Beyond the paltry $1.5 bn estimate, French President Jacques Chirac has stated bluntly that `France does not intend to raise its contribution to NATO because of the cost of enlargement' (Washington Post, July 24, 1998).
Not the new NATO members. These countries are still throwing off the vestiges of a command economy and don't want to commit the resources to a full scale modernization effort.
Dale Herspring, an expert on the region, writes: `. . .the East Europeans have done little to prepare themselves to meet NATO's military standards. Hungary and the Czech Republic in particular are trying to join NATO `on the cheap'. . .In fact, the military situation of all three countries is disastrous. Planes are crashing, morale is plummeting, and equipment is outdated. Unless the parliaments of these countries get serious or the West. . .decides to foot the bill, the Czech Republic and Hungary will never meet NATO standards.'
The U.S. and other NATO allies are riding the bandwagon of `extending the borders of freedom in Europe' and failing to see the reconstruction effort these countries face. What if a crisis comes, and we have to defend these countries with limited interoperability and even less effective command and control cooperation? The Washington Post reported on March 18 that all three countries would struggle to find a few hundred officers who speak English to NATO standards.
Mr. President, before I conclude, I would like to respond to several arguments I have heard during this debate against my amendment. First, there has been a document circulated outlining Secretary of State Dean Acheson's comments during a press conference on March 18, 1949.
I am familiar with the document. Let me begin by saying that if you are basing your argument for a global NATO on a press interview transcribed in the second person, your argument is on shaky ground indeed. A careful review of the record of this press interview with Secretary Acheson on March 18, 1949 reveals that his comments did not imply a global NATO beyond the careful scope of the treaty.
Acheson states that Article 4 is broader than Article 5, which it is. Article 4 gives NATO the flexibility to respond to threats related to collective defense, but which may not be precipitated by an armed attack.
When asked if there `was no provision [in the treaty] which looked toward these Parties acting as a unit in regard to some matter not covered by the Treaty,' Secretary Acheson, as paraphrased, said, and rightly so, that the allies `might act as a unit or they might not, but that there was nothing in the Treaty which required them to do so.' Secretary Acheson reiterated in this very interview what he had said in his letter to the President transmitting the NATO treaty: that NATO only had authority to deal with matters under the purview of the treaty.
This is essentially what I have said all along. The countries that make up NATO can act together on any security matter they desire. But NATO itself is designed for a specific mission. When asked if `there was no provision for anything except consultation, except actual armed attack on one of the signatories, the Secretary replied that there were Articles one, two, three, and four.'
These articles certainly identified some of the political and economic goals of NATO's collective defense mission. After looking at the careful language of articles 5 and 6 of the Treaty, however, it is preposterous to argue that NATO can turn itself into a global policeman based on the general language of article 1.
When Secretary Acheson says that there is no limiting clause, the transcript seems to indicate he is referring to article 4, which is not necessarily limited by geography. Acheson did not mean that the treaty had no limits. In the letter transmitting the treaty to President Truman, Acheson stated flatly that the North Atlantic Council will have `. . .no powers other than to consider matters within the purview of the treaty. . .' (Letter to President Truman transmitting the NATO treaty, April 7, 1949). The articles of the treaty speak for themselves and don't imply in the slightest a military mission unrelated to collective defense.
Second, some would try to portray a vote on this amendment as a vote on Bosnia. Let me state clearly that this amendment is not intended to be another vote on the Bosnia mission. The NATO mission in Bosnia is related to the out of area debate we are having today, but this vote is more about avoiding the Somalia's of NATO's future than rehashing the debate over Bosnia.
The amendment I am offering explicitly refers to future NATO military missions. Making this another vote on Bosnia would miss the purpose: to keep NATO on a sound course for the future.
One could argue that if you supported the Bosnia mission, you would not offer this amendment. I disagree. You may support Bosnia, but you may support NATO more and recognize the threats a Somalia experience poses to NATO. I doubt there is anyone in the Senate who has not grown more concerned with each missed deadline for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Bosnia.
There is nothing in this amendment that stops the U.S., unilaterally or with other countries, from engaging in ethnic conflicts like Bosnia. If we want to send our soldiers to the flashpoints of Europe and Asia, then let's have that debate. Don't cloak these missions in the banner of a successful military alliance not intended for such purposes. Don't entangle the U.S. in the brushfires of Europe, Asia, and Africa through NATO.
Third, and on a somewhat related note, some would argue this amendment constrains the President as commander in chief. My amendment has nothing to do with the President's authority as Commander in Chief. Nothing in this amendment limits the President's ability to deploy U.S. forces unilaterally and in concert with other nations to defend the United States.
This amendment has to do with the question of what the President can do through the North Atlantic Treaty. In that treaty, to which the Senate gave its advice and consent based on a shared understanding borne out by 40 years of alliance practice, the U.S. was making a security commitment limited by the mission of collective defense within a carefully defined geographical area.
The Senate should give its advice and consent if NATO is to expand its mission.
To conclude, these and other issues deserve extensive debate. The risks of an ill-defined NATO are real. The Senate should not allow this alliance to shift from collective defense to fitful multilateralism. This Administration is stretching NATO's scope to cover the globe. The Ashcroft amendment is the right answer to `Treaty Creep.'
The statements and policies of Administration officials belie a failure to grasp the purpose of a military alliance. There is no long-term vision of where the expansion process will stop. The U.S. is slashing defense while increasing security obligations abroad. Beware the Administration strong on NATO expansion, but weak on defense.
The resistance of Administration officials to define where the expansion of NATO's mission and membership will stop indicates how far Article 5 has diminished in importance. Secretary Albright has stated that `. . .no European democracy will be excluded because of where it sits on the map.' The Administration's dismissal of the logistical and strategic constraints of war may work for Foggy Bottom. In the real world, real soldiers die in defense of real borders.
Treaty creep will cost American lives, harm U.S. interests, and undermine NATO. The drift in this Administration's foreign policy is threatening the future of a focused NATO which serves American interests. The Senate should not be complacent with fifty years of NATO success. This body has a role to play in the scope of U.S. treaty commitments.
Changing NATO into a mini-UN with a standing army is not something the American people will support. We have been lucky in Bosnia. The first time NATO has a Somalia experience in pursuit of an expanded mission, U.S. support for the alliance will be undermined. Voting for the Ashcroft amendment is the best way to be clear about NATO's mission--the territorial defense of Western Europe. This amendment is the best way to advance U.S. interests through NATO.
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